Chapter XXVIII: Appendix: V
NOTE AS TO THE BERLIN CONGRESS.
It has been pointed out by Mr. Lucy, in the _Westminster Gazette_, that the account given in the text, page 34, of the quarrel between M. Waddington and Lord Salisbury, at the Berlin Congress, is manifestly incorrect, inasmuch as it was the Anglo-Russian agreement of 31st May, not the Cyprus Convention with Turkey of 4th June, that was published by the _Globe_ newspaper through the instrumentality of Marvin, the Cyprus Convention being issued in the ordinary way. The confusion between the two instruments in the text is undeniable and needs correction. At the same time the result of as full an enquiry as I have been able to make into the affair, by a reference to contemporary documents, is not such as to make me doubt the substantial truth of the story. What seems precisely to have happened is this:
Lords Beaconsfield and Salisbury, before entering the Congress, had concluded two separate agreements, both secret, regarding Ottoman affairs--the one with Russia, the other with Turkey. These while conceding something to Russia, would, they thought, conjointly secure the integrity of the Sultan's dominions on the Asiatic side against further aggression. The agreement with Russia recognized her permanent possession of Batum, but was more than counterbalanced, in their opinion, by the second Convention, unknown to the Russian Government as to the rest of the world, guaranteeing the remainder of his Asiatic dominions under English protection to the Sultan. The two treaties were drafted at the Foreign Office almost simultaneously, and by accident or negligence that with Russia became known, the very day it was signed, to M. Charles Marvin, a poor journalist and teacher of languages, who had been taken on as extra Writer for his knowledge of Russian in the Treaty Department at the Foreign Office. Marvin, who was wretchedly underpaid at the rate of tenpence an hour, had been intrusted with the copying of the agreement, and yielded to the temptation of betraying a summary of it to his employers in the Press. This was on the 31st May, a fortnight before the Congress met.
For some days after this Marvin seems to have remained on unsuspected at the Foreign Office, it being imagined at first that it was perhaps Count Schouvalof himself, the Russian ambassador in London, who had given the information to the Press. Later, seeing that the summary was no more than a summary, and had appeared in one newspaper only, the _Globe_, it was resolved to deny it; and Lord Salisbury had little difficulty in persuading the House of Lords and the country that it lacked authenticity. In answer to a question put to him about it by Lord Grey, Lord Salisbury declared roundly "the statement to which the noble Earl refers, and other statements that have been made that I have seen, are wholly unauthenticated and are not deserving of the confidence of your Lordship's House."
Nevertheless, the incident raised a suspicion of England's good faith abroad, and, doubtless was the cause of the declaration, mentioned in the text, being demanded of the Ambassadors at the first sitting of the Congress. This must have been subscribed to by Lords Beaconsfield and Salisbury on the 13th June, the other dates being:
The Agreement with Russia, signed in London, 31st May.
The _Globe_ summary, published in the evening of the same day, 31st
May.
Lord Salisbury's denial in the House of Lords, 3rd June.
First sitting of the Berlin Congress, 13th June.
Publication by the _Globe_ of the full text of the Agreement, on
evening of 14th June.
Lord Beaconsfield's and Lord Salisbury's discomfiture must consequently have been still more sudden than in my account of it when the news became public property at Berlin on the 15th; and doubtless the sensation caused there was primarily on account of the Agreement, not of the Convention, which latter was not published till 8th July. All the same I still adhere to my recollection of the letter shown me at Simla that it was the Cyprus Convention that was the main cause of M. Waddington's resentment, and of Lord Salisbury's concession to him about Tunis and the rest. That it was so is confirmed to me by a passage in my diary of 1884, when, being at Constantinople and having just had a conversation with Count Corti on the subject, I made the following entry. It must be remembered that the Count had been Italian ambassador at the Berlin Congress, and was actually ambassador to the Sultan at the date of the conversation; nor was he other than a friendly witness, for he was always regarded as an _Anglomane_ and ally of our British diplomacy.
"_October 26._ Count Corti came to take us in a steam launch to
Therapia. We had luncheon with the Wyndhams, and called on the
Noailles (at the English and French Embassies).... On our way back
to Constantinople Count Corti entertained us with stories of the
Berlin Congress and of Lord Salisbury's antics there. Disraeli and
Salisbury had gone there quite on their high horse to curb the
territorial ambitions of Russia, and the publication of the secret
convention for the acquisition of Cyprus was a great shock to
everybody. Salisbury broke it gently to Waddington before the news
was published, and Waddington consulted his colleagues, it being
generally agreed that there was no middle course between going to
war and saying nothing. 'Il faut la guerre ou se taire.' But the
publication was a great blow to Disraeli, who took to his bed and
did not appear for four or five days. Lord Salisbury, however,
brazened it out, and came to the Congress with an air of defiance.
There was no rupture between him and Waddington, and they remained
on apparently friendly terms, but Waddington had his revenge. He
was sitting one day with Salisbury, and, the conversation leading
that way, Waddington asked what the English Government would say to
France taking Tunis, and Salisbury said he did not see the harm.
Whereupon Waddington communicated this to Paris, and on his return
the French ambassador in London was instructed to write to Lord
Salisbury reminding him of his words. Thus Salisbury was caught.
'But,' said Corti, 'if he had known anything of his business he
would have declined to answer the note officially and would have
pleaded a private conversation.' He did not believe that any
arrangement of _condominium_ was come to between Salisbury and
Waddington at that time, though I told him, without mentioning
names, of the letter Lytton had shown me. Corti is interesting
diplomatically, as he has been to more congresses than any man in
Europe."
This entry, which is a contemporary record of Count Corti's recollection of the incident, five years after it happened, shows that the two secret agreements had remained closely connected in his mind as the cause of Waddington's displeasure. They certainly were present in the Duke of Richmond's mind when, representing the Foreign Office on 17th June, in answer to a further question about the authenticity of the full text of the Anglo-Russian Agreement, he said "as an explanation of the policy of Her Majesty's Government it is _incomplete_ and therefore inaccurate," for this _incompleteness_ can only be understood as an allusion to the Cyprus Convention in 1878, and the seizure of Tunis by France in 1881, which after all is the important matter. Some day, no doubt, the whole incident will be made clear by a publication of the secret records at the Foreign Office or at the Quai d'Orsay. In the meantime we may accept it as probable that, finding the Russian Agreement divulged, Lord Salisbury resolved to make a clean breast also of the other Agreement, and, in Count Corti's words, broke gently to M. Waddington the existence also of a Convention with Turkey. One thing I am certain of in my recollection, that the letter shown me at Simla described the quarrel and the terms obtained in the reconciliation with M. Waddington.
The Cyprus Convention was published in London on the 9th July, having been signed on the 4th June, but there is evidence of its having been in Lord Beaconsfield's thoughts at least three months earlier, for Lord Derby, speaking in the Lords, 18th July, gave it as his reason for leaving the Cabinet in March that the policy of the Government had become such, that it was already, at that date, being considered necessary "to seize and occupy the island of Cyprus."
W. S. B.
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Secret history of the English occupation of EgyptChapter XXVIII: Appendix: V
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