Chapter IV: The First Stage of the Campaign. Operations From Kovno to Vitebsk (2)

In following Bagration on his march to Bobruisk the course of events elsewhere has been somewhat anticipated. On July 14th King Jerome had thrown up his command. A little previously he had quarrelled with Vandamme, who commanded the 8th Corps under him. Vandamme was a man whose general character is entitled to no kind of respect. His conduct in Germany had been abominable. He was, however, a thorough soldier, and could not endure Jerome’s easy-going ideas of military discipline. The consequence was an open quarrel and the supersession of Vandamme. Napoleon, who knew his insubordinate disposition, did not traverse Jerome’s action. But the delay at Grodno and the failure to close with Bagration kindled his wrath, all the more so since his own immediate operations had miscarried. He vented his rage and disappointment in two violently abusive letters, and Jerome left the army.

As regards the degree of blame which attaches to Jerome, it is obvious that, but for the ill-advised order to march upon Drissa, Bagration would have been in no danger. He left Volkovisk on June 28th; Jerome did not even reach Grodno until the 30th. The vile Polish roads, rendered worse by the rain, made marching extremely difficult. A rest may well have been necessary for the over-worked and ill-fed troops; and Jerome was obliged to wait until Reynier had been relieved by the slowly advancing Austrians. Owing to the orders which he had received from head-quarters, Bagration all but marched into the midst of the forces manoeuvring to intercept him. It is clear that, had Jerome moved eastward from Grodno at once, he would have pressed his antagonist hard. On the other hand, he had to take into account the harassed state of his troops, their lack of adequate supplies, the miserable roads, the absence of Reynier, the slowness of Schwarzenberg, and last, not least, the hidden Russian army of Tormazov, which might prove very formidable. Napoleon in his place would probably have taken the risk of an advance of Tormazov on Warsaw. Jerome did not, and, indeed, seeing his position as a subordinate, could not, do so. It is possible that he did not act with all the vigour which circumstances demanded; but in that case the blame must be laid at the door of Napoleon for appointing to a vitally important command a man who lacked the necessary qualifications for it. Napoleon also was directing manoeuvres on the basis of hypotheses which might, and in fact did, prove unfounded. He appears rather to have ignored geographical and climatic conditions; he was certainly ill-informed as to distances. Finally he was committing the same error which had already cost him dear in Spain, in endeavouring to direct complicated strategic manoeuvres from a distance; and the optimism which was becoming a mental disease with him badly affected his calculations.

The Emperor, apparently believing that Bagration was stronger than was actually the case, and that he might break northward, directed Eugène with the 4th Corps on July 7th in the track of Davout; but soon becoming aware that his intelligence was false, recalled him to Smorgoni, where he arrived on the 12th. On the 14th Eugène left to support the advance on Drissa, marching by way of Vileika, where the magazines captured by Colbert afforded supplies. Nevertheless food was invariably scanty. The wretched roads wore out the men, who fell sick or straggled in numbers. The horses fared still worse, and many died. St. Cyr, meanwhile, had marched by Novi Troki to Vilna, whence he was directed by Glubokoïe also on Drissa. The march of the unhappy Bavarians will later be alluded to. On July 11th Napoleon ordered Mortier with part of the Guard also upon Glubokoïe, and next day the first detachment of the Head-quarters Staff was directed thither. De Fezensac, who was with this detachment, notes that the Young Guard were already suffering from the effects of the tropical heat, scanty rations and fatigue--especially the newly formed “Flanqueurs-Chasseurs.” Yet Napoleon in a letter of the 11th suggests that Mortier can live on the country!

The 10th Corps, after clearing the right bank of the Niemen, had been directed north-eastward towards Mitau and Riga, which latter place it was destined to besiege. The operations of the 10th Corps were so isolated and otherwise of so languid a nature that they may for the moment be ignored. Here it is only necessary to observe that the 10th Corps was moving north-eastward on a broad front, the Prussians advancing on Mitau, the 10th Division, Poles and Germans under Grandjean, on Dünaburg. At the latter place there was a bridge-head garrisoned by some reserve battalions.

Davout, having occupied Minsk, remained there for some days. The halt was necessary in order to rally the stragglers and re-establish discipline. It was also utilised in commencing the organisation of Minsk as one of the main depôts of the army, for which its situation at the intersection of the Warsaw-Moscow and Vilna-Kiev high-roads admirably fitted it.

Davout had rightly inferred that his occupation of Minsk would oblige Bagration to retire upon Bobruisk. He might then endeavour to march up the left bank of the Berezina to the Minsk-Smolensk road at Borisov or Bobr, and thence press on to join Barclay. The Marshal accordingly sent forward his advance-guard, under Bordesoulle, to reconnoitre Borisov and occupy it if possible. He estimated Bagration’s strength, from the reports of spies and peasants, at 16 to 18 regiments of infantry and 120 guns, besides cavalry. The evaluation was much below the truth, and gives the impression that his informants had only seen and counted the regiments of one of Bagration’s two corps and the 27th Division.

Borisov was undefended. Working parties were busy almost until the last on the entrenchments of the bridge-head; but the only troops available to defend it were two skeleton battalions, which retired on the approach of the French to Mohilev. The place was occupied by Bordesoulle on the 11th, and there and in the vicinity were taken a large amount of flour and forage, about 80,000 pounds of salt, 16 spiked guns, 4000 cannon-balls and shells, some thousands of entrenching tools, and a quantity of hospital equipment and supplies.

Davout’s other cavalry brigade, under Pajol, was directed on Igumen, 35 miles south-east of Minsk, and thence also upon the Berezina. On the 13th it captured a Russian convoy of 180 waggons, which, however, being left slenderly guarded, was retaken next day by Cossacks. Pajol, meanwhile, occupied the crossings of the Berezina at Berezino and elsewhere, and awaited the arrival of Davout. He reconnoitred towards Bobruisk, and it was the presence of one of his detachments at Svislocz which alarmed Bagration and induced him to precipitate his march.

Davout decided that to advance on Bobruisk would probably be waste of time, since Bagration could almost certainly reach the place before him. He therefore rightly determined to march for Mohilev, 110 miles east of Minsk, and only some 60 from Berezino. Bagration was on the 14th still two days’ march west of Bobruisk with his advance-guard, while Borozdin and Platov were yet farther off, and could not reach the fortress until the 18th. Thence to Mohilev was four long days’ march on bad roads, while Davout had a much shorter distance to traverse. Even if he reached Bobruisk before the Russians, they could cross the Berezina under cover of the fortifications.

While Davout remained about Minsk, Grouchy, with his two cavalry divisions and Colbert’s Lancers, supported by Claparède’s Polish Legion, was making a sweep northward and westward to the great bend of the Dnieper near Orsha. On the 14th he entered Lepel, 48 miles north of Borisov, capturing large magazines of food-stuffs and forage, besides about 160 Russian prisoners. He then turned south-eastward to Orsha, which was occupied on the 18th without resistance. The magazines of provisions were even more important than those at Lepel, and a number of boats and pontoons were also taken.

The withdrawal of King Jerome left Davout in command of the whole Napoleonic right wing. Napoleon had intended that the Marshal should assume chief command only when the junction of the two forces should be complete, and later he reprimanded him for doing so before it had been effected. It is difficult to perceive what other course lay open to Davout. He made various efforts to induce the offended King to retain his command, but in vain: Jerome was thoroughly disgusted.

Davout’s advanced guard left Minsk on July 12th, and by the 15th his main body was concentrated near Igumen. Bagration’s whole force could not reach Bobruisk until the 18th, the French thus had a long start in the race to Mohilev. The untrustworthy 33rd Léger was left to garrison Minsk. The 5th Corps and Latour-Maubourg were directed by Igumen on Mohilev, and the 8th, temporarily commanded by General Tharreau, by Minsk and Borisov on Orsha.

The 7th Corps was ordered back to Slonim by Napoleon. The Emperor, deceived by Tormazov’s long inactivity, had made up his mind that he need fear nothing from him. As a fact it was lack of preparation and the necessity for completing it which was keeping Tormazov inactive; his army was very far from a sham. Napoleon, however, deciding that the 34,000 Austrians were unnecessary in that region, determined to call them up to the centre. Schwarzenberg had crossed the Bug at Mogilnitza on July 3rd, and a week later reached Pruzhani, 60 miles on the Brest-Litovsk-Minsk road. Detachments occupied Pinsk and other places, and captured large supplies and immense quantities of salt. Otherwise the Austrians had been inactive. The spirit both of officers and men was decidedly hostile to the enterprise in which they were engaged, and though Schwarzenberg himself was a Francophile he was naturally very cautious, and probably under orders to do as little as possible. Such considerations would naturally incline Napoleon to wish to have the Austrians under his own eye. Reynier, with the 7th Corps, was to take Schwarzenberg’s place and cover the frontier of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. These plans, however, could not be executed, for on July 23rd the Russian Third Army appeared on the scene with momentous results, and both Schwarzenberg and Reynier had to be diverted to check it.

Davout crossed the Berezina at Berezino on July 15th and advanced on Mohilev, leaving Pajol with three regiments of cavalry and one of infantry to guard communications. On the 19th he was near Mohilev with Compans, Desaix and Valence. The place was defended only by four skeleton battalions, and was easily carried by Desaix on the 20th. Eighteen officers and 200 men were taken; with 120,000 rations of biscuit and flour, some thousands of muskets, and several thousand pounds of gunpowder.

Pajol on the 19th reported that Bobruisk was full of Russian troops. Davout therefore inferred that he would soon be attacked, and made preparations accordingly. He called up Claparède from the northward, where he was supporting Grouchy, and sent for his reserve artillery, which was still in rear. He had already sent to Poniatowski and Tharreau to hasten their march. He was by no means at his ease, since he had, as he says, only 16,000 men (an underestimate) and expected to be attacked by 50,000. He looked about for a position in which he could receive battle against superior numbers, and found one at Saltanovka, about 8 miles on the Bobruisk road.

Bagration had received orders to advance on the Düna by way of Orsha, and on the 19th he started Raievski with the 7th Corps, Platov, Dorokhov and the bulk of Sievers’ cavalry, for Mohilev. Borozdin, with the divisions of Karl of Mecklenburg and Neverovski, followed on the 20th, while Voronzov brought up the rear with his division of combined grenadier companies, the 5th Chasseurs from Paskievich’s division and the Kharkov Dragoons. The garrison of Bobruisk, under General Ignatiev, consisted now of about 6000 men. The artillery armament was fairly powerful, but the fortifications were by no means very formidable. General Zapolski, commanding the reserve troops at Mozyr, was ordered to hold firm there so as to cover Tormazov’s line of communications with Kiev.

Bagration himself was furious at the necessity for retreating, and his letters are couched in terms of angry disgust at the inaction of the main army. “You have 100,000 men,” he says in one place. “Well, fight!” And elsewhere, “Why don’t we fight? We are worse than the Prussians and Austrians.” His troops were weakened by nineteen days of marching in rain, heat and over vile tracks. Had there only been a little fighting Bagration would have been less exasperated. He says in one letter that he had galloped forty versts on the chance of seeing an engagement--an admission which throws a somewhat amusing light upon his impetuous character.

On the 21st Bagration’s leading troops reached Staroi Bykhov, some 25 miles south of Mohilev, and on the same day the advanced Cossacks, under Sissoiev, met the remains of the Mohilev garrison pursued by the 3rd Chasseurs-à-cheval, the only light cavalry regiment which Davout had retained. Unexpectedly assailed, the Chasseurs were broken and pursued to within a few miles of Mohilev, losing over 200 prisoners alone, and only rallying under cover of the 85th Regiment, which moved out to their relief.

Davout, having ascertained that behind the Cossacks were at least two Russian infantry divisions, collected on the 22nd his whole disposable force in his chosen position at Saltanovka. His left rested on the marshy bank of the Dnieper and was unassailable. His front was covered by a stream flowing in a difficult ravine, spanned at Saltanovka, some 1200 yards from the Dnieper, by a wooden bridge. About a mile farther up stood the hamlet and water-mill of Fatova, where a second rivulet, flowing parallel to the Dnieper, joins the first. On this, a mile from Fatova, lay the village of Selets. About Saltanovka there were thick woods, especially on the north bank of the stream; farther west the ground was more open, but broken and difficult. Generally speaking, the position was extremely strong; only on the right was it at all assailable. Desaix’s division guarded it, the 85th Regiment, under General Friederichs, on the left, the 108th on the right. The bridge was barricaded; the villages were prepared for defence. One of Compans’ regiments supported Desaix near Selets; the other two were held back to meet a turning movement, and only brought up later. Valence’s Cuirassiers and the remains of the 3rd Chasseurs were in reserve near Selets. The whole force counted some 20,000 men with 56 guns. Claparède and the artillery reserve could not arrive before the 23rd.

On the 22nd the head of Bagration’s army was at Dashkova, 5 miles south of Saltanovka. Bagration ordered Raievski with the 7th Corps and Sievers’ cavalry to attack next day. His reason seems to be expressed in his letter to Raievski on the 22nd. He tells him that he has only 6000 men in his front, according to his own intelligence; he is therefore to attack with God’s help and enter Mohilev on the heels of the enemy. Bagration’s reasoning clearly is that, Mohilev being only held by a detachment, Raievski may easily clear the way, and the army get through towards Orsha before the arrival of the French main body. There is no indication that he intended to turn Davout’s right with Borozdin and Neverovski while Raievski was attacking in front: they could not reach Dashkova until late on the 23rd.

1 verst = 2/3 mile. Russian Troops shown black, French shaded.

THE BATTLE OF SALTANOVKA (July 23rd, 1812)

Fought by Marshal Davout to check Bagration’s advance on Mohilev.]

Raievski advanced from Dashkova at 6 a.m. on the 23rd. He had with him about 17,000 men with 84 or 96 guns. His cavalry he left in reserve at Novo Sielki, 3 miles from Dashkova. He ordered Paskievich’s division to endeavour to turn the French right, promising that as soon as the attack made headway he would hurl Kolubakin’s division at Saltanovka.

Paskievich, driving in the French skirmishers, fought his way across the rivulet, and, bringing up a battery to cover his advance, pushed on against the 108th Regiment beyond it. Raievski, marking the advancing roll of Paskievich’s fire, believed that the time had come, and sent forward Kolubakin’s division. The Russians flung themselves at the bridge, drove off a battalion of the 85th which endeavoured to take them in flank, and pressed doggedly on under a murderous fire which swept them away by platoons. Unable to advance, with the stolid courage of their race they refused to fall back, and stood facing the French volleys until Raievski withdrew them.

Paskievich’s leading troops, attacking Fatova, were charged and repulsed across the stream by two battalions of the 108th under Colonel Achard. Achard, in his turn, hotly pursuing, was driven back to his own side; and Paskievich, again advancing, carried Fatova, and penetrated almost to the outskirts of Selets; but his offensive power had exhausted itself, and before the heavy fire of his well-posted and well-protected opponents he could advance no farther. Meanwhile Raievski, determined not to abandon his lieutenant, called up Kolubakin’s reserves, and made another desperate attempt upon the bridge, himself and General Vassilchikov leading on foot, with reckless bravery. All was in vain; the splendid infantry went forward only to die, and as the last attack reeled back from Friederichs’ front, an aide-de-camp arrived to report Paskievich’s failure. It was now past four o’clock, and Davout, feeling safe on his right, ordered forward Compans with the 61st and 111th Regiments and began a general advance. Prisoners told Raievski that Davout had about Mohilev 3 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions, and, believing that he was opposed by overwhelming forces, he gave orders to retreat. Compans followed as far as Novo Sielki, but as the road was practically a defile between woods he could do nothing to seriously harass the Russian retreat, and Davout’s handful of light cavalry was of course useless. Claparède and the heavy artillery reached Mohilev during the closing stages of the battle. Raievski at Dashkova was met by Bagration, and the latter, judging that the way was barred by the bulk of Davout’s corps, decided to pass the Dnieper and retreat on Smolensk.

Raievski gave his loss as 2504 killed, wounded and missing. That of the French was naturally, under the conditions of the fighting, much less. Davout stated it at less than 900. General Desaix was slightly wounded. Davout was on worse terms with him than ever, and pointedly ignored him in his reports.

Bagration wrote to Barclay that he had failed to break through at Mohilev, and so would make for Smolensk. On the 24th Platov and Dorokhov--except one fatigued infantry regiment--forded the Dnieper at Verkalobovo, and pushed on to join Barclay. Raievski, supported by Voronzov, held firm at Dashkova. Borozdin went back to Staroi Bykhov, while the pontooneers were sent on to bridge the Dnieper at Novi Bykhov, 14 miles farther south. On the 25th Borozdin marched for the selected place of passage, and Raievski followed to Staroi Bykhov, unpursued by Davout, who could not meddle with Sievers’ and Vassilchikov’s squadrons. The Second Army crossed the Dnieper on the 26th and 27th, and marched rapidly upon Mstislavl. On the same day Platov was in touch with Barclay, having passed the Dnieper at Dubrovna on the 27th. Davout had remained practically inactive. He has been blamed for his inertness; but it must be remembered that he was inferior in numbers to Bagration. He had in hand only some 25,000 men, and his nearest reinforcement was the 5th Corps, which, harassed by fatigue, disease and lack of supplies, only reached the Berezina on the 24th. On the 25th Bordesoulle reported that Bagration was bridging the Dnieper, and on the same day Latour-Maubourg sent a detailed and fairly accurate statement of Bagration’s strength, which probably made Davout more than ever inclined to caution. On the 27th Poniatowski’s leading brigade was at last within reach, but on the same day Bordesoulle reported that Bagration was across the Dnieper. Whatever Davout might have wished to attempt it was now too late. On the 29th Napoleon sent orders for him to canton his three corps along the Dnieper.

As has been seen, the First Russian Army had concentrated at the camp of Drissa, but it had scarcely arrived when proposals for its abandonment were made.

The Russian army can scarcely be said to have had a commander at this moment. Clausewitz gives a graphic account of the disorder that prevailed. The Emperor was of course nominally the supreme head, and he was more or less at the mercy of his personal entourage. He himself believed in Phull, but everyone else distrusted the Prussian theorist--certainly not without good reason. The Tzar’s relations often exercised undue influence over him, and were distrusted and disliked by the courtiers and soldiers; the courtiers were at odds with the military men; finally, the native Russian officers were jealous of the foreigners. Barclay himself was included among the objects of their dislike, and Colonel von Wollzogen, one of his German aides, was regarded with poisonous hatred, merely because his manners were unpleasing! Projects of strategy were almost as numerous as advisers. Count Lieven, late ambassador at Berlin, had there seen much of Scharnhörst, who considered that no attempt should be made to fight before reaching Smolensk. Barclay protested repeatedly against remaining at Drissa, and he was supported by the Tzar’s relative, Alexander of Württemberg. Paulucci, the chief-of-staff, declared furiously that the man who had selected such a position could only be either a fool or a traitor, and resigned.

The camp of Drissa lay in a bend of the Düna between Drissa and Bridzievo. Its land front was about 6500 yards in length, that on the river about 8000. The land front had ten redoubts, connected by batteries. In front of redoubts 6, 7, 8 and 9 was an abattis 2000 yards long and 120 broad; but before the left wing a marshy wood gave excellent cover to an attacking enemy. Two more redoubts strengthened the first line of defence. The second was formed of five closed works, and another formed a kind of citadel behind it. Communication was maintained with the right bank by four bridges, which had only just been constructed and were incompletely protected with outworks. The subsidiary means of defence--pitfalls, palisades, entanglements and abattis--were also very incomplete. The stores were largely accumulated in wooden sheds in the village of Drissa, opposite the left wing and exposed to hostile fire.

These tactical defects were, however, slight as compared with the strategic disadvantages. Lying far away from the Moscow road it could afford no defence against an enemy who chose to advance by that line, and it did not even cover that to St. Petersburg. The roads which led to it were mere country tracks, which ruined the convoys which had to use them. Moreover, by retiring on Drissa the First Army had actually retreated away from, instead of towards, Bagration, and if the two separated forces wished to effect a junction they could do so only by retiring far to the rear, or by perilous marches across the front of Napoleon’s advancing columns.

Alexander, perhaps at Phull’s instigation, reprimanded Bagration for retreating, as if he could have done anything else. Finally, however, Phull was induced to give way, and it was decided, just in time, to evacuate Drissa. The 1st Corps was ordered to cover the St. Petersburg road, and on July 14th the rest of the army began its march for Vitebsk.

The French advanced troops were already almost on the Düna. On the 13th Oudinot with Legrand’s division made a somewhat unnecessary demonstration against the bridge-head of Dünaburg. On the night of the 14-15th Wittgenstein bridged the Düna and sent across a detachment under Kulnev, which surprised St. Genies’ cavalry brigade, and captured the brigadier and over 100 men. Meanwhile the First Army pursued its march, covered by the river, and reached Polotsk on the 18th.

On July 16th Napoleon left Vilna and on the 18th arrived at Glubokoïe. Next day, learning that Drissa was abandoned, he turned Eugène towards Vitebsk, placed the cavalry of the 6th Corps under his orders, and called Grouchy also to join him. The 6th Corps was marching for Glubokoïe, already in a sad condition owing to heat, bad roads and deficiency of bread. It should have received 70,000 bread rations at Vilna, but so completely had the commissariat broken down that only 27,000 could be furnished. Diarrhoea and dysentery had broken out; and the unhappy Bavarians fell out in thousands, mostly to die untended by the wayside.

Murat’s three infantry divisions, under the general command of Comte Lobau, were extended from Perebrod, 20 miles west of Drissa, towards the south-east. Oudinot was approaching on the left. Ney and Nansouty were near Desna, some 20 miles below Drissa.

The conditions among the leading troops were less pitiable than with the 6th Corps, but still very bad. Supplies were scanty. Bread was scarce; the troops were lucky if they received even flour. Owing to the breakdown of the transport clothing and equipment--especially footgear--were becoming deficient. The roads were bad, the heat was great and there was much sickness. Lack of supplies led to a general slackening of the bonds of discipline. The country was ravaged by marauding stragglers, who committed every kind of outrage. All efforts to check the evil failed completely.

On the 18th Barclay was at Polotsk. He rightly inferred that Napoleon would direct his attacks against the Russian left, and informed Alexander that he must continue his retreat on Vitebsk. Fresh orders were given to Wittgenstein; and the reserve troops at Dünaburg and elsewhere were placed under his command.

At Polotsk the Tzar left the army. It was a wise step, for he was useless at the front, while at the seat of government his presence would be invaluable. Paulucci accompanied him, and was replaced by Major-General Yermólov, while Colonel Toll became Quartermaster-General. On bidding farewell Alexander bade Barclay not to endanger his army, for it was the only one that Russia possessed. This injunction undoubtedly made a strong impression upon Barclay, and is the best explanation of his irresolution some weeks later.

On July 20th Napoleon’s plan was definitely formed. He would turn Barclay’s left by throwing forward the Guard and the 4th and 6th Corps to Bechenkoviczi on the road to Vitebsk, while Murat and Ney contained the Russians in front, and Oudinot occupied Drissa and threatened their right.

Barclay, however, was already moving. On the 19th Uvarov’s cavalry corps started from Polotsk, and by the 23rd the entire army was collected round Vitebsk. There Barclay heard that Bagration had reached Mohilev, and wrote begging him to hasten his march on Orsha. He sent Major-General Tuchkov IV with his infantry brigade, 3 cavalry regiments and 1 of Cossacks, towards Babinovichi on the Orsha road, and Lieutenant-General Count Ostermann-Tolstoï, who had succeeded Shuvalov (retired through illness) with the 4th Corps, a brigade of Dragoons, and the Hussars of the Guard and of Sumi, towards Ostrovno on the way to Bechenkoviczi. The rest of the Russian army remained at Vitebsk to rest and reorganise.

The advance-guard of the French 4th Corps was already at Bechenkoviczi. Oudinot had two divisions at Polotsk and the third at Drissa. Lobau was to Eugène’s left rear, with Ney some 20 miles farther back: Murat, with Nansouty’s corps, was near Bechenkoviczi; Montbrun was moving up the right bank of the Düna towards Vitebsk; Napoleon with the Guard was at Kamen, about 21 miles from Bechenkoviczi. The unhappy 6th Corps was toiling along the Glubokoïe-Polotsk road.

At 6 a.m. on the 25th Murat’s and Ostermann’s outposts collided near Ostrovno. Here the road, coming from Vitebsk between woods, made a sharp turn to the right, and another equally abrupt to the left some way farther on. The leading Russian regiment, the Guard Hussars, charged headlong and, sabring the French pickets, blundered up against Piré’s brigade in the rear. It was driven back with heavy loss upon a horse battery which was following, and in the confusion the French captured six guns. Ostermann, who was some way behind, sent forward the Sumi Hussars to check the French advance. He then formed for battle, with Choglokov’s division deployed across the road and Bakhmetiev’s in columns behind, and in this order the 4th Corps marched forward to Ostrovno, and took position between the woods.

Ostermann had in all 18 battalions and 20 squadrons--some 13,000 men and perhaps 60 guns. The French troops which could take part in the action included Bruyère’s and St. Germain’s cavalry divisions and Delzons’ infantry division--10,000 bayonets, 6000 lances and sabres, with about 40 guns.

Ostermann proved a very poor tactician. Against infantry and artillery in position the French cavalry could do nothing, and until the head of Delzons’ division, the two battalions of the 8th Léger, arrived the action was confined to some spectacular but useless cavalry skirmishing. When the 8th Léger came up it was attacked by three Russian battalions, which moved forward against it, but they were charged in flank by two cavalry regiments and driven back. They should not have been exposed alone in front of the position. Ostermann then attacked both flanks of the French at once, but with only four battalions, which were charged by the cavalry and broken. Delzons’ division was now coming into action, and Ostermann withdrew to a position two miles farther back. The action was certainly not to his credit.

Barclay on this day had sent Lieutenant-General Konovnitzin with his division of the 3rd Corps (less Tuchkov IV’s brigade) and the 1st Cavalry Corps to support his advanced guard. Early on the 26th Ostermann retired behind Konovnitzin, who took up a defensive position behind a ravine, with a wood on his left. At 10 a.m. Murat arrived in his front with Delzons and Nansouty. Huard’s brigade (two regiments) was directed against the Russian right, Roussel’s upon the left; the 106th Regiment and Nansouty’s cavalry, except one brigade which covered the left, remained in reserve.

Roussel’s troops found much difficulty in penetrating the wood on the Russian left and, assailed by Konovnitzin’s reserve, were driven out and over the ravine. The Russians, however, pursuing heedlessly, were repulsed by a charge of one of Nansouty’s brigades; and Roussel, rallying his troops, penetrated into the wood. Huard, meanwhile, was steadily pushing forward on the Russian right, and, being presently supported by the 106th, gained ground rapidly. Konovnitzin drew off in good order and retreated on Vitebsk, little harassed by the way, the broken and wooded nature of the country greatly impeding the pursuit. Napoleon, wishing to deliver a general action at Vitebsk, directed Eugène not to press too closely, lest Barclay should take alarm and retreat without fighting.

On the 27th Napoleon had near Ostrovno the Guard (less Claparède and Colbert), Lobau’s three divisions, the 3rd and 4th Corps, and Nansouty’s and Montbrun’s cavalry, about 120,000 men in all. The 2nd Corps was at Drissa and Polotsk, in contact with Wittgenstein, and the 6th at Uchach, 60 miles in rear of Ostrovno. During the night Konovnitzin had been joined by the corps commander, Tuchkov I, with Strogonov’s division; and the united force now retired on Vitebsk.

Barclay had made up his mind to fight at Vitebsk. His reasons, as detailed to the Tzar, were that Napoleon had in hand only the Guard, the 3rd and 4th Corps, and Murat’s cavalry, while the steadiness of the Russian troops in the recent fighting gave good hopes of victory; and that he felt it his duty to draw Napoleon’s attention upon him and give Bagration time wherein to come up. As regards the first reason he did not know that Napoleon had with him three divisions of Davout’s corps, and was therefore 30,000 stronger than his estimate. Respecting the second, if Bagration really were making the terribly dangerous march from Mohilev by Orsha and Babinovichi, Barclay was indeed bound to fight for the sake of his comrade. That the plan of attempting a junction by way of Orsha was hazardous is clear, but it scarcely affects Barclay’s reasoning. On the assumption that Bagration was coming by the Orsha road, and that Napoleon was only 90,000 strong, his determination was not unwise.

The Russian army was drawn up on the 27th behind the Luchizza, a stream flowing into the Düna just below Vitebsk. Clausewitz criticises the position severely; but he seems rather prone to ignore the fact that good tactical positions are not plentiful in Russia--as he himself elsewhere admits. Strategically it had the grave defect of lying almost parallel to the Orsha road by which communications with Bagration were expected to be established. But it is at any rate certain that it would, like the faulty position of Eylau, have been defended with desperate courage. An advance-guard of 8 battalions, 2 Cossack regiments and all the regular light cavalry was stationed on the left bank of the Luchizza, under General Pahlen, the commander of the 3rd Cavalry Corps.

Though the Russian army had suffered less than its opponents during the long marches from the Niemen to Vitebsk it had not escaped considerable losses by disease and fatigue. The reinforcements along the Düna had mostly been assigned to Wittgenstein. Platov and Dorokhov were also absent. Barclay’s strength at Vitebsk appears to have been about 82,000 men, of whom 14,000 were cavalry--mostly regulars--and over 400 excellently horsed guns.

On the 27th the French advance-guard moved upon Vitebsk, and there was some brisk fighting between Pahlen’s detachment and Broussier’s and Bruyère’s divisions. The Cossacks of the Russian Guard overthrew the 16th Chasseurs-à-cheval, who endeavoured to stop them with carbine fire, and made a mad dash right among Broussier’s infantry squares, while some Voltigeurs of the 9th French Regiment, pushed across the Luchizza, defended themselves brilliantly against a cloud of Russian horsemen. Pahlen steadily retired as the French advanced, and Napoleon did not wish to press, since his concentration would not be complete until the evening. Ney was still on the march from Ostrovno, and Montbrun on the other bank of the Düna opposite Vitebsk. In the afternoon Barclay received Bagration’s despatch announcing that he was marching for Smolensk. Barclay at once issued orders for a retreat. In the night the whole army, leaving its camp-fires burning, evacuated its position and moved silently away in three columns, General Dokhturov, with the 5th and 6th Corps, marching directly on Smolensk by way of Rudnia, the rest of the army taking the more circuitous routes by Surazh and Poriechie. Dokhturov’s march was covered by a rear-guard, under Major-General Shevich, that of the other two columns by Pahlen with 14 battalions and 32 squadrons. The withdrawal from the position was a triumph of good management and discipline. Scarce a single straggler was left behind, and the retiring columns were well on their way before the fact of their departure was ascertained. The diverging lines of retreat confused the French cavalry, and not until the 30th was Murat definitely able to report that Barclay had retreated on Smolensk. Except for some not very serious skirmishing between the advanced guards of the French and the rear-guards of the Russians there was no fighting. The Russians moved at a pace which set pursuit at defiance. On July 31st Dokhturov was outside Smolensk, having marched 80 miles in four days. On August 1st Barclay arrived from Poriechie. Bagration, hurrying from Novi Bykhov by Propoïsk and Mstistavl, came up two days later. His troops had covered 150 miles through sands, bogs and forests in eight days. The pedestrian feats of the Russians are remarkable. Since June 28 the Second Army had marched over 540 miles, giving an average of 15 miles a day. As there were some days of rest or battle the actual pace was much more rapid.

The Russian losses in the fighting round Vitebsk may be estimated at about 4000, with 6 (or 8) guns. Those of the French may have been a little less.

Napoleon entered Vitebsk on the 28th. He must have been bitterly disappointed at the negative result of his operations. Once more the Russians had quietly withdrawn out of reach at the very moment of contact. The French losses through fatigue and disease had been relatively enormous, and the manoeuvre of Vitebsk had failed as completely as the manoeuvre at Vilna. In a sense the failure was even worse, for the Russians had emerged from the situation with a great strategic success to their credit. In spite of blunders and miscalculation, despite contradictory orders and lack of any unity of command, Barclay and Bagration had achieved what had been the primary object of their weary marches and manoeuvres to the rear, and had effected their union.