Chapter XIV: A Last Appeal to Gladstone

Such was the state of feeling in the inner circle of the Nationalists at Cairo when the Alexandrian riot occurred. The next day I went up to London in high spirits, carrying with me Sabunji's telegram of the 10th to show to Hamilton. The news of the riot met me at the station.

"_June 12._--... Another scare. Riots at Alexandria, Cookson hurt, an officer of the Superb killed, and fifty or sixty Europeans. This has caused great excitement. I am not sure whether it will be for Arabi's advantage or not. It will show he is master of the situation; unless, indeed, it be a trap laid for him by Dervish to get him to go to Alexandria where he might arrest him.... I went to Eddy Hamilton and told him I was now in possession of indisputable knowledge that Arabi commanded the country, also that Tewfik was in great danger of being deposed by the feeling of the country, and that, if they did not want a violent solution of the difficulty, they had better come speedily to terms with him. He promised to repeat all I said to Gladstone. It is evident to me now that they would catch at any compromise which should leave Tewfik on the throne.

"Went down to the House of Commons. Harry Brand asked his father, the Speaker, for a ticket of entrance for the 'rebel Blunt,' and he said, 'he does not deserve one,' but gave it. Dilke answered various questions about Egypt, assuming that Dervish and the Khedive were having it all their own way. This has rather frightened me, for there is a report that Arabi has gone down with Dervish to Alexandria (this proved untrue), and I fear treachery. Sabunji, too, has sent a new telegram as follows: 'I have just seen Arabi. Your message delivered. All quiet. Abdallah Nadim addressed four thousand persons at the Azhar, attacking the Turkish Commission and the Khedive. The Commission has withdrawn the proposals of Europe, and I hope for peace. The Circassians are intriguing. The Sheykh el Islam has rejoined, Sultan Pasha has not. The riot is nothing.' To this we composed an answer coming down in the train, and sent it from Three Bridges: 'Dervish means mischief, bribery, perhaps murder. Call a public meeting under Nadim and Abdu and the Azhar University, a hundred thousand persons. Let them insist on Dervish's departure. If this is refused let him be arrested by the police and sent away. Make terms with the Khedive. Be careful the Consuls are not molested. Let Nadim be the mover in action. Arabi and the army must stand aloof.' I am far from easy in my mind.

"Had a long conversation before leaving London with Frederic Harrison, who has written again on Egypt to the 'Pall Mall.' I have shown him my letters to Gladstone. He will be of valuable assistance.... Just as we were leaving James Street Lady Malet rushed in wildly, demanding of me the truth of what I had been doing in Egypt. I told her pretty nearly. She said my honour was at stake in clearing myself of the charge of intriguing against my country. She besought me, too, to calm down things there; and I promised to send a message to Arabi not to touch a hair of her son's head. I shall write by to-morrow's mail, and in the meanwhile my telegram will suffice. I do not think he runs the slightest danger. Poor Lady Malet! I am very sorry for her. She told me people said I had been in a conspiracy with Gladstone against her son's policy in Egypt. I assured her that Gladstone was guiltless of my telegrams, and that I accepted the full responsibility of all I had done. She made me promise to come and see her; but--such are the miseries of political life--she looks upon me as Edward's murderer.

"_June_ 13._--I was very nervous all night, expecting to hear that Arabi had been arrested or murdered. But the papers show him to be quite master of the situation. The Khedive is forming a new Ministry, in which Arabi is to be Minister of War as ever. I trust, therefore, he has followed my advice about making terms with Tewfik. Now they have only to get Dervish away, and all will go smoothly."

So thought the majority of the London papers, the "Pall Mall" almost alone dissenting from this view of a peaceful solution having been arrived at, and its comments, prompted by the Foreign Office, show the animus of our officials and their determination there should not be peace on any terms which should leave the Nationalists in power. Morley thus writes: "It would be difficult to make a greater mistake than that into which the 'Times' has fallen this morning, when it mistakes the temporary and provisional arrangement, entered into by the Khedive, the Consuls-General, Dervish, and Arabi for the preservation of order, for the final settlement of the Egyptian difficulty. The excitement in Egypt is so great that Europeans are in danger of their lives. The only restraining force in the country that can hold the mob in awe is the army, and the army is in the hands of Arabi. For the moment, then, Arabi must be made use of to prevent massacre. But because Dervish holds Arabi responsible with his head for the preservation of order, it no more follows that he has abandoned the intention to re-establish the _status quo_ than that England and France have come to terms with Arabi because they insisted he should use his troops to suppress the rioting in Alexandria." We were, however, taken in in England, just as Arabi was taken in at Cairo, by the treacherous truce Malet and Colvin had agreed to, and did not suspect its hollowness. Arabi on that occasion gave his word of honour to Tewfik that, come what might, he would defend his life like his own, and this promise the Khedive, who had nothing but treachery towards him in his heart, accepted and abused to the end.

To continue my journal of that day I find: "Button told me yesterday that Rothschild had offered Arabi £4,000 (one hundred thousand francs) a year for life if he would leave Egypt.[19]... As we went up to London they gave us the following telegram: 'Cairo, June 12th, 11 a. m. I have just seen Arabi, he sends you his salaams. He thinks the European proposals have disappeared and peace is concluded. Arabi master of the situation. Dervish gone. Khedive went to Alexandria. Arabi led him by the arm to the station. National Party triumphant. I worked hard but have triumphed.'... I have been between laughing and crying ever since. I went at once to Downing Street, and told Eddy Hamilton and Horace Seymour what had happened. They seemed to think that now, even at the eleventh hour, Gladstone might acknowledge his errors, or rather Malet's errors, and make peace with Arabi. Button thinks this possible too. But the Foreign Office will harden its heart.... Dined at home and went to a party at the Admiralty. Found the Gregorys and Sir Frederick Goldsmid there, and had some conversation on Egypt with Lord Northbrook. I spoke my mind to him pretty freely. I said, 'It depends entirely upon you now whether there is bloodshed in Egypt or not.'

"_June 14._--I am quite worn out. Mrs. Howard, whom I met in the Park, said I looked altered. And in fact I have not had Egypt, sleeping or waking, out of my head since the crisis began.... I spent the morning and breakfasted with Goldsmid, who is going this evening on a special mission to Constantinople, and primed him well with my views, showing him all my Gladstone correspondence." (_N. B._--This General Goldsmid was afterwards employed as chief of the Intelligence Department by Wolseley in his campaign. He was a soft-spoken man, whom I had known the year before at Cairo.)... "Had luncheon with Lascelles, who seems to agree with my views about Egypt." (There was some thought, I believe, at that time at the Foreign Office of his being sent out to Cairo to replace Malet, as he already knew Egypt; and on a mission of conciliation he would have done well. Only, unfortunately, none such was decided on.)... "There is confirmation of Sabunji's news in to-day's 'Daily Telegraph.' The other papers look upon the Khedive's and Dervish's flight as caused by their desire to restore order at Alexandria. They say Dervish will put himself at the head of 12,000 men who have been massed there and march against Arabi, who is now alone at Cairo(!). I have telegraphed to Arabi: 'Praise God for victory and peace.'"

This was the last point at which it seemed to me possible that the long game I had been playing against Colvin could be won and war averted. Henceforth it was a losing battle, though I fought it out to the end. The determining cause with Gladstone, in whom alone salvation lay, was, I believe, about this date when certain industrial towns of the North of England protested against the dilatory character of the Government treatment of the Egyptian case, on the ground that the long continuance of the crisis there was injuring trade. This was used upon him as a means of coercion by Chamberlain, egged on by Dilke, in the Cabinet.

"_June 15._--I am anxious about the state of things at Alexandria, but suppose Arabi can depend upon his men. There is a general stampede there and at Cairo. Malet, I am thankful to say, has left Cairo. Dervish still hangs on at Alexandria. He and the Khedive have gone to Ras-el-Tin Palace, where they are under the guns of the fleet.... Another telegram from Sabunji as follows: 'The Khedive's departure has aroused suspicion. Agitation. Activity in army preparations. Nadim, Abdu and the army openly defy the Porte. Arabi is moderate and vigilant. A plot to murder Nadim. There is danger of serious disturbance on European side. Dervish declines retiring till the fleet is withdrawn. Recall Malet for God's sake. All curse and will murder him if he continues.' I went at once to Eddy Hamilton and implored him to get Malet ordered on board ship" (this was done) "and afterwards sent him (Hamilton) a letter warning the Government not to count on Turkish troops. We then sent an answer to Sabunji: 'Turkish Commissioner demands troops from Constantinople. They are not likely to be sent. But prepare. Keep order at all costs. Another riot would be fatal. Malet leaves soon. Patience.'... Dined at Lord De la Warr's.... On coming home found the telegraph to Cairo interrupted, by the flight, I suppose, of the Eastern Telegraph clerks. This alarms me a little.

"_June 16._--Went to see Button, who is very hopeful. But I am losing my faith in Gladstone and think the English Government means mischief. I gave my Gladstone correspondence yesterday to Kegan Paul to put in print, so as to have it ready in case of the worst.... My telegram has gone after all.... In low spirits. Another telegram from Sabunji: 'New Commissioner with unknown instructions arrived. Nation and army in counsel daily to devise defensive plans. They distrust the double Commission. Inform me of Gladstone's policy and of Lord Granville's. Arabi is firm. All the journals closed except the "Wattan" and the "Official Journal." Panic among foreigners. The Khedive has thanked Arabi for keeping order. All is quiet. Nadim has been stopped from calling public meetings.'

"Yesterday when I saw Eddy he told me I had better not return to Downing Street as my visits there were remarked on, but to write him any news I might receive. Now I have written him yet another letter to try and find out what Gladstone's policy really is. Eddy's answer, however, is very unsatisfactory. There is a sensational announcement in the 'St. James's Gazette' of British troops ordered to Egypt. Home to Crabbet in a very nervous state. I see that a hurried meeting of the Cabinet was called yesterday in Mr. Gladstone's private room. Can this ordering of troops have been the consequence? I cannot help thinking they mean to push on an intervention. The French, however, have apparently made their peace with Arabi."

Not the French only, but the other European Powers, especially Germany and Austria, were at that moment in a mood to come to terms with him and to sacrifice Tewfik, for the preservation of order's sake. The "Pall Mall Gazette" of 16th June says: "The German Powers are supposed to advocate an arrangement with Arabi on the basis of Tewfik's abdication in favour of his son with a regency.... There are many points in its favour, though 'the solemn obligations of England and France' may make it impossible for them to do otherwise than stand by the man who has implicitly followed their counsels--especially those of the English Representative--it is perfectly conceivable that the practical failure of Tewfik, personal as well as political, may have impressed the other Powers with the expediency of by and by finding some more capable substitute." Compare, too, Malet's despatch of June 14: "The Agents of Austria and Germany have telegraphed to their Governments that the effect of any armed intervention, not excepting Turkish, will place the lives of their countrymen in danger. They consider the political question as a secondary matter compared with the security of their fellow subjects. With this object they are in favour of leaving the matter entirely in the hands of the Porte, and they believe that the only means of avoiding the most serious calamities is the departure from Alexandria of the fleet and myself." Poor Malet at this date, I have heard, spoke to his friends of his professional career as ruined. All depended for him and Colvin on bringing on hostilities.

"_June 17._--Very troubled night. But there is no confirmation of the news about the troops in to-day's papers; and the day is so fine, I feel again light-hearted. The Sultan dares not interfere. That is proved. The French have made their terms with Arabi, and it is hinted that Germany and Austria are doing likewise. So England does not matter.

"The following is our party at Crabbet: Ebrington, Lymington, Granny Farquhar, Eddy Hamilton, Dallas (of the Foreign Office), Nigel Kingscote (junior), Button Bourke, and Walter Seymour. News of despatch of troops contradicted. All seems going well. We have agreed to talk nothing about Egypt. But we cannot help it.

"_June 18._--Sunday, Waterloo day, and never did England look more foolish. I got a telegram at breakfast announcing a new Ministry under Ragheb and Arabi, evidently consented to by the German Powers and Turkey. We are consequently singing Hallelujahs."

Here I may as well insert three more of Sabunji's letters, which he wrote in these last days. They throw a valuable light on what was passing in the Nationalist mind at Cairo:

"Cairo, _June 14, 1882_.

"I called to-day on Arabi Pasha just a few minutes after he
received your telegram. We talked for about an hour and a half. I
asked him why this panic in the country if he and the Khedive had
already come to terms. He said: 'As far as I am concerned I believe
the Khedive would be sincere in his dealing with me, if left alone
and far from Sir E. Malet's advice. He has by this time become
convinced that there is nobody in his Government who could control
the country and preserve peace except the man whom European
statesmen despise, Ahmed Arabi. The Khedive has now made peace
with me, and in the presence of the Representatives of the six
European Powers and of Dervish Pasha, has asked me to take on
myself the responsibility of public safety. I have accepted his
order, and pledged my word and sworn to defend his life and the
lives of all who inhabit Egypt, of every creed and nation; and, as
long as I live and my jurisdiction is not interfered with, I will
keep my word. But, if this peace is looked upon by others as a
fictitious and fraudulent peace, that is the Khedive's lookout. For
myself, I am sincere in my dealing with all who deal honestly and
sincerely with me; but with those who deal dishonestly I pay them
with their own coin, and with the fraudulent I am doubly
fraudulent. Time and Ismaïl, in spite of us, have trained us to
Turkish deceit. As we make use of the arms, guns and ammunition
they left us, so we make use of their deceit, _when the Turks force
us to do so_. We will not be the aggressors, but we will resist all
who attempt to attack us. We are a sincere nation, and grateful to
those who take us by the hand and help us to reform our country. We
wish for nothing except reforms' (he uttered that with emphasis).
'But those who would cheat us will find us the very roots of fraud,
_sudar el ghish_. Europe, and especially England, looks upon us as
barbarians. They can crush us, they say, in twenty-four hours.
Well, if they are willing, let them try it, but they will lose
their 80 millions of public debt and the 20 millions the fellahin
privately owe to the bankers. The first shot fired will release us
from these engagements; and the nation on this account wishes
nothing more than war.'

"I hear much the same language from every one. Great preparations
are going on. Vast stores of rifles and ammunition have been found,
laid up by Ismaïl when he intended to make himself independent of
the Porte. These they will make good use of. But I tell them I hope
there will be no occasion. They say they can resist for years, for
God has blessed them with a crop this summer twice as great as in
ordinary fertile years.

"I sounded Arabi about Halim. I found him to prefer Halim to
Tewfik, but he says that if Tewfik will only free himself from
Malet's influence all will go well. Malet, he says, has been misled
by Colvin, and has done immense harm to his own country, as well
as Egypt, by their misrepresentation of facts.

"_June 17._--Last night I went to Shereï Pasha's, where Arabi,
Mahmud Sami, Abd-el-Aal, Ali Fehmi, Nadim, Hajrasi and many others
were being entertained at dinner. After they had dined and we were
smoking and talking politics, an officer came in with a letter from
an English lady asking protection, as she had been advised to leave
Cairo. I was begged to write her an answer at once to assure her
there was no danger, and that if there should be trouble Arabi
would protect her life as his own. Arabi has become a hero with
many of the European ladies, whom I have heard praising him for the
protection he has given. When he drives through the town all rush
to the windows and balconies. I make converts to the National
Party, all I can, among the Europeans I meet.

"_June 18._--Yesterday at noon, on Ragheb being telegraphed as
Prime Minister, I went to see Arabi, who read me a telegram just
received from the Khedive requesting him to co-operate with Ragheb
as Minister of War. After coffee had been served he wrote a
telegram of thanks to the Khedive and handed it to me. It was very
politely worded. A few minutes afterwards he said: 'Let us go for a
drive through the town to inspire confidence in the minds of the
people.' He and Ali Fehmi drove in one carriage, and I and Nadim in
the other. We went through Faggala, preceded by heralds. We
alighted at Embabeh's house (the Sheykh el Islam's), and Arabi
said, 'Come in, I will introduce you to our Pope.' On entering the
reception room Arabi took off his boots, and turning to me said,
'We consider this place as the holy abode of our Sheykh.'
Accordingly I did the same. On entering, the Sheykh, who was
sitting on a low divan, rose and advanced a few paces towards
Arabi, who saluted him and kissed his hands. I only shook hands
with him, and he invited us to take seats. There were several of
the Azhar Sheykhs with him, among them the son of Arusi. At first
they talked about the situation and the new Ministry. Then the
conversation turned on Embabeh's dealings with the Khedive during
the late events. From all I saw I conclude that the report of a
coolness having taken place between Embabeh and Arabi was not true.
While Embabeh was concluding his narrative coffee was served, and
Arabi introduced me formally to him, and explained that I was a
friend of Mr. Blunt. Embabeh then explained to me all about the
telegram. He had written the answer, he said, with his own hand,
thinking the telegram addressed to him; but he had never apologized
to the Khedive about it. He believes Sir E. Malet heard of it
originally through Sultan Pasha, or some of the Khedive's
adherents.

"Next Arabi showed Embabeh a proclamation he had made guaranteeing
the lives and properties of all the inhabitants of Egypt, whatever
their creed or nation, and Arabi begged him to write a similar one,
showing, as Sheykh el Islam, that the Mohammedan religion, far from
allowing, forbids Moslems to hurt Christians, Jews, or others, and
commands the faithful to protect them. Embabeh agreed to this, and,
in my presence and that of the other four Sheykhs, prayed God to
help him to succeed in reforming the country. He also promised to
help him in fostering peace between Mohammedans and others,
inasmuch as all were brothers notwithstanding the diversity of
creeds.

"We then went on to Artin Bey's, where also we were entertained
with great honour, and afterwards drove through the Clot Bey Road,
the Mouski, and other parts of the town, while the people stood on
both sides saying, 'May God exalt you.'

"At the end of the drive Arabi told me he was invited to dine with
Seyd Hassan Akkad, and took me with him, with all the pashas,
officers, sheykhs, and Ulemas. Our host's large house was crowded;
Arabi, Mahmud Sami, Ahmed Pasha, Abdu, Nadim, and I were in the
principal sitting-room, where we recited poetry, making or
composing elegies and satires, and amusing ourselves at Ragheb's
expense. Arabi composed a satire, Abdu two, Nadim made four, and
Sami two. At dinner I sat by Arabi. The courses were about thirty
different Arab dishes, besides the European and Eastern cakes,
sweetmeats and fruit.

"After dinner we talked freely about politics, and about different
plans and forms of government. The republican form was preferred;
and Mahmud Sami, who displayed great knowledge and ingenuity,
endeavoured to show the advantage of a republican government for
Egypt. He said: 'From the beginning of our movement we aimed at
turning Egypt into a small republic like Switzerland--and then
Syria would have joined--and then Hejaz would have followed us.
But we found some of the Ulema were not quite prepared for it and
were behind our time. Nevertheless we shall endeavour to make Egypt
a republic before we die. We all hope to see the "Saturnia regna"
once more.'

"_June 19._--Abdu, Nadim, Sami, and I were talking the night before
last about the peaceful means to be taken to tide over the Egyptian
difficulty. Abdu said that he has made up his mind to get together
all the documents he has in his possession, with others concerning
Egyptian affairs, and go to England and depose them himself before
Mr. Gladstone and the English Parliament. He would take also with
him a worthy person as representative of the leading merchants of
the land; and another who would represent the liberal fellahin.
Mahmud Sami approved the idea, and said he also wished he could go
to Europe on such a mission, and Abdu is already preparing for the
journey. So is Nadim and Seyyid Hassan Moussa el Akkad, the leading
Arab merchant of Cairo, a man of considerable wealth, influence,
and patriotism.

"Ragheb is made Prime Minister, but his policy being Turkish nobody
is pleased with him except the Circassians. People suspect some
Ottoman intrigue in the matter and are very uneasy. I am trying to
calm their minds and tell them to keep quiet.

"The last events have increased the hatred in the Arab heart
against the Turks, Circassians, and the Sultan himself. I heard
Sami and Abdu and Nadim curse the Sultans and all the Turkish
generation from Genjis Khan to Holagu and down to Abdul Hamid. They
are preparing the nation for a republican form of government. A
large party is already formed and disposed; _crescit eundo_. They
will seize upon the first occasion which presents itself. They
expect the armed intervention of Turkish troops with pleasure in
this last crisis. It would have been the signal for a complete
independence from the Porte. But the cunning Turk saw the danger
and abstained. Nadim told me yesterday, while we were coming from
Shubra, that he must, before he dies, crush down the Sultan's
throne. ---- said: 'This is my aim too--may God help us to
succeed.'

"I must tell you that I have been received here with such honour,
respect, and politeness as I never could dream of. All the pashas,
colonels, sheykhs, merchants receive me with open arms, and lavish
upon me their kindness and hearty thanks. We have arranged with
Nadim to give a dinner party to all the leaders of the National
Party in your honour, and to thank you for the help given them in
their struggle."

"Cairo, _June 22_.

"Last night I went to Mahmud Sami's house, where I met all our
friends and the Pashas and many other of the leaders. We talked
politics all night, and I communicated to them the contents of your
letters received to-day by Brindisi. I also gave them a summary of
the English newspapers you and Lady Anne had sent me. Afterwards I
presented to Mahmud Sami, in the presence of Nadim, a petition on
the part of the National Party, in which they ask Mr. Gladstone to
send to Egypt a Consul who understands the affairs of their
country. Sami approved the petition and said they will have it
signed when Arabi Pasha comes back to Cairo and present it to Mr.
Gladstone through you. At the end of the _soirée_ I was informed
that Sir E. Malet has for the fourth time urged Tewfik to arrest
Abdu, Nadim, Mahmud Sami, and myself.

"_June 23._--As soon as Ragheb Pasha was confirmed by the Khedive
as Prime Minister, his first act and order was to call me to
Alexandria with Nadim. On Monday night the Under-Secretary sent his
carriage to my hotel with his man, who informed me that Hassan
Pasha Daramalli wished to see me, and had sent his carriage. I went
with Nadim, not trusting myself to go alone. When we got there we
were received courteously, and afterwards he informed me that
Ragheb Pasha had charged him with a message that he wished me to go
and meet him at Alexandria at the Divan of the Administration. I
replied 'very well,' and Nadim said he, too, would go with me. And
so we left the house with the firm intention of having nothing to
do with Ragheb.

"Thus at the very time I was telegraphing to you, 'for God's sake
save Malet or he will be murdered by fanatics,' he was urging the
Khedive to arrest me. Often, when hot-headed young Egyptians were
discussing Malet and Colvin's death, I endeavoured to convince them
of their folly, and that no possible good result could come of it
to the National cause.

"_June 24._--Mahmud Pasha Fellaki, who had deserted the National
cause on account of his not having received a place in Mahmud
Sami's Ministry, has now been reconciled and has received from
Arabi the post of Minister of Public Works."

* * * * *

(Sabunji then describes the crisis preceding Mahmud Sami's resignation, Arabi's appeal to the Sultan, Dervish's mission and Osman Bey's mission, and how they flattered Abdul Hamid with professions of zeal for the Caliphate.) "As to their real convictions, however, they care for Abdul Hamid as much as they would care for a man in the moon. They would make use of him as long as he can be useful to them and until they are strong enough to declare themselves an independent republic. This has been the basis of their program from the beginning. But they have prudently chosen to proceed by degrees. Mahmud Pasha Sami assured me in Nadim and Abdu's presence that before they die they must declare themselves independent of the Porte, and Egypt a republic. Nadim's efforts are employed to instill this idea in the minds of the young generation. Since I came here I and Nadim have been together night and day. We sit talking and devising plans till one or two every morning. We mix in every society. Sheykhs, Ulemas, Notables, merchants, and officers receive us with open arms, and we talk to them of your endeavours and of the service which you have rendered to the National cause. They all long to see you and present you with their hearty thanks. Indeed, people so good and sincerely kind deserve every attention and help."

I am not able to fix an exact date to the moment when Gladstone finally hardened his heart against the Egyptians and resolved on military operations--he persuaded himself that it would not be war--but it must have been some time between the 20th June and the end of the month. The considerations that seem to have decided him were, first, of course, parliamentary ones. His Whig followers were on the point of a revolt, and Chamberlain was pressing him with tales of the impatience of the provinces. The diplomatic defeat of the Foreign Office was becoming too plain to be concealed. Granville, with his little maxims of procrastination and using a threat as if it were a blow, had "dawdled it out" in Egypt till England had become the laughing-stock of Europe. On the Stock Exchange things were looking badly and trade was suffering from the long crisis. What were called the "resources of civilization," that is to say, lying, treachery and fraud, had been tried by the Foreign Office to more than their extreme limit, and one and all had proved absolutely of no use against the Nationalist obstinacy. Arabi had been ordered by all the majesty of England to leave Egypt, and he had not gone. On the contrary he had gained an immense reputation throughout the Mohammedan East at England's expense. It seemed to many that there would be a Pan-Islamic revolt in India. England, as I had said on Waterloo day, had never looked so foolish. Serious officials were alarmed at this, and all the jingoism of the Empire, asleep since Disraeli's parliamentary defeat in 1880, was suddenly awake and crying for blood. Mr. Gladstone hardened his heart and let his conscience go, not, I think, by any deliberate decision saying that this or that should be done, but simply by leaving it to the "departments," and to the "men on the spot," that is to say, the Admiralty, Sir Beauchamp Seymour, and Colvin (for Malet had been withdrawn) to work out a solution their own way. We had won our diplomatic game against the Foreign Office too thoroughly. It was to be the turn now of England's fighting forces.

"_June 19._--A Stock Exchange scare of Bright and Chamberlain having resigned" (a scare which showed the ignorance of the public as to Chamberlain's position, classing him still with Bright).

"_June 20._--A more reasonable article in the 'Daily News.' Frederic Harrison strongly advises me to write Gladstone a public letter and have it printed. He is prepared to answer for its effect in the provinces. I have accordingly begun one.

"_June 21._--Finished my letter and took it to the Howards for approval. He (George Howard) made me modify some sentences, so as not to compromise Gladstone personally. She warmly approved. Frank Lascelles was there. I then arranged with Button to publish it tomorrow, or Friday at latest, and sent it in to Gladstone.

"_June 22._--To Button early. We think they mean mischief after all. Harry Brand writes that if the French hold out on the Note the Government mean to act in Egypt, notwithstanding Germany. I doubt, however, if France is prepared for this. I shall follow up my letter (to Gladstone) with other letters, if necessary. I am certain that if England lands troops anywhere in Egypt, the Sultan will proclaim a Jehad and that the Mussulmans will rise in India. Things are in a pretty pass."

My letter to Gladstone appeared in the "Times" on the following day, 23rd June, the very day the Conference met at Constantinople. It created a great sensation. It stands thus:

"_June 21st, 1882._

"SIR,

"The gravity of the present situation in Egypt, and the interests
of honour and advantage to the English nation which are there
engaged, impel me to address you publicly on the subject of the
diplomatic steps which have led to this imbroglio, and to put on
record certain facts which, in the case of any new departure taken
by the Powers at the approaching Conference, should not be lost
sight of.

"You are aware, sir, that during the past winter I was engaged as
mediator in a variety of unofficial but important negotiations
carried on between Sir Edward Malet and Sir Auckland Colvin on the
one hand, and the chiefs of the National Egyptian party on the
other, negotiations in which I engaged my personal honour to the
loyalty of Her Majesty's agents; also that I have been in close
communication with those chiefs since my return to England, and
that I am consequently in a position to speak with certainty and
authority as to the character and intentions of the popular
movement in Egypt. You know, moreover, that I have from time to
time warned Her Majesty's Government of the danger they were
running from a false appreciation of facts, and that I have
repeatedly urged the necessity of their coming to a rapid
understanding with those in whose hands the guidance of the
movement lay. Finally, you know that in the interests of right and
justice, and in accordance with a promise made by me to the
Egyptians, I have counselled them to the best of my ability in the
recent crisis, and spared no pains to urge them to come to that
settlement of their difficulties with the Khedive, Mohammed Tewfik,
at which they have now happily arrived. In this I took upon myself
a great responsibility, but one which, I think, the event has
already justified.

"The main points in the past which I would state are these:

"1. In the month of December last I assisted the National Party to
publish a program of their views, which was just and liberal, and
to which they have since rigidly adhered. At this time, and down to
the publication of the Dual Note of the 8th of January, the
Egyptians had no quarrel whatever with England or the English.
Neither had they any real quarrel with the Khedive or the Control,
trusting in these to permit the development of political liberty in
their country in the direction of Parliamentary and constitutional
self-government. Their aim was, and is, the resumption by Egypt of
her position as a nation, the redemption of her debt, and the
reform of justice. They trusted then, as now, to the army, which
was and is their servant, to secure them these rights, and to their
Parliament to secure them these ends; and they were prepared to
advance gradually, and with moderation, in the path they had
traced.

"2. The Dual Note, drawn up by M. Gambetta with the view of making
England a partner of his anti-Mussulman policy and understood by
the Egyptians as the first step in a policy analogous to that
recently pursued in Tunis, changed this confidence into a sentiment
of profound distrust. Instead of awing them, it precipitated their
action. It caused them to insist upon the resignation of Sherif
Pasha, whom they suspected of the design to betray them, and to
assist with the Khedive in summoning a Nationalist Ministry to
office. This insistence, though represented by the English journals
as the work of the army, was, in fact, the work of the nation
through their representatives the Notables. Of this I can furnish
ample evidence.

"3. The unexpected fall of M. Gambetta prevented the execution of
the threat of armed intervention implied by the Dual Note.
Nevertheless, a plan of indirect intervention was persisted in. The
English and French Controllers-General protested against the
Constitution granted by the Khedive on the 6th of February, and the
English and French Governments carefully withheld their assent to
it, signifying only that the Article, giving to the Egyptian
Parliament the right of voting that half of the Budget which was
not affected to the payment of the Debt, was an infringement of
international engagements. Their argument for this, based on
certain firmans of the Porte, and certain decrees of the Khedive,
has been constantly denied by the Egyptians.

"4. Acting, it must be presumed, in accordance with their
instructions, the English agents at Cairo have for the past three
months set themselves steadily to work to bring about a revolution
counter to the will of the people and the liberties granted to them
by the Viceroy. The English Controller-General, though a paid agent
of the Egyptian Government, has not scrupled to take part in this;
and the English Resident Minister has spared no pains to create a
quarrel between the Khedive and his Ministers. The
Controller-General, sitting in council with the Ministers as their
official adviser, has withheld his advice, counting, it would seem,
on the mistakes likely to be made by men new to office, and noting
these in silence. The English press correspondents, hitherto held
in check by the Resident, have been permitted full license in the
dissemination of news injurious to the Ministry, and known to be
false. I will venture to recall to you some of the scares reported
at this time and disseminated through Europe--the scare of banditti
in the Delta; the scare of the Bedouin rising; the scare of revolt
in the Soudan; the scare of an Abyssinian war; the scare of huge
military expenditure; the scare of a general refusal to pay taxes,
of the resignation of the provincial governors, of the neglect of
the irrigation works, of danger to the Suez Canal; the scare of
Arabi Pasha having become the bribed agent, in turn, of Ismaïl, of
Halim, and of the Sultan.

"For some of these a very slight foundation may have existed in
fact; for most there was no foundation whatsoever.

"On the 20th of March I addressed Lord Granville, by Arabi Pasha's
request, on this subject, and pointed out to him the danger caused
to peace in Egypt through the attitude of the English agents urging
that a Commission should be sent to Cairo to examine into Egyptian
grievances.

"In the month of April advantage was taken by the English and
French Consuls-General of the discovery of a plot to assassinate
the National Ministry, and traced by these to an agent of Ismaïl
Pasha's, to induce the Khedive to put himself in open opposition to
his Ministers. Those implicated in the plot and condemned to
banishment were men of position, Turks and Circassians, and as such
of the same race and society with the Khedive and he was unwilling
to ratify their sentence, and suffered himself to be persuaded to
refuse his signature. This led to the rupture which the previous
diplomatic action of the Consuls-General had prepared. A summons
was then sent by Mahmud Sami Pasha to the Deputies to come to Cairo
and decide between the Ministers and the Khedive, and the Deputies
came. Sultan Pasha, however, through jealousy, refused to preside
at any formal sitting; and advantage was again taken of the
circumstance by the Consuls-General to encourage all who were in
opposition to the National Party to rally round the Khedive. A
section of the rich Egyptians, fearing disturbance, sided with the
Circassians, and the Consuls-General, deceived by appearances,
ventured a _coup de main_. An _ultimatum_, dictated by them, was
sent in to the Ministers, insisting on the resignation of the
Ministry and Arabi Pasha's departure from the country. The step for
an instant seemed to have succeeded, for the Ministry resigned. It
became, however, immediately apparent that the feeling of the
country had been miscalculated by our diplomacy, and Arabi, by the
manifest will of the nation, returned next day to power.

"I cannot understand that the action of our Consul-General in this
matter was justified by any principle of Liberal policy; it has
certainly not been justified by success.

"6. When the Fleet was ordered to Alexandria, I endeavoured to
convey a warning, as my private opinion, based upon all I had
witnessed last winter of the temper of the Egyptian people, that
the presence of English men-of-war at that moment in the port of
Alexandria, especially if their crews should be allowed on any
pretence to land, would be exceedingly likely to provoke a serious
disturbance and it was my intention to go myself to Egypt to do
what I could towards mitigating what I feared would be the results.

"7. About the same time the English Government consented to the
despatch of a Turkish Commissioner to Cairo. It was supposed that
the authority of the Sultan was so great in Egypt that obedience
would be shown to whatever orders his representative might bring,
or that, at any rate, little opposition would be offered. In any
case, the Porte was authorized to act in its own way. Dervish Pasha
was sent; and it is lamentable to record that the English Foreign
Office at that time seems to have counted mainly on the fact that
he was a man notoriously unscrupulous in his method of dealing with
rebels. I have reason to know that what was expected of him was,
that he should summon Arabi Pasha to Constantinople; that, failing
this, he should have recourse to bribery; and that in the extreme
resort, he should arrest or shoot the Minister of War as a mutineer
with his own hand. Whether these were really Dervish Pasha's
instructions or intentions I will not argue. The Porte seems to
have been as little prepared as Her Majesty's Government were for
the strength of the National feeling in Egypt; and only the union
and courage shown by the people would seem to have convinced the
Sultan that methods such as those formerly used by Dervish against
the Albanians would here be out of place. Humaner counsels have in
any case prevailed, and peace has been recommended between the
Khedive and his people.

"Such, sir, is shortly the history of England's diplomatic action
in Egypt during the past six months. It is one of the most
deplorable our Foreign Office has to record. The future, however,
in some measure remains to us, though, when the Conference
assembles, England's will be only one of many voices raised in the
settlement. It is not for me to suggest the words which should
there be spoken; but I will venture to express my conviction that
if Her Majesty's representative then comes forward with an honest
confession of the mistakes made, and a declaration of England's
sympathy with Egyptian freedom, England will regain her lost
ground. In spite of the just anger of the Egyptians at the unworthy
tricks which have been played upon them by our Foreign Office, they
believe that a more generous feeling exists in the body of the
English nation, which would not suffer so vast a public wrong to be
committed as the subjugation of their country for a misunderstood
interest in Egyptian finance and in the Suez Canal. They have, over
and over again, assured me, and I know that they speak truly, that
their only aim is peace, independence, and economy; and that the
Suez Canal cannot be better protected for England, as for the rest
of the world, than by the admission of the Egyptian people into the
comity of nations. Only let the hand of friendship be held out to
them freely, and at once, and we shall still earn their gratitude.

"I am, Sir, your obedient Servant,

"WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT."

FOOTNOTES:

[19] Arabi, in answer to a question of mine as to this matter, told me many years afterwards that he had never heard of any offer of a pension _as made him by the Rothschilds_. He said, however, that soon after the ultimatum of 26th May, he received a visit from the French Consul, who, having asked what was the amount of his then pay, had offered him the double--that is to say, E£500 a month--from the French Government, if he would consent to leave Egypt and go to Paris to be treated there as Abd-el-Kader had been treated. He refused, however, to have anything to do with it, telling him that it was his business if necessary to fight and die for his country, not to abandon it. I have a note of this conversation but without date. Compare also the "Pall Mall" of 18th May: "Ourabi is said to be thinking of visiting Europe to recruit his health--a commendable intention, and no harm would be done if he were alotted a handsome travelling allowance on condition that he did not return."