Chapter LXXIII: Appendix: H (1)

[On the 1st of December, one of the secretaries of the American Anti-Slavery Society addressed a note to each of the Governors of the slave states, in which he informed them, in courteous and respectful terms, that he had directed the Publishing Agent of this society, thereafter regularly to transmit to them, free of charge, the periodical publications issued from the office of the society. To this offer the following replies were received:--]

GOVERNOR CAMPBELL'S LETTER.

JAMES G. BIRNEY, Esq., _New York_

"RICHMOND, _Dec. 4, 1837_.

SIR,--I received, by yesterday's mail, your letter of the 1st
instant, in which you state that you had directed the publishing
agent of the American Anti-Slavery Society, hereafter, regularly to
transmit, free of charge, by mail, to all the governors of the slave
states, the periodical publications issued from that office.

Regarding your society as highly mischievous, I decline receiving
any communications from it, and must request that no publications
from your office be transmitted to me.

I am, &c,

DAVID CAMPBELL."

* * * * *

GOVERNOR BAGBY'S LETTER.

"TUSCALOOSA, _Jan. 6, 1838_

SIR,--I received, by due course of mail, your favor of the 1st of
December, informing me that you had directed the publishing agent of
the American Anti-Slavery Society to forward to the governors of the
slaveholding states the periodicals issued from that office. Taking
it for granted, that the only object which the society or yourself
could have in view, in adopting this course, is, the dissemination
of the opinions and principles of the society--having made up my own
opinion, unalterably, in relation to the whole question of slavery,
as it exists in a portion of the United States, and feeling
confident that, in the correctness of this opinion, I am sustained
by the entire free white population of Alabama, as well as the great
body of the people of this Union, I must, with the greatest respect
for yourself, personally but not for the opinions or principles
advocated by the society--positively decline receiving said
publications, or any others of a similar character, either
personally or officially. Indeed, it is presuming a little too much,
to expect that the chief magistrate of a free people, elected by
themselves, would hold correspondence or give currency to the
publications of an organized society, openly engaged in a scheme
fraught with more mischievous consequences to their interest and
repose, than any that the wit or folly of mankind has
heretofore devised.

I am, very respectfully,

Your ob't servant,

A.P. BAGBY"

JAMES G. BIRNEY, _Esq., New York_.

* * * * *

GOVERNOR CANNON'S LETTER.

[This letter required so many alterations to bring it up to the ordinary standard of epistolary, grammatical, and orthographical accuracy, that it is thought best to give it in _word_ and _letter_, precisely as it was received at the office.]

"EXECUTIVE DEPT.--

NASHVILLE. _Dec. 12th, 1837_.

Sir

I have rec'd yours of the 1st Inst notifying me, that you had
directed, your periodical publications, on the subject of Slavery to
be sent to me free of charge &c--and you are correct, if sincere, in
your views, in supposing that we widely differ, on this subject, we
do indeed widely differ, on it, if the publications said to have
emanated from you, are honest and sincere, which, I admit,
is possible.

My opinions are fix'd and settled, and I seldom Look into or
examine, the, different vague notions of others who write and
theorise on that subject. Hence I trust you will not expect me to
examine, what you have printed on this subject, or cause to have
printed. If you or any other man are influenced by feelings of
humanity, and are laboring to relieve the sufferings, of the human
race, you may find objects enough immediately around you, where you
are, in any nonslaveholding State, to engage your, attention, and
all your exertions, in that good cause.

But if your aim is to make a flourish on the subject, before the
world, and to gain yourself some notoriety, or distinction, without,
doing good to any, and evil to many, of the human race, you are,
pursuing the course calculated to effect. Such an object, in which
no honest man need envy. Your honours, thus gaind, I know there are
many such in our country, but would fain hope, you are not one of
them. If you have Lived, as you state forty years in a Slave holding
State, you know that, that class of its population, are not the
most, miserable, degraded, or unhappy, either in their feelings or
habits, You know they are generally governd, and provided for by men
of information and understanding sufficient to guard them against
the most, odious vices, and hibets of the country, from which, you
know the slaves are in a far greater degree, exempt than, are other
portions of the population. That the slaves are the most happy,
moral and contented generally, and free from suffering of any kind,
having, each full confidence, in his masters, skill means and
disposition to provide well for him, knowing also at the same time
that _it is his interest to do it_. Hence in this State of Society
more than any other, Superior intelligence has the ascendency, in
governing and provideing, for the wants of those inferior, also in
giveing direction to their Labour, and industry, as should be the
case, superior intelligence Should govern, when united with Virtue,
and interest, that great predominating principle in all human
affairs. It is my rule of Life, when I see any man labouring to
produce effects, at a distance from him, while neglecting the
objects immediately around him, (in doing good) to suspect his
sincerity, to suspect him for some selfish, or sinister motive, all
is not gold that glitters, and every man is not what he, endeavours
to appear to be, is too well known. It is the duty of masters to
take care of there slaves and provide for them, and this duty I
believe is as generally and as fully complyd with as any other duty
enjoind on the human family, for next to their children their own
offspring, their slaves stand next foremost in their care and
attention, there are indeed very few instances of a contrary
character.

You can find around you, I doubt not a large number of persons
intemix'd, in your society, who are entirely destitute of that care,
and attention, towards them that is enjoyed by our slaves, and who
are destitute of that deep feeling of interest, in guarding their
morals and habits, and directing them through Life in all things,
which is here enjoyd by our slaves, to those let your efforts be
directed immediately around you and do not trouble with your vague
speculations those who are contented and happy, at a distance
from you.

Very respectfully yours,

N. CANNON."

Mr. JAS. G. BIRNEY, _Cor. Sec._ &c.

* * * * *

[The letter of the Secretary to the governor of South Carolina was not _answered_, but was so inverted and folded as to present the _subscribed_ name of the secretary, as the _superscription_ of the same letter to be returned. The addition of _New York_ to the address brought it back to this office.

Whilst governor Butler was thus refusing the information that was proffered to him in the most respectful terms from this office, he was engaged in another affair, having connection with the anti-slavery movement, as indiscreet, as it was unbecoming the dignity of the office he holds. The following account of it is from one of the Boston papers:--]

"_Hoaxing a Governor_.--The National Aegis says, that Hollis Parker,
who was sentenced to the state prison at the late term of the
criminal court for Worcester county, for endeavoring to extort money
from governor Everett, had opened an extensive correspondence,
previous to his arrest, with similar intent, with other
distinguished men of the country. Besides several individuals in New
York, governor Butler, of South Carolina, was honored with his
notice. A letter from that gentleman, directed to Parker, was lately
received at the post office in a town near Worcester, enclosing a
check for fifty dollars. So far as the character of Parker's letter
can be inferred from the reply of governor Butler, it would appear,
that Parker informed the governor, that the design was entertained
by some of our citizens, of transmitting to South Carolina a
quantity of 'incendiary publications,' and that with the aid of a
little money, he (Parker) would be able to unravel the plot, and
furnish full information concerning it to his excellency. The bait
took, and the money was forwarded, with earnest appeals to Parker to
be vigilant and active in thoroughly investigating the supposed
conspiracy against the peace and happiness of the South.

The Aegis has the following very just remarks touching this
case:--'Governor Butler belongs to a state loud in its professions
of regard for state rights and state sovereignty. We, also, are
sincere advocates of that good old republican doctrine. It strikes
us, that it would have comported better with the spirit of that
doctrine, the dignity, of his own station and character, the respect
and courtesy due to a sovereign and independent state, if governor
Butler had made the proper representation, if the subject was
deserving of such notice, to the acknowledged head and constituted
authorities of that state, instead of holding official
correspondence with a citizen of a foreign jurisdiction, and
employing a secret agent and informer, whose very offer of such
service was proof of the base and irresponsible character of him who
made it.'"

* * * * *

GOVERNOR CONWAY'S LETTER.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS, _March_ 1, 1838.

Sir--A newspaper, headed '_The Emancipator_,' in which you are
announced the 'publishing agent,' has, for some weeks past, arrived
at the post office in this city, to my address. Not having
subscribed, or authorized any individual to give my name as a
subscriber, for that or any such paper, it is entirely _gratuitous_
on the part of its publishers to send me a copy; and not having a
favorable opinion of the _intentions_ of the _authors and founders_
of the '_American Anti-Slavery Society_;' I have to request a
discontinuance of '_The Emancipator_.'

Your ob't servant, "J.S. CONWAY."

R. G. WILLIAMS, Esq., New York.

* * * * *

[NOTE.--The following extract of a letter, from the late Chief Justice Jay to the late venerable Elias Boudinot, dated Nov. 17, 1819, might well have formed part of Appendix E. Its existence, however, was not known till it was too late to insert it in its most appropriate place. It shows the view taken of some of the _constitutional_ questions by a distinguished jurist,--one of the purest patriots too, by whom our early history was illustrated.]

"Little can be added to what has been said and written on the
subject of slavery. I concur in the opinion, that it ought not to be
_introduced, nor permitted_ in any of the _new_ states; and that it
ought to be gradually diminished, and finally, abolished, in all
of them.

To me, the _constitutional authority_ of the Congress to prohibit
the _migration_ and _importation_ of slaves into any of the states,
does not appear questionable.

The first article of the Constitution specifics the legislative
powers committed to Congress. The ninth section of that article has
these words:--'The _migration_ or _importation_ of such persons as
any of the _now existing_ states shall think proper to admit, shall
not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year 1808--but a tax
or duty may be imposed on such importation not exceeding _ten
dollars_ for each person.'

I understand the sense and meaning of this clause to be, That the
power of the Congress, although _competent to prohibit such
migration and importation_, was not to be exercised with respect to
the THEN existing states, and _them only_, until the year 1808; but
that Congress were at liberty to make such prohibition as to any
_new state_ which might in the _meantime_ be established. And
further, that from and after _that_ period, they were authorized to
make such prohibition as to _all the states, whether new or old_.

Slaves were the persons intended. The word slaves was avoided, on
account of the existing toleration of slavery, and its discordancy
with the principles of the Revolution; and from a consciousness of
its being repugnant to those propositions to the Declaration of
Independence:--'We hold these truths to be self-evident--that all
men are created equal--that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain inalienable rights--and that, among these, are life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.'"

* * * * *

NO. 9.

THE ANTI-SLAVERY EXAMINER.

* * * * *

LETTER

OF

GERRIT SMITH,

TO

HON. HENRY CLAY.

* * * * *

NEW YORK:

PUBLISHED BY THE AMERICAN ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY, NO. 143 NASSAU STREET. ----- 1839.

* * * * * This No. contains 3-1/2 sheets.--Postage, under 100 miles, 6 cts. over 100, 10 cts.

_Please Read and circulate_.

LETTER.

* * * * *

PETERBORO, MARCH 21, 1839.

HON. HENRY CLAY:

DEAR SIR,

In the Annual Meeting of the American Colonization Society, held in the Capitol in the city of Washington, December, 1835, you commented on a speech made by myself, the previous autumn. Your objections to that speech formed the principal subject matter of your remarks. Does not this fact somewhat mitigate the great presumption of which I feel myself guilty, in undertaking, all unhonored and humble as I am, to review the production of one of the most distinguished statesmen of the age?

Until the appearance of your celebrated speech on the subject of slavery, I had supposed that you cherished a sacred regard for the right of petition. I now find, that you value it no more highly than they do, who make open war upon it. Indeed, you admit, that, in relation to this right, "there is no substantial difference between" them and yourself. Instead of rebuking, you compliment them; and, in saying that "the majority of the Senate" would not "violate the right of petition in any case, in which, according to its judgment, the object of the petition could be safely or properly granted," you show to what destructive conditions you subject this absolute right. Your doctrine is, that in those cases, where the object of the petition is such, as the supplicated party can approve, previously to any discussion of its merits--there, and there only, exists the right of petition. For aught I see, you are no more to be regarded as the friend of this right, than is the conspicuous gentleman[A] who framed the Report on that subject, which was presented to the Senate of my state the last month. That gentleman admits the sacredness of "the right to petition on any subject;" and yet, in the same breath, he insists on the equal sacredness of the right to refuse to attend to a petition. He manifestly failed to bear in mind, that a right to petition implies the correlative right to be heard. How different are the statesmen, who insist "on the right to refuse to attend to a petition," from Him, who says, "Whoso stoppeth his ears at the cry of the poor, he also shall cry himself, but shall not be heard." And who are poor, if it be not those for whom the abolitionists cry? They must even cry by proxy. For, in the language of John Quincy Adams, the champion of the right of petition, "The slave is not permitted to cry for mercy--to plead for pardon--to utter the shriek of perishing nature for relief." It may be well to remark, that the error, which I have pointed out in the Report in question, lies in the premises of the principal argument of that paper; and that the correction of this error is necessarily attended with the destruction of the premises, and with the overthrow of the argument, which is built upon them.

[Footnote A: Colonel Young.]

I surely need not stop to vindicate the right of petition. It is a natural right--one that human laws can guarantee, but can neither create nor destroy. It is an interesting fact, that the Amendment to the Federal Constitution, which guarantees the right of petition, was opposed in the Congress of 1789 as superfluous. It was argued, that this is "a self-evident, inalienable right, which the people possess," and that "it would never be called in question." What a change in fifty years!

You deny the power of Congress to abolish the inter-state traffic in human beings; and, inasmuch as you say, that the right "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states," does not include the right to prohibit and destroy commerce; and, inasmuch as it is understood, that it was in virtue of the right to regulate commerce, that Congress enacted laws to restrain our participation in the "African slave trade," you perhaps also deny, that Congress had the power to enact such laws. The history of the times in which the Federal Constitution was framed and adopted, justifies the belief, that the clause of that instrument under consideration conveys the power, which Congress exercised. For instance, Governor Randolph, when speaking in the Virginia Convention of 1788, of the clause which declares, that "the migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by Congress prior to the year 1808," said, "This is an exception from the power of regulating commerce, and the restriction is to continue only till 1808. Then Congress can, by the exercise of that power, prevent future importations."

Were I, however, to admit that the right "to regulate commerce," does not include the right to prohibit and destroy commerce, it nevertheless would not follow, that Congress might not prohibit or destroy certain branches of commerce. It might need to do so, in order to preserve our general commerce with a state or nation. So large a proportion of the cloths of Turkey might be fraught with the contagion of the plague, as to make it necessary for our Government to forbid the importation of all cloths from that country, and thus totally destroy one branch of our commerce with it, to the end that the other branches might be preserved. No inconsiderable evidence that Congress has the right to prohibit or destroy a branch of commerce, is to be found in the fact, that it has done so. From March, 1794, to May, 1820, it enacted several laws, which went to prohibit or destroy, and, in the end, did prohibit or destroy the trade of this country with Africa in human beings. And, if Congress has the power to pass embargo laws, has it not the power to prohibit or destroy commerce altogether?

It is, however, wholly immaterial, whether Congress could prohibit our participation in the "African slave trade," in virtue of the clause which empowers it "to regulate commerce." That the Constitution does, in some one or more of its passages, convey the power, is manifest from the testimony of the Constitution itself. The first clause of the ninth section says: "The migration or importation of such persons, as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to they year 1808." Now the implication in this clause of the existence of the power in question, is as conclusive, as would be the express and positive grant of it. You will observe, too, that the power of Congress over "migration or importation," which this clause implies, is a power not merely to "regulate," as you define the word, but to "prohibit."

It is clear, then, that Congress had the power to interdict our trade in human beings with Africa. But, in view of what has been said on that point--in view of the language of the Federal Constitution--of the proceedings of the Convention, which framed it--and of the cotemporary public sentiment--is it any less clear, that Congress has the power to interdict the inter-state traffic in human beings?

There are some, who assert that the words "migration" and "importation," instead of referring, as I maintain they do--the former to the removal of slaves from state to state, and the latter to their introduction from Africa--are used in the Constitution as synonyms, and refer exclusively to the "African slave trade." But there is surely no ground for the imputation of such utter tautology, if we recollect that the Constitution was written by scholars, and that remarkable pains were taken to clear it of all superfluous words--a Committee having been appointed for that special purpose. But, it may be asked, Why, in reference to the taking of slaves from one state to another, use the word "migration," which denotes voluntary removal? One answer is--that it can be used with as much propriety in that case, as in the removal of slaves from Africa--the removal in the one case being no less involuntary than in the other. Another answer is--that the framers of the Constitution selected the word "migration," because of its congruity with that of "persons," under which their virtuous shame sought to conceal from posterity the existence of seven hundred thousand slaves amongst a people, who had but recently entered upon their national career, with the solemn declaration, that "all men are created equal."

John Jay, whose great celebrity is partly owing to his very able expositions of the Constitution, says: "To me, the constitutional authority of the Congress to prohibit the migration _and_ importation of slaves into any of the states, does not appear questionable." If the disjunctive between "migration" and "importation" in the Constitution, argues their reference to the same thing, Mr. Jay's copulative argues more strongly, that, in his judgment, they refer to different things.

The law of Congress constituting the "Territory of Orleans," was enacted in 1804. It fully recognizes the power of that body to prohibit the trade in slaves between a territory and the states. But, if Congress had this power, why had it not as clear a power to prohibit, at that time, the trade in slaves between any two of the states? It might have prohibited it, but for the constitutional suspension of the exercise of the power. The term of that suspension closed, however, in 1808; and, since that year, Congress has had as full power to abolish the whole slave trade between the states, as it had in 1804 to abolish the like trade between the Territory of Orleans and the states.

But, notwithstanding the conclusive evidence, that the Constitution empowers Congress to abolish the inter-state slave trade, it is incomprehensible to many, that such states as Virginia and Maryland should have consented to deprive themselves of the benefit of selling their slaves into other states. It is incomprehensible, only because they look upon such states in the light of their present character and present interests. It will no longer be so, if they will bear in mind, that slave labor was then, as it is now, unprofitable for ordinary agriculture, and that Whitney's cotton-gin, which gave great value to such labor, was not yet invented, and that the purchase of Louisiana, which has had so great an effect to extend and perpetuate the dominion of slavery, was not yet made. It will no longer be incomprehensible to them, if they will recollect, that, at the period in question, American slavery was regarded as a rapidly decaying, if not already expiring institution. It will no longer be so, if they will recollect, how small was the price of slaves then, compared with their present value; and that, during the ten years, which followed the passage of the Act of Virginia in 1782, legalizing manumissions, her citizens emancipated slaves to the number of nearly one-twentieth of the whole amount of her slaves in that year. To learn whether your native Virginia clung in the year 1787 to the inter-state traffic in human flesh, we must take our post of observation, not amongst her degenerate sons, who, in 1836, sold men, women, and children, to the amount of twenty-four millions of dollars--not amongst her President Dews, who write books in favor of breeding human stock for exportation--but amongst her Washingtons, and Jeffersons, and Henrys, and Masons, who, at the period when the Constitution was framed, freely expressed their abhorrence of slavery.

But, however confident you may be, that Congress has not the lawful power to abolish the branch of commerce in question; nevertheless, would the abolition of it be so clearly and grossly unconstitutional, as to justify the contempt with which the numerous petitions for the measure are treated, and the impeachment of their fidelity to the Constitution, and of their patriotism and purity, which the petitioners are made to endure?

I was about to take it for granted, that, although you deny the power of Congress to abolish the inter-state traffic in human beings, you do not justify the traffic--when I recollected the intimation in your speech, that there is no such traffic. For, when you speak of "the slave trade between the states," and add--"or, as it is described in abolition petitions, the traffic in human beings between the states"--do you not intimate there is no such traffic? Whence this language? Do you not believe slaves are human beings? And do you not believe that they suffer under the disruption of the dearest earthly ties, as human beings suffer? I will not detain you to hear what we of the North think of this internal slave trade. But I will call your attention to what is thought of it in your own Kentucky and in your native Virginia. Says the "Address of the Presbyterian Synod of Kentucky to the Churches in 1835:"--"Brothers and sisters, parents and children, husbands and wives, are torn asunder, and permitted to see each other no more. Those acts are daily occurring in the midst of us. The shrieks and the agony often witnessed on such occasions, proclaim with a trumpet tongue the iniquity and cruelty of the system. There is not a neighborhood where these heart-rending scenes are not displayed. There is not a village or road that does not behold the sad procession of manacled outcasts, whose chains and mournful countenances tell that they are exiled by force from all that their hearts hold dear." Says Thomas Jefferson Randolph, in the Virginia Legislature in 1832, when speaking of this trade: "It is a practice, and an increasing practice, in parts of Virginia, to rear slaves for market. How can an honourable mind, a patriot, and a lover of his country, bear to see this ancient dominion, rendered illustrious by the noble devotion and patriotism of her sons in the cause of liberty, converted into one grand menagerie, where men are to be reared for the market like oxen for the shambles. Is it better--is it not worse than the (foreign) slave trade--that trade which enlisted the labor of the good and wise of every creed and every clime to abolish? The (foreign) trader receives the slave, a stranger in language, aspect, and manner, from the merchant who has brought him from the interior. The ties of father, mother, husband, and child, have already been rent in twain; before he receives him, his soul has become callous. But here, sir, individuals whom the master has known from infancy, whom he has seen sporting in the innocent gambols of childhood--who have been accustomed to look to him for protection, he tears from the mother's arms, and sells into a strange country--among strange people, subject to cruel taskmasters."

You are in favor of increasing the number of slave states. The terms of the celebrated "Missouri compromise" warrant, in your judgment, the increase. But, notwithstanding you admit, that this unholy compromise, in which tranquillity was purchased at the expense of humanity and righteousness, does not "in terms embrace the case," and "is not absolutely binding and obligatory;" you, nevertheless, make no attempt whatever to do away any one of the conclusive objections, which are urged against such increase. You do not attempt to show how the multiplication of slave states can consist with the constitutional duty of the "United States to guarantee to every state in the Union a republican form of government," any more than if it were perfectly clear, that a government is republican under which one half of the people are lawfully engaged in buying and selling the other half; or than if the doctrine that "all men are created equal" were not the fundamental and distinctive doctrine of a republican government. You no more vindicate the proposition to enlarge the realm of slavery, than if the proposition were as obviously in harmony with, as it is opposed to the anti-slavery tenor and policy of the Constitution--the rights of man--and the laws of God.

You are perhaps of the number of those, who, believing, that a state can change its Constitution as it pleases, deem it futile in Congress to require, that States, on entering the Union, shall have anti-slavery Constitutions. The Framers of the Federal Constitution doubtless foresaw the possibility of treachery, on the part of the new States, in the matter of slavery: and the restriction in that instrument to the old States--"the States now existing"--of the right to participate in the internal and "African slave trade" may be ascribed to the motive of diminishing, if not indeed of entirely preventing, temptation to such treachery. The Ordinance concerning the North-west Territory, passed by the Congress of 1787, and ratified by the Congress of 1790, shows, so far as those bodies can be regarded as correct interpreters of the Constitution which was framed in 1787, and adopted in 1789, that slavery was not to have a constitutional existence in the new States. The Ordinance continues the privilege of recapturing fugitive slaves in the North-west Territory to the "existing States." Slaves in that territory, to be the subjects of lawful recapture, must in the language of the Ordinance, owe "labour or service in one of the _original_ States."

I close what I have to say on this topic, with the remark, that were it admitted, that the reasons for the increase of the number of slave States are sound and satisfactory, it nevertheless would not follow, that the moral and constitutional wrong of preventing that increase is so palpable, as to justify the scorn and insult, which are heaped by Congress upon this hundred thousand petitioners for this measure.

It has hitherto been supposed, that you distinctly and fully admitted the Constitutional power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia. But, on this point, as on that of the right of petition, you have for reasons known to yourself, suddenly and greatly changed your tone. Whilst your speech argues, at no small length, that Congress has not the right to abolish slavery in the District, all that it says in favor of the Constitutional power to abolish it, is that "the language (of the Constitution) may _possibly_ be sufficiently comprehensive to include a power of abolition." "Faint praise dams;" and your very reluctant and qualified concession of the Constitutional power under consideration, is to be construed, rather as a denial than a concession.

Until I acquire the skill of making white whiter, and black blacker, I shall have nothing to say in proof of the Constitutional power of Congress over slavery in the District of Columbia, beyond referring to the terms, in which the Constitution so plainly conveys this power. That instrument authorises Congress "to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such District." If these words do not confer the power, it is manifest that no words could confer it. I will add that, never, until the last few years, had doubts been expressed, that these words do fully confer that power.

You will, perhaps, say, that Virginia and Maryland made their cessions of the territory, which constitutes the District of Columbia, with reservations on the subject of slavery. We answer, that none were expressed;[A] and that if there had been, Congress would not, and in view of the language of the Constitution, could not, have accepted the cessions. You may then say, that they would not have ceded the territory, had it occurred to them, that Congress would have cleared it of slavery; and that, this being the fact, Congress could not thus clear it, without being guilty of bad faith, and of an ungenerous and unjustifiable surprise on those States. There are several reasons for believing, that those States, not only did not, at the period in question, cherish a dread of the abolition of slavery; but that the public sentiment within them was decidedly in favor of its speedy abolition. At that period, their most distinguished statesmen were trumpet-tongued against slavery. At that period, there was both a Virginia and a Maryland society "for promoting the abolition of slavery;" and, it was then, that, with the entire consent of Virginia and Maryland, effectual measures were adopted to preclude slavery from that large territory, which has since given Ohio and several other States to the Union. On this subject, as on that of the inter-state slave trade, we misinterpret Virginia and Maryland, by not considering, how unlike was their temper in relation to slavery, amidst the decays and dying throes of that institution half a century ago, to what it is now, when slavery is not only revivified, but has become the predominant interest and giant power of the nation. We forget, that our whole country was, at that time, smitten with love for the holy cause of impartial and universal liberty. To judge correctly of the view, which our Revolutionary fathers took of oppression, we must go back and stand by their side, in their struggles against it,--we must survey them through the medium of the anti-slavery sentiment of their own times, and not impute to them the pro-slavery spirit so rampant in ours.

[Footnote A: There is a proviso in the Act of Virginia. It was on this, that three years ago, in the Senate of the United States, Benjamin Watkins Leigh built his argument against the constitutional power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia. I well remember that you then denied the soundness of his argument. This superfluous proviso virtually forbids Congress to pass laws, which shall "affect the rights of individuals" in the ceded territory. Amongst the inviolable "rights" was that of holding slaves, as Mr. Leigh contended. I regret, that, in replying to him, you did not make use of the fact, that all the members of Congress from Virginia voted in favor of the Ordinance, which abolished slavery in the North-West Territory; and this too, notwithstanding, that, in the Act of 1784, by which she ceded the North-West Territory to the Confederacy, she provided, that the "citizens of Virginia" in the said Territory, many of whom held slaves, should "be protected in the enjoyment of their rights." This fact furnishes striking evidence that at, or about, the time of the cession by Virginia of her portion of the District of Columbia, her statesmen believed, that the right to hold slaves in those portions of our country under the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress, was not beyond the reach of the controlling power of Congress.]

I will, however, suppose it true, that Virginia and Maryland would not have made the cessions in question, had they foreseen, that Congress would abolish slavery in the District of Columbia:--and yet, I affirm, that it would be the duty of Congress to abolish it. Had there been State Prisons in the territory, at the time Congress acquired jurisdiction over it, and had Congress immediately opened their doors, and turned loose hundreds of depraved and bloody criminals, there would indeed have been abundant occasion for complaint. But, had the exercise of its power in the premises extended no farther than to the liberation of such convicts, as, on a re-examination of their cases, were found to be clearly guiltless of the crimes charged upon them; the sternest justice could not have objected to such an occasion for the rejoicing of mercy. And are not the thousands in the District, for whose liberation Congress is besought, unjustly deprived of their liberty? Not only are they guiltless, but they are even unaccused of such crimes, as in the judgment of any, justly work a forfeiture of liberty. And what do Virginia and Maryland ask? Is it, that Congress shall resubject to their control those thousands of deeply wronged men? No--for this Congress cannot do. They ask, that Congress shall fulfil the tyrant wishes of these States. They ask, that the whole people of the United States--those who hate, as well as those who love slavery, shall, by their representatives, assume the guilty and awful responsibility of perpetuating the enslavement of their innocent fellow men:--of chaining the bodies and crushing the wills, and blotting out the minds of such, as have neither transgressed, nor even been accused of having transgressed, a single human law. And the crime, which Virginia and Maryland, and they, who sympathise with them, would have the nation perpetrate, is, not simply that of prolonging the captivity of those, who were slaves before the cession--for but a handful of them are now remaining in the District. Most of the present number became slaves under the authority of this guilty nation. Their wrongs originated with Congress: and Congress is asked, not only to perpetuate their oppression, but to fasten the yoke of slavery on generations yet unborn.

There are those, who advocate the recession of the District of Columbia. If the nation were to consent to this, without having previously exercised her power to "break every yoke" of slavery in the District, the blood of those so cruelly left there in "the house of bondage," would remain indelible and damning upon her skirts:--and this too, whether Virginia and Maryland did or did not intend to vest Congress with any power over slavery. It is enough, that the nation has the power "to deliver them that are drawn unto death, and those that are ready to be slain," to make her fearfully guilty before God, if she "forbear" to exercise it.

Suppose, I were to obtain a lease of my neighbor's barn for the single and express purpose of securing my crops; and that I should find, chained up in one of its dark corners, an innocent fellow man, whom that neighbor was subjecting to the process of a lingering death; ought I to pause and recall President Wayland's, "Limitations of Human Responsibility," and finally let the poor sufferer remain in his chains; or ought I not rather, promptly to respond to the laws of my nature and my nature's God, and let him go free? But, to make this case analogous to that we have been considering--to that, which imposes its claims on Congress--we must strike out entirely the condition of the lease, and with it all possible doubts of my right to release the victim of my neighbor's murderous hate.

I am entirely willing to yield, for the sake of argument, that Virginia and Maryland, when ceding the territory which constitutes the District of Columbia, did not anticipate, and did not choose the abolition of slavery in it. To make the admission stronger, I will allow, that these States were, at the time of the cession, as warmly opposed to the abolition of slavery in the District as they are said to be now: and to make it stronger still, I will allow, that the abolition of slavery in the District would prove deeply injurious, not only to Virginia and Maryland but to the nation at large. And, after all these admissions, I must still insist, that Congress is under perfectly plain moral obligation to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia.

They, who are deterred from favoring the abolition of slavery in the District by the apprehension, that Virginia and Maryland, if not, indeed, the nation at large, might suffer injurious consequences from the measure, overlook the fact, that there is a third party in the case. It is common to regard the nation as constituting one of the parties--Virginia and Maryland another, and the only other. But in point of fact, there is a third party. Of what does it consist? Of horses, oxen, and other brutes? Then we need not be greatly concerned about it--since its rights in that case, would be obviously subordinate to those of the other parties. Again, if such be the composition of this third party, we are not to be greatly troubled, that President Wayland and thousands of others entirely overlook its rights and interests; though they ought to be somewhat mindful even of brutes. But, this third party is composed, not of brutes--but of men--of the seven thousand men in the District, who have fallen under the iron hoofs of slavery--and who, because they are men, have rights equal to, and as sacred as the rights of any other men--rights, moreover, which cannot be innocently encroached on, even to the breadth of one hair, whether under the plea of "state necessity"--of the perils of emancipation--or under any other plea, which conscience-smitten and cowardly tyranny can suggest.

If these lines shall ever be so favored, as to fall under the eye of the venerable and beloved John Quincy Adams, I beg, that, when he shall have read them, he will solemnly inquire of his heart, whether, if he should ever be left to vote against the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, and thus stab deeply the cause of civil liberty, of humanity, and of God; the guilty act would not result from overlooking the rights and interests, and even the existence itself, of a third party in the case--and from considering the claims of the nation and those of Virginia and Maryland, as the only claims on which he was called to pass, because they were the claims of the only parties, of which he was aware.

You admit that "the first duty of Congress in relation to the District, of Columbia, is to render it available, comfortable, and convenient as a seat of the government of the whole Union." I thank you for an admission, which can be used, with great effect, against the many, who maintain, that Congress is as much bound to consult the interests and wishes of the inhabitants of the District, and be governed by them, as a State Legislature is to study and serve the interests and wishes of its constituents. The inhabitants of the District have taken up their residence in it, aware, that the paramount object of Congressional legislation is not their, but the nation's advantage. They judge, that their disfranchisement and the other disadvantages attending their residence are more than balanced by their favorable position for participating in Governmental patronage and other benefits. They know, that they have no better right to complain, that the legislation of Congress is not dictated by a primary regard to their interests, than has the Colonization Society, of which you are President, to complain, that the Capitol, in which it holds its annual meetings, is not constructed and fitted up in the best possible manner for such occasions. They know, that to sacrifice the design and main object of that building to its occasional and incidental uses, would be an absurdity no greater than would Congress be guilty of in shaping its legislation to the views of the thirty thousand white inhabitants of the District of Columbia, at the expense of neglecting the will and interests of the nation.

You feel, that there is no hazard in your admission, that the paramount object in relation to the District of Columbia, is its suitableness for a seat of Government, since you accompany that admission with the denial, that the presence of slavery interferes with such suitableness. But is it not a matter of deep regret, that the place, in which our national laws are made--that the place from which the sentiment and fashion of the whole country derive so much of their tone and direction--should cherish a system, which you have often admitted, is at war with the first principles of our religion and civil polity;[A] and the influences of which are no less pervading and controlling than corrupting? Is it not a matter of deep regret, that they, whom other governments send to our own, and to whom, on account of their superior intellect and influence, it is our desire, as it is our duty, to commend our free institutions, should be obliged to learn their lessons of practical republicanism amidst the monuments and abominations of slavery? Is it no objection to the District of Columbia, as the seat of our Government, that slavery, which concerns the political and moral interests of the nation, more than any other subject coming within the range of legislation, is not allowed to be discussed there--either within or without the Halls of Congress? It is one of the doctrines of slavery, that slavery shall not be discussed. Some of its advocates are frank enough to avow, as the reason for this prohibition, that slavery cannot bear to be discussed. In your speech before the American Colonization Society in 1835, to which I have referred, you distinctly take the ground, that slavery is a subject not open to general discussion. Very far am I from believing, that you would employ, or intentionally countenance violence, to prevent such discussion. Nevertheless, it is to this doctrine of non-discussion, which you and others put forth, that the North is indebted for her pro-slavery mobs, and the South for her pro-slavery Lynchings. The declarations of such men as Henry Clay and John C. Calhoun, that slavery is a question not to be discussed, are a license to mobs to burn up halls and break up abolition meetings, and destroy abolition presses, and murder abolition editors. Had such men held the opposite doctrine, and admitted, yea, and insisted, as it was their duty to do, that every question in morals and politics is a legitimate subject of free discussion--the District of Columbia would be far less objectionable, as the seat of our Government. In that case the lamented Dr. Crandall would not have been seized in the city of Washington on the suspicion of being an abolitionist, and thrown into prison, and subjected to distresses of mind and body, which resulted in his premature death. Had there been no slavery in the District, this outrage would not have been committed; and the murders, chargeable on the bloodiest of all bloody institutions, would have been one less than they now are. Talk of the slaveholding District of Columbia being a suitable locality for the seat of our Government! Why, Sir, a distinguished member of Congress was threatened there with an indictment for the _crime_ of presenting, or rather of proposing to present, a petition to the body with which he was connected! Indeed the occasion of the speech, on which I am now commenting, was the _impudent_ protest of inhabitants of that District against the right of the American people to petition their own Congress, in relation to matters of vital importance to the seat of their own Government! I take occasion here to admit, that I have seen but references to this protest--not the protest itself. I presume, that it is not dissimilar, in its spirit, to the petition presented about the same time by Mr. Moore in the other House of Congress--his speech on which, he complains was ungenerously anticipated by yours on the petition presented by yourself. As the petition presented by Mr. Moore is short, I will copy it, that I may say to you with the more effect--how unfit is the spirit of a slaveholding people, as illustrated in this petition, to be the spirit of the people at the seat of a free Government!

[Footnote A: "It (slavery) is a sin and a curse both to the master and the slave:"--_Henry Clay_.]

"_To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States_:

The petition of the undersigned, citizens of the District of Columbia represents--That they have witnessed with deep regret the attempts which are making _to disturb the integrity_ of the Union by a BAND OF FANATICS, embracing men, women, and children, who cease not day and night to crowd the tables of your halls with SEDITIOUS MEMORIALS--and solicit your honorable bodies that you will, in your wisdom, henceforth give neither support nor countenance to such UNHALLOWED ATTEMPTS, but that you will, in the most emphatic manner, set the seal of your disapprobation upon all such FOUL AND UNNATURAL EFFORTS, by refusing not only to READ and REFER, but also to RECEIVE any papers which either directly or indirectly, or by implication, aim at any interference with the rights of your petitioners, or of those of any citizen of any of the States or Territories of the United States, or of this District of which we are inhabitants."

A Legislature should be imbued with a free, independent, fearless spirit. But it cannot be, where discussion is overawed and interdicted, or its boundaries at all contracted. Wherever slavery reigns, the freedom of discussion is not tolerated: and whenever slavery exists, there slavery reigns;--reigns too with that exclusive spirit of Turkish despotism, that, "bears no brother near the throne."

You agree with President Wayland, that it is as improper for Congress to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, as to create it in some place in the free States, over which it has jurisdiction. As improper, in the judgment of an eminent statesman, and of a no less eminent divine, to destroy what they both admit to be a system of unrighteousness, as to establish it! As improper to restrain as to practice, a violation of God's law! What will other countries and coming ages think of the politics of our statesmen and the ethics of our divines?

But, besides its immorality, Congress has no Constitutional right to create slavery. You have not yet presumed to deny positively, that Congress has the right to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia; and, notwithstanding the intimation in your speech, you will not presume to affirm, that Congress has the Constitutional right to enact laws reducing to, or holding in slavery, the inhabitants of West Point, or any other locality in the free States, over which it has exclusive jurisdiction. I would here remark, that the law of Congress, which revived the operation of the laws of Virginia and Maryland in the District of Columbia, being, so far as it respects the slave laws of those States, a violation of the Federal Constitution, should be held of no avail towards legalizing slavery in the District--and the subjects of that slavery, should, consequently, be declared by our Courts unconditionally free.