Chapter I: =The Ethical Basis=

8. The term _virtue_ expresses the whole purpose of education. Virtue is the idea of inner freedom which has developed into an abiding actuality in an individual. Whence, as inner freedom is a relation between insight and volition, a double task is at once set before the teacher. It becomes his business to make actual each of these factors separately, in order that later a permanent relationship may result.

Insight is conceived as the perception of what is right or wrong.
This perception is founded on the spontaneous, or intuitive, feeling
that arises in the mind when certain elementary will-relations are
presented to the intelligence. The unperverted mind has a natural
antipathy to strife, malevolence, injustice, selfishness; it has a
corresponding approval of harmony, good-will, justice, benevolence.
These feelings arise, naturally, only when the appropriate ideas are
present. Insight, therefore, is a state of feeling or disposition
arising from knowledge, or ideas.

When volition has come into permanent accord with educated insight,
virtue has been attained. Conscience approves every virtuous
act; it disapproves every deviation from virtue. Inner freedom,
therefore, is marked by approving conscience; lack of it, by accusing
conscience. The development of virtuous character is not so easy,
however, as might appear from these simple statements, for virtue
has a shifting, not to say a developing character. Elementary as the
fundamental ethical ideas may be when presented in the home or in
the kindergarten, they are not elementary when met with in modern
civilization. At times virtue has been of a military character, as
in Sparta and Rome; at other times it has been ecclesiastical, as in
the Middle Ages. At the present time, in addition to all that it has
ever been from a purely Christian character, it is civil, social,
industrial. Virtue in a modern city has a content quite different
from that in a pioneer mining camp. Furthermore, virtue is uneven in
its development. The race has, for instance, been trained long and
hard to respect unprotected property, so that we may fairly say such
respect has become instinctive; yet when unprotected property comes
into new relations to the individual, as in the case of borrowed
books, we may find only a rudimentary conscience. What scholar is not
a sufferer from this form of unripe virtue?

9. But even here at the outset we need to bear in mind the identity of morality with the effort put forth to realize the permanent actuality of the harmony between insight and volition. To induce the pupil to make this effort is a difficult achievement; at all events, it becomes possible only when the twofold training mentioned above is well under way. It is easy enough, by a study of the example of others, to cultivate theoretical acumen; the moral application to the pupil himself, however, can be made, with hope of success, only in so far as his inclinations and habits have taken a direction in keeping with his insight. If such is not the case, there is danger lest the pupil, after all, knowingly subordinate his correct theoretical judgment to mere prudence. It is thus that evil in the strict sense originates.

It is helpful to give the pupil abundant opportunity to pass judgment
upon the moral quality of actions not his own. The best opportunities
are at first the most impersonal ones, for where the child himself is
immediately concerned, the quality of his judgment may be impaired
by intense personal feelings, such as fear of blame or punishment.
Literature furnishes the earliest and most copious examples; later,
history may be helpful, though there is great danger of taking
partial or mistaken views as to the moral quality of historical
deeds. A selection of literature is an artistic whole. All the
relations can be easily perceived, but any given historical event is
likely to be a small section of a whole too vast for the youthful
mind to comprehend. It is for this reason that caution is needed when
passing judgment upon historical facts.

To encourage the child to pass judgment in these impersonal cases
is to sharpen his natural perceptions of right and wrong, and
to influence his disposition favorably. One who has been led
to condemn cruelty to animals in this way is likely to be more
thoughtful himself, and less disposed wantonly to inflict pain. But
every resource of authority and persuasion, as well as appeal to
sensibility and conscience, must be employed to make virtuous action
habitual, and to prevent the generation of evil.

10. Of the remaining practical or ethical concepts, the idea of perfection points to health of body and mind; it implies a high regard for both, and their systematic cultivation.

Perfection here means _completeness of efficiency_, rather than
acquisition of holiness. An efficient will is strong, vigorous,
decided; it is self-consistent in the pursuit of leading purposes,
not vacillating or incoherent. Still, the idea of moral perfection is
not a remote one, for, in order to be thoroughly efficient, a will
must be in substantial accord with the ethical order of a rational
society. All its deviations from established law and custom will be
for their improvement, not for the destruction of what is good in
them.

11. The idea of good-will counsels the educator to ward off temptation to ill-will as long as such temptation might prove dangerous. It is essential, on the other hand, to imbue the pupil with a feeling of respect for good-will.

Good-will is one of the three concrete virtues lying at the basis of
social order. It is both _passive_, as in _laissez faire_ attitudes
of mind, and _active_ as in thoroughgoing civic, business, and social
coöperation. School training must seek to impress the mind with
respect for the active rather than the passive type of good-will.
So, too, must it ward off the dangers both of passive and active
ill-will, as manifested, in covetousness, malice, malevolence, envy,
treachery, stinginess, cruelty, hard-heartedness. How these ends may
be attained, will be considered later.

12. The idea of justice demands that the pupil abstain from contention. It demands, furthermore, reflection on strife, so that respect for justice may strike deep root.

No idea appeals more strongly to the unperverted youthful mind than
that of justice or fair play; even the gentlest natures become
indignant at manifestations of injustice. The basis of the idea is,
in the thought of our author, our natural displeasure in contention
over that which, in the nature of the case, only one person can
have. Primarily, it concerns property rights, but secondarily it may
extend to other relations in which two or more wills are at issue.
Justice in the acquisition, possession, and disposition of wealth is
the theme of the greater part of every judicial system. The idea of
justice is the second of the three concrete moral virtues necessary
for civilized society.

13. The idea of equity is especially involved in cases where the pupil has merited punishment as requital for the intentional infliction of pain. Here the degree of punishment must be carefully ascertained and acknowledged as just.

=Note.=--This kind of punishment should not be confounded with
educative punishment--so called, _i.e._, punishment through natural
consequences.

The third concrete moral idea is that of _equity_, or _requital_. It
arises when existing will-relations are altered either for good or
bad. The natural demand is that the requital shall be adequate to the
deed. Lack of requital for good deeds we call ingratitude, one of the
most hateful of human failings. In savagery and barbarism private
vengeance is the normal method of requiting injuries. Remnants of
this system still exist in the duel, and in the fierce vendettas of
some sparsely settled regions. Civilization demands that requital
for evil deeds shall be remanded to the executors of established
law. Only in this way is society saved from destructive broils. In
this respect, as in so many others, the school is the miniature of
the institutional world. The teacher is, to a considerable extent,
lawgiver, judge, and executive. Not a small part of his moral
influence upon his pupils depends upon the justice of his requitals
for violated law. Good-will, justice or rights, and requital are the
three fundamental concrete moral ideas upon which sound character,
both individual and national, is based. The remaining two are that
of inner freedom and that of efficiency. Though formal in character,
_i.e._, devoid of positive content, they are equally important with
the more concrete conceptions.

14. Where a number of pupils are assembled there arises, naturally, on a small scale, a system of laws and rewards. This system, and the demands which in the world at large spring from the same ideas, must be brought into accord.

The school is a miniature world, to be regulated by the same system
of moral ideas as that which obtains in society. Compare 182, 310.

15. The concept of an administrative system has great significance for pedagogics, since every pupil, whatever his rank or social status, must be trained for coöperation in the social whole to fit him for usefulness. This requirement may assume very many different forms.

16. Of the system of civilization only the aspect of general culture, not that of special training, must be emphasized at this point.

=Note.=--The principles of practical philosophy which have just
been briefly indicated are at the same time the starting-points of
ethical insight for the pupils. If the resolve to direct the will
accordingly be added, and if the pupil obeys this resolve, such
obedience constitutes morality. Quite distinct from this is the
obedience yielded, be the motive fear or affection, to the person
of the teacher, so long as that higher obedience is not securely
established.

17. For the business of education, the idea of perfection, while it does not rise into excessive prominence, stands out above all others on account of its uninterrupted application. The teacher discovers in the as yet undeveloped human being a force which requires his incessant attention to intensify, to direct, and to concentrate.

=Note.=--The maxim _perfice te_ is neither so universal as Wolff
asserted, as though it were the sole fundamental principle
of ethics, nor so objectionable as Kant represents it to be.
Perfection, quantitatively regarded (_Vollkommenheit_--the state of
having _come_ to _fulness_), is the first urgent task wherever man
shows himself lower, smaller, weaker, more narrowly limited, than
he might be. Growth, in every sense of the word, is the natural
destiny of the child, and the primary condition of whatever else of
worth may be expected of him in later life. The principle _perfice
te_ was deprived of its true meaning by the attempt to define by
it the whole of virtue--a blunder, since no single practical idea
ever exhausts the contents of that term. Quite different is the
import of the next remark, which applies solely to the practice of
pedagogy.

18. The constant presence of the idea of perfection easily introduces a false feature into moral education in the strict sense. The pupil may get an erroneous impression as to the relative importance of the lessons, practice, and performance demanded of him, and so be betrayed into the belief that he is essentially perfect when these demands are satisfied.

19. For this reason alone, if others were wanting, it is necessary to combine moral education proper, which in everyday life lays stress continually on correct self-determination, with religious training. The notion that something really worthy has been achieved needs to be tempered by humility. Conversely, religious education has need of the moral also to forestall cant and hypocrisy, which are only too apt to appear where morality has not already secured a firm foothold through earnest self-questioning and self-criticism with a view to improvement. Finally, inasmuch as moral training must be put off until after insight and right habits have been acquired, religious education, too, should not be begun too early; nor should it be needlessly delayed.

It is well known what obstacles confront the American teacher who
desires to give a religious basis to moral character. For a full
discussion of the subject viewed from numerous standpoints, the
reader is referred to “Principles of Religious Education,” Longmans,
Green & Co., New York, 1900. This book is a series of lectures by
prominent school men and others.