Chapter IV: The Indian Nations in Alliance with the Confederacy

The work of soliciting the military support of the Indians and, to a large extent, that of securing it, antedated very considerably the formal negotiation of treaties with their constituted authorities. Whether it be true or not, that Douglas H. Cooper, United States agent for the Choctaws and the Chickasaws, did, as early as April, 1861, begin to enroll his Indians for the service of the Confederate States, it is indisputable that, immediately upon receiving Secretary Walker's communication[408] of May thirteenth, he began to do it in real earnest and, from that time forward, gained his recruits with astonishing ease. There were many[409] to recommend the employment of the Indians and some to oppose it. A certain F. J. Marshall, writing[410] to Jefferson Davis from Marysville, Kansas, on the twentieth of May, mapped out a tremendous programme of activities in which Indians were to play their part and to help secure everything of value between the Missouri line and the Pacific coast. Henry McCulloch thought[411] they might be used advantageously in Texas and on her borders. Pike believed[412] not more than thirty-five hundred could be counted upon, maybe five thousand, but whatever the number, he would engage them quickly and provide them with the necessary equipment. He wanted also to employ[413] a battalion of those Indians that more strictly belonged to Kansas. Presumably, then, he would not have confined Confederate interest to the slaveholding tribes. Others besides Pike were doubtless of the same mind. Marshall was, for instance, and southern emissaries were frequently heard of, north of the Neosho River. Henry C. Whitney, one of two United States special agents (Thomas C. Slaughter was the other), sent[414] out to Kansas to investigate and with a view to relieve under congressional appropriation[415] the distress among the Indians, caused by the fearful and widespread drouth of 1860, met[416] with many traces of secessionist influence.[417]

The efforts of Cooper, coupled with those of Pike and McCulloch, in this matter of the enlistment of Indian troops, were soon rewarded. Chief Hudson's proclamation of June fourteenth, besides being a declaration of independence, was a call for troops and a call that was responded to by the Choctaws with alacrity. A little more than a month later, the enlistment of Indians had so far advanced that McCulloch was able to speak[418] positively as to his intended disposition of them. It was to keep them, both the Choctaw-Chickasaw regiment, which was then well under way towards organization, and the Creek, which was then forming, at Scullyville, situated fifteen miles, or thereabouts, from Fort Smith, as a check upon the Cherokees. Evidently the peace-loving element among the Cherokees was yet the dominant one. On the twenty-fifth of July, Cooper furnished further information,

The organization of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Regiment of Mounted
Rifles will be completed this week, but as yet no arms[419] have been
furnished at Fort Smith for them. I hope speedy and effectual measures
will be taken to arm the people of this (Indian) Territory--the
Creeks, Seminoles, Cherokees.... The Choctaws and Chickasaws can
furnish 10,000 warriors[420] if needed. The Choctaws and Chickasaws
are extremely anxious to form another regiment.

There seems to be a disposition to keep the Indians at home. This
seems to me bad policy. They are unfit for garrison duty, and would be
a terror to the Yankees.[421]

All this time, of course, Pike had been making progress with his treaties and undoubtedly simplifying Cooper's task by embodying in those treaties the principles of an active alliance. These clauses from the Creek Treaty will illustrate the point:

ARTICLE I. There shall be perpetual peace and friendship, and an
alliance offensive and defensive, between the Confederate States of
America, and all of their States and people, and the Creek Nation of
Indians, and all its towns and individuals.[422]

ARTICLE XXXVI. In consideration of the common interests of the Creek
Nation and the Confederate States, and of the protection and rights
guaranteed to the said nation by this treaty, the Creek Nation, hereby
agrees that it will, either by itself or in conjunction with the
Seminole Nation, raise and furnish a regiment of ten companies of
mounted men to serve in the armies of the Confederate States for
twelve months, the company officers whereof shall be elected by the
members of the company, and the field officers by a majority of the
votes of the members of the regiment. The men shall be armed by the
Confederate States, receive the same pay and allowances as other
mounted troops in the service, and not be moved beyond the limits of
the Indian country west of Arkansas without their consent.[423]

ARTICLE XXXVII. The Creek Nation hereby agrees and binds itself at any
future time to raise and furnish, upon the requisition of the
President, such number of troops for the defence of the Indian
country, and of the frontier of the Confederate States as he may fix,
not out of fair proportion to the number of its population, to be
employed for such terms of service as the President may fix; and such
troops shall always receive the same pay and allowances as other
troops of the same class in the service of the Confederate
States.[424]

ARTICLE XXXVIII. It is further agreed by the said Confederate States
that the said Creek Nation shall never be required or called upon to
pay, in land or otherwise, any part of the expenses of the present
war, or of any war waged by or against the Confederate States.[425]

ARTICLE XXXIX. It is further agreed that, after the restoration of
peace, the Government of the Confederate States will defend the
frontiers of the Indian country, of which the Creek country is a part,
and hold the forts and posts therein, with native troops, recruited
among the several Indian Nations included therein, under the command
of officers of the army of the Confederate States, in preference to
other troops.[426]

Although John Ross had positively forbidden the recruiting of any force within the limits of the Cherokee country, that while nominally for home defense, should be in reality a reserve force for the Confederacy, he was unable to prevent individuals from going over, on their own responsibility entirely, to McCulloch; and many did go and are believed to have fought[427] with his brigade at the Battle of Oak Hills, or Wilson's Creek. That battle proved the determining point in this period of Cherokee history. It was a Confederate victory, and a victory gained under such circumstances[428] that the watchful Indians had every reason to think that the southern cause would be triumphant in the end.

The dissensions[429] among the Cherokee and the constant endeavors of the Ridge Party to develop public sentiment in favor of the Confederacy, to undermine the popularity of John Ross, and to destroy his influence over the full-bloods were, and there is no gainsaying it, the real causes of the ultimate Cherokee defection. The Battle of Wilson's Creek was only the occasion, only the immediate cause, the excuse, if you please, and of itself could never have brought about a decision. Yet its effect[430] upon Cherokee opinion was unquestionably great and immediate, and that effect was noticeably strengthened and intensified by the memory of other Federal reverses along the Atlantic seaboard, especially the more recent and more serious one of Manassas Junction, on the twenty-first of July.

Up to about that time, the neutral policy of John Ross seems to have received the endorsement of a majority of the Cherokee people. In the last days of June, the Executive Council had been called together and had, after a session of several days, publicly and officially approved[431] of the stand the principal chief had taken to date. But events were already under way that were to make this executive action in no sense a true index to popular feeling. The secessionists were secretly organizing themselves, ready to seize the first opportunity that might appear. The full-bloods, or non-secessionists, were also organized and, under the name of "Pins," were holding meetings of mutual encouragement among the hills. Encounters between the two factions were not infrequent and the half-breeds resorted to all sorts of expedients for persuading, or that failing, of frightening the full-bloods into a compliance with their wishes. They told them that the Kansas people had designs upon their lands (which was not altogether untrue), and that the Federal government would free their slaves and otherwise dispossess, degrade, and humiliate them. Such arguments had their effect and there was little at hand to counteract it, none in the memory of the past, none in the neglect and embarrassment of the present, none in the prospect of the future. There were no Federal troops, no new Federal assurances of protection. Agent Crawford, who was the only agent within reach, added his threats and his Confederate promises to those of the half-breeds. Then came the Battle of Wilson's Creek with its disastrous Federal showing, and the exhausted resisting power of the Pins went down before the renewed secessionist ardor.

A meeting of the Cherokee Executive Council had been called for August first, and John Ross, Joseph Vann, James Brown, John Drew, and William P. Ross, all prominent non-secessionists, had attended it. On this occasion, a general, or mass, meeting of the Cherokee people was arranged for, in response to a public appeal, and the date for it was fixed for the twentieth of August.[432] In the interval came the news from Springfield and another communication from Albert Pike.[433]

The convention which met at Tahlequah in August of 1861 ended in the secession of the Cherokee Nation. While it was in progress, the events of the last few months were gone over in thorough review and emphasis placed upon those of recent occurrence. The attendance at the convention was large.[434] Both political factions were well represented and there seems to have been only a slight show of force, if any, from the secessionists. The Reverend Evan Jones is our authority for thinking that some "seventy or eighty of them appeared there in arms with the intention to break up the meeting;" but that only two of them succeeded in making any disturbance.[435] In the course of the meeting, Agent Crawford put in an appearance and again asserted himself in behalf of the Confederacy. He "appeared on the platform," says an eyewitness,

And stated that although for some time past he had been among the
Cherokees acting as U. S. Agent, it had been by the advice and consent
of the Confederate authorities, and with the understanding that when
the proper time arrived he should declare himself the Agent of the C.
S. A. That time had now come making this the proudest day of his
life.[436].

Such a confession of baseness seems hardly credible. The secessionist was entitled to his opinions touching the doctrine of state rights, for which a difference of view found its justification both in fact and in theory. He might even conscientiously believe in the righteousness of negro enslavement, inasmuch as it really did offer an easy solution of a labor problem; and moreover, would work under a benign paternalism, for the thorough, because so gradual, development of an inferior race; but by no standard of personal honor, or of moral rectitude could conduct such as Crawford's be condoned.

John Ross had opened the meeting with an address in which he had defined its purposes and his own good intentions, both past and present. Personally, he seemed still inclined to maintain a neutral attitude but designing persons had made his position most difficult.[437]

... Our soil has not been invaded, our peace has not been molested,
nor our rights interfered with by either Government. On the contrary,
the people have remained at home, cultivated their farms in security,
and are reaping fruitful returns for their labors. But for false
fabrications, we should have pursued our ordinary vocations without
any excitement at home, or misrepresentations and consequent
misapprehensions abroad, as to the real sentiments and purposes of the
Cherokee people. Alarming reports, however, have been pertinaciously
circulated at home and unjust imputations among the people of the
States. The object seems to have been to create strife and conflict,
instead of harmony and good-will, among the people themselves, and to
engender prejudice and distrust, instead of kindness and confidence,
towards them by the officers and citizens of the Confederate
States....

... The great object with me has been to have the Cherokee people
harmonious and united in the full and free exercise and enjoyment of
all their rights of person and property. Union is strength; dissension
is weakness, misery, ruin. In time of peace, enjoy peace together; in
time of war, if war must come, fight together. As brothers live, as
brothers die. While ready and willing to defend our firesides from the
robber and murderer, let us not make war wantonly against the
authority of the United or Confederate States, but avoid conflict with
either, and remain strictly on our own soil. We have homes endeared to
us by every consideration, laws adapted to our condition of our own
choice, and rights and privileges of the highest character. Here they
must be enjoyed or nowhere else. When your nationality ceases here, it
will live nowhere else. When these homes are lost, you will find no
others like them. Then, my countrymen, as you regard your own rights,
as you regard the welfare of your posterity, be prudent how you act.
The permanent disruption of the United States is now probable. The
State on our border and the Indian nations about us have severed their
connection from the United States and joined the Confederate States.
Our general interests are inseparable from theirs, and it is not
desirable that we should stand alone. The preservation of our rights
and of our existence are above every other consideration. And in view
of all the circumstances of our situation I do say to you frankly that
in my opinion the time has now come when you should signify your
consent for the authorities of the nation to adopt preliminary steps
for an alliance with the Confederate States upon terms honorable and
advantageous to the Cherokee Nation.[438]

]

After having received this most solemn of warnings, "and a few pertinent and forcible remarks from Colonel Crawford," the meeting organized with Joseph Vann as president and William P. Ross as secretary. To effect a reconciliation between the contending factions and to decide upon some national policy that should be acceptable to the majority of the people, were, undoubtedly, the objects sought and so, after much discussion, a series of resolutions was adopted in which these ideas were given prominence as well as some of kindred importance. The resolutions asserted the legal and constitutional right of property in slaves and, in no doubtful terms, a friendship for the Confederacy. Yet the convention itself took no definite action towards consummating an alliance but left everything to the discretion of the constituted authorities of the nation, in whom it announced an unwavering confidence.

Whereas we, the Cherokee people, have been invited by the executive of
the Cherokee Nation, in compliance with the request of many citizens,
to meet in general meeting, for the purpose of drawing more closely
the bonds of friendship and sympathy which should characterize our
conduct and mark our feelings towards each other in view of the
difficulties and dangers which have arisen from the fearful condition
of affairs among the people of the several States, and for the purpose
of giving a free and frank expression of the real sentiments we
cherish towards each other, and of our true position in regard to
questions which affect the general welfare, and particularly on that
of the subject of slavery: Therefore be it hereby

_Resolved_, That we fully approve the neutrality recommended by the
principal chief in the war pending between the United and the
Confederate States, and tender to General McCulloch our thanks for the
respect he has shown to our position.

_Resolved_, That we renew the pledges given by the executive of this
nation of the friendship of the Cherokees towards the people of all
the States, and particularly towards those on our immediate border,
with whom our relations have been harmonious and cordial, and from
whom they should not be separated.

_Resolved_, That we also take occasion to renew to the Creeks,
Choctaws, Seminoles, Chickasaws, and Osages, and others, assurances of
continued friendship and brotherly feeling.

_Resolved_, That we hereby disavow any wish or purpose to create or
perpetuate any distinctions between the citizens of our country as to
the full and mixed blood, but regard each and all as our brothers, and
entitled to equal rights and privileges according to the constitution
and laws of the nation.

_Resolved_, That we proclaim unwavering attachment to the constitution
and laws of the Cherokee Nation, and solemnly pledge ourselves to
defend and support the same, and as far as in us lies to secure to
the citizens of the nation all the rights and privileges which they
guarantee to them.

_Resolved_, That among the rights guaranteed by the constitution and
laws we distinctly recognize that of property in negro slaves, and
hereby publicly denounce as calumniators those who represent us to be
abolitionists, and as a consequence hostile to the South, which is
both the land of our birth and the land of our homes.

_Resolved_, That the great consideration with the Cherokee people
should be a united and harmonious support and defense of their common
rights, and we hereby pledge ourselves to mutually sustain our
nationality, and to defend our lives and the integrity of our homes
and soil whenever the same shall be wantonly assailed by lawless
marauders.

_Resolved_, That, reposing full confidence in the constituted
authorities of the Cherokee Nation, we submit to their wisdom the
management of all questions which affect our interests growing out of
the exigencies of the relations between the United and Confederate
States of America, and which may render an alliance on our part with
the latter States expedient and desirable.

And which resolutions, upon the question of their passage being put,
were carried by acclamation. JOSEPH VANN, President.

Wm. P. Ross, Secretary.
Tahlequah, C. N., August 21, 1861.[439]

In making his plans, prior to the Battle of Wilson's Creek, for effecting a junction with Price and cooperating with him and others in southwest Missouri, McCulloch acted, not under direct orders from Richmond, but from his own desire to take such a position opposite the Cherokee Neutral Lands, once so outrageously intruded upon by Kansas settlers and now being made the highway of marauders entering Missouri, as would make it appear to the Cherokees that he was there as their friend and as the protector of their interests. After the battle, he refused, and rightly in view of his own special commission, to accompany Price in his forward march towards the Missouri River. Instead he drew back into the neighborhood of the Cherokee boundary and there developed his plans for attacking Kansas, should such a course be deemed necessary in order to protect Indian Territory.

It was at this juncture that the Cherokees as a nation expressed their preference for the South and for the southern cause, moved thereto, however, by the peculiarities and the difficulties of their situation. The Executive Council lost no time in communicating[440] to McCulloch the decision of the Tahlequah mass-meeting and their own determination to carry out its wishes by effecting an alliance with the Confederacy "as early as practicable." They realized very clearly that this might "give rise to movements against the Cherokee people upon their northern border" and were resolved to be prepared for such an emergency. They, therefore, authorized the raising of a regiment of mounted men, home guards they were to be and to be so designated, officered by appointment of the principal chief, Colonel John Drew being made the colonel. It would appear that the nucleus of this regiment, and with a strong southern bias, had made[441] its appearance prior to the Tahlequah meeting and the circumstance gave rise to the suspicion that the Cherokees had not been acting in good faith. After the war, the suspicion concentrated, very unjustly, upon John Ross and was made the most of by Commissioner Cooley at the Fort Smith conference; in order to accomplish, for reasons dishonorable to the United States government, the aged chief's deposition.

Drew's regiment of home guards was tendered to McCulloch and he agreed to accept it[442] but not until after a treaty of alliance should have been actually consummated between the Cherokees and the Confederate States. Pending the accomplishment of that highly desirable object, McCulloch promised to protect the Cherokee borders with his own troops and confessed[443] that he had already authorized the enlistment of another force of Cherokees under the command of Stand Watie, which had been designed to protect that same northern border but "not to interfere with the neutrality of the Nation by occupying a position within its limits."

It is not easy to decide just when or by whom the use of Indians by the Federals in the border warfare[444] was first suggested. As late as May twenty-second, Governor Charles Robinson of Kansas, in a letter[445] to Superintendent Branch, protested against even so much as arming them, which would certainly indicate that a general use of their services had not yet been thought of or resorted to; but, in August, when Senator James H. Lane was busy organizing his brigade of volunteers for the defense of Kansas, he resolved,[446] rather officiously, one might think, upon using some of the Kansas River tribes in establishing "a strong Indian camp near the neutral lands to prevent forage into Kansas" and arranged for a conference with the Indians at Fort Lincoln, his headquarters. Soon, however, a stay of execution was ordered[447] until the matter could be discussed, in its larger aspects, with Commissioner Dole, to whom courtesy,[448] at least, would have demanded that the whole affair should have been first submitted.

Dole was then in Kansas[449] and before long became aware[450] that General Fremont was also favoring the enlistment of Indians, or, at all events, their employment by the army in some capacity. He had approached Agent Johnson on the subject, his immediate purpose being to request Fall Leaf, a Delaware, "to organize a party of 50 men for the service of" his department. Agent Johnson called the tribe together and discovered that the chiefs were much averse to having their young men enlist. Dole inquired into the matter and assured[451] the chiefs that a few braves only were needed and those simply for special service and that there was no intention of asking the tribe, as a tribe, to give its services. The chiefs refused consent, notwithstanding; but Fall Leaf and a few others like him did enlist.[452] They were probably among the fifty-three Delawares, subsequently reported[453] as having been employed by Fremont to act as scouts and guides. Fall Leaf attained the rank of captain.[454] Superintendent Branch,[455] be it said, and also Commissioner Dole,[456] at this stage of the war, were strongly opposed to a general use of the Indians for purposes of active warfare. They knew only too well what it was likely to lead to. Indeed, the most that Dole had, up to date, agreed[457] to, was the supplying the Indians with the means of their own defense when United States troops had shown themselves quite unavailable.

Dole's opinion being such, it is scarcely to be supposed that he could have considered favorably Senator Lane's idea of an Indian camp in the Cherokee Neutral Lands or the one, developed later, of an Indian patrol along the southern boundary of Kansas. Lane's troubles, quite apart from his Indian projects, were daily increasing; and, considering the method of warfare indulged in by him and encouraged in his white troops, the same one that pro-slavery and free-state men had equally experimented with in squatter-sovereignty days, it would have been simply deplorable to have permitted him the free use of Indian warriors. Complaints[458] of Lane and of his brigade, of their jayhawking and of their marauding were being made on every hand. Governor Robinson[459] reported these complaints and endorsed them. Secretary Cameron, while making his western tour of investigation, heard[460] them and reported them also. Lane attributed[461] them to personal dislike of him, to envy, to everything, in fact, except their true cause; but we know now that they were all well-grounded. Yet, remarkable to relate, Lane's influence with Lincoln and with the War Department suffered no appreciable decline. His suggestions[462] were acted upon; and, as we shall presently see, he was even permitted to organize a huge jayhawking expedition at the beginning of the next year.

The mention of Lane's jayhawking expedition calls to mind the conditions that made it seem, at the time, an acceptable thing and takes us back in retrospect to Indian Territory and to the events occurring there after the Tahlequah mass-meeting of the twenty-first of August. As soon as the meeting had broken up, John Ross despatched[463] a messenger to Albert Pike to inform him of all that had happened and of the Cherokee willingness, at last, to negotiate with the Confederacy. It was arranged that Pike should come to the Cherokee country, taking up his quarters temporarily at Park Hill, the home of Ross near Tahlequah, and that a general Indian council should be called. A special effort was made to have the fragmentary bands of the northeast represented and Pike sent out various agents[464] to urge an attendance. John Ross was also active in the same interest. He, personally, communicated with the Osages[465] and with the Creeks[466] by letter; but the Creeks,[467] like Evan Jones,[468] seem to have been incredulous as to Cherokee defection. They seem to have doubted the genuineness of the letter sent to them and made inquiries about it, only to be assured[469] again and again by Ross that all was well and that he wished the Indians en masse to join the Southern States.

The council at Tahlequah, viewed in the light of its immediate object, was unusually successful. Four treaties were negotiated, one[470] at Tahlequah itself, October seventh, with the Cherokees and three at Park Hill. Of these three, one[471] was with four bands of the Great Osages, Clermont's, White Hair's, Black Dog's, and the Big Hill, October second; another[472] with the Quapaws, October fourth; and the third,[473] on the same day, with the Senecas[474] (once of Sandusky) and the Shawnees (once of Lewistown and now of the mixed band of Senecas and Shawnees). Hereditary[475] chiefs alone signed for the Great Osages, the merit chief, Big Chief, being, apparently, not present. The notorious ex-United States agent, J. W. Washbourne,[476] was very much in evidence as would most likely also have been the equally notorious and disreputable Indian trader, John Mathews,[477] had he not recently received his deserts at the hands of Senator Lane's brigade.

An accurate and connected account of the occurrences at the Tahlequah council, it is well nigh impossible to obtain. Some intimidation[478] seems to have been used, and there was a report of a collision[479] between the Ross and Ridge factions some days previous to the meeting. Drew's regiment, which, when organized, had been placed as a guard[480] on the northern border, escorted[481] Commissioner Pike to Park Hill and later took up its station on the treaty ground. Some of Stand Watie's Confederate forces were also in the neighborhood.[482] In 1865, at the Fort Smith Council, held for the readjustment of political relations with the United States government, the Indians of the Neosho Agency gave[483] a rather picturesque description of the way they had been prevailed upon to sign the treaty with the Confederate States. The real object of the Tahlequah meeting was evidently not revealed to them until they had actually reached the treaty ground. Agent Dorn had told them that they had to go to the meeting. They went and were there taken in hand by Pike who said,

If you don't do what we lay before you, we can't say you shall live
happy.

The Indians

feeling badly, just looked on, and the white man went to work, got up
a paper and said I want you to sign that. The Indian did not want to,
but he compelled him. You know yourself that, under such
circumstances, he would do anything to save his life....

Now that the history of the diplomatic relations between the Indian tribes and the Confederacy has been brought thus far, nothing seems more fitting than to return to the consideration of the Federal government and its representatives, its purposes, and its plans, beginning the account with the Indian Office and Commissioner Dole. Dole's early attempt to prevail upon the War Department to resume its occupation of Indian Territory was followed up by the convincing letter of the thirtieth of May in which he likened the Indians to the Union element in some of the border states and ended by throwing the full responsibility for any disloyalty that might appear among them upon the Federal authorities; inasmuch as they had neglected and were still neglecting to give the support and protection that any ordinary guardian is bound in honor to give to his wards. Dole said in writing to Secretary Smith,

... Experience has shown that the presence of even a small force of
federal troops located in the disaffected States has had the effect to
preserve the peace, encourage the friends of the Union, and induce the
people to return to their allegiance.

That this same result would be produced in the Indian country I cannot
doubt, as they can have no inducement to unite with the enemies of the
United States unless we fail as a nation to give them that protection
guaranteed by our treaty stipulations, and which is necessary to
prevent designing and evil-disposed persons from having free
intercourse with them, to work out their evil purposes....[484]

Nothing came of Dole's application and thus was exemplified, as often before and often since, a very serious defect in the American administrative system by which the duty of doing a certain thing rests upon one department and the means for doing it with quite another. It is surely no exaggeration to say that hundreds and hundreds of times the Indians have been the innocent victims of friction between the War and Interior Departments.

But if the authorities at Washington were indifferent to the Indian's welfare, Senator Lane was neither indifferent to nor ignorant of the strategical importance of Indian Territory. With him the defence of Kansas and the means of procuring that defence were everything. Indian Territory and the Indian tribes came within the scope of the means. And so it happened that, while he was organizing his Kansas brigade, he commissioned[485] a man, E. H. Carruth, who had formerly posed as an educator[486] among the Seminoles, to communicate with the various tribes for the purpose of determining their real feelings towards the United States government and of obtaining, if possible, an interview between Lane and some of their accredited representatives. The interview was to take place "at Fort Lincoln on the Osage or some point convenient thereto."[487]

Now a considerable portion of the Creek tribe was in just the right mood and in just the right situation to receive such overtures in the right spirit. That portion consisted of those who, after the treaty of July tenth had been negotiated in the manner already described, had rallied around Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la; and who, in a Creek convention that had been called for August fifth had declared that the chiefs, who had signed a treaty outside the National Council, had violated a fundamental law of the tribe and had thereby forfeited their administrative rank. The criticism applied to Motey Kennard and to Echo Harjo, the principal and the second chief respectively. Kennard, as we have seen, was the leader of the Lower Creeks and Harjo of the Upper. A further division in Creek ranks was now inevitable and it came forthwith, the Non-treaty Party, made up mostly of Upper Creeks, proceeding to recognize[488] Ok-ta-ha-hassee Harjo (better known as "Sands") as the acting principal chief of the tribe. It also betook itself westward so as to be as much as possible out of the reach of the secessionists. When once in a position of at least temporary security, it despatched Mik-ko Hut-kee (White Chief), Bob Deer, Jo Ellis, and perhaps others to Washington to confer with the "Great Father."[489]

The Creek delegates, Mik-ko Hut-kee and his companions, went, on their way to Washington, northward through Kansas, saw Superintendent Coffin[490] and, later, Lane's agent, E. H. Carruth. This was about the second week of September and Carruth was at Barnesville, Lane's headquarters. Carruth received the Creeks kindly, read sympathetically the letter[491] that they brought from their distressed chiefs, Sands and Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la, assured the equally distressed delegates of the continued fatherly interest of the United States government, and sent them on their way, greatly comforted. It was while these Creek delegates were lingering at Barnesville that Carruth made a special effort to induce the southern Indians generally to send representatives for an interview with Lane. He wrote personally to Ross,[492] to the two Creek chiefs,[493] and to the Wichita chief, Tusaquach,[494] and, in addition, wrote to the Seminole chiefs and headmen[495] and to the "loyal" Choctaws and Chickasaws.[496]

Presumably, Superintendent Coffin did not altogether approve of Senator Lane's taking it upon himself to confer with the Indians who, after all, were officially Coffin's charges; for, in October, we find him, likewise, planning for an intertribal conference to be held at Humboldt.[497] It is rather interesting to look back upon all this and to realize, as perforce we must, that every plan for conferring with the southern tribes in the interests of the United States government, at this critical time, contemplated a meeting at some place outside of Indian Territory. Here were agents of the Indian's "Great Father" offering protection to the red men and yet giving incontestable proof in the very details of the offer that they did not themselves dare to venture[498] beyond the Kansas boundary. As a matter of fact, all such plans for a general conference came to nothing, although, as late as November, Lane had still the idea of one in mind. He was, at the time, hoping to meet the Indians at Leroy[499] in Coffey County, Kansas, on the twenty-fourth. Lane also continued to advocate the use of the friendly Indians as soldiers. A little earlier, Agent Johnson had endorsed[500] Lane's plan in a letter to Commissioner Dole; but the coming of General Hunter upon the scene considerably affected the sphere of influence.

Dissatisfaction with Fremont on account of his extravagance, his haphazard way of issuing commissions, his tardiness, and, above all, his general military incompetence had crystallized in September; and, by orders[501] of General Scott on the twenty-fourth of October, Hunter was directed to relieve him. Hunter reached his post in early November and almost immediately thereafter, either upon his own initiative or after consultation with someone like Coffin (it could hardly have been with Lane; for Lane had gone[502] to Washington, or with Branch; for Branch was strongly opposed to the project intended), he telegraphed[503] to the War Department "for permission to muster a Brigade of Kansas Indians into the service of the United States, to assist the friendly Creek Indians in maintaining their loyalty." Evidently, the request was not granted,[504] but duties akin to it were, by arrangement of President Lincoln, conferred upon Hunter which involved his assuming the responsibility of holding, if such a plan were feasible, an intertribal council so as to renew the confidence of the southern Indians in the United States government. A letter[505] from Dole, outlining the plan, reveals an astonishing ignorance of just how far those selfsame Indians had gone in their defection, because of the loss of the confidence.

In the giving of these new duties to General Hunter, there was not the slightest intention of ignoring Senator Lane. In fact, Dole expressly mentioned that Lane had called for just such an Indian conference[506] and suggested that, if Hunter's military duties prevented his meeting the Indians in person, Lane might take his place, "provided he can be spared from his post." The whole affair was incident to the reorganization that had recently, under general orders[507] of the ninth of November, taken place in the Western Department, from which had resulted a Department of Kansas, separate and distinct from the Department of Missouri. The Department of Kansas included "the State of Kansas, the Indian Territory west of Arkansas, and the Territories of Nebraska, Colorado, and Dakota" and was to be under the command of Major-general David Hunter[508] with headquarters at Fort Leavenworth. The idea governing this division of the old western department was, ostensibly, as Nicolay and Hay express[509] it, that Kansas might be protected, Indian Territory repossessed, and Texas reached. As we shall presently see, a similar reorganization took place, about the same time, in the Confederate western service and for very much the same reason, the condition of the Indian country being a very large proportion of that reason. It is barely possible that, as far as the United States was concerned, Senator Lane's recommendation[510] of the ninth of October was almost wholly accountable for the change.

It was, undoubtedly, high time that something vigorous was being done to stay Confederate progress in Indian Territory. Indeed, events were happening there at this very moment that made all plans for an inter-tribal conference exceedingly out of date. The Confederate government had now a large Indian force[511] in the field and expectations of an increase, provided the necessary arms[512] were obtainable. On the twenty-second[513] of November, by special orders[514] from Richmond, Indian Territory had been erected into a separate military department and Albert Pike, now a brigadier-general, assigned to the command of it. For the present, however, things seem to have remained much as they were with McCulloch nominally in command and Cooper in actual charge. Moreover, long before Pike reappeared upon the scene, matters had come to an issue between the secessionist and unionist Creeks.

Determined not to allow themselves to be over-persuaded or intimidated by the secessionist element in their nation, the unionist Creeks, under Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la, had withdrawn from active intercourse with the rival faction and, resisting all attempts of Cooper and others to inveigle them into an interview that might result in compromise, they had encamped at or near the junction of the Deep and North Forks of the Canadian River. Cooper resolved to attack them there and, for the purpose, gathered[515] together an effective fighting force of about fourteen hundred men, all Indians except for a detachment of Texas cavalry. On the fifth of November, Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la broke camp and took up the line of march for Kansas, hoping that, in Kansas, he and his followers would receive either succor or refuge. It has been estimated that Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la's force, at this time, was less than two thousand men and that it comprised, besides Creeks and Seminoles, some two or three hundred negroes. His traveling cortege was, however, very much larger; for it included women and children, the sick and the aged. Approximately half of the Creeks were on the move for pastures new. For many of them it was a second exodus.

Colonel D. H. Cooper reached the deserted camp of Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la on the fifteenth of November and, finding his enemy gone and locating his trail, moved himself in a slightly northeasterly direction towards the Red Fork of the Arkansas. He came up with the unionist Creeks at Round Mountain on the night of the nineteenth and an indecisive engagement[516] followed, both sides claiming the victory. Under cover of darkness, Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la managed to slip away and crossed into the Cherokee country where there were plenty of disaffected full-bloods to give him sympathy. It is more than likely that they had invited him there and had prepared for his coming. Cooper did not attempt to pursue the Creek refugees, having been called back to the Arkansas line, there to wait in readiness to reenforce McCulloch should the Federals make a forward march southward from Springfield, as then seemed probable. But that danger soon passed, passed even before Cooper had had time to take the post indicated or to leave his own camp at Concharta, after a brief recuperation. He was now free to follow up the meagre advantage of the nineteenth.

The next opportunity to crush Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la came in the Battle of Bird Creek [Chusto-Talasah, Little High Shoals, or the Caving Banks],[517] fought December 9, 1861. On the twenty-ninth of the preceding month, a part of Cooper's force had set out for Tulsey Town and an advance guard had been sent up the Verdigris in the direction of a place, called "Coody's Settlement," where Colonel John Drew with a detachment of his regiment of Cherokee full-bloods was posted. The orders were that Drew should effect a junction with Cooper's main force and, on December eighth they were all encamped on Bird Creek in the southwestern corner of the Cherokee Nation. At this juncture, word came that Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la wished to treat for peace and Major Pegg, a Cherokee, with three companions was sent forward to confer with him. They found the Creek chief, surrounded by his warriors and ready for battle. It was evening and Colonel Cooper had scarcely heard the news of the Creek determination to fight when a message came that four companies of Drew's regiment, horrified at the thought of fighting with their neighbors, had dispersed and gone over to Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la. The incident did not promise well for success on the morrow and the Battle of Bird Creek was another indecisive engagement, although the Creeks, eager and resplendent with their yellow corn-shuck badges, seem to have had all the advantage of position. Again they made their escape and again Colonel Cooper was prevented from following them, this time because he was exceedingly fearful lest the Cherokee desertion might have a lasting and disastrous effect upon the remaining Indian forces, particularly upon the small group that was all that was left of the original First Cherokee Mounted Rifles. Cooper's personal opinion was, that the defection was widespread among the Cherokees and that it would be sheer folly to start out after Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la until more white troops had been added to the pursuing force, by way both of reenforcement and of encouragement.

Instead, therefore, of continuing northward, Colonel Cooper drew off in the direction of Fort Gibson and, from that point, sent for aid to Colonel James McIntosh at Van Buren. He then occupied himself with his own troops and prevailed upon John Ross to rally[518] the Cherokees. It was now the nineteenth of December and the aged chief did his best to keep his people true to the faith that the nation had pledged in the treaty of the seventh of October. He recalled to their minds the fact that it was, by all odds, the best treaty that the Cherokees had ever secured, the one that gave them the fullest recognition of their rights as a semi-independent people, and he might have added with sad, sad truth that it was the best that they could ever hope to get. He made no such pessimistic reflection, however, but concluded,

It is, therefore, our duty and interest to respect it, and we must, as
the interest of our common country demands it. According to the
stipulations of the treaty we must meet enemies of our allies whenever
the south requires it, as they are our enemies as well as the enemies
of the south; and I feel sure that no such occurrence as the one we
deplore would have taken place if all things were understood as I have
endeavored to explain them. Indeed the true meaning of our treaty is,
that we must know no line in the presence of our invader, be he who he
may....[519]

Colonel Cooper then addressed[520] the Indians and, after him, Major Pegg;[521] but they were not convinced and many of them went home, positively refusing to march farther with the army.

Meanwhile Cooper's call for reenforcements had reached McIntosh[522] and, as the need seemed so urgent, McIntosh resolved to supply it and notified Cooper to that effect. Subsequently, he decided[523] to take the field in person and to head a column, separate from Cooper's. What induced him to do this, nobody can well say. Cooper always felt that the incompleteness of the victory over Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la, which was soon to come, was mainly attributable to the divided effort of the attacking force. In the two former engagements, Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la's force, such as it was, untrained and miscellaneous, had greatly outnumbered the Confederate; but now the two were more equally matched in point of numbers and the chances of success were all on the southern side because of superior training and equipment, so Cooper was probably correct in his conjecture. McIntosh's excuse[524] for advancing precipitately and alone was, notwithstanding, very reasonable. The scarcity of forage made it expedient to march compactly; and the two generals had agreed, so McIntosh declared, when in conference at Fort Gibson, "that either force should attack the enemy on sight."

The privilege of attacking Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la fell, under this arrangement, supposing it was made, to McIntosh, who had been able to push on in advance of Cooper. The Battle of Chustenahlah was fought in the early afternoon of December 26, 1861, and ended in what seemed the complete defeat of the Creeks. McIntosh reported that, although their position was strong, they were forced to retreat

To the rocky gorges amid the deep recesses of the mountains, where
they were pursued by our victorious troops and routed in every
instance with great loss. They endeavored to make a stand at their
encampment, but their efforts were ineffectual, and we were soon in
the midst of it. The battle lasted until 4 o'clock, when the firing
gradually ceased....[525]

And then the Creeks fled, leaving practically everything in the shape of property behind them. Cooper came up and detachments of his troops pursued them almost to the Kansas line. The weather was bitterly cold, provisions scarce, the country rough and bleak. The pursuit took the form of a seven day scout; but the Creeks, no matter how great their dispersion, were headed straight for Walnut Creek, Kansas.

Their coming was anticipated. Hearing of their approach, Superintendent Coffin had directed[526] all the agents[527] under his charge to report to him for duty at a place on the Verdigris River called Fort Roe[528] "about thirty-five or forty miles from Leroy and Burlington." It was Coffin's intention to meet the refugees upon their first arrival; but, as Commissioner Dole was expected soon to be at Fort Leavenworth, he thought it best to wait[529] and consult with him. It does not seem to have been recorded on just what date the first of the Indian refugees crossed the Kansas line, but they were very soon crossing in great numbers and, by the time Coffin finally reached them, their condition was truly pitiable. They took up their station on the bare prairies between the Verdigris and the Arkansas Rivers and stretched themselves in almost hopeless confusion over about two hundred miles of country. Fortunately the land upon which they camped was Indian land, New York Indian land, and the few white men thereon were legally intruders and could not consistently object to the presence of the refugees. The numbers of the refugees were variously estimated. Starting with about forty-five hundred,[530] they increased daily and at an astonishing rate; for the exodus of the Creeks was but the signal for the flight of other tribesmen from Indian Territory, of all those, in fact, who were either tired of their alliance with the Confederacy or had never been in sympathy with it and were only too eager to take the first chance to escape from it.

The suffering of the refugees, due to destitution and exposure, was something horrible to think upon. Superintendent Coffin had little to give them. He appealed to General Hunter for an allowance from the army supplies and Hunter sent down his chief commissary of subsistence, Captain J. W. Turner, to do what he could to relieve the distress. Hunter also sent Brigade-surgeon A. B. Campbell; for it was not simply food and clothing, that were needed and roof shelter, but medical attendance. As soon as possible, cheap blankets[531] were furnished and some condemned army tents. The journey northward had been undertaken in the bitterest of cold weather. With a raw northwest wind beating in their faces,

And over the snow-covered roads, they travelled all night and the next
day, without halting to rest. Many of them were on foot, without
shoes, and very thinly clad.... In this condition they had
accomplished a journey of about three hundred miles; but quite a
number froze to death on the route, and their bodies with a shroud of
snow, were left where they fell to feed the hungry wolves....

Families who in their country had been wealthy, and who could count
their cattle by the thousands and horses by hundreds, and owned large
numbers of slaves, and who at home had lived at ease and comfort, were
without the necessaries of life.[532]

When, sometime in early December, Commissioner Dole heard of the resistance that the unionist Creeks were making to Colonel Cooper, he immediately applied once more, through the Secretary of the Interior, to the War Department for troops sufficient to assert Federal supremacy south of the Kansas line, his immediate object being, the strengthening of the force then opposed to Cooper. At the moment, Lane's expedition was under consideration, Lane having managed to convince the Washington authorities, both congressional and administrative, that an expedition southward was absolutely necessary[533] for the protection of the frontier.

]

Somewhat earlier, in fact in the late autumn, the non-secession Indians of various tribes had made their own appeal for help. They had made it to the United States government and also, a little later on, to the Indian tribes of Kansas. Along about the first of November, a mixed delegation[534] of Creeks, Seminoles, and Chickasaws had made its appearance[535] at Leroy and, finding there the United States Creek agent, George A. Cutler, had consulted with him "in reference to the intentions of the Federal government regarding the protection due them under treaty stipulations." Cutler advised the Indians to talk the matter over with Senator Lane and accompanied them to Fort Scott, Lane's headquarters, for the purpose. Arriving there, they learned that Lane had gone to Washington and had left his command in charge of Colonel James Montgomery. Colonel Montgomery counselled with the Indians as Cutler had done and helped them to reach the decision that it would be best to proceed to Washington and lay their complaints before the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. At the same time, Montgomery notified[536] President Lincoln of their intention.

Still accompanied by Agent Cutler, the delegation resumed its journey, going by way of Fort Leavenworth. There they conferred[537] with General Hunter and left greatly strengthened in their resolution of proceeding to Washington; for Hunter, too, thought that such a trip might compel the government to realize the Indian's very real distress and its own obligation to relieve it. We are fain to believe that General Hunter personally believed in the military necessity of securing Indian Territory even though he did do all he could to oppose the project of Senator Lane in the early months of 1862 and even though he did disapprove of the formation of the department of Kansas and his own assignment to it instead of to that of Missouri, which would have been his preference. If he at any time to date had wavered[538] in his opinion as to the needs of the Indians and their legitimate claim upon the United States government for protection, Carruth's letter of November twenty-sixth ought to have settled the matter, unless, indeed, its rather savage tone had created prejudice instead of working conviction as was intended.

... I have from the first believed it would be good policy to let
loose the northern Indians, under the employ of government; it
certainly would be better for the border States to have the Indian
country for a battle ground than to have it remain a shelter for rebel
hordes the coming winter....[539]

The visit of the Indians to Washington proved very opportune. By the twenty-seventh of December, they were back at Fort Leavenworth and considerably reassured. Superintendent Coffin had a council with them on the twenty-eighth "at the Fort to good satisfaction." He says of his interview,

I gave them Presents of Pipes, tobacco, and Sugar, and they went on
their way to Fort Scott rejoicing they seem to be in fine
Spirits,[540] but are at a Loss what to do for a living til Lanes Army
goes down there into the Indian Territory they want very much to get
Some of the Funds now due the Creeks....[541]

A more pathetic appeal, and one more immediately telling in its effects, was that made to the brother Indians of Kansas. It came direct from Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la and when it reached the Delawares found in them a ready response. It invited their cooperation[542] in the war and asked for men and ammunition.[543] This is the Delaware reply:[544]

We are much rejoiced to receive your letter by James McDaniel[545] and
David Balon. Our Agent has sent it to our great Father, the
President, "at Washington," and to Gen. Hunter at "Fort Leavenworth."
It gives us great pleasure to hear that you are good and true friends
to the President, and to the Government of the United States. We hope
you will continue to be their friend. If bad men of the South ask you
to go to war against the President, stop your ears, don't listen to
them, they are your worst enemies, they are trying to destroy you and
the Country.

Grand Children it does our hearts good, we rejoice to hear of the
victories you have gained over your enemies of the Government under
your brave leader Oputh-la-yar-ho-la.

Grand Children we are ready and willing to help you. Our brave
Warriors are ready to spill their Blood for you, and are only waiting
to hear from our great Father at Washington, we have asked of him the
privaledge of going to your assistance, and hope that our request will
be granted, we don't wish to go to War against the wishes of our great
Father the President. We have heard that the President will soon have
a large Army in the Indian Country to protect you, that he has
ordered Gen. Lane to march to your relief. We are confident that our
great Father is able and will protect his red children--Grand Children
we pray to the "great spirit" to protect you and keep you out of the
hands of the bad men of the South, who are trying to destroy you and
the Government--We have no fears as to the result of this war--the
President has large Armies in the field that will conquer and punish
the Rebels--We are proud of our Muscogee Children.

The United States government had already determined upon an expedition to the Indian country and, yielding to the importunities of Senator Lane, who represented General Hunter as in full accord with himself in the matter, had decided to use the Kansas Indians in the making up of the attacking force. It was well that the Indians had manifested a readiness to fight and that the Delawares, particularly, had overcome their previous aversion. The first official record of the fact that the decision to use the Kansas Indians had been reached appears to be a communication[546] from Assistant Adjutant-general E. D. Townsend to Surgeon-general C. A. Finley, under date of December 31, 1861, notifying him that medical supplies would soon be needed for a force of about twenty-seven thousand men, about four thousand of whom were to be Indians, which was to be concentrated at an early day near Fort Leavenworth. On the third of January, Lane wrote[547] to Hunter, informing him, as if at first hand and semi-officially, of the new plan. It is not to be wondered at that General Hunter took offence at the officiousness and presumption Lane displayed. In point of fact, it was a clear case of executive interference.

Now that it had, to all appearances, gained a long-desired object, the Indian Office lost no time in lending the War Department its hearty cooperation. Commissioner Dole was especially enthusiastic and, under instructions from Secretary Smith, prepared to go out to Kansas himself to help organize the Indians for army service. He also sent particulars[548] of the new movement to Superintendent Branch and a circular letter[549] to the agents of the central superintendency, detailing the advantages that would accrue to individual Indians should they enlist. Dole wrote these letters on the sixth of January and was then expecting to be in Leavenworth City for the making of final arrangements eight or ten days "hence." He did not manage to get away, however, quite so soon; but the agents went to work immediately and, even before Dole arrived in Kansas, Agent Farnsworth, who had always been rather too eager for Indian enlistment, was able to report[550] the initial steps taken. By the twenty-first of January,[551] Dole was well on his way west. He reached Kansas in due season and there learned[552] for the first time, that Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la had been completely overwhelmed, that the refugees were on the Verdigris, and that General Hunter was subsisting them. This was doleful news, indeed, and made the project of a southern expedition seem more and more expedient.

General Hunter had done the best he could to relieve the awful sufferings of the refugees; but, on the sixth of February, he was obliged to inform[553] Dole that he could do no more, that he had practically reached the end of his resources, and that, after the fifteenth of February, the whole responsibility of subsisting the destitute Indians would have to fall upon the Interior Department. Dole was almost at his wits' end. He had no funds that he could use legitimately for the need that had arisen. It was a case of emergency, however, and something certainly had to be done. Before the fifteenth of December arrived, additional reports[554] came in from Superintendent Coffin, detailing distress. Under the circumstances it was necessary to act quickly and without congressional authorization. Dole telegraphed[555] to Secretary Smith,

Six thousand Indians driven out of Indian territory, naked and
starving. General Hunter will only feed them until 15th. Shall I take
care of them on the faith of an appropriation?

He received a reply[556] that should have been dictated, not so much in the spirit of generosity, as of simple justice:

Go on and supply the destitute Indians, Congress will supply the
means. War Department will not organize them.

With this approbation in hand, Dole went to work, purchased sufficient supplies on credit, and appointed[557] a special agent, Dr. William Kile of Illinois, who had been commissioned[558] by President Lincoln to act on Lane's staff and was then in Kansas as Lane's brigade quartermaster, to attend to their distribution. Meanwhile, the attention of Congress had been called to the matter and a particularly strong letter of Dole's, describing the utter misery of the exiles, was read in the Senate February 14, in support of a joint resolution for their relief.[559] It was intended originally to apply only to the loyal Creeks, Seminoles, and Chickasaws but had its title changed later so as to make it include the Choctaws. On the third of March, Congress passed[560] an act providing that the annuities of the "hostiles," Creeks, Chickasaws, Seminoles, Wichitas, and Cherokees, should be applied, as might be necessary, to the relief of refugees from Indian Territory. It was expressly stipulated in this enactment[561] that the money should not be used for other than Indian Territory tribes.

Secretary Smith's telegram, as the reader has probably already observed, had given to Dole a small piece of information that was not of slight significance, signifying as it did a change of front by the War Department. The War Department had rescinded its former action and had now refused to organize the Indians for service. The objections to Lane's enterprise must have been cumulative. Before the idea of it had embraced the Indians and before it had become so closely identified with Lane's name and personality, in fact, while it was more or less a scheme of McClellan's, Hunter had interposed[562] objections, but purely on military grounds. His force was scarcely equal to a movement southward. Subsequently, Halleck interposed objections likewise and his reasons,[563] whatever his motives may have been, were perfectly sound, indeed, rather alarmingly so, since they broadly hinted at the miserably local interests involved in the war in the west and the gross subordination of military policies to political. Then came Lane with energy like the whirlwind, a local politician through and through. He had absolutely no respect for official proprieties and the military men, opposed to him, were men of small calibre. He reached Kansas, joyfully intent upon putting into immediate effect the power that Lincoln had conferred upon him, only to find that there stood Hunter, fully prepared to contest authority with him. The Adjutant-general had written[564] Hunter that Lane had not been given a command independent of his own and that, if he so desired, he might conduct the expedition southward in person. In the evening of the twenty-sixth, Lane reached Leavenworth, and the very next day, Hunter issued general orders[565] that he would command in person. Taken aback and excusably indignant, Lane communicated[566] at once with John Covode and requested him to impart the news to the President, to Stanton[567] and the new Secretary of War, and to General McClellan.

Official sensitiveness was unquestionably at the bottom of the whole trouble, yet Lincoln was very largely to blame for having yielded to Lane's importunities. He frankly said that he had wished to keep the affair out of McClellan's hands as far as possible.[568] He hoped to profit by the services of both Hunter and Lane; but, if they could not agree, then Lane must yield the precedence to Hunter. He must report for orders or decline the service.[569] Military men, stationed in the west, and civil officers of Kansas were all prejudiced against the "Lane Expedition."[570] They expected it to be nothing but jayhawking and marauding of the worst description. The Indians, however, were deeply disappointed[571] when a halt came in the preparations. Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la personally addressed a communication[572] to Lincoln. He wanted nobody but Lane to command the expedition. Pending a settlement, Dole ordered[573] Coffin[574] to desist from further enrollment. Secretary Stanton was declared opposed to the use of Indians in civilized warfare.[575] Soon the orders for the expedition were countermanded with the understanding, explicit or implied, that it should later proceed under the personal direction of General Hunter.

The military situation in the middle west and the great desire on the part of the Confederacy to gain Missouri and to complete her secession from the old Union necessitated, at the opening of 1862, a thorough-going reoerganization of forces concentrated in that part of the country. Experience had shown that separate and independent commands had a tendency to become too much localized, individual commanders too much inclined to keep within the narrow margin, each of his instructions, for the good of the service as a whole to be promoted. It was thought best, therefore, to establish the Trans-Mississippi District of Department No. 2[576] and to place in command of it, Major-general Earl Van Dorn. The district was to comprise all of Louisiana north of the Red River, all of Indian Territory proper, all of Arkansas, and all of Missouri west of the St. Francis. Wise in the main, as the scheme for consolidation unquestionably was, it had its weak points. The unrestricted inclusion of Indian Territory was decidedly a violation of the spirit of the Pike treaties, if not of the actual letter. Under the conditions of their alliance with the Confederacy, the Indian nations were not obliged to render service outside of the limits of their own country; but the Confederacy was obliged, independent of any departmental reoerganization or regulations, to furnish them protection.

Almost the first thing that Van Dorn did, after assuming command of the new military district, was to write,[577] from his headquarters at Jacksonport in eastern Arkansas, to Price, advising him that Pike would shortly be ordered to take position in southwestern Missouri, say in Lawrence County near Mt. Vernon, "with instructions to cooperate with you in any emergency." Van Dorn was then laboring under the impression that Pike's force consisted of a majority of white troops, three regiments, he thought, out of a brigade of eight or nine thousand men, whereas there was only one white regiment in the whole Indian department. Colonel Cooper complained[578] that this latter condition was the fact and insisted that it was contrary to the express promises made, by authority,[579] to the Choctaws and Chickasaws when he had begun his recruiting work among them the previous summer. Had Van Dorn only taken a little trouble to inquire into the real state of affairs among the Indians, he would, instead of ordering Pike to bring the Indian regiments out of Indian Territory, have seen to it that they stayed at home and that danger of civil strife among the Cherokees was prevented by the presence of three white regiments, as originally promised. At this particular time as it happened, Pike was not called upon to move his force; for the order so to move did not reach him until after the Federals, "pursuing General Price, had invaded Arkansas."[580]

]

It proved, however, to be but a brief stay of execution; for, as soon as Van Dorn learned that Price had fallen back from Springfield, he resolved[581] to form a junction with McCulloch's division in the Boston Mountains and himself take command of all the forces in the field. He estimated[582] that, should Pike be able to join him, with Price's and McCulloch's troops already combined, he would have an army of fully twenty-six thousand men to oppose a Federal force of between thirty-five and forty thousand. Pike was duly informed[583] of the new arrangement and ordered[584] to "hasten up with all possible dispatch and in person direct the march of" his "command, including Stand Watie's, McIntosh's, and Drew's regiments." His men were to "march light, ready for immediate action."[585] The outcome of all these preparations was the Battle of Pea Ridge[586] and that battle was the consummation, the culminating point, in fact, of the Indian alliance with the Southern Confederacy. It was the beginning of the end. It happened just at the time when the Richmond legislators were organizing[587] the great Arkansas and Red River superintendency,[588] which was intended to embrace all the tribes with whom Albert Pike had made his treaties. Albert Pike retired from Pea Ridge to his defences at Fort McCulloch, angry and indignant that the Indians had been taken out of their own country to fight the white man's battles. His displeasure was serious; for the Indian confidence in the Confederacy depended almost wholly upon the promises and the assurances of the Arkansas poet.