Chapter II: Front Matter (2)

Our army is in the field, our fleet is ready for battle, and behind
it stands the entire German Nation. [Enthusiastic applause from the
entire house.] The entire nation! [with a gesture particularly
directed toward the Social Democrats. Renewed applause, in which
the Social Democrats also joined.] You, gentlemen, realize your
duty in its entirety. The question needs no further consideration,
and I request speedy action. [Enthusiastic applause.]

* * * * *

[01] The Times of London contained on Aug. 12, 1914, the following:

"The statement made by the German Imperial Chancellor to the Reichstag on Aug. 4, which we published yesterday and reproduce below, lends piquancy to a communication that reached us from an influential quarter in Germany on Aug. 2. The communication, which we give in its original form, bore the name of a personage holding a prominent position in Germany, and standing in a close personal relationship to the German Emperor. It was evidently timed for publication on the morning of Aug. 3, the day of Sir Edward Grey's historic speech in the House of Commons":

Aug. 2, 1914.

I hear with astonishment that in France and elsewhere in the world
it is imagined that Germany wants to carry on an aggressive war,
and that she had with this aim brought about the present situation.
It is said that the Emperor was of the opinion that the moment had
come to have a final reckoning with his enemies; but what a
terrible error that is! Whoever knows the Emperor as I do, whoever
knows how very seriously he takes the responsibility of the crown,
how his moral ideas are rooted in true religious feeling, must be
astonished that any one could attribute such motives to him.

He has not wanted the war; it has been forced upon him by the might
of the circumstances. He has worked unswervingly to keep the peace,
and has together with England thrown his whole influence into the
scales to find a peaceful solution, in order to save his people
from the horrors of war. But everything has been wrecked upon the
attitude of Russia, which in the middle of negotiations which
offered good outlook of success mobilized her forces, wherewith she
proved that she did not mean in earnest what her assurances of
peaceful intentions indicated.

Now Germany's frontiers are menaced by Russia which drags her
allies into the war, now Germany's honor is at stake. Is it
possible under these circumstances that the most peace-loving
monarch can do otherwise than take to the sword in order to defend
the most sacred interests of the nation?

And, finally, the German people! In them is firmly rooted the word
of Prince Bismarck against aggressive wars: "One must not try to
look into the cards of Fate."

It must be stated again: Russia alone forces the war upon Europe.
Russia alone must carry the full weight of responsibility.

* * * * *

STATEMENT TO AMERICA.

Issued to The Associated Press from General Headquarters, Sept. 2.

I do not know what is thought of this war in America. I assume
there have been published in America the telegrams exchanged
between the German Emperor, the Emperor of Russia, and the King of
England, containing the history of the events that preceded the
outbreak of the war, and which bears irrefutable testimony of how
the Emperor, until the last moment, strove hard to preserve the
peace.

These efforts had to be futile, as Russia, under all circumstances,
had resolved upon war, and as England, which for decades had
encouraged the anti-German nationalism in Russia and France, did
not avail herself of the splendid opportunity offered her to prove
her often-emphasized love of peace, otherwise the war between
Germany and France and England could have been averted.

When once the archives are opened the world will learn how often
Germany extended to England her friendly hand, but England did not
desire the friendship of Germany. Jealous of the development of
Germany, and feeling that by German efficiency and German industry
she has been surpassed in some fields, she had the desire to crush
Germany by brute force, as she in former times subdued Spain,
Holland, and France. She believed the moment had arrived, and
therefore the entry of German troops into Belgium gave her a
welcome pretext to take part in the war.

Germany, however, was forced to enter Belgium because she had to
forestall the planned French advance, and Belgium only awaited this
advance to join France. That only a pretext was involved as far as
England is concerned is proved by the fact that already on the
afternoon of Aug. 2, that is, prior to the violation of Belgium
neutrality by Germany, Sir Edward Grey assured the French
Ambassador unconditionally of the help of England in case the
German fleet attacked the French coast.

Moral scruple, however, the English policy does not know. And thus
the English people, who always posed as the protagonist of freedom
and right, has allied itself with Russia, the representative of the
most terrible barbarism, a country that knows no spiritual or no
religious freedom, that tramples upon the freedom of peoples as
well as of individuals. Already England is beginning to recognize
that she has made a mistake in her calculations, and that Germany
will master her enemies. She is therefore trying by the pettiest
means to injure Germany as much as possible in her commerce and
colonies, by instigating Japan, regardless of the consequences to
the cultural community of the white race, to a pillaging expedition
against Kiao-Chau, and leading the negroes in Africa to fight
against the Germans in the colonies.

Having strangled the news service of Germany to the whole world,
and having opened the campaign against us with a falsehood, England
will tell your countrymen that the German troops burned down
Belgian villages and cities, but will pass over in silence the fact
that Belgian girls gouged out the eyes of defenseless wounded.
Officials of Belgian cities have invited our officers to dinner and
shot and killed them across the table. Contrary to all
international law, the whole civilian population of Belgium was
called out, and after having at first shown friendliness, carried
on in the rear of our troops a terrible warfare with concealed
weapons.

Belgian women cut the throats of soldiers whom they had quartered
in their homes while they were sleeping. England also will say
nothing of the dumdum bullets which are being used by the English
and French despite all conventions and their hypocritical
proclamations of humanity, which can be seen here in their original
packing as they were found on French and English prisoners of war.

The Emperor has authorized me to say all this and to state that he
has full confidence in the sense of justice of the American people,
which will not allow itself to be deceived through the war of
falsehood which our enemies are conducting against us.

The statement of the Chancellor concludes as follows:

Every one who has lived in Germany since the outbreak of the war
has been able to witness the great moral uprising of all Germans
who, pressed hard on all sides, cheerfully take the field for the
defense of their rights and their existence; every one knows that
this people is not capable of any unnecessary cruelty or of any
brutality. We will win, thanks to the great moral strength which
our just cause gives to our troops, and in the end the greatest
falsehoods will be able to obscure our victories as little as they
do our rights.

* * * * *

GERMANY'S ARMAMENTS.

Speech Delivered in the Reichstag, March 30, 1911.

I have asked to speak in order to make a few brief remarks on the
question of disarmament and arbitration. The Social Democratic
motion proposes that I should take steps to bring about a general
limitation of armaments. As a matter of fact, the idea of
disarmament is being constantly discussed by pacifists in
Parliaments and in Congresses far and wide. Even the first peace
conference at The Hague had to confine itself to expressing the
wish that the Governments should devote themselves to the continued
study of the question.

Germany has responded to this desire, but has been able to find no
suitable formula, and I am not aware that other Governments have
been more successful. The time when wars were made by Cabinets is
past. The feelings which here in Europe may lead to war lie
elsewhere.

They have their roots in antagonisms which must be found in popular
sentiment. Everybody knows how easily this sentiment is influenced
and how, unfortunately, in many cases, it abandons itself
helplessly to irresponsible press agitations. A counterpoise to
all such and similar influences can but be desired. I shall be the
first to welcome it whenever international efforts succeed in
creating such a counterpoise.

But if I am to take practical steps and am to propose mutual
disarmament to the other powers, then general pacific assurances
and adjurations are not enough. With Germany there is no need for
such assurances or adjurations, in view of her constant policy
throughout forty years, which shows that we seek no quarrels in the
world. I should have to submit a fixed, definite programme. Then I
should have to consider in all sobriety whether such a programme
could be drawn up and carried out. Any one who makes uncertain and
vague proposals can easily become a disturber of the peace rather
than a peacemaker.

I shall have to decline to draw up such a formula and submit it to
an international congress.

England's Naval Police.

England is convinced, and has repeatedly declared, in spite of her
desires for the limitation of expenditure on armaments and for the
adjustment of any disputes that may arise by arbitral procedure,
that her fleet must in all circumstances be superior, or at any
rate equal, to any possible combination in the world. England has a
perfect right to strive for such a state of things, and, precisely
because of the position that I take up toward the disarmament
question, I am the last to cast doubts upon it. It is quite another
thing, however, to make such a claim the basis of a convention
which must be recognized by all the other powers in peaceful
agreement. What if counterclaims are raised and the other powers
are not satisfied with the rôles assigned to them?

One only requires to propound these questions in order to see
things would not go well for European dignity at any world congress
which had to decide upon such claims.

And then armies. If, for example, Germany should be required to
reduce her army by 100,000 men, by how many men must the other
powers diminish their armies? Notwithstanding all the pacific
assurances which, thank God, are being given everywhere, every
nation would reply to me at any preliminary inquiry that it claims
that position in the world which corresponds with the sum of its
national power, that the strength of its defensive forces must be
adapted to this claim. At any rate, I would give no other reply for
Germany. I should be touching the honor and national sentiment of
any other people if I expected any other statement from it.

Question of Control.

Every attempt at international disarmament must break down on the
question of control, which is absolutely impracticable. A classic
example of that is afforded by Prussia when overthrown by Napoleon.
Her army was to be limited to 45,000 men, but her patriotism,
notwithstanding the most ruthless application of every means of
control, managed to raise an army four times as large. The question
of disarmament is insoluble so long as men are men and States are
States.

In the course of the debate reference has been made to the recent
utterances of the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in
the House of Commons on the disarmament question. The English
Minister gave expression to the idea that a reciprocal exchange of
information concerning the naval construction of both countries
would insure them against surprises, and that thereby both
countries would be convinced that they were not trying mutually to
outstrip each other, while other powers would thereby be kept
informed regarding the relations of Germany and England, and so the
exchange of announcements would, on the whole, serve to promote
peace.

We were all the more able to adhere to this idea as our naval
building programme has always lain open. We have already declared
our readiness to come to an understanding on this point with
England, in the hope that it may bring about a desired appeasement.

World-embracing international arbitration treaties dictated by an
international areopagus I consider just as impossible as general
international disarmament. Germany takes up no hostile position
toward arbitration. In all the new German treaties of commerce
there are arbitration clauses. In the main it was due to Germany's
initiative that an agreement was arrived at at the second Hague
conference for the establishment of an International Prize Court.

Arbitration treaties can certainly contribute in a great measure to
maintain and fortify peaceful relations. But strength must depend
on readiness for war. The dictum still holds good that the weak
becomes the prey of the strong. If a nation can not or will not
spend enough on her defensive forces for her to be able to make her
way in the world, then she falls back into the second rank.

* * * * *

Austria-Hungary's Version of the War

By Kaiser Franz Josef and Count Berchtold.

* * * * *

The Imperial Rescript and Manifesto.

Ischl, July 28.

Dear Count Stürgkh:

I have resolved to instruct the Ministers of my Household and
Foreign Affairs to notify the Royal Servian Government of the
beginning of a state of war between the Monarchy and Servia. In
this fateful hour I feel the need of turning to my beloved peoples.
I command you, therefore, to publish the inclosed manifesto.

MANIFESTO.

To my peoples! It was my fervent wish to consecrate the years
which, by the grace of God, still remain to me, to the works of
peace and to protect my peoples from the heavy sacrifices and
burdens of war. Providence, in its wisdom, has otherwise decreed.
The intrigues of a malevolent opponent compel me, in the defense of
the honor of my Monarchy, for the protection of its dignity and its
position as a power, for the security of its possessions, to grasp
the sword after long years of peace.

With a quickly forgetful ingratitude, the Kingdom of Servia, which,
from the first beginnings of its independence as a State until
quite recently, had been supported and assisted by my ancestors,
has for years trodden the path of open hostility to
Austria-Hungary. When, after three decades of fruitful work for
peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I extended my Sovereign rights to
those lands, my decree called forth in the Kingdom of Servia, whose
rights were in nowise injured, outbreaks of unrestrained passion
and the bitterest hate. My Government at that time employed the
handsome privileges of the stronger, and with extreme consideration
and leniency only requested Servia to reduce her army to a peace
footing and to promise that, for the future, she would tread the
path of peace and friendship. Guided by the same spirit of
moderation, my Government, when Servia, two years ago, was
embroiled in a struggle with the Turkish Empire, restricted its
action to the defense of the most serious and vital interests of
the Monarchy. It was to this attitude that Servia primarily owed
the attainment of the objects of that war.

The hope that the Servian Kingdom would appreciate the patience and
love of peace of my Government and would keep its word has not been
fulfilled. The flame of its hatred for myself and my house has
blazed always higher; the design to tear from us by force
inseparable portions of Austria-Hungary has been made manifest with
less and less disguise. A criminal propaganda has extended over the
frontier with the object of destroying the foundations of State
order in the southeastern part of the monarchy; of making
the people, to whom I, in my paternal affection, extended my full
confidence, waver in its loyalty to the ruling house and to the
Fatherland; of leading astray its growing youth and inciting it to
mischievous deeds of madness and high treason. A series of
murderous attacks, an organized, carefully prepared, and well
carried out conspiracy, whose fruitful success wounded me and my
loyal peoples to the heart, forms a visible bloody track of those
secret machinations which were operated and directed in Servia.

A halt must be called to these intolerable proceedings and an end
must be put to the incessant provocations of Servia. The honor and
dignity of my monarchy must be preserved unimpaired, and its
political, economic, and military development must be guarded from
these continual shocks. In vain did my Government make a last
attempt to accomplish this object by peaceful means and to induce
Servia, by means of a serious warning, to desist. Servia has
rejected the just and moderate demands of my Government and refused
to conform to those obligations the fulfillment of which forms the
natural and necessary foundation of peace in the life of peoples
and States. I must therefore proceed by force of arms to secure
those indispensable pledges which alone can insure tranquillity to
my States within and lasting peace without.

In this solemn hour I am fully conscious of the whole significance
of my resolve and my responsibility before the Almighty. I have
examined and weighed everything, and with a serene conscience I set
out on the path to which my duty points. I trust in my peoples,
who, throughout every storm, have always rallied in unity and
loyalty around my throne, and have always been prepared for the
severest sacrifices for the honor, the greatness, and the might of
the Fatherland. I trust in Austria-Hungary's brave and devoted
forces, and I trust in the Almighty to give the victory to my arms.

FRANZ JOSEF.

* * * * *

DECLARATION OF WAR.

Published in Special Edition of Official Gazette, Vienna, July 28.

The Royal Government of Servia not having given a satisfactory
reply to the note presented to it by the Austro-Hungarian Minister
in Belgrade on July 23, 1914, the Imperial and Royal Government of
Austria-Hungary finds it necessary itself to safeguard its rights
and interests and to have recourse for this purpose to force of
arms. Austria-Hungary, therefore, considers itself from this moment
in a state of war with Servia.

* * * * *

"DAYS OF WORLD'S HISTORY."

Congratulatory Telegram to Kaiser Wilhelm II., Aug. 27.

Victory after victory. God is with you. He will be with us also. I
most sincerely congratulate you, dear friend, also the young hero,
your dear son, the Crown Prince, and the Crown Prince Rupprecht, as
well as the incomparably brave German Army. Words fail to express
what moves me and, with me, my army, in these days of world's
history.

"FRANZ JOSEPH."

* * * * *

WILL OF WILHELM II. THAT SWUNG THE SWORD.

Kaiser Franz Josef's Address in Bestowing the Great Cross on the German Kaiser, September, 1914.

The glorious victories, so crushing to the foe, which the German
Army has won in battle under your chief command owe their begetting
and their success to your iron will, which sharpened and swung the
heavy sword.

To the laurel that crowns you as victor I wish to add, if I may,
the highest military honor which we possess, in begging you to take
in true brotherhood of arms and as a token of my appreciation the
Great Cross of my military Order of Marie Theresa. The decoration
itself, dear friend, shall be handed to you by a special envoy as
soon as it is convenient for you.

* * * * *

A PURELY DEFENSIVE WAR.

By Count Berchtold, Foreign Minister for Austria-Hungary.

(Copyright, Evening News Publishing Company of Newark, N.J., 1914.)

Austria-Hungary looks upon this war as a purely defensive one,
which has been forced on her by the agitation directed by Russia
against her very existence. Austria-Hungary has given many proofs
in late years of her peaceful intention. She refrained from any
interference with arms in the Balkan war, though her interests were
at stake. Subsequent events have proved what a serious danger the
increase in territory and prestige which it brought Servia were for
Austria-Hungary. Servia's ambitions have since grown and have been
solely directed against the Dual Monarchy. Russia has tacitly
approved of Servia's action because Russian statesmen wish to form
an iron ring of enemies around Austria-Hungary and Germany in order
that Russia's grasp on Constantinople and on Asia should never
again be meddled with. Austro-Hungarian soldiers are fighting for
their homes and for the maintenance of their country, the Russians
are fighting to help the Russian Czar to gain the rule of the
world, to destroy all his neighbors who may be dangerous to Russian
ambitions. England is helping the Russians to oust her German
rival. She feared for some time that German culture and German
scientific methods would prove the stronger in a peaceful
competition, and she now hopes to crush Germany with the help of
Russia and France. And France is fighting to win back
Alsace-Lorraine, to take her revenge on Germany, which the French
nation has been aiming at for the last forty-four years.

That is how Austria-Hungary looks upon the war. She never wished
for territorial increase, she wished for peace and that her people
should develop in safety.

Germany equally had nothing to gain by a war, but Germany knows
that Austria-Hungary's enemies are her enemies and that the
dismemberment of the Hapsburg monarchy would mean the isolation of
the German Empire.

And so, after all efforts to keep Russia and England from breaking
the peace of Europe had failed, she drew her sword to defend her
and her allies' (ally's) interests.

Truth and honor are on the side of the two empires in this war, the
unspeakable inventions and prevarications published by the French,
Russian, and English press in the last weeks alone must prove to
the American people who can afford to tell the truth and nothing
but the truth in this war.

The Austro-Hungarian and German people have a clear conscience and
need fear no misrepresentation of their action.

* * * * *

A DISCORDANT NOTE.

By Count Michael Karolyi, Leader of Hungarian Independent Party, New York, July 27.

If Austria had pursued a policy of directly helping the Balkan
countries, if Austria had in the past made it a point to be
actively their friend, this war would not confront us. Since it has
come, of course all Hungarians will support the empire and internal
differences will be dismissed while the empire is imperiled.

As for the loyalty of the many Serbs within Austria-Hungary it is
hard to say. There again we must hope that they will take the
Austrian side. But the Austrian policy toward the Balkan countries
has been wrong, all wrong.

* * * * *

A German Review of the Evidence

* * * * *

Certified by Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, German Ex-Colonial Secretary.

_The following is presented as a complete defense of the German position in the present war and is based upon examination of the German and English "White Papers." It was prepared in Germany and forwarded to Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, who had it translated for_ THE NEW YORK TIMES _of Nov. 1, 1914_.

_Dr. Dernburg gives this statement his full approval and accepts complete responsibility for it._

Two of the five great European powers that are at present engaged in war, Austria-Hungary and Russia, whose differences for years have been constantly increasing in sharpness, and after the tragedy in Serajevo became impossible to be bridged by diplomacy, conjured up the frightful struggle.

With these two, two other powers are so closely united by alliances that their participation in the war also was unavoidable; they are Germany and France.

There are two other great European powers whose relations to the two aforesaid groups before the war were very much alike in the essential points. Just as Italy was politically tied by alliance to the central powers, so England was with the Franco-Russian Alliance. Hence it was uncertain how these countries, each geographically removed from the main body of the Continent, would act in a war, and it seemed quite possible that both would decide to remain neutral.

As a matter of fact, the Italian Government came to the view that such a stand would be for the best interests of its country.

This decision might have made it considerably more easy for England to also maintain her neutrality, which, from political, economical, and ethical reasons, would have been advantageous and natural for the Island Empire. To the surprise and indignation of all those Germans who for years had been working toward an adjustment of the conflicting interests of both countries--among these ought to be mentioned, above all, the Kaiser and the Imperial Chancellor--the Liberal British Ministry immediately declared war on Germany, and did not confine itself to a naval war, but, in keeping with agreements reached years ago between the English and the French General Staffs, as is now admitted, equipped an expeditionary army, thus considerably strengthening the French forces.

The question arises, "What reasons led British politics to this monstrous step?"

Much has been written during the last weeks from the German side, criticising most sharply and with great justification the motive of the London Cabinet. In the following discussion we will confine ourselves to an impartial review of the documents published by the English Government itself in its own defense.

The essential part of this justification is contained in the "Correspondence Concerning the European Crisis," placed before the British Parliament shortly after the start of the war, which is known as the British "White Paper." In amplification are to be considered the "White Book" placed by the German Government before the Reichstag and the "Orange Book" published by Russia.

* * * * *

I.

THE RUSSIAN MOBILIZATION.

In a public speech, delivered Sept. 19, the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Lloyd George, according to the report of The Westminster Gazette, which may be considered as his organ, characterized the quarrel between Germany and Russia in the picturesque manner which this statesman prefers, as follows:

GERMANY--I insist that you stand aside with crossed arms while
Austria strangles your little brother, (Servia.)

RUSSIA--Just you touch this little fellow and I will tear
your ramshackle empire limb from limb.

We will not waste words in considering the flippant form here used in a discussion of an unspeakably bloody and world-historic conflict. But this expression in very pregnant form makes Russia appear in the light in which the London powers-that-be desire to show the empire of the Czar to the British people, viz., in the role of the noble-hearted protector of persecuted innocence, while Germany, supporting and egging on Austria-Hungary, is shown as morally responsible for the war.

Cites English Documents.

This, also, is the chain of thought in the speech of the British Prime Minister in the House of Commons on Aug. 4. Translations of this speech have been spread by the British Government in neutral countries in hundreds of thousands of copies under the title: "The Power Responsible for War Is Germany."

Now, we claim that the British "White Paper" itself furnishes irrefutable proof that not Germany, which up to the last moment offered the hand of mediation, but Russia is responsible for the war, and that the Foreign Office at London was fully cognizant of this fact.

Furthermore, the "White Paper" shows that England's claim that she entered this war solely as a protector of the small nations is a fable.

The documents reproduced in the "White Paper" do not begin until July 20, and only a few introductory dispatches before the 24th are given. The first of the very important reports of the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Sir George Buchanan, to the Secretary of State, Grey, is dated on that day; on the same day the note addressed by Austria-Hungary to the Servian Government had been brought to the knowledge of the European Cabinets, and the British Ambassador conferred with the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Sazonof, over this matter. The French Minister also took part in this conference. When the latter and M. Sazonof, in the most insistent way, tried to prove to Buchanan that England, together with Russia and France, must assume a threatening attitude toward Austria-Hungary and Germany, the British Ambassador replied:

I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what their
Excellencies had just said to me. I could not, of course, speak in
the name of his Majesty's Government, but personally I saw no
reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from his Majesty's
Government that would entail an unconditional engagement on their
part to support Russia and France by force of arms. Direct British
interests in Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country
would never be sanctioned by British public opinion.--(British
"White Paper" No. 6.)

The British Ambassador thereupon asked the question whether Russia was thinking of eventually declaring war on Austria. The following was the answer:

M. Sazonof said that he himself thought that Russian mobilization
would at any rate have to be carried out; but a council of
Ministers was being held this afternoon to consider the whole
question....

The dispatch continues:

French Ambassador and M. Sazonof both continue to press me for a
declaration of complete solidarity of his Majesty's Government with
French and Russian Governments.... (British "White Paper" No. 6.)

This shows plainly that the Russian mobilization must have been planned even before July 24, for otherwise M. Sazonof could not have spoken of the necessity of carrying it through.

It is furthermore very remarkable that the Russian Minister on this early day spoke of the mobilization in general and not of the partial mobilization against Austria-Hungary.

Finally we find that the British Government was fully informed at the very latest on July 24--it may have had before it previous documents, but they are not contained in the "White Paper"--concerning Russian mobilization and thereby the development of Russian and French politics that had to be anticipated.

Russian Aggression.

Had there been any doubts concerning these matters on the part of the British Government, the continual urging of Russian and French diplomatists must have made things plain. Russia's aggressive policy, and not the Austrian declaration of war on Servia, which did not come until five days later, led to the European war. Servia meant so little to England, although England traditionally poses as a protector of small nations, that the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg was able to describe England's interest in the kingdom on the Save as "nil." Only later, after the beginning of the war, England warmed up to Servia, and in the aforementioned speech Mr. Lloyd George found the most hearty tones in speaking of the heroic fight of this "little nation," although he was obliged to admit simultaneously that its' history is not untainted.

On the day following that conversation, on July 25, the British Ambassador had another talk with M. Sasonof, during the course of which he felt obliged to express to the Russian Government a serious warning concerning its mobilization.

On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate
war by mobilizing until you had had time to use your influence in
favor of peace his Excellency assured me that Russia had no
aggressive intentions and she would take no action until it was
forced on her. Austria's action was in reality directed against
Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present status quo in the
Balkans and establishing her own hegemony there. He did not believe
that Germany really wanted war, but her attitude was decided by
ours. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there
would be no war. If we failed them now rivers of blood would flow
and we would in the end be dragged into war....

I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign
Affairs and warned him that if Russia mobilized Germany would not
be content with mere mobilization or give Russia time to carry out
hers, but would probably declare war at once! His Excellency
replied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush Servia and
become the predominant power in the Balkans, and, if she feels
secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of
war. He assured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate a
conflict, but that unless Germany could restrain Austria I could
regard the situation as desperate.--(British "White Paper" No. 17.)

A more convincing contradiction of the claim that Germany fell upon unexpectant Russia can hardly be imagined. Sazonof's conversation with the British Ambassador shows that Russia had decided from the beginning to bring about the war, unless Austria would subject itself to Russia's dictation.

Now, Russia was not alone concerned about Servia, but from its viewpoint Austria-Hungary must not maintain the preponderant position in the Balkans.

Sure of French help, Russia was determined to work against this. The reports of the British representative do not suggest with a word that Germany was responsible for the war; on the contrary, Sir Buchanan again, on his own account, warned the Russian Government to keep aloof from military measures, in his conversation with M. Sazonof on July 27, although the "White Paper" does not show that he had received any instructions by Sir Edward Grey.

His Excellency must not, if our efforts were to be successful, do
anything to precipitate a conflict. In these circumstances I
trusted that the Russian Government would defer the mobilization
ukase for as long as possible, and that troops would not be allowed
to cross the frontier even when it was issued.--(British "White
Paper," No, 44.)

Just as its own Ambassador in Petersburg pointed out to the British Government the dangers of Russian mobilization, England did not lack German warnings. On July 28 the British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir E. Goschen, reported as follows by wire concerning a conversation with the Imperial Chancellor:

... but if the news were true which he had just read in the papers,
that Russia had mobilized fourteen army corps in the South, he
thought the situation was very serious, and he himself would be in
a very difficult position, as in these circumstances it would be
out of his power to continue to preach moderation at Vienna. He
added that Austria, who as yet was only partially mobilizing, would
have to take similar measures, and if war were to result Russia
would be entirely responsible.--(British "White Paper" No. 71.)

In a telegram of Mr. Goschen's of July 30, reporting a conversation with the Secretary of State, von Jagow, it is stated:

He begged me to impress on you difficulty of Germany's
position in view of Russian mobilization and military measures
which he hears are being taken in France.--(British "White Paper"
No. 98.)

The British Government has added a few further publications to its "White Paper." Among these is a report of the hitherto British Ambassador in Vienna, Sir Maurice de Bunsen. The document is dated Sept. 1; that is, a full month after the outbreak of the war. The tendency of this publication is not only to unburden Russia and England from all blame and to put it upon German and Austro-Hungarian politics, but it attempts to make Germany responsible for the war to greater extent than Austria-Hungary in trying to sow dissension between the two allies.

Ambassador de Bunsen represents matters as if Germany, through its ultimatum to Russia on July 31, had roughly interrupted negotiations promising success then going on between Vienna and Petersburg. In this report it is stated:

(Retranslated.) M. Schebeko [the Russian Ambassador at Vienna] on
July 28th attempted to induce the Austrian Government to authorize
Count Scapary to continue negotiations which he had been carrying
on with M. Sazonof and which appeared very promising. Count
Berchtold on this day declined, but two days later, July 30th,
although Russia then had already started partial mobilization
against Austria, he received M. Schebeko again in the most
courteous manner and gave his consent to continuation of the pour
parleurs.... On Aug. 1st M. Schebeko informed me that Austria was
ready to submit to mediation those parts of its note to Servia
which appeared to be irreconcilable to the independence of
Servia.... Unfortunately these pour parleurs in St. Petersburg and
Vienna were suddenly broken off by the quarrel being removed to the
more dangerous territory of a direct conflict between Germany and
Russia. Germany on July 31 stepped between the two with its double
ultimatum addressed to St. Petersburg and Paris.... A delay of a
few days in all probability would have spared Europe one of the
greatest wars in history.

On the other hand, be it remembered that the fact that any negotiations between Austria and Russia were carried on up to the last hour was solely the result of the uninterrupted German efforts to maintain peace, which fact Sir Maurice de Bunsen very wisely buries in silence. These negotiations, by the way, hardly were as promising of success as is made to appear. The Austrian version of it is found in the Vienna Fremdenblatt of Sept. 25, 1914. There the most important spots of Bunsen's report, that Austria-Hungary had been ready to moderate several points of its note to Servia, are mentioned, as follows:

As we are told by a well-informed source, these assertions do not
at all correspond to the facts; furthermore, from the very nature
of the steps undertaken by the dual monarchy in Belgrade, this
would have been entirely inconceivable.

A glance at the date shows that the Bunsen report is misleading, for he himself tells that Count Berchtold, on July 30, had expressed his consent to a continuation of the exchange of thought in Petersburg; the latter, therefore, could not begin before the 31st, while in the night from July 30 to 31 the mobilization of the entire Russian Army against Germany was ordered in Petersburg, finally making impossible the continuation of the last German attempt at mediation in Vienna.

The truth is, in spite of Russian and English twistings, that without the interval caused by Germany's efforts in Vienna, which interval England allowed to pass unused in Petersburg, the war would have broken out a few days sooner.

Let us consider how the fact of the Russian mobilization, the dimensions and tendency of which was brought to the knowledge of the London Cabinet at the very latest on July 24, must affect Germany.

On July 24 the Russian Government declared, in an official communiqué, it would be impossible for it to remain indifferent in an Austro-Servian conflict.

Germany's Hand Forced.

This declaration was followed immediately by military measures which represented the beginning of Russian mobilization long planned. But even on July 27 the Russian Minister of War, Suchomlinof, assured the German Military Attaché upon word of honor (Annex 11 of the German "White Paper") that no order for mobilization had been given and no reservists had been drawn and no horse had been commandeered.

Although in this conversation there had been left no doubt to the Russian Minister of War concerning the fact that measures of mobilization against Austria must be considered by Germany also as very threatening toward itself, during the next days news of the Russian mobilization arrived in quick succession.

On the 29th mobilization of Southern and Southwestern Russia was ordered, which was extended on the 30th to twenty-three provinces.

On the night of the 30th to the 31st, while the efforts of the Kaiser to maintain peace were continuing and were receiving friendly attention in Vienna, in St. Petersburg the mobilization of the entire Russian Army was ordered. Even as late as 2 P.M. on the 31st, however, (German "White Paper," Page 18, of NEW YORK TIMES reprint,) the Czar telegraphed the Kaiser that the military measures now being taken were meant for defensive purposes against Austria's preparations, and he gave his pledge as far away from desiring war.

In the face of such evident duplicity of Russian politics, a further delay such as was desired by Sir Maurice de Bunsen would have been for every German statesman a crime against the security of his own country.

On the other hand, upon what German measures did the Russian Government base its order for mobilization? The British "White Paper" proves how frivolously steps leading to the most serious results were ordered in St. Petersburg. On July 30 Sir George Buchanan telegraphed:

M. Sazonof told us that absolute proof was in possession of the
Russian Government that Germany was making military and naval
preparations against Russia, more particularly in the direction of
the Gulf of Finland,--(British "White Paper" No. 97.)

Proofs Lacking.

On the other hand, Buchanan's telegram of July 31 (British "White Paper" No. 113) states:

Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active
military preparations, and she cannot afford to let her get a
start.--(British "White Paper" No. 113.)

So, from one day to the next the "absolute proof" changed to a reason for the assumption. In reality, both were assertions that lack all proof.

The finishing part of a telegram sent by the British Ambassador in Berlin to Sir Edward Grey on July 31 deserves special mention:

He [the German Secretary of State] again assured me that both the
Emperor William, at the request of the Emperor of Russia and the
German Foreign Office, had even up till last night been urging
Austria to show willingness to continue discussion--and telephonic
communications from Vienna had been of a promising nature--but
Russia's mobilization had spoiled everything.--(British "White
Paper" No. 121.)

Therefore, the German Chancellor, in his memorandum placed before the Reichstag, stated with full justification:

The Russian Government has smashed the laborious attempts at
mediation on the part of the European State Chancelleries, on the
eve of success, by the mobilization, endangering the safety of the
empire. The measures for a mobilization, about whose seriousness
the Russian Government was fully acquainted from the beginning, in
connection with their constant denial, show clearly that Russia
wanted war.

To this is to be added that the English Government also was made
fully cognizant of the intentions of the Russian mobilization, by a
witness that could not be suspected, namely, its own representative
in St. Petersburg, and therefore must bear full responsibility.

* * * * *

II.

GREY'S OMISSIONS AND ERRORS.

We have seen from the "Blue Book" that the Secretary of State in London was informed at the very latest on July 24 by his Ambassador in St. Petersburg of the plan of the Russian mobilization and consequently of the tremendous seriousness of the European situation. Yet eight to nine days had to elapse before the beginning of the war. Let us see whether Sir Edward Grey used this time to preserve peace, according to his own documents.

From this testimony it appears that even at the beginning of the last and decisive part of the European crisis, which began on June 28, 1914, with the assassination of the Austrian heir to the throne, Sir Edward Grey refrained from considering a direct participation of his country in the possible world war. At least, this must be the impression gained from his remarks to the representatives of the two powers with whom England is today at war. Thus, he said to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Count Mensdorff, on July 23:

The possible consequences of the present situation were terrible.
If as many as four great powers of Europe--let us say Austria,
France, Russia, and Germany--were engaged in war, it seemed to me
that it must involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money and
such an interference with trade that a war would be accompanied or
followed by a complete collapse of European credit and
industry.--(British "White Paper" No. 3.)

Here Grey speaks only of four of the big powers at most that may go to war, without even hinting at the fifth, namely, England. On July 24 he had another conversation with the Austrian Ambassador, the theme of which was the note--meanwhile presented to Servia. It caused apprehensions on his part, but he declared again:

The merits of the dispute between Austria and Servia were not the
concern of his Majesty's Government....

I [Grey] ended by saying that doubtless we should enter into an
exchange of views with other powers, and that I must await their
views as to what could be done to mitigate the difficulties of the
situation.--(British "White Paper" No. 5.)

We are already striking the fateful peculiarity of Grey's policy to hesitate where prompt action, or at least a clear and open conduct, would have been his duty. This weakness of his nature has been used with great art by French and Russian diplomacy. This is illustrated by the conversation of July 24 between him and the French Ambassador, Cambon, in London:

M. Cambon said that, if there was a chance of mediation by the four
powers he had no doubt that his Government would be glad to join
in it; but he pointed out that we could not say anything in St.
Petersburg till Russia had expressed some opinion or taken some
action. But, when two days were over, Austria would march into
Servia, for the Servians could not possibly accept the Austrian
demand. Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take
action as soon as Austria attacked Servia, and, therefore, once the
Austrians had attacked Servia it would be too late for any
mediation.--(British "White Paper" No. 10.)

Thus, England must not give any advice to Russia before it knows Russia's intent and even its measures. But inasmuch as Austria will have proceeded against Servia by that time Russia must make war, and the conclusion is that even on July 24 the catastrophe is considered unavoidable. Grey shows himself more and more hypnotized by the fatalistic view that it is too late. Hence he reports also on July 24 a conversation of the German Ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky:

I reminded the German Ambassador that some days ago he had
expressed a personal hope that if need arose I would endeavor to
exercise moderating influence at St. Petersburg, but now I said
that, in view of the extraordinarily stiff character of the
Austrian note, the shortness of time allowed, and the wide scope of
the demands upon Servia, I felt quite helpless as far as Russia was
concerned, and I did not believe any power could exercise influence
alone.--(British "White Paper" No. 11.)

From a conversation of Grey with the Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador, on July 25:

Alone we could do nothing. The French Government were traveling
[this refers to the visit at St. Petersburg by Messrs. Poincaré and
Viviani] at the moment, and I had had no time to consult them, and
could not, therefore, be sure of their views.--(British "White
Paper" No. 25.)

If Sir Edward Grey sincerely desired the maintenance of peace, he must have had to use his entire influence at St. Petersburg to bring about the stopping of the threatening military measures taken by Russia, whereas he was waiting for the opinion of the French Government. He was bound to do this, so much the more in view of the fact that he demanded from Germany that it should exert its influence with Austria.

That this request of Grey's was complied with by Germany in so far as it was in any way in accord with the alliance with Austria-Hungary, and that in Vienna every effort was made to conciliate matters, is shown by the assurance of the Chancellor; he declares:

In spite of this [the Austro-Hungarian Government having remarked
with full appreciation of our action that it had come too late] we
continued our mediatory efforts to the utmost and advised Vienna to
make any possible compromise consistent with the dignity of the
monarchy.--(German "White Paper," Page 17, of NEW YORK TIMES
reprint.)

Grey well knew that Germany was doing all it could to mediate in Vienna. He expressed his recognition and his joy over it on July 28 ("Blue Book," Page 67):

It is very satisfactory to hear from the German Ambassador here
that the German Government have taken action at Vienna in the sense
of the conversation recorded in my telegram of yesterday to
you.--(British "White Paper" No. 67.)[02]

Neither has Grey been left in the dark by the German side concerning the difficulties, which by the Russian mobilization made every attempt to mediate in Vienna abortive. Even on July 31 the British Ambassador in Berlin telegraphed:

The Chancellor informs me that his efforts to preach peace and
moderation at Vienna have been seriously handicapped by the Russian
mobilization against Austria. He has done everything possible to
obtain his object at Vienna, perhaps even rather more than was
altogether palatable at the Ballplatz.--(British "White Paper" No.
108.)

England and Russia.

How, on the other hand, about Grey's action with Russia? From the very beginning one should have had a right to expect that, as Germany acted in Vienna, thus France, if it was active in Grey's spirit, would be working in St. Petersburg for peace. Of this no trace whatsoever can be found. The French Government thus far has not published any series of documents concerning its activity during the crisis, and neither in the Russian "Orange Book" nor in the English "Blue Book" is anything mentioned of the mediating activity on the part of France.

On the contrary, the latter power, wherever she puts in an appearance--as for instance in the conversation of the English Ambassador in St. Petersburg with his French colleague and M. Sazonof, as mentioned above--appears as fully identical with Russia.

It is also stated on July 24:

The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would
fulfill all the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia if
necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in all
diplomatic negotiations.... It seems to me from the language held,
by French Ambassador that even if we decline to join them, France
and Russia are determined to make a strong stand.--(British "White
Paper" No. 6.)

One should think that Grey, who in view of this could not possibly expect an influence for peace being brought to bear by France, but only a strengthening of the Russian desire for aggression, now would have acted in the most energetic manner in St. Petersburg for the maintenance of peace.

In reality, however, during the days that still remained, aside from a weak and in St. Petersburg absolutely ineffective advice to postpone mobilization, he did nothing whatsoever, and later placed himself in a manner constantly more recognizable on the side of Russia.

The claim that the time limit given by the Austrian note to Servia was the cause of the war, that Grey's mediation had only miscarried owing to the haste of Germany, is disproved by the British documents themselves. De Bunsen on July 26 telegraphed to Grey from Vienna:

Russian Ambassador just returned from leave, thinks that
Austro-Hungarian Government are determined on war and that it is
impossible for Russia to remain indifferent. He does not propose to
press for more time in the sense of your telegram of the 25th
inst.--(British "White Paper" No. 40.)

Therefore Russia has paid little attention to the very shy and timid efforts to maintain peace by the London Secretary of State, even where these were concerned in the attempt to change the position taken by Austria.

Another proof: Sazonof on July 27 sent a telegram to the Russian Ambassador in London which the latter transmitted to Grey, and which concerns itself with the much mentioned proposition of the latter to have the conflict investigated by a conference of the four great powers not immediately concerned.

Russian Sincerity Questioned.

The conference plan was declined without much hesitation and openly by Germany, because it was compelled to see therein an attempt to place Austria before a European court of arbitration, and because it knew the serious determination of its ally in this matter. But did Russia really want the conference? Minister Sazonof declares:

I replied to the [British] Ambassador that I have begun
conversations with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, under
conditions which I hope may be favorable. I have not, however,
received as yet any reply to the proposal made by me for revising
the note between the two Cabinets.--(British "White Paper" No.
53.)

Here it is shown plainly how little the conference plan was after the heart of the Russians. Had they accepted it it would have had to be done immediately. As soon as the situation had grown very much more serious by the failure of the negotiations with Austria-Hungary there would have been no more time for this.[03]

A telegram of the English Ambassador in St. Petersburg, dated July 27, (British "White Paper" No. 55,) shows how this conference was expected to be conducted in St. Petersburg:

His Excellency [Sazonof] said he was perfectly ready to stand aside
if the powers accepted the proposal for a conference, but he
trusted that you would keep in touch with the Russian Ambassador in
the event of its taking place.--(British "White Paper" No. 55.)