Chapter IV: =Differentiation of Morality=

148. Pupils at once active and kindly are not rare, and so far as the ideas of perfection and good-will are concerned, give rise to no anxiety, at least not at first. With a firm government, moreover, they are easily induced to make the golden rule their own, and they soon become disposed to yield in contention, or rather, become more careful about picking a quarrel. Accordingly, with reference also to equity and justice, they cause little anxiety. In time they gain mental balance, the basis of genuine self-control, and are now on the road to inner freedom. In short, they are in possession of that which, in the light of fundamental ethical ideas, constitutes morality.

But these constituents of moral conduct are not found together in every one, nor do they always remain together. Side by side with the praiseworthy traits mentioned, others of an opposite nature frequently manifest themselves; it becomes evident that the latter are not excluded, and thus the former do not determine the character.

149. In order to exclude the morally evil, the praiseworthy traits of the objective side of character need to be reinforced by the good resolutions of the subjective part.

These resolutions, to be worth anything morally, must rest on that theoretical judgment whereby the pupil through examples comes to distinguish between better and worse in willing. As long as his judging lacks clearness, energy, and completeness, his resolutions are without a foundation in his mind and heart. They are hardly more than memorized words.

When, on the other hand, the theoretical judgment has become interwoven with the totality of interest growing out of experience, social intercourse, and instruction, it creates a warm affection for the good wherever found, an affection which influences not only all of the pupil’s efforts of will, but also the manner in which he assimilates what instruction and life henceforth offer.

150. Finally, in order to fortify moral decisions, we must avail ourselves of the assistance derived from the logical cultivation of maxims, from the systematic unification of the same, and from their constant application in life.

Here the organic connection between character growth and the formation of habits of reflection becomes apparent; training is, therefore, obviously unable to accomplish its work except in conjunction with instruction.

As soon as a pupil gets a clear notion that a presented ideal of
conduct promotes the true realization of his own being, he is
in a position to acquire an interest in reaching that ideal. An
end, hitherto remote, comes nearer, so that it begins to exercise
influence upon the conduct that leads to it. Convention, appeal,
or even compulsion from without, are now reinforced by the good
resolutions arising from the pupil’s own subjective states. Here we
see the interaction of intellectual and emotional capacities. The
intellect perceives relations, thus bringing into consciousness a new
ideal; this distant end is mediated inasmuch as desire or feeling
impels the pupil to enter upon a course of conduct whose stages lead
to the ideal goal.[15]

[15] See Dewey, “Interest as Related to Will,” reprint by the National Herbart Society for 1899, pp. 15–16.