Chapter III: Front Matter (3)

Russian shrewdness evidently expected to control the conference by keeping in touch with Grey, who of course would have been the Chairman. The dispatches of his own Ambassadors lying before him should have enabled the Secretary of State to see the perfidy of the Russian policy. Buchanan wrote on the 28th from St. Petersburg:

... and asked him whether he would be satisfied with the assurance
which the Austrian Ambassador had, I understood, been instructed to
give in respect to Servia's integrity and independence.... In reply
his Excellency stated that if Servia were attacked Russia would not
be satisfied with any engagement which Austria might take on these
two points....--(British "White Paper" No. 72.)

Entirely in contrast herewith is one report of the British representative in Vienna, dated Aug. 1, and speaking of a conversation with the Russian Ambassador there:

Russia would, according to the Russian Ambassador, be satisfied
even now with assurance respecting Servian integrity and
independence. He said that Russia had no intention to attack
Austria.--(British "White Paper" No. 141.)

What, then, may one ask, was the opinion which Sir Edward Grey had formed concerning Russia's real intentions? He learns from Russian sources and notes faithfully that Russia will accept Austrian guarantees for independence of Servia, and also that it will not accept such guarantees. It is the same duplicity which Russia, when its own mobilization was concerned, showed toward Germany. Did Sir Edward not notice this duplicity, or did he not wish to notice it? If the documents of the English Government have not been selected with the purpose to confuse, then in London the decision to take part in the war does not seem to have been a certainty at the beginning. We have seen that Ambassador Buchanan in St. Petersburg on July 24 gave the Russian Minister to understand that England was not of a mind to go to war on account of Servia. This position, taken by the Ambassador, was approved by Sir Edward Grey on the following day in the following words:

I entirely approve what you said ... and I cannot promise more on
behalf of the Government.--(British "White Paper" No. 24.)

Based upon these instructions, Sir George Buchanan, even on July 27, stated to M. Sazonof, who continued to urge England to unconditionally join Russia and France:

I added that you [Grey] could not promise to do anything more, and
that his Excellency was mistaken if he believed that the cause of
peace could be promoted by our telling the German Government that
they would have to deal with us as well as with Russia and France
if she supported Austria by force of arms. Their [the German]
attitude would merely be stiffened by such a menace.--(British
"White Paper" No. 44.)

But on this same 27th day of July, Grey, submitting to the intrigues of Russian and French diplomacy, had committed one very fateful step (Telegram to Buchanan, July 27):

I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and
Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would
stand aside. His Excellency deplored the effect that such an
impression must produce. This impression ought, as I have pointed
out, to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the first fleet
which is concentrated, as it happens, at Portland not to disperse
for manoeuvre leave. But I explained to the Russian Ambassador that
my reference to it must not be taken to mean that anything more
than diplomatic action was promised.--(British "White Paper" No.
47.)

For Russia this order to the fleet meant very much more than a diplomatic action. Sazonof saw that the wind in London was turning in his favor and he made use of it. Among themselves the Russian diplomatists seem to have for a long time been clear and open in their discussion of their real object. You find among the documents of the Russian "Orange Book" the following telegram of Sazonof of July 25 to the Russian Ambassador in London:

In case of a new aggravation of the situation, possibly provoking
on the part of the great powers' united action, [des actions
conformes,] we count that England will not delay placing herself
clearly on the side of Russia and France, with the view to
maintaining the equilibrium of Europe, in favor of which she has
constantly intervened in the past, and which would without doubt be
compromised in the case of the triumph of Austria.--(Russian
"Orange Paper" No. 17.)

There is no mention of Servia here, but Austria should not triumph. Russia's real intention, of course, was not placed so nakedly before the British Secretary of State, hence to him the appearance was maintained that the little State of the Sawe was the only consideration, although the Russian Army was already being mobilized with all energy.

On the 28th he wires to the Russian Ambassador, Count Benckendorff, to London to inform the British Government:

It seems to me that England is in a better position than any other
power to make another attempt at Berlin to induce the German
Government to take the necessary action. There is no doubt
that the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin.--(British
"White Paper" No. 54.)

The opinion subtly suggested upon him by Paris and Petersburg diplomacy, namely, that he should not use any pressure upon Russia, but upon Germany, now takes hold of Grey more and more. On July 29 he writes to the German Ambassador as follows:

In fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by any method
that Germany thought possible if only Germany would "press the
button in the interests of peace."--(British "White Paper" No. 84.)

Petersburg, now assured of the support of Grey, becomes more and more outspoken for war. On the 28th Grey again expressed one of his softhearted propositions for peace. Mr. Sazonof hardly made the effort to hide his contempt. Buchanan telegraphs on the 29th as follows:

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that proposal referred to in
your telegram of the 28th inst. was one of secondary importance.
Under altered circumstances of situation he did not attach weight
to it.... Minister for Foreign Affairs had given me to understand
that Russia would not precipitate war by crossing frontier
immediately, and a week or more would in any case elapse before
mobilization was completed. In order to find an issue out of a
dangerous situation it was necessary that we should in the
meanwhile all work together.--(British "White Paper" No. 78.)

Naivete or Cynicism?

Here it really becomes impossible to judge where the naïveté of the British Secretary of State ends and cynicism begins, for Sazonof could not have told to him more plainly than in these lines that all Russia's ostensible readiness for peace served no other purpose than to win time to complete the strategical location of the Russian troops.

This point is emphasized by one document coming from a writer presumably unbiased, but presumably distrustful of Germany, wherein the confirmation is found that England and Russia had come to a full agreement during these days.

On July 30 the Belgian Chargé d'Affaires de l'Escaille in Petersburg reported to the Belgian Government upon the European crisis. Owing to the fast developing events of a warlike nature, this letter did not reach its address by mail, and it was published later on. The Belgian diplomatist writes:

It is undeniable that Germany tried hard here [that is, in
Petersburg] and in Vienna to find any means whatsoever in order to
forestall a general conflict....

And after M. de l'Escaille has told that Russia--what the Czar and his War Minister with their highest assurances toward Germany had denied--was mobilizing its own army, he continues:

Today at Petersburg one is absolutely convinced, yes, they have
even received assurances in that direction, that England and France
will stay by them. This assistance is of decisive importance and
has contributed much to the victory of the [Russian] war party.

This settles Grey's pretended "attempts at mediation." The truth is that British politics decided to prevent a diplomatic success of Germany and Austria, now worked openly toward the Russian aim. "The exertion of pressure upon Berlin" included already a certain threat, mingled with good advice.

On July 23 Grey had only spoken of four possible powers in war; hence when on the German side some hope of England maintaining neutrality was indulged in, this impression rested upon Grey's own explanations. On July 29, however, after a political conversation with Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador in London, he adds an important personal bit of information. He wires concerning it to Berlin, to Goschen:

After speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the
European situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite
private and friendly way, something that was on my mind. The
situation was very grave.... But if we failed in our efforts to
keep the peace, and if the issue spread so that it involved every
European interest, I did not wish to be open to any reproach from
him, that the friendly tone of all our conversations had misled him
or his Government into supposing that we should not take action....
But we knew very well that if the issue did become such that we
thought that British interests required us to intervene, we must
intervene at once and the decision would have to be very
rapid.--(British "White Paper" No. 89.)

But what is especially wrong is that Grey brought this warning, which only could have any effect if it remained an absolute, confidential secret between the English and German Governments, also to the French Ambassador, so that the entire Entente could mischievously look on and see whether Germany really would give in to British pressure. Of course, in his manner of swaying to and fro, he did not wish either that Cambon should not accept this information to the German Ambassador as a decided taking of a position on the part of England:

I thought it necessary [speaking to M. Cambon] to say that because
as he knew we were taking all precautions with regard to our fleet
and I was about to warn Prince Lichnowsky not to count on our
standing aside, but it would not be fair that I should let M.
Cambon be misled into supposing that we had decided what to do in a
contingency that I still hoped might not arise....--(British "White
Paper" No. 87.)

Stirring Up Trouble.

On the German side Grey's open threat, which was presented, however, with smooth and friendly sounding words, was received with quiet politeness. Goschen telegraphed on the 30th concerning a talk with State Secretary von Jagow:

His Excellency added that telegram received from Prince Lichnowsky
last night contains matter which he had heard with regret, but not
exactly with surprise, and, at all events, he thoroughly
appreciated the frankness and loyalty with which you had
spoken.--(British "White Paper" No. 98.)

Now the work of stirring up trouble is continued unceasingly. On July 30 the British Ambassador in Paris, Sir F. Bertie, concerning a conversation with the President of the Republic, reports:

He [Poincaré] is convinced that peace between the powers is in the
hands of Great Britain. If his Majesty's Government announced that
England would come to the aid of France in the event of a conflict
between France and Germany ... there would be no war, for Germany
would at once modify her attitude.--(British "White Paper" No. 99.)

Did Grey really think for one moment that the German Empire would change its position immediately, in other words, would suddenly leave its ally in need, or is all this only a mass of diplomatic blandishments?

On the same day Grey steps from the personal warning which he had given to the German Ambassador to the sharpest official threat. In a telegram to the Ambassador in Berlin upon the question placed before him by the Chancellor of the empire on the day prior, (British "White Paper" No. 85,) whether England would remain neutral if Germany would bind itself, after possible war, to claim no French territory in Europe whatever, while in lieu of the French colonies a like guarantee could not be accepted, Grey answers with thundering words:

His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the
Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to
neutrality on such terms. What he asks us in effect is to engage to
stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten, so
long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the
colonies. From a material point of view such a proposal is
unacceptable, for France without further territory in Europe being
taken from her could be so crushed as to lose her position as a
great power and become subordinate to German policy. Altogether
apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain
with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the
good name of this country could never recover.--(British "White
Paper" No. 101.)

With this telegram the war on Germany was practically declared, for as a price of British neutrality an open humiliation of Germany was demanded. If France--the question of French colonies is of very minor importance in this connection--must not be defeated by Germany, then England forbade the German Government to make war. It was furthermore stated that Germany was absolutely compelled to accept Russian-French dictates, and would have to leave Austria to its own resources. This would have meant Germany's retirement from the position of a great power, even if she had backed down before such a challenge.

* * * * *

III.

THE AGREEMENT WITH FRANCE.

Only in the light of the developments concerning England's relation to France, given at the beginning of the war, Grey's policy, swaying between indecision and precipitate action, becomes apparent.

In all the explanations which the British Government in the course of eight years had presented to the British Parliament concerning the relations to other large powers, the assurance had been repeated that no binding agreements with the two partners of the Franco-Russian alliance had been made, above all, that no agreement with France existed. Only in his speech in the House of Commons on Aug, 3, 1914, which meant the war with Germany, Grey gave to the representatives of the people news of certain agreements which made it a duty for Great Britain to work together with France in any European crisis.

The fateful document, which in the form of an apparently private letter to the French Ambassador, dealt with one of the most important compacts of modern history, was written toward the end of the year 1912, and is published in the British "White Paper" No. 105, Annex 1:

London Foreign Office, Nov. 22, 1912.

My Dear Ambassador:

From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and
military experts have consulted together. It has always been
understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of
either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to
assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation
between experts is not, and ought not to be, regarded as an
engagement that commits either Government to action in a
contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The
disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets
respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement
to co-operate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave
reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, it might
become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon
the armed assistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an
unprovoked attack by a third power, or something that threatened
the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other
whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression
and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be
prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the
plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into
consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect
should be given to them.

Yours, &c.,

E. GREY.

Was Parliament Deceived?

A few members of the English Parliament who on Aug. 3 dared to gingerly protest against the war may have had reason to complain about the hiding of facts from the House of Commons. When such understandings can be made without any one having an idea of their existence, then--so far as England is concerned--the supervision of the Government, theoretically being exercised by a Parliament, becomes a fiction.

Veiled Defensive Alliance.

As a matter of fact, Grey does not desire to have accepted as political obligations the conversations of the French and English Army and Navy General Staffs concerning the future plans of campaign which took place from time to time in times of peace. However, the true tendency of this agreement, for such it is, gives itself away in the promise to immediately enter with France into a political and military exchange of opinions in every critical situation; it means in realty nothing less than a veiled defensive alliance which by clever diplomatic manipulations can be changed without any difficulty to an offensive one, for inasmuch as the English Government promises to consult and work together with France, and consequently also with its ally, Russia, in every crisis, before a serious investigation of the moments of danger, it waives all right of taking an independent position.

How would England ever have been able to enter a war against France without throwing upon itself the accusation of faithlessness against one with whose plans for war it had become acquainted through negotiations lasting through years?

Here a deviation may be permissible, which leaves for a moment the basis of documentary proof.

If one considers how this agreement of such immeasurable consequences was not only hidden from the British Parliament by the Cabinet, but how to the very edge of conscious deceit its existence was denied--in the year 1913 Premier Asquith answered a query of a member of the House of Commons that there were no unpublished agreements in existence which in a case of war between European powers would interfere with or limit free decision on the part of the British Government or Parliament as to whether or not Britain should take part at a war--then certain reports making their appearance with great persistency in June, 1914, concerning an Anglo-Russian naval agreement are seen in a different light.

Persons who were acquainted with the happenings in diplomacy then stated that the Russian Ambassador in Paris, M. Iswolski, during the visit which the King of England and Sir Edward Grey were paying to Paris, had succeeded in winning the English statesmen for the plan of such an agreement. A formal alliance, it was said, was not being demanded by Russia immediately, for good reasons. M. Iswolski was attempting to go nearer to his goal, carefully, step by step.

It had been preliminarily agreed that negotiations should be started between the British Admiralty and the Russian Naval Attaché in London, Capt. Wolkow. As a matter of fact Wolkow during June went to St. Petersburg for a few days to, as was assumed, obtain instructions and then return to London.

Grey's "Twisty" Answer.

These happenings aroused so much attention in England that questions were raised in Parliament concerning them. It was noted how twisty Grey's answer was. He referred to the answer of the Premier, already mentioned, stated that the situation is unchanged, and said then that no negotiations were under way concerning a naval agreement with any foreign nation. "As far as he was able to judge the matter," no such negotiations would be entered into later on.

The big Liberal newspaper, The Manchester Guardian, was not at all satisfied with this explanation; it assumed that certain conditional preliminary agreements might not be excluded.

This Russian plan, which was later worked out in St. Petersburg, went into oblivion on account of the rapidly following European war. In the light of the following revelation of Grey's agreement with France, the news of the naval agreement desired by Iswolski assumed another aspect.

Let us return to the Anglo-French agreement. The following remarks by the French Ambassador in London, reported by Grey, prove that, on the ground of this agreement, France, with very little trouble, would be able to make out of a diplomatic entanglement a case for Allies' interest as far as England is concerned.

A German "Attack."

He [Cambon] anticipated that the [German] aggression would take the form of either a demand to cease her preparations or a demand that she should engage to remain neutral if there was war between Germany and Russia. Neither of these things would France admit.--(British "White Paper" No. 105.)

Therefore, even the demand addressed to France not to, jointly with Russia, attack Germany became a German "attack," which obliged England to come to the aid!

In spite of this, even on July 27 in a conversation with Cambon, Grey gave himself the appearance as if his hands were free. He told the Frenchman:

If Germany became involved and France became involved we had not
made up our minds what we should do; it was a case that we should
have to consider.... We were free from engagements and we should
have to decide what British interests required us to do.--(British
"White Paper" No. 87.)

M. Cambon remarked in reply that the Secretary of State had clearly pictured the situation, but on the very following day the French Ambassador took the liberty to remind Grey of the letter written in 1912. (British "White Paper" No. 105.)

Grey did not deny the claim implied in this reminder, but even as late as July 31 he reports as follows concerning the conversation with Cambon:

Up to the present moment we did not feel and public opinion
did not feel that any treaties or obligations of this country were
involved.... M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help
France if Germany made an attack on her. I said I could only adhere
to the answer that, as far as things had gone at present, we could
not take any engagement.... I said that the Cabinet would certainly
be summoned as soon as there was some new development; that at the
present moment the only answer I could give was that we could not
undertake any definite engagement.--(British "White Paper" No.
119.)

Now, if we remember that even on the day before Grey had informed the German Imperial Chancellor that it would be a shame for England to remain neutral and allow France to be crushed, we here find a new proof of the unreliability of his conduct. If he has been gullible, the declaration of 1912, the dangerous character of which is increased by its apparently undefined tenor, has enmeshed him more and more. Also the military and naval circles, whose consultations with the representatives of the French Army and Navy certainly have been continued diligently since the beginning of the Servian crisis, were forcing toward a decision.

At all events, it became more impossible with every hour for Germany to keep England out of the way by any offers whatsoever. This is proved by Grey's conversation of Aug. 1 with the German Ambassador:

He asked me whether if Germany gave a promise not to violate
Belgian neutrality we would engage to remain neutral. I replied
that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were
considering what our attitude should be.... The Ambassador pressed
me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would
remain neutral. I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any
promise.... (British "White Paper" No. 123.)

Belgium Not the Cause.

Hence, only if Germany would permit herself to be humiliated war with England could be avoided. The violation of Belgium's neutrality was in no way the cause of England joining Germany's enemies, for while German troops did not enter Belgium until the night from Aug. 3 to 4, Grey gave on Aug. 2 the following memorandum to the French Ambassador after a session of the Cabinet in London:

I am authorized to give an assurance that if the German fleet comes
into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile
operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet
will give all the protection in its power.--(British "White Paper"
No. 148.)

As the aim of this decision, of which M. Cambon was informed verbally, was to give France an assurance that it would be placed in a position "to settle the disposition of its own Mediterranean fleet," Grey would not accept the version of Cambon that England would take part in a war with Germany. This is a case of splitting hairs in order to put the blame of starting the war on Germany, for while England promised to protect the French coast and to make it possible for the French fleet to stay in the Mediterranean, she almost immediately proceeded to a warlike action against Germany, especially as the English Minister simultaneously refused to bind himself to maintain even this peculiar neutrality.

* * * * *

IV.

BELGIAN NEUTRALITY.

The highest representatives of the German Empire with emphatic seriousness declared that it was with a heavy heart and only following the law of self-preservation that they decided to violate the neutrality of the Kingdom of Belgium, guaranteed by the great powers in the treaties of 1831 and 1839.

The German Secretary of State on Aug. 4 informed the English Government through the embassy in London that Germany intended to retain no Belgian territory, and added:

Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German Army could not be
exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned,
according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had
consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being with her a
question of life or death to prevent French advance.--(British
"White Paper" No. 157.)

In answer Grey caused the English Ambassador in Berlin to demand his passports and to tell the German Government that England would take all steps for defense of Belgian neutrality. This, therefore, represents, in the view which very cleverly has been spread broadcast by British publicity, the real reason for the war. But in spite of the moral indignation that is apparent against Germany, the consideration for Belgium, up until very late, does not seem in any way to have been in the foreground. We find on July 31 Grey stated to Cambon:

The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not
say a decisive, but an important, factor in determining our
attitude.--(British "White Paper" No. 119.)

Here, therefore, there was no talk about England grasping the sword on account of Belgium. Now no one will claim that the assumption that the German troops could march through Belgium would be new or unheard of. For years this possibility had been discussed in military literature.[04]

This expression on the part of the historical Faculty is very interesting. It shows that a plan of campaign between the English and French had long been considered, and that the Belgian entry into the alliance against Germany was a matter agreed upon.

A Sudden Decision.

It must also be assumed that the Belgian Government knew toward the end of July at the latest that the war between Germany and France was probable and the march of Germans through Belgium very possible.

If England had not taken part in the war against Germany, it may be assumed that it would have given Belgium the advice to permit the marching through of the German Army, somewhat in the same manner as the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg did, with a protest. In doing so the Belgian people would have been spared a great deal of misery and loss of blood. On Aug. 3 the Belgian Government replied to an offer of military help by France as follows:

We are sincerely grateful to the French Government for offering
eventual support. In the actual circumstances, however, we do not
propose to appeal to the guarantee of the powers. Belgian
Government will decide later on the action which they may think
necessary to take.--(British "White Paper" No. 151.)

One day later London decided to make Belgian neutrality the cause of the war against Germany before the eyes of the world. The Ambassador in Brussels received the following orders:

You should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to
them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, his
Majesty's Government expects that they will resist by any means in
their power and that his Majesty's Government will support them in
offering such resistance, and that his Majesty's Government in this
event are prepared to join Russia and France.--(British "White
Paper" No. 155.)

Not until England thus stirred Belgium up, holding out the deceptive hope of effective French and English help, did Belgian fanaticism break loose against Germany. Without the intervention of England in Brussels the events in Belgium, one may safely assert, would have taken an entirely different course, which would have been far more favorable to Belgium.

But, of course, England had thus found a very useful reason for war against Germany. Even on the 31st of July Grey had spoken of the violation of Belgian neutrality as not a decisive factor. On Aug. 1 he declined to promise Prince Lichnowsky England's neutrality, even if Germany would not violate Belgium's neutrality. On Aug. 4, however, the Belgian question was the cause that suddenly drove England to maintain the moral fabric of the world and to draw the sword.

This suddenly became the new development, which was still lacking for Grey in order to justify this war before public opinion in England.

Another English Advantage.

And something else was secured by the drawing of Belgium into the war by the British Government, which had decided to make war on Germany for entirely different reasons: the thankful part of the protector of the weak and the oppressed.

As an English diplomat, when Russia was mobilizing, openly stated, the interests of his country in Servia were nil, so for Grey even Belgium, immediately before the break with Germany, was not decisive. However, when England had irrevocably decided to enter the war it stepped out before the limelight of the world as the champion of--the small nations.

* * * * *

[02] Recently a book entitled "Why We Make War," in defense of Great Britain, appeared at Oxford, as the authors of which "Members of the Faculty for Modern History in Oxford" are mentioned. This work undertakes, on the ground of the official publications, to whitewash Grey's policy, and of course incidentally the Russian policy. All together this publication, parading in the gown of science, is contradicted by our own presentation of the facts; it may be mentioned also that this work contains in part positive untruths. Thus it states on Page 70 (retranslation):

No diplomatic pressure whatever was exerted [by Germany] on Vienna,
which, under the protection of Berlin, was permitted to do with
Servia as she liked.

Grey's own words contradict this assertion.

[03] In the aforementioned book of the Oxford historians there is stated on Page 69 (retranslation):

This mediation [namely, Grey's mediation proposition] had already
been accepted, by Russia on July 25th.

We have shown in the foregoing that the Russian Government did in no manner subscribe to the conference plan in binding terms. As an additional proof, a part of Buchanan's dispatch of the 25th may be mentioned:

He [Sazonof] would like to see the question placed on international
footing.... If Servia should appeal to the powers, Russia would be
quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of
England, France, Germany, and Italy. It would be possible in his
opinion that Servia might propose to submit the question to
arbitration.--(British "White Paper" No. 17.)

Hence, not if England, but only if Servia would propose arbitration by the powers, Mr. Sazonof was willing! The most amusing part of this is that the Russian Minister himself considers such a proposition on the part of Servia merely as "possible"; evidently it would have appeared as a great condescension on the part of the Government at Belgrade if it, standing on the same basis as Austria-Hungary, would appear before a European tribunal! For us there is no additional proof necessary that a mediation conference, which for Austria was not acceptable even when proposed by England, would be unthinkable if the move for such came from Servia. In expressing such an idea. Mr. Sazonof proved that it was his intention to bring war about.

[04] The book, which appeared at Oxford, "Why We Are at War," mentioned previously states on Page 27 (retranslation):

That such a plan [the marching through Luxemburg and Belgium] had
been taken into consideration by the Germans has been known in
England generally for several years; and it has also been generally
accepted that the attempt to carry out this plan would bring about
the active resistance of the British armed forces: one assumed that
these would be given the task of assisting the left wing of the
French, which would have to resist German advance from Belgian
territory.

* * * * *

"Truth About Germany"

* * * * *

Attested by Thirty-four German Dignitaries.[05]

Board of Editors.

Paul Dehn, Schriftsteller, Berlin.

Dr. Drechsler, Direktor des Amerika-Instituts, Berlin.

Matthias Erzberger, Mitglied des Reichstags, Berlin.

Prof. Dr. Francke, Berlin.

B. Huldermann, Direktor der Hamburg-Amerika Linie, Hamburg.

Dr. Ernst Jaeckh, Berlin.

D. Naumann, Mitglied des Reichstags, Berlin.

Graf von Oppersdorff, Mitglied des preussischen Herrenhauses,
Mitglied des Reichstags, Berlin.

Graf zu Reventlow, Schriftsteller, Charlottenburg.

Dr. Paul Rohrbach, Dozent an der Handelshochschule, Berlin.

Dr. Schacht, Direktor der Dresdner Bank, Berlin.

Honorary Committee.

Ballin, Vorsitzender des Direktoriums der Hamburg-Amerika Linie,
Hamburg.

Fürst von Bülow, Hamburg.

Dr. R.W. Drechsler, Direktor des Amerika-Instituts, Berlin.

D. Dryander, Ober-Hof-und Domprediger, Berlin.

Dr. Freiherr von der Goltz, Generalfeldmarschall, Berlin.

Von Gwinner, Direktor der Deutschen Bank, Berlin.

Prof. Dr. von Harnack, Berlin.

Fürst von Hatzfeldt, Herzog zu Trachenberg.

Dr. Heineken, Direktor des Norddeutschen Lloyds, Bremen.

Fürst Henckel von Donnersmarck.

Dr. Kaempf, Praesident des Reichstags, Berlin.

Prof. Dr. Eugen Kühnemann, Breslau.

Prof. Dr. Lamprecht, Leipsic.

Dr. Theodor Lewald, Direktor im Reichsamt des Innern, Berlin.

Franz von Mendelssohn, Praesident der Handelskammer, Berlin.

Fürst Münster-Derneburg, Mitglied des Herrenhauses.

Graf von Oppersdorff, Mitglied des Herrenhauses und des Reichstags,
Berlin.

Graf von Posadowsky-Wehner.

Dr. Walther Rathenau, Berlin.

Viktor Herzog von Ratibor.

Dr. Schmidt, Ministerialdirektor, Berlin.

Prof. Dr. von Schmoller, Berlin.

Graf von Schwerin-Löwitz, Praesident des Hauses der Abgeordneten.

Wilhelm von Siemens, Berlin.

Friedrich Fürst zu Solms-Baruth.

Max Warburg, Hamburg.

Siegfried Wagner, Baireuth.

* * * * *

Try to realize, every one of you, what we are going through! Only a few weeks ago all of us were peacefully following our several vocations. The peasant was gathering in this Summer's plentiful crop, the factory hand was working with accustomed vigor. Not one human being among us dreamed of war. We are a nation that wishes to lead a quiet and industrious life. This need hardly be stated to you Americans. You, of all others, know the temper of the German who lives within your gates. Our love of peace is so strong that it is not regarded by us in the light of a virtue, we simply know it to be an inborn and integral portion of ourselves. Since the foundation of the German Empire in the year 1871, we, living in the centre of Europe, have given an example of tranquillity and peace, never once seeking to profit by any momentary difficulties of our neighbors. Our commercial extension, our financial rise in the world, is far removed from any love of adventure, it is the fruit of painstaking and plodding labor.

We are not credited with this temper, because we are insufficiently known. Our situation and our way of thinking are not easily grasped.

Every one is aware that we have produced great philosophers and poets, we have preached the gospel of humanity with impassioned zeal. America fully appreciates Goethe and Kant, looks upon them as cornerstones of elevated culture. Do you really believe that we have changed our natures, that our souls can be satisfied with military drill and servile obedience? We are soldiers because we have to be soldiers, because otherwise Germany and German civilization would be swept away from the face of the earth. It has cost us long and weary struggles to attain our independence, and we know full well that, in order to preserve it, we must not content ourselves with building schools and factories, we must look to our garrisons and forts. We and all our soldiers have remained, however, the same lovers of music and lovers of exalted thought. We have retained our old devotion to all peaceable sciences and arts; as all the world knows, we work in the foremost rank of all those who strive to advance the exchange of commodities, who further useful technical knowledge. But we have been forced to become a nation of soldiers in order to be free. And we are bound to follow our Kaiser, because he symbolizes and represents the unity of our nation. Today, knowing no distinction of party, no difference of opinion, we rally around him, willing to shed the last drop of our blood. For though it takes a great deal to rouse us Germans, when once aroused our feelings run deep and strong. Every one is filled with this passion, with the soldier's ardor. But when the waters of the deluge shall have subsided, gladly will we return to the plow and to the anvil.

It deeply distresses us to see two highly civilized nations, England and France, joining the onslaught of autocratic Russia. That this could happen will remain one of the anomalies of history. It is not our fault; we firmly believed in the desirability of the great nations working together, we peaceably came to terms with France and England in sundry difficult African questions. There was no cause for war between Western Europe and us, no reason why Western Europe should feel itself constrained to further the power of the Czar.

The Czar, as an individual, is most certainly not the instigator of the unspeakable horrors that are now inundating Europe. But he bears before God and posterity the responsibility of having allowed himself to be terrorized by an unscrupulous military clique.

Ever since the weight of the crown has pressed upon him, he has been the tool of others. He did not desire the brutalities in Finland, he did not approve of the iniquities of the Jewish pogroms, but his hand was too weak to stop the fury of the reactionary party. Why would he not permit Austria to pacify her southern frontier? It was inconceivable that Austria should calmly see her heir apparent murdered. How could she? All the nationalities under her rule realized the impossibility of tamely allowing Servia's only too evident and successful intrigues to be carried on under her very eyes. The Austrians could not allow their venerable and sorely stricken monarch to be wounded and insulted any longer. This reasonable and honorable sentiment on the part of Austria has caused Russia to put itself forward as the patron of Servia, as the enemy of European thought and civilization.

Russia has an important mission to fulfill in its own country and in Asia. It would do better in its own interest to leave the rest of the world in peace. But the die is cast, and all nations must decide whether they wish to further us by sentiments and by deeds, or the government of the Czar. This is the real significance of this appalling struggle, all the rest is immaterial. Russia's attitude alone has forced us to go to war with France and with their great ally.

The German Nation is serious and conscientious. Never would a German Government dare to contemplate a war for the sake of dynastic interest, or for the sake of glory. This would be against the entire bent of our character. Firmly believing in the justice of our cause, all parties, the Conservatives and the Clericals, the Liberals and the Socialists, have joined hands. All disputes are forgotten, one duty exists for all, the duty of defending our country and vanquishing the enemy.

Will not this calm, self-reliant and unanimous readiness to sacrifice all, to die or to win, appeal to other nations and force them to understand our real character and the situation in which we are placed?

The war has severed us from the rest of the world, all our cable communications are destroyed. But the winds will carry the mighty voice of justice even across the ocean. We trust in God, we have confidence in the judgment of right-minded men. And through the roar of battle, we call to you all. Do not believe the mischievous lies that our enemies are spreading about! We do not know if victory will be ours, the Lord alone knows. We have not chosen our path, we must continue doing our duty, even to the very end. We bear the misery of war, the death of our sons, believing in Germany, believing in duty.

And we know that Germany cannot be wiped from the face of the earth.

* * * * *

[05]

"Athenwood," Newport, R.I.,

Sept. 17, 1914.

Today I have received from Germany a pamphlet entitled "Truth About
Germany, Facts About the War." The correctness and completeness of
its statements are vouched for by thirty-four persons, whose names
are recorded therein as members of an Honorary Committee. I know
personally seventeen of these thirty-four persons, and have known
them for years, some of them intimately. With six of them I have
labored as a colleague in university work. I have been introduced
into their homes, have broken bread at their tables and have
conversed with them long and often upon the problems of life and
culture. They are among the greatest thinkers, moralists and
philanthropists of the age. They are the salt of the earth! The
great theologian Harnack, the sound and accomplished political
scientist and economist von Schmoller, the distinguished
philologian von Wilamowitz, the well-known historian Lamprecht, the
profound statesman von Posadowsky, the brilliant diplomatist von
Bülow, the great financier von Gwinner, the great promoter of trade
and commerce Ballin, the great inventor Siemens, the brilliant
preacher of the Gospel Dryander, the indispensable Director in the
Ministry of Education Schmidt. Two of them are, in a sense, our own
countrywomen, the Baroness Speck von Sternburg and Frau
Staats-minister von Trott zu Solz. The latter is the granddaughter
of our own John Jay. I have known her, her mother and her
grandfather. No statement was ever issued which was vouched for by
more solid, intelligent, and conscientious people. Its correctness,
completeness and veracity cannot be doubted. As I read it the
emotions which it arouses make both speech and sight difficult. I
wish it might come into the hands of every man, woman, and child in
the United States.

(Signed) JOHN W. BURGESS,

Ex-Dean Faculties of Political Science, Philosophy, Pure Science
and Fine Arts, Columbia University; Roosevelt Professor of American
History and Institutions at Friedrich Wilhelms University, Berlin,
1906; Visiting American Professor at Austrian Universities,
1914-15.

Under the head of "An Anti-British Pamphlet," The London Times of Aug. 23, 1914, noted as follows:

The Vossischezeitung gives extracts from a brochure issued under
the auspices of a committee of such prominent Germans as Prince
Bülow, Herr Ballin, Dr. von Gwinner, and Field Marshal von der
Goltz, for the purpose of "opening the eyes" of the United States
regarding the causes of the present war. Copies of this pamphlet
are being given to all Americans returning home from Germany. One
chapter, headed "Neutrality by Grace of England," scoffs at the
idea of England today being the defender of neutral States and
declares that it was England who in 1911 was ready to land 160,000
men at Antwerp to help the French against the Germans.

As to who will ultimately win in the war, the pamphlet asks whether
it will be the striving nation, the young strength, or the old
peoples, France and England, with their flagging civilization in
alliance with Muscovite retrogression.

* * * * *

HOW THE WAR CAME ABOUT.

Who is responsible for the war?--Not Germany! England's policy! Her shifting of responsibility and promoting the struggle while alone possessing power to avert it.

It is an old and common experience that after the outbreak of a war the very parties and persons that wanted the war, either at once or later, assert that the enemy wanted and began it. The German Empire especially always had to suffer from such untruthful assertions, and the very first days of the present terrible European war confirm again this old experience. Again Russian, French, and British accounts represent the German Empire as having wanted the war.

Only a few months ago influential men and newspapers of Great Britain as well as of Paris could be heard to express the opinion that nobody in Europe wanted war and that especially the German Emperor and his Government had sincerely and effectively been working for peace. Especially the English Government, in the course of the last two years, asserted frequently and publicly, and was supported by The Westminster Gazette and a number of influential English newspapers in the assertion, that Great Britain and the German Empire during the Balkan crisis of the last few years had always met on the same platform for the preservation of peace. The late Secretary of State, von Kiderlen-Waechter, his successor, Mr. von Jagow, and the Imperial Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, likewise declared repeatedly in the Reichstag, how great their satisfaction was that a close and confidential diplomatic co-operation with Great Britain, especially in questions concerning the Near East, had become a fact. And it has to be acknowledged today that at that time the German and British interests in the Near East were identical or at any rate ran in parallel lines.

The collapse of European Turkey in the war against the Balkan Alliance created an entirely new situation. At first Bulgaria was victorious and great, then it was beaten and humiliated by the others with the intellectual help of Russia. There could be no doubt about Russia's intentions: she was preparing for the total subjection of weakened Turkey and for taking possession of the Dardanelles and Constantinople in order to rule from this powerful position Turkey and the other Balkan States. Great Britain and the German Empire, which only had economic interests in Turkey, were bound to wish to strengthen Turkey besides trying to prevent the Muscovite rule on the whole Balkan peninsula.

Servia had come out of the second Balkan war greatly strengthened and with her territory very much increased. Russia had done everything to strengthen this bitter enemy of our ally, Austria-Hungary. For a great number of years Servian politicians and conspirators had planned to undermine the southeastern provinces of Austria-Hungary and to separate them from the Dual Monarchy. In Servia as well as in Russia prevailed the opinion that, at the first attack, Austria-Hungary would fall to pieces. In this case Servia was to receive South Austria and Russia was to dictate the peace in Vienna. The Balkan war had ruined Turkey almost entirely, had paralyzed Bulgaria, that was friendly, and had strengthened the Balkan States that were hostile to Austria. At the same time there began in Rumania a Russian and French propaganda, that promised this country, if it should join the dual alliance, the Hungarian Province of Siebenbuergen.

Thus it became evident in Germany and in Austria that at St. Petersburg, first by diplomatic and political, then also by military, action a comprehensive attack of Slavism under Russian guidance was being prepared. The party of the Grand Dukes in St. Petersburg, the party of the Russian officers, always ready for war, and the Pan-Slavists, the brutal and unscrupulous representatives of the idea that the Russian Czarism was destined to rule Europe--all these declared openly that their aim was the destruction of Austria-Hungary. In Russia the army, already of an immense size, was increased secretly but comprehensively and as quick as possible; in Servia the same was done, and the Russian Ambassador in Belgrade, Mr. von Hartwig, was, after the second Balkan war, the principal promoter of the plan to form against Austria a new Balkan alliance. In Bosnia, during all this time, the Servian propaganda was at work with high treason, and in the end with revolver and the bomb.

In Vienna and in Berlin the greatness and the purpose of the new danger could not remain doubtful, especially as it was openly said in St. Petersburg, in Belgrade, and elsewhere that the destruction of Austria-Hungary was imminent. As soon as the Balkan troubles began Austria-Hungary had been obliged to put a large part of her army in readiness for war, because the Russians and Servians had mobilized on their frontiers. The Germans felt that what was a danger for their ally was also a danger for them and that they must do all in the power to maintain Austria-Hungary in the position of a great power. They felt that this could only be done by keeping perfect faith with their ally and by great military strength, so that Russia might possibly be deterred from war and peace be preserved, or else that, in case war was forced upon them, they could wage it with honor and success. Now it was clear in Berlin that in view of the Russian and Servian preparations, Austria-Hungary, in case of a war, would be obliged to use a great part of her forces against Servia and therefore would have to send against Russia fewer troops than would have been possible under the conditions formerly prevailing in Europe. Formerly even European Turkey could have been counted upon for assistance, that after her recent defeat seemed very doubtful. These reasons and considerations, which were solely of a defensive nature, led to the great German military bills of the last two years. Also Austria-Hungary was obliged to increase its defensive strength.

Whoever considers carefully the course of events that has been briefly sketched here will pronounce the assertion of our enemies, that Germany wanted the war, ridiculous and absurd. On the contrary, it can be said that Germany never before endeavored more eagerly to preserve peace than during the last few years. Germany had plenty of opportunities to attack and good opportunities to boot, for we knew for years that the army of France was no more ready than that of Russia. But the Germans are not a warlike nation and the German Emperor, with his Government, has always shown how earnestly he meant his reiterated assertions that the preservation of peace was his principal aim. He was actuated in this by general considerations of humanity, justice, and culture, as well as by the consideration of the German trade and commerce. This, especially the transoceanic commerce of Germany, has increased from year to year. War, however, means the ruin of commerce. Why expose Germany needlessly to this terrible risk, especially as everything in Germany prospered and her wealth increased? No, the German Army bills were merely meant to protect us against, and prepare us for, the attacks of Muscovite barbarism. But nobody in Germany has ever doubted for a moment that France would attack us at the first Russian signal. Since the first days of the Franco-Russian alliance things have become entirely reversed. Then France wanted to win Russia for a war of revenge against Germany; now, on the contrary, France thought herself obliged to place her power and her existence at the disposal of the Russian lust of conquest.

In the Spring of 1914 the German press reported from St. Petersburg detailed accounts of Russia's comprehensive preparations for war. They were not denied in Russia, and Paris declared that Russia would be ready in two or three years and then pursue a policy corresponding to her power; France, too, would then be at the height of her power. If the German Government had desired war, on the strength of these accounts, which were true, it could have waged a preventive war at once and easily. It did not do so, considering that a war is just only when it is forced upon one by the enemy. Thus Spring went by with the atmosphere at high tension. From St. Petersburg and Paris overbearing threats came in increasing numbers to the effect that the power of the Dual Alliance was now gigantic and that Germany and Austria soon would begin to feel it. We remained quiet and watchful, endeavoring with perseverance and with all our might to win over Great Britain to the policy of preserving peace. Colonial and economic questions were being discussed by the German and English Governments, and the cordiality between the two great powers seemed only to be equaled by their mutual confidence.