Chapter XVIII: Dufferin's Mission

Lord Dufferin's arrival at Cairo on the 6th November placed matters there on an entirely new footing. Up to that point Riaz Pasha and the rest of the Khedive's Ministers had been doing pretty much as they liked, subject only to Malet's weak supervision. But Dufferin was a man of another mould, and soon showed the Khedive that his position while in Egypt was to be that of master, not adviser. He paid little attention to his tales, and not much, I believe, to Malet's, but opened the doors of his Embassy to every one who could give information. Mackenzie Wallace, his chief assistant, in a very few days acquired a good general knowledge of what had been going on in Egypt during the last two years, and his book about it gives more of the truth than any other yet published in English. Dufferin, though an idle man, was a rapid worker, and where he had something serious to do, knew how easiest to do it.

Nevertheless, for the first fortnight after Dufferin's arrival, and until he had quite assured himself of his ground, the prosecution of Arabi was allowed to work on in its own casual way, swayed by the Khedive's ever shifting impulses of a desire to conceal the truth on the one hand, and an unwillingness on the other to let go his prey. These will be best recorded by simply reproducing the letters and telegrams which now passed almost daily between me in London and Messrs. Broadley and Napier at Cairo, as will the successive steps by which a compromise of the trial was eventually come to.

_Broadley to Blunt, November 6th (in answer to his letter of
November 2nd)_:

"I entirely concur in all you say, and shall exercise the greatest
prudence. I am completing a perfect case for defence, showing:

"(1) Purity, honesty of Arabi's inspirations.

"(2) Perfect concurrence of Tewfik till July 12.

"(3) Perfect concurrence of the Sultan throughout.

"(4) Universality of the movement.

"(5) Wholly illegal constitution of the Court Martial.

"(6) Absurdity of the white flag (on which subject Napier has
secured A 1 deposition from Lambton).

"(7) Abnormal humanitarian character of Arabi.

"(8) Abnormal iniquity of all proceedings until our arrival.

"(9) Torture of prisoners.

"(10) Letters from Tewfik to Constantinople against England.

"(11) Systematic falsification of the 'Moniteur.'

"Shall demand release of all the accused. _Keep this private._

"Now all I fear is the enormous expense of a protracted trial of
eight or nine months. Arabi _alone_ calls 400 witnesses.... I spend
freely. I entertain the correspondents. I have wheedled the
'Egyptian Gazette' into being our special organ. I have turned
public opinion here quite in favour of Arabi. We are obliged to
employ a dozen interpreters at salaries varying from £1 to £2
10_s._ a week.... My absence from Tunis means utter loss of _all_
there. All my pending cases have been given up, including some of
great magnitude. Bourke will tell you I have one retainer alone of
£250 a year, and another of £100.... I hope you will take all this
into consideration.... I only say I believe all will depend on
liberal if not lavish expenditure. Remember we have every one
against us, and people don't work without a reward here.... An
Arabi fund should be raised. The nine months' Tichborne trial is a
specimen. But I don't think we should exceed _one-tenth_ of that at
the worst.... All I say hinges on expenses. Don't think of me but
only of incidental expenses.... I work sixteen hours a day....
Napier is invaluable."

_Napier to Blunt, November 6th_:

"You seem to be doubtful about the _acte d'accusation_. We have not
had it officially communicated. It is not proposed by the
prosecution to frame it until the close of the evidence. But in
substance it is fairly stated in a telegram I think to the
'Times':

"(1) The abuse of the White Flag.

"(2) Complicity in massacres and pillage, June 11.

"(3) Complicity in destruction by fire of the city.

"(4) Carrying war into territory of the Sultan.

"(5) General acts of mutiny and rebellion against the Khedive and
the Sultan."

_Broadley to Blunt, November 7th (telegraphed)_:

"If you don't mind expense great success sure--see my yesterday's
letter. I shall crush Tewfik and his crew past hope of redemption."

_Napier to Blunt, November 10th_:

"I have seen Dufferin to-day. He received me most kindly, though he
declined to enter on business at once. He had only just received
his instructions. Broadley and I are to meet him to-morrow.

"There seems to be a desire to burk inquiry into the rebellion
question. The Government and all the papers are pledged to the
ridiculous rebel cry, the one of all others that incenses me most.
It is an old trick that has been played in Afghanistan, the Cape,
and elsewhere. Any one can see that it may be smashed into a cocked
hat at once.... Proposals for a compromise must come from the other
side, must be put in writing, and must contain all that you
claim--indeed I think they ought to amount to unconditional
surrender. Of this of course more fully afterwards. You may be
assured that we will not consent to anything without communication
with you, and fullest deliberation."

_Napier to Blunt, November 15th_:

"I suppose you can guess the innumerable difficulties with which we
have to deal. In the first place since we were not permitted to be
present at the examination of the witnesses, it is necessary for us
not only to have the whole of the evidence copied, but also to
submit the whole of it to each of the prisoners for his observation
and consideration.... There are 136 witnesses who will be brought
against us. Besides these, 125 prisoners have been interrogated,
and their answers will be used against each other. Then anybody who
pleases seems to have been allowed to write letters to the Court,
among others, H. H. the Khedive and, I believe, the Ministers, or
some of them.... Not one word of the evidence is on oath, and most
of it consists of hearsay and opinion.... 'In your opinion is Arabi
a rebel?' 'I don't know.' 'You bad, wicked man, why don't you
know?' 'I can't tell why I don't know.' 'Then think it over, and
to-morrow bring a written statement of what you do know.' To-morrow
the wretch arrives with a written statement that the prisoner in
question is a rebel and incendiary.

"Then again the translations afforded us are not correct
translations from the originals, and the originals are not true
records of the evidence of the witnesses themselves....

"Thank Heaven they have imprisoned a man named Rifaat. [He had been
Secretary to the Government and Director of the Press.] They could
not have done anything so destructive to their own case. Not only
does he know French well, but he has good literary ability, and a
very fair knowledge of all these tortuous and involved intrigues
rolled up one within another the untanglement of which is a
business enough to make the head reel. How if it were to appear
that the Abdin, Sept. 9, demonstration had been got up by the
Khedive as the best means of ridding him of the disagreeable
tutelage of Riaz and his Ministry! And how if the dark deeds of
June 11 were plotted in the Palace to force the English and French
to crush the now uncontrolled and uncontrollable National movement!

"I have been in hopes all along that the Government would not face
the trial, and that they would find some means to put an end to the
scandal that must ensue. But I begin to think that that will not be
so. Many people in high places are prompted by motives of revenge,
and still hope to wreak it upon their enemies. Others hope that by
the unworthy devices of the Court a fair trial may yet be
prevented. And I have no doubt they will in a great measure
succeed. Again, perhaps it is the policy of the English Cabinet to
insist upon the matter being threshed out, so as to give them time
to meet the storm, and an opportunity of throwing over the Turks
and perhaps Tewfik. If the trial is to go on I cannot tell what the
expense will be, but I fear it will be very great."

_Napier to Lady Anne Blunt, November 16th_:

"Lord Dufferin began at once by lending us his assistance. Broadley
and I called a day or two after his arrival. Broadley made a very
masterly statement which put him in possession of the whole of our
numerous causes of complaint. He has also been given copies of our
formal protests, and I believe will indirectly assist us to defeat
the Court of imbeciles with whom we have to deal.... The
correspondents, with the exception of Bell, are all, I believe,
favourable. The 'Daily News' especially. Wallace of the 'Times' has
just arrived, and I believe his influence will go far to counteract
Bell's extraordinary correspondence. Bell will particularly be
called to account for his 'Arabi's head-in-a-charger' policy. I
think he seems a little uncomfortable on the prospect of being
examined on his telegrams in Court."

Mackenzie Wallace, here alluded to, arrived with Dufferin from Constantinople, where he was "Times" correspondent, and afterwards became Dufferin's private secretary when His Lordship went to India as Viceroy. He was an able man, and acted while in Egypt entirely in concert with Dufferin, and has written the only English narrative of the events of 1882 which has any historical value.

What follows is in connection with the final attempt made by the prosecution to get evidence against Arabi on a point which might be treated as a capital one, namely, the arrest of Suliman Sami, who had been in command of the Egyptian rear-guard at the evacuation of Alexandria, and who, having been subjected to the usual intimidation treatment in prison, was now said to be ready to give evidence that Arabi had ordered him to burn the city. It was this sudden desperate attempt to obtain a capital verdict that brought matters to a crisis at Cairo, and resulted, as we shall see, in the compromise effected by Dufferin of the trial.

_Broadley to Blunt, November 17th_:

"An attempt has been made to force Suliman Bey to implicate Arabi.
It has been done so clumsily that Suliman has contradicted every
other witness called to prove the same thing, _but_ I believe it
was done at a midnight or secret sitting when Wilson was absent....
Try and make your peace with the Foreign Office, Dufferin is
square, and we could get a lot by soft words."

_Beaman to Blunt, November 17th_:

"I just write a line ... to say that things are going on very well.
The evidence of Suliman Sami, which seems to have rejoiced the
prosecution, is not worth a straw, having been palpably invented
for the occasion, and not supported by any of the preceding
testimony. The only question seems to be if the prisoners will get
off without a trial, or if they will have a chance of being fairly
heard in their own defence. I am convinced that the Government here
is using every effort to quash the proceedings, as the facts that
would come out in cross-examination would be compromising to every
man almost now in power, and would lay bare some very unpleasant
facts about the Khedive. For this last reason it is just possible
that our Government may feel inclined to propose terms to Arabi, as
it will be a rough _exposé_ if the trial proves the biggest scamp
in Egypt is the man whom we brought an army here to uphold.
Personally I have very little doubt that the Khedive and Omar
Loutfi arranged the Alexandrian massacre in order to aim a blow at
Arabi, who had just declared himself responsible for public safety.
I hold proofs which carry me half way to conviction, but the time
has not yet come to produce them."

_Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. November 18th_:

"Believe excellent compromise possible. Do not attack the Foreign
Office. Absolute secrecy necessary."

_Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. November 20th_:

"London parleys Dufferin. Egyptian Government's desire to
compromise lessened by thinking public opinion in England changed
owing to Suliman Sami's perjury."

_Broadley to Blunt, November 21st_:

"Important crisis imminent. The friends of the Egyptian Government
assert intention of hanging Arabi. Remain in London."

_Broadley to Blunt, November 21st_:

"Nothing I could say could give you an idea of the infamous conduct
of the Egyptian Government. They set our procedure rules at
defiance, and say they do not care a curse, as they are treating
diplomatically for the hanging of Arabi."

_Napier to Blunt, November 21st:_

"We are simply fighting all the force of the Egyptian Government
single-handed, though I believe Lord Dufferin will come to the
rescue. They are striving to procure the judicial murder of these
prisoners, and it takes all our time to meet their many wiles.
Wilson and Dufferin are helping us, but they, the Egyptian
Government, are quick and unscrupulous. We are necessarily more
slow and cautious."

_Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. November 26th:_

"Egyptian Government proposes to try Arabi alone. Telegraph your
opinion."

_Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. November 27th:_

"Letters explaining situation fully posted. Reason to believe if
Arabi, Mahmud Sami and Toulba consent to admit formal charges of
rebellion or continuing war against orders of the Khedive, the
Egyptian Government will consent to exile or internment at the Cape
of Good Hope, or elsewhere, some of the accused simple exile, the
majority amnesty. I implore absolute secrecy. Napier and myself
favourable to compromise seeing difficulty of proving efforts to
prevent burning, etc."

_Blunt to Broadley, November 28th:_

"Cannot approve terms named--certainly not Cape, but am consulting
friends to-night about funds. Our political position immensely
strong. Definite answer later."

_Broadley to Blunt. Letter. November 27th, 1882_:

("_Private and most urgent._)

"MY DEAR BLUNT,

"I invite _all_ your prudence, calm consideration and tact to the
subject of this letter. I have had a long interview [with] Dufferin
to-day. He is most friendly. The dossier is before us. _Nothing_
presents difficulties but the burning of Alexandria. As regards
this I believe the proof will fail as to Araby's orders, but many
ugly facts remain, viz.: no efforts to stop conflagration and
loot. (2) Continued intimacy with Suliman Sami _afterwards_. (3) No
punishment of offenders. (4) Large purchases petroleum. (5)
Systematic manner of incendiarism by soldiers.

"This is _the rub_. Could Arabi have not stopped the whole thing?
Besides, some of his former speeches, etc., have a very burning
appearance.

"If Arabi will plead _guilty formally to_ one _of the charges of
rebellion_ (_i. e_., his continuing war after Khedive's orders) he
will be exiled.

"Cape of Good Hope under certain conditions with sufficient
allowance. I think I can secure these terms for him, Mahmud Sami
and Toulba. Rest, simple exile or pardon. Can I think secure
_allowance_ or with forfeiture property--retention military rank.

"Against this we have enormous length trial--chances of turn public
opinion--expense _and_ the five facts which I allude to above.

"If a word of this transpires you will do me incalculable injury.
Think over all this and remember our great and grave
responsibility. Dufferin is charming. Please at once telegraph as
follows: If you say 'I accept the principle. Make best possible
terms,' say _pax_. I _advise_ this course as best. If you say, 'Go
on--no sort of compromise can be accepted,' say _bellum_.

"I am prepared to fight manfully to the bitter end strongly as
ever. I leave all to you--but think well over all the
contingencies.

"Very faithfully yours, "A. M. BROADLEY."

_Napier to Blunt. Letter. November 27th_:

"Cairo, _Nov. 27th, 1882_.

"DEAR BLUNT,

"It is much to be regretted that the Post Office people have found
out our correspondence, for they have, to my knowledge, opened your
last letter to me registered and received last Friday. It contained
the Borelli charges returned, and a short note from you. I do not
think anything was abstracted. I shall send this by ordinary post
under cover to H. H. Asquith, Temple, E. C., in the hope that it
may escape their vigilance. I, of course, protested at once, but
do not suppose that they will mend their ways. I also greatly
regret that I have no time to keep copies of my own letters to you
for reference. You must not be surprised therefore if you sometimes
meet with repetition. I cannot tell you of all the tricks they have
played upon us, as they would fill volumes. The letter had been
obviously opened by being slit across above the seal, and gummed up
again. It had been cleverly done, and I might not have discovered
it but for the fact that the gum used was not quite set. It
therefore opened along the line of the slit, and I at once found
the gum where no gum should have been. I will send you a short note
by the direct mail so that you shall not be surprised at the delay
in the delivery of this. Although we have been hard at work since
last mail, I do not know that anything of much importance has
occurred except that we have been admitted to the defence of Mahmud
Sami, with whom we have had several long conferences. Toulba is
ill, suffering from nervous excitement, I think, and asthma. I do
not know whether he will die, but I have done everything in my
power to get him proper medical assistance, a change of room, a
companion, and, if possible, a raised bed.

"The last evidence in the question of the burning of Alexandria has
not been communicated to us except through the medium of the
Egyptian Gazette, which may or may not be correct. It is not
formidable in itself, but it is quite sufficient to give colour to
a finding against the prisoner on that charge. It becomes,
therefore, of the most vital importance to consider whether there
is no way out other than through the portals of the court martial.
There is no doubt that we could discredit the evidence, and even
smash it up in cross-examination. And besides, on the other charges
of Rebellion and Massacre of June 11th I feel sure we could make it
hot for the prosecution, but there is an opinion in a very high
quarter that there is a strong determination to execute if the
Court should find guilty. Assume, therefore, that the Court Martial
find the prisoner (for I am only speaking of the chief now) guilty,
it will be for the English Government to reverse the sentence. I am
of opinion that it would be dangerous to trust them to carefully
examine the evidence and the manner in which it has been obtained.
I think it possible that that matter would be hastily disposed of
in the Foreign Office, and that they might leave the prisoner to
the Court, declaring that everything had been done to secure a
fair trial, and that they could not interfere with a verdict
deliberately arrived at after the fullest opportunity given to the
defence. And besides, it is more than probable that they would
allow _some_ sentence to pass--any sentence suffered here would be
most dangerous to the prisoner. After careful consideration I dare
not advise the prisoner to trust to the trial if he have an
alternative. If terms of banishment are offered, with proper
safeguards and provision for maintenance, I shall be strongly in
favour of accepting them. To sum up: If found guilty by the Court,
some punishment, perhaps death, certainly a serious one, will be
inflicted: If acquitted, either voluntary banishment without means,
or remaining in the country at the mercy of the Government here. If
he leaves the country under a compromise all charges except that of
rebellion would have to be withdrawn, and provision for his life in
a suitable place would have to be accorded. I have reason to
believe that the course of a compromise finds favour with all but
Riaz, and is also favourably regarded by Dufferin.

"Give us your opinion, and believe me ever very sincerely yours,

"MARK NAPIER.

"P. S.--As far as the case goes nothing could be better. In law, in
fact, and in the infamous manner it has been conducted. _But_ there
are the dangers and considerations I have alluded to. Broadley has
in my opinion conducted all the different discussions with the
Court and Dufferin with the greatest energy, skill, and judgment.
The law of the case is perfect for us, _but_ it is a case which
will be decided in the Cabinet and not in the Court. It is
impossible to rebut hearsay, and as I have had no opportunity to
consider the whole evidence, I will not offer an opinion on that
now."

_Broadley and Napier to Blunt. Telegram. November 28th, 7.42 p.
m._:

"Long interview with Dufferin. I entreat you give us discretion to
obtain best terms possible. We know delay fatal. Rely on our
judgment. Foreign Office's support unreliable. Dufferin disposed
to exceed his instructions on our behalf. Dufferin rules Egyptian
Government. Defense case burning Alexandria suspicious. Hence
anxiety. Embrace present moment. Dufferin's good offices absolutely
necessary. Telegraph instantly full discretion. Interview Dufferin
ten to-morrow.

"BROADLEY, NAPIER."

_Napier to Blunt. Same date_:

"I give you my honour I most strongly concur in our telegram
herewith. Strongest cause for full immediate discretion. Every
personal interest contrary to our request. NAPIER, private."

_Blunt to Broadley, November 28th midnight_:

"Cannot approve terms less than honourable exile--not
internment--Aden, Malta, Cyprus. Within these limits use
discretion."

_Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. November 29th_:

"Arabi gives us written authority to act with discretion in concert
with Dufferin, who proposes Arabi pleads guilty on formal charge of
rebellion--others abandoned. Sentence read commuting punishment to
exile--exile simple on parole--good place which you can settle with
the Foreign Office--perhaps Azores. Suitable allowance granted and
compensation for loss of property entailed by sentence. You
probably fail to realize difficulty of rebutting case of burning
Alexandria and obtaining evidence for defence. Foreign Office
certainly indisposed to interfere in any Egyptian sentence short of
death--for example, long detention in an Egyptian prison. Am
convinced ultimate result inevitably worse, dreading great
responsibility, having full knowledge of the position of affairs. I
trust you will leave us discretion, to avoid possible disaster."

_Blunt to Broadley. Telegram. November 29th, 3 p. m._:

"Have consulted De la Warr. We approve full discretion on basis of
telegram just received."

_Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. November 30th_:

"All progressing well. Try to negotiate in concert with De la Warr
the place of exile--Fiji suggested. Gratified at your confidence."

_Blunt to Broadley. Telegram. November 30th, 2.30 p. m._:

"Reject Fiji or Azores. Insist on Moslem country for religious
life. They cannot refuse. Will consult Chenery. De la Warr away."

_Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. December 1st_:

"Dufferin's conduct admirable. Suggests De la Warr's arranging
place of exile with Foreign Office. Prisoners entirely satisfied."

_Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. December 3rd_:

"Arabi's trial over. For correct account see 'Standard.' Egyptian
Government fulfilled all engagements to the letter."

_Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. December 4th_:

"Arabi delighted at result and sends thanks--inclined Cape.
Dufferin brick [_sic_]."

_Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. December 4th, 4.50 p. m._:

"Surprised your not wiring. Success complete. Anglo-Egyptian colony
furious."

_Blunt to Broadley. Telegram. December 4th_:

"Congratulate all. De la Warr says place of exile in English
territory left to Dufferin. I don't fancy Cape. How about Gibraltar
or Guernsey. Consult Arabi."

_Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. December 4th_:

"Many thanks kind telegram."

It will be perceived by these telegrams that it was not without reluctance that I agreed to the compromise proposed by Dufferin. We had at the moment the full tide of English opinion with us, and I knew that the Foreign Office could not do otherwise than agree to almost any terms we chose to impose, and I was most unwilling that the charge of rebellion should be admitted by us. At the same time it was not possible for me in the face of Broadley's, and especially Napier's, telegrams to withhold my assent. The responsibility was too great. I had also the question of costs to consider. It is true that a public subscription had been opened which had brought us valuable names. But the actual sums subscribed did not yet amount to £200, while Broadley's bill was running already to £3,000. A continuation for another month of the trial would have meant for me a larger expenditure than I was prepared to face in a political quarrel which was not quite my own. I therefore took counsel with De la Warr, and especially with Robert Bourke, of whom I have already spoken, and who warned me how frail a thing public opinion was to rely on, and advised me strongly to consent. I remember walking up and down with him in Montagu Square, where he lived, in indecision for half an hour before I was finally convinced and yielded. I consequently sent the telegram of approval, and eventually, after much argument, we succeeded in obtaining as Arabi's place of exile the Island of Ceylon, the traditional place of exile of our father Adam when driven out of Paradise. No more honourable one could possibly have been fixed upon.

The exact terms of the arrangement come to with Dufferin were unfortunately not committed by him to writing, an oversight on Broadley's part, who ought to have insisted on this and thus saved us much after trouble and misunderstanding. The negligence allowed the Egyptian Government to inflict degradation of rank on the prisoners, which was certainly not in the spirit of Lord Dufferin's arrangement, though, perhaps, legally following the _pro formâ_ sentence of death for rebellion. Room, too, was left for dispute as to what was the amount of the allowance intended as compensation for the confiscations. Broadley seems to have exaggerated to his clients the promises on this head. Personally I consider that they were not illiberally dealt with, as the property of most of them was insignificant, and they were allowed to retain property belonging to their wives. The only considerable sufferer pecuniarily was Mahmud Pasha Sami, who had a large estate which he forfeited. As to Arabi, his sole worldly possessions, besides what furniture was in his house at Cairo, a hired one, and some horses in his stable, consisted of the eight acres of good land he had inherited from his father in his native village, to which he had at various time added parcels of uncultivated land on the desert edge, amounting to some six hundred acres, paid for out of his pay in prosperous days. These at the time of the confiscation cannot have been worth much over £2,000 or £3,000, for barren land was then selling for only a few reals the acre, and he had not had time to reclaim or improve them.[33]

A point, too, which was long disputed, but which is no longer of importance, was whether the _paroles_ of the prisoners were given to the Egyptian or the English Governments. But with these matters I need not trouble myself more than to say that the English Government, having gained its end of getting the rebellion admitted by us, and so a title given for their intervention in Egypt, gave little more help to the defence of certain unfortunate minor prisoners who on various pretexts found themselves excluded from the amnesty, and were subjected to all the injustices of the Khedive's uncontrolled authority. These, however, belong to a period beyond that of which I now propose to write, namely, that of the permanent Occupation, and cannot be detailed in my present memoir, which now, I think, has made clear at least my own part in the events of the revolution to the last point where that part was personal.

Looking back at my action in Egypt during that period, with its early successes and its final failure to obtain for the National Government fair treatment at English hands, I cannot wholly regret the course I took. I made, of course, many mistakes, and I feel that I am in considerable measure responsible for the determination the Nationalists came to to risk their country's fortune on the die of battle. But I still think their fate would have been a worse one if they had not fought, tamely surrendering to European pressure. They at least thus got a hearing from the world at large, and if any attention since has been paid to fellah grievances it has been won wholly by Arabi's persistence, which I encouraged, in accepting the logic of their political principles even to the point of war. It obliged England to listen to their complaints and, if it could not prevent her from depriving them of their political liberty, it has forced her since to remedy most of their secular material wrongs.

What the future may bring to Egypt I know not. She has grown rich under English tutelage, and though I do not consider riches synonymous with the well being of a nation, they have been in Egypt of at least this value, that they have enabled the native Nile population so far to hold its own against foreign intrusion as owner of the soil. While this is, the Nation will remain alive, and the day may yet come for the fellah race when self-government will be restored to them, and the armed struggle of 1882 will appear to them in its true light as the beginning of their national life, and one, as such, glorious in their annals. To that day of final emancipation I still pin my hopes, though it is not likely I shall live to see it.[34]

If my life is prolonged for a few years, it is my intention to continue the writing of my memoirs, and this will include much that is of importance to Egypt, though nothing of such high historical value as the recital already made. The present volume may well stand by itself, and so with regret I leave it. I should have wished to include in it an account of Lord Dufferin's mission of reconstruction, and the weak efforts made by Gladstone to undo the wrong he had inflicted on the cause of liberty, and on his own reputation as a man of good. But this would lead me too far, and I prefer to end my actual narrative at the point where we have now arrived, the close of the eventful year, 1882. On one of the last days of it I received a second characteristic letter from Gordon in which, speaking of the war and the suppression of liberty in Egypt, he quotes the following appropriate verse:

"When thou seest the violent oppression of the poor, or the
subversion of justice, marvel not at it, for the Higher than the
Highest regardeth it."

FOOTNOTES:

[33] A claim made recently in his name for a large indemnity in regard to these lands, and embodied in a petition addressed to our King Edward, is an entire illusion on Arabi's part, and marks the fact, otherwise very apparent to those who know him, that he has fallen into a condition of senile decay for which there is no remedy.

The worst oversight was that the promised general amnesty was not exactly defined. Hence the later prosecutions on so-called "criminal" charges.

[34] This was written in 1904.

APPENDICES