Chapter III: Criticism of the Accepted View (2)

(4) Still other views assume that Augustus was compelled to
yield to the demands for war by army and citizens. But where is
there a shred of evidence to show that the Roman army pined for
conquest? On the other hand in the long and melancholy list of
military revolts and imperial assassinations during the empire
no cause is more frequently given than the dislike of active
campaigning against a dangerous enemy, and the strictness
of discipline which it demanded. Troops constantly revolted
because they were compelled to leave comfortable quarters and
go to distant ends of the empire on campaigns. Under great and
successful generals like Trajan, there would not likely be
revolts against profitable conquests, but where is the evidence
to show that the army as such ever demanded conquests, and had
to be appeased? Least of all conquests in Germany, where there
was no spoil, nothing but privations, dense forests, untrodden
ways, storms, and in particular a savage foe. Armies mutinied
when ordered to undertake wars against the Germans: there is no
instance of their urging a campaign against them. As for the
demands of the citizens for wars it may be said that hatred of
wars and praise of peace is the key note of the literature of
the period. Nothing can be further removed from the demands for
war than the spirit in which the elegiac poets, for example,
pride themselves on their disinclination to encounter the
perils and hardships of war. The senate and nobility were
not eager for war, since an emperor’s conquest made him even
more powerful and necessary to the state, while working a
corresponding diminution in the prestige of the senate and the
nobility. As for the _plebs urbana_, they had by this time lost
practically all their political activity and influence. Neither
their condition nor their temper would prompt them to yearn
for a war, which would likely result in their being called away
to service from the distributions of corn in the city, from the
largesses of money, and from the games now more numerous and
splendid than ever.

(5) It will be observed further, that all the views cited
above assume: (a) that the conquest of Germany was the only
means at Augustus’ disposal for protecting Gaul; (b) that his
conflicts on German soil could have had no other purpose than
Germany’s subjugation. These views, however, prove nothing
further than that Gaul needed protection, and that to this end
battles were fought in Germany. Evidence will be presented
to show that at this period, in Germany as elsewhere, Rome
was endeavoring to protect her borders by a show of military
strength, and by rendering friendly considerable portions of
territory between these borders and the strongholds of the
enemy. A study of Rome’s several campaigns from this point of
view justifies such a conclusion. Only in this sense could Rome
have sought to establish at the Elbe a shorter and more distant
boundary from Italy. The “bufferstate” policy (see Chapter IV),
once we concede it as a possibility, makes unnecessary any
speculation as to who, if any, of Augustus’ military advisers
was responsible for his abandonment of peace plans, so long
maintained. The military movements involved in such a policy,
in lieu of imperial conquest, would satisfy very well the
longing for adventure, and even for the spoils of war, on the
part of the Roman soldiery. Foreign victories were scarcely
needed to strengthen the internal organization of the Roman
state. And it seems difficult to believe that Augustus could
have expected to find in them any effective antidote for the
decadence in Roman society, a decadence which had begun during,
and largely as a result of, a period of conquests, and had
grown apace down to the days of his own reign. It was from
the middle class, in whom the frugal and constant virtues of
earlier days still survived, not from the fashionable upper
classes, the young nobility, to whom Ovid’s writings appealed,
that the empire drew its solid and dependable support.

We must now consider the matter of a German province in the time of Augustus. Many assert that the subjugation was complete or practically complete;[107] that the provincial organization was just about to be put into operation when disaster overtook Varus, and made such an organization forever impossible.[108] Gardthausen thinks[109] that Drusus’ death came opportunely for German freedom; that although his three campaigns did not reduce Germany to the actual condition of a province, Drusus had nevertheless laid sure foundations for the subjugation of that country. And while he can point to no certain evidence Gardthausen believes the Romans established garrisons in the very heart of the land[110]: Koepp sees no reason to conclude that Germany was ever a Roman province[111]; he is quite sure that the part on the right of the Rhine was never such, either before or after the battle with Varus.[112] Zumpt[113] was probably the first to deny the existence of a province in Germany. Later, however, Mommsen’s view became the accepted one.[114] He mentions for the year 16 B. C. a “governor of Germany”, and gives for the years 9-6 B. C., during which the land between the Rhine and the Elbe is described as “a province, though still by no means reduced to tranquillity”, a discussion on the “Organization of the province of Germany”, as evidence for which he adduces the administration of Roman law, and the establishment of an altar to Augustus among the Ubii. Next, for the years 6-9 A. D., he speaks of the “province of Germany”, as an undoubted fact, and says that the battle of the Teutoburg forest was the reason for “giving up the new German province” (p. 52). Quite positively he says (p. 107): “The original province of Germany, which embraced the country from the Rhine to the Elbe, subsisted only twenty years”, i. e., 12 B. C. to 9 A. D. Further on (p. 108) we are told that “the governorship and the command were not, in a strict sense done away with by that catastrophe, although they were, so to speak, placed in suspense”, and that out of the parts on the left of the Rhine, and the remnants of the district upon the right, there were formed the two Roman provinces of Upper and Lower Germany[115]; that these were “in the territory which properly belonged to the Belgic”, but that the latter, since “a separation of the military and civil administration was, according to the Roman arrangements, excluded, was placed for administrative purposes also under the commandants of the two armies, so long as the troops were stationed there” [east of the Rhine].

The relation of this so-called province of Germany to the great Gallic-Germanic command is discussed by Hirschfeld[116], who believes that the separation of the command over the Rhine legions from the Gallic governorship was complete in Augustus’ time. In like manner Marquardt[117] thinks that as a consequence of subjugation on the east side of the Rhine there arose the two provinces of Upper and Lower Germany, whose organization was interrupted by reason of the unexpected events of the year 9 A. D. Schiller also speaks of a division into two provinces, but regards the establishment of the provinces as planned rather than actually carried out. While he includes the Germans on the left bank of the Rhine in the Belgic, one of the three Gallic provinces set up by Augustus 16-13 B. C., he adds: “Wahrscheinlich nahmen später auch die beiden Germanien an den gallischen Provinziallandtagen [in Lugdunum] theil.”[118] On the other hand, he describes Mainz in the year 9 B. C. as lying in “der von ihm [Drusus] gewonnenen künftigen Provinz Germaniae.”[119] Further on[120] we are told that after Quintilius Varus succeeded Tiberius, and at the same time obtained command over both the provinces of Germany, the disaster to Varus took place, and a change in the German policy of the emperor ensued, “und die Benennung Ober- und Untergermanien, einst als Benennung für das Land zur Elbe geplant, bezeichnete jetzt etwas prahlerisch den schmalen Streifen längs dem Rheine am linken Ufer.”[121] Riese, who has carefully examined all the available sources, shows conclusively that no such separation was made, and that Germany was considered by the Romans as merely a part of Gaul, which they regarded as extending to the Elbe.[122] The east boundary of Roman Gaul, to be sure, was originally the Rhine, and, as land divisions in the geographical treatise of Agrippa (who died 12 B. C.), Gaul appears on the one side, while Germany with Raetia and Noricum stands on the other. The governor of Gaul (the so-called Gallia Comata) was Agrippa in 21, M. Lollius in 17, and Tiberius in 16. Then, probably during the presence of the emperor in Gaul (16-13 B. C.), the land was divided into three separate provinces—Belgica, Lugdunensis, and Aquitania.[123] The legate of Belgica naturally, as before, commanded the army of all Gaul[124], which was on duty among the Germanic stocks on the left bank of the Rhine, and intended to serve as a defense against the Germans on the right bank of that river. Therefore such commanders could very properly be called commanders in Germany, as by Velleius (II, 97, 1): “accepta in Germania clades sub legato M. Lollio”, although, as is well known, the actual defeat of the legion was west of the Rhine, in Roman Germany, i. e., in Gaul proper. During Drusus’ command, in the year 12 B. C., the three Gauls were again united. Later Tiberius, and after him Ahenobarbus, commanded, probably under like conditions, as more certainly Tiberius did, when a second time (4-6 A. D.) he held both the supreme civil and military commands in Gaul and the Danube lands. The only difficulty in the acceptance of such a view is that Sentinus is called by Velleius “legatus Augusti in Germania”, and by Dio “τῆς Γερμανίας ἄρχων”. But this does not mean that at that time there was a German province along with the Gallic one. The combined testimony of Pliny, Ptolemy, Strabo, and of Augustus himself, tells us nothing of a German province, but indicates that the Gallica extended to the Elbe. Significant too are the words employed by Velleius. Although ever ready to praise Tiberius, and to expatiate on his military achievements, in his narrative of peoples subdued by Tiberius (“in formam provinciae redacti”), he says nothing about his conquering the Germans, but “sic perdomuit Germaniam, ut in formam paene stipendiariae redigeret provinciae” (II, 97, 4). Florus is the only ancient author who supports the view that Germany was conquered and organized as a province (II, 30). And he is not only unreliable, but uses the term _provincia_ in different senses.[125] Once (II, 30, 23) it may mean nothing more than “land”, since surely there was no province before Drusus, while in another place (II, 30, 25) it may very well refer to the province of Gaul. In answer to Mommsen’s view that the establishment of a separate province in Germany is evident from the organization of courts there, and in the erection of an altar to Augustus, Riese convincingly argues that the administration of justice, which could be exercised also by a Gallic governor, proves nothing; further that the establishment of an altar to Augustus at Köln would be of significance for our question only in case it had been customary in every province for the emperor’s worship to be observed in a single place. But that this was by no means true is seen from the instances of this cult in different places of one and the same province[126], e. g., in Asia, Macedonia, and Lycia. Riese concludes that Varus also, as his predecessors, was at the head of the entire Gallic-Germanic province. This is nowhere expressly stated in the ancient sources, but seems probable from all the facts. First of all Varus, as the husband of Claudia Pulchra, was related by marriage to Augustus, and so an available man for the position, since it was the emperor’s policy from the beginning of the reorganization in Gaul to entrust this position of plenary power only to those who were closely connected with the emperor’s house.[127] And not only are we nowhere told the contrary, but it is highly improbable that the emperor, just at the time when the Gallico-Germanic provincial arrangement was succeeding so well, would have instituted any change in it. Further, since we find that under Varus’ successor, no less than under his predecessors, the entire power of Gaul and Germany was combined, it would seem most probable that the status was not different during Varus’ incumbency.

From the foregoing it is evident that scholars are far from unanimously accepting the old view that Germany was organized into a province, or that any attempt was made to that end. On the other hand Riese’s presentation of facts has definitely proved, beyond the chance for further argument, that no such province was organized. But so strong is the force of the preconceived and traditional view that Riese, despite his successful attack on a part of it, expresses the belief that a conquest of Germany was intended. However, we are by no means restricted to Riese’s contention that Rome’s relations with the Germans, as a part of the Gallic province, looked to their subjugation. If so, they would have been treated as other peoples, including the Gauls, whom we know Rome wished to make subjects, and would not have been left in a state of uncertainty, neither a province nor yet wholly independent, as they were left for fifteen years after Tiberius’ departure for Rhodes. This very matter of indecision with reference to Germany has been suggested as directly responsible for the catastrophe which befell Varus. So Ferrero says[128]: “In Germany ... the people, apparently subdued, were not bound to pay any tribute, and were left to govern themselves solely and entirely by their own laws,—a strange anomaly in the history of Roman conquests.” Nor in theirs alone, one may well add. It seems strange that such an anomalous “conquest” should not long since have been recognized as no conquest at all, and as nothing more or less than a desultory series of punitive expeditions or of demonstrations.

Once more we press the question why, if Germany was not subdued by Rome and never organized into a province, did Rome give up the attempt to do so? Many, as shown above[129], argue that Rome was unable to accomplish her purpose, and that the defeat of Varus was the great turning point in her policy, and the direct cause for abandoning the attempt.[130] Gardthausen in addition to the direct cause (the defeat) finds also a more remote one.[131] He thinks that the unfortunate family estrangement which in 6 B. C. drove Tiberius into voluntary retirement forced Augustus to suspend or give up a plan that was well considered and already successfully begun; that this advantage nevertheless was forever lost, since Augustus could find no competent successor to Tiberius[132], and was unwilling to entrust to one person the large forces which were necessary to bring about the subjugation of the land. Although the war with Germany was costly and fraught with danger, Delbrück is of the opinion that Rome could reasonably count upon final success, since the war party which is not strong enough to risk an engagement must sooner or later succumb. Energetic prosecution of the war with Rome’s available forces would without doubt have brought ultimate victory.[133]. But the explanation why Rome did not continue the war which Germanicus was apparently bringing to successful issue Delbrück discovers not in the war itself, but in the inner conditions of the Roman principate. Tiberius had become emperor only by adoption; Germanicus, however, stood in the same relationship to the deceased Augustus in which the latter once stood to Julius Caesar. Tiberius was by nature jealous, and concluded that for his own safety he could not allow the same condition to establish itself between Germanicus and the legions in Germany as had once existed between Caesar and the legions in Gaul. To bring the war to a close required not only a commander of the highest ability, and with great means at his disposal, but one who had a free hand in the prosecution of the war. Tiberius did not have a general who could meet the requirements, and even if he had had such a one, would not have dared to send him. Hence after watching the course of affairs for a year or two he recalled Germanicus, and the Germans remained free.[134] Koepp[135] sees the reason for Germanicus’ recall not, as Tacitus hints, in the jealousy of Tiberius, but in the fact that Germanicus’ campaigns and losses were proving too expensive.[136] Riese is closely in agreement with Delbrück’s view given above. There was, he says, no change of policy on the part of Augustus, but the change was due to Tiberius. Notwithstanding Germanicus’ loyalty in putting down a rebellion in the legions, Tiberius was suspicious and recalled him. The Roman troops were brought to the right bank of the Rhine, and Germanicus, as commander of Gaul, never had a successor. Never again was Tiberius willing to expose his power to the danger of great leaders in command of the Rhine army. As a result of this decision the frontier forces were divided into the armies of lower and upper Germany, and, after the year 17 A. D., these were under the command of consular legates, because Tiberius was too suspicious to allow the command of these armies to be united with that of Gaul.[137]

The great diversity of views cited above shows that as yet no satisfactory conclusion has been reached which will explain Rome’s alleged change of policy toward German territory. As we have seen, many have sought other reasons for this change beside the defeat of Varus, a clear indication that it in itself is insufficient. If one must assume such a series of personal and accidental causes, adding supposed conditions of jealousy, weakness of the empire, inadequate finances, etc., it is evident that the defeat of Varus ceases, even under the most favorable interpretation, to be a great climacteric cause. It was only one of a series of contributing causes, i. e., of relatively small concern, and significant only because of chance association with other reasons. The whole position of the theorists as to Varus’ defeat is full of inconsistencies, assumptions, and inferences, at variance with the evidence, and ending in the admission that after all several other causes were equally operative. With this we may take leave of the traditional view as to the significance of the defeat of Varus, in the conviction that no one has reasonable ground to continue to espouse it, when once a simple and satisfactory solution is offered that not only recognizes but explains all the ascertainable facts. And at this point we may summarize the objections which have been adduced against the belief that Augustus had in mind the conquest of Germany:

(1) Varus was defeated with a small army in a battle which was
absolutely no test of the military strength of the two peoples.

(2) The defeat was completely avenged by Tiberius and
Germanicus, and Germany was overrun by them only a few years
later. Only twice in these campaigns did the Germans venture to
meet the invaders in the open field, and each time they were
severely defeated.

(3) The Roman power was vastly greater than that of even a
united Germany, and could unquestionably have completed a
thorough conquest had that been the desire.

(4) It was contrary in the first place to the well-known
character of Augustus to attempt this war of conquest, and
in the second place, after having begun it, to abandon the
undertaking.

(5) It was also contrary to the well-recognized peace policy of
Rome at this period.

(6) It was highly unlike Rome to give up this conquest on
account of a single setback.

(7) Whatever may have been the ultimate intentions of Augustus,
certainly the methods followed were utterly unlike those of any
conquest ever undertaken, and a rational criticism will try
to explain the facts rather than to twist them so as to fit a
preconceived theory.

(8) There was certainly no “_provincia_” to abandon, under any
circumstances.

(9) If there was any change of policy it was under Tiberius,
and to be explained by circumstances peculiar to that time.
Augustus, after the defeat of Varus, went on quite as he had
after the defeat of Lollius.

The cumulative effect of these objections is overwhelming, and causes the student of history not only to feel sceptical about the significance of Varus’ defeat, but strongly convinced that it played no such part in the determination of Augustus’ Germanic policy as is generally supposed. And since the current theory as to this defeat can be maintained only after disregarding these several and serious objections, some interpretation of Augustus’ purpose must be offered which will obviate these difficulties, and still be consistent with his known policies and acknowledged acts. In the following chapter it will be made clear that Augustus had no other purpose in his operations in Germany than to make repeated demonstrations of Rome’s power, in order to impress the barbarians[138], and to make the frontier defense effective by pacifying and bringing into friendly relations with Rome large parts of the bordering territory; that it was not at any time his intention to conquer Germany, and organize it as a subject province.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Mommsen, _Röm. Gesch._, V, p. 41; 51; Idem, _Die Oertlichkeit der Varusschlacht_, p. 207; Gardthausen, I, p. 1199. Ch. Gailly de Taurines (_Les Légions de Varus_, Paris, 1911, p. 73) places the number as probably 22,000.

[2] Vell., II, 119.

[3] Velleius’ words (II, 119) suggest a series of changing incidents and conditions: “ordinem atrocissimae calamitatis; exercitus iniquitate fortunae circumventus ... inclusus silvis, paludibus, insidiis”; cf. also Tac., _Ann._, I, 65: “Quintilium Varum sanguine oblitum et paludibus emersum”.

[4] Vell., II, 117; II, 120: “ex quo apparet Varum magis imperatoris defectum consilio quam virtute destitutum militum se magnificentissimumque perdidisse exercitum”; Suet., _Tib._, 18: “Varianam cladem temeritate et neglegentia ducis accidisse.” Cf. also Tac., _Ann._, II, 46: “quoniam tres vagas legiones et ducem fraudis ignarum perfidia deceperit” [Arminius], where “vagas” suggests an army marching in loose order, ignorant of the territory and without proper leadership. So Mommsen (_Röm. Gesch._, V, p. 40) calls Varus: “Ein Mann ... von trägem Körper und stumpfem Geist und ohne jede militärische Begabung und Erfahrung”; Deppe (_Rh. Jahrbr._, 87, p. 59) accepting Zangemeister’s date for the defeat of Varus as August 2, 9 A. D. (see _Westd. Zeitschr._, 1887, pp. 239-242) says that the battle followed a feast day, which explains the enigma of how a Roman army of 18,000 men could be annihilated by an unorganized German host: “Die Soldaten waren an diesem Tage noch festkrank, nicht geordnet, überhaupt unvorbereitet, entsprechend der Angabe des Tacitus, der sie in den _Ann._, II, 46, nennt ‘tres vacuas [vagas] legiones et ducem fraudis ignarum’”.

[5] Dio, 56, 20 f. says that the Romans were fewer at every point than their assailants; moreover, the latter increased as the battle continued, since many of those who at first wavered later joined them, particularly for the sake of plunder. Mommsen (_Die Oertlichkeit_, etc., p. 209) thinks that from the communities which joined the Cherusci in the uprising the Romans were confronted by numbers probably two or three times their equal.

[6] Cf. Tac., _Ann._, II, 46: “At se [Maroboduum] duodecim legionibus petitum duce Tiberio inlibatam Germanorum gloriam servavisse.” Mommsen (_Röm. Gesch._, V, p. 34) estimates the combined strength (regular and auxiliary) of the two armies in the campaign against Maroboduus at almost double that of their opponents, whose fighting force was 70,000 infantry and 4,000 horsemen.

[7] See Eduard Meyer, “Kaiser Augustus” (in _Kleine Schriften_, Halle a. S., 1900, p. 486); Mommsen, _Röm. Gesch._, V, p. 37; Shuckburgh, Suet., _Aug._, 24; Vell., II, 114. Ritterling (“Zur Geschichte des römischen Heeres in Gallien,” _Rh. Jahrbr._, 114-115, p. 162) argues, on the basis of three legions each to the nine provinces, that Augustus retained 27 legions after the battle of Actium. This is out of harmony with the well-known view of Mommsen that Augustus had only 18 legions until the year 6 A. D., at which time he raised eight new legions in view of the uprising in Illyricum.

[8] _Gesch. der röm. Kaiserzeit_, I, p. 232 f.: “Der Verlust—er mag 16.000 betragen haben—erscheint trotz alledem nicht bedeutend genug, um eine Wendung in der germanischen Politik zu rechtfertigen.” Koepp (_Die Römer in Deutschland_, p. 34) agrees that it is absurd to think that the loss of three legions could produce such a change in policy: “so ist es doch schwer zu glauben, dass er [Augustus] in besonnenen Stunden aus dem Verlust dreier Legionen die Konsequenz gezogen haben sollte, dass es mit der Provinz Germanien aus und vorbei sein müsse.” Much the same view is expressed by him in _Westfalen_, I, p. 40: “nicht als ob der Untergang dreier Legionen ein Verlust gewesen wäre, der das Reich in seinen Grundfesten hätte erschüttern können; wenn man in Pannonien fünfzehn Legionen aufgeboten hatte, so hätte man auch am Rhein eine ähnliche Waffenmacht zusammenbringen können, wenn wirklich der Sieg des Arminius zu einer Gefahr des Reiches geworden wäre. Und später noch ist Brittannien erobert worden, ist Dacien Provinz geworden, ist der Kampf gegen die Parther aufgenommen worden.”

[9] _Hist. of Rome_, V, p. 61; cf. also p. 54: “The Romano-German conflict was not a conflict between two powers equal in the political balance, in which the defeat of the one might justify the conclusion of an unfavorable peace; it was a conflict in which ... an isolated failure in the plan as sketched might as little produce any change as the ship gives up its voyage because a gust of wind drives it out of its course.”

[10] _Kaiser Augustus_, p. 116.

[11] _Kaiser Augustus_, p. 486; cf. Dio, 57, 5. However, Meyer attaches undue significance to this fact. While the old rule confined service in the army to citizens, in times of peril freedmen, or slaves manumitted especially for the occasion, had been enrolled many times previous to the occasion referred to—indeed as early as the Punic wars. See examples cited by Shuckburgh, Suet., _Aug._, 25. According to Suetonius _libertini_ were employed twice by Augustus: “Libertino milite, praeterquam Romae incendiorum causa et si tumultus in graviore annona metueretur, bis usus est: semel ad praesidium coloniarum Illyricum contingentium, iterum ad tutelam ripae Rheni.” These two occasions, at the uprising in Pannonia, and after the defeat of Varus, are mentioned also by Dio, 55, 31 and 56, 23.

[12] This is the figure given by Ed. Meyer (“Bevölkerung des Altertums,” _Conrad’s Handw. d. Staatsw._, 3rd ed., II (1909), p. 911), who accepts with slight modifications, Beloch’s calculations. The latter (_Die Bevölkerung der griechisch-römischen Welt_ (1886), p. 507) gave 54,000,000 at the time of the death of Augustus. In a later essay (_Rh. Mus._, IV (1889), p. 414 ff.) Beloch raises materially his estimate of the population of Gaul, which, if accepted, and it seems very plausible, would affect somewhat the total for the empire. Thus H. Delbrück (_Gesch. d. Kriegskunst_, II, 2nd ed. (1909), p. 175) after Beloch’s revision, calculates the population of the empire at sixty to sixty-five millions, and O. Seeck (_Jahrb. für Nationalökonomie und Statistik_, III, 13 (1897), p. 161 ff.), would prefer in many instances much more generous calculations than those of Beloch. Compare, however, Beloch’s vigorous reply in the same volume. We have preferred to accept, however, the more conservative figure.

[13] That this was the custom followed for the _socii_ and _auxilia_ during the period of the republic is suggested by Pliny, _N. H._, 25, 33, 6, and the same general proportion seems to have been observed later, as Tacitus, _Ann._, IV, 5, in speaking of the “sociae triremes alasque et auxilia cohortium,” adds, “neque multo secus in numero virium.” Detailed information regarding the size of these auxiliary contingents is nowhere given. See Liebenam, art. “Exercitus,” _Pauly-Wiss._, VI, 1601, 1607. G. L. Cheesman (_The Auxilia of the Roman Imperial Army_, Oxford, 1914 p. 53 ff.) finds that the _auxilia_ under Augustus were at least as numerous as the legionaries, and later became more so. He calculates 180,000 for the year 69 A. D., and 220,000 for the middle of the second century A. D. Cf. also Delbrück, _op. cit._, II, p. 203 (2nd ed.).

[14] Cf. Ed. Meyer, _ibid._, p. 909. The evidence for the enrollment of foreigners in the legions at this time is conveniently summarized by Liebenam, art. “Dilectus,” _Pauly-Wiss._, V, 611 ff.

[15] Mommsen, _Eph. Epigr._, V (1884), p. 159 ff.; _Hermes_, XIX (1884), p. 1 ff., esp. p. 11.

[16] We must remember that this restriction in the recruiting sources of the legionaries was wholly an act of free choice on the part of Augustus, whatever the motive may have been. That suggested by Seeck, _l. c._, p. 611, does not seem very probable; it involved a change in the usage to which men had already become accustomed in the civil wars, and it was gradually but completely abandoned by his successors. There was nothing in the general conditions which required it.

[17] _Rh. Mus._, XLVIII (1893), p. 602 ff. His conclusions in part rest on none too certain foundations, and introduce an insufficiently motivated complexity in the system of levying troops, for Augustus at the beginning of his career used non-citizen soldiers freely, and after the defeat of Varus, of the two new legions which were raised one was a Galatian contingent, the _Deiotariana_, which was given citizenship and a place in the army (Mommsen, _Res Gestae Divi Augusti_, 2nd ed. (1885), p. 70; O. Seeck, _Gesch. d. Untergangs d. ant. Welt_, 3rd ed., I, p. 260), and the other was recruited from the non-citizen population of Rome (Tac., _Ann._, I, 31, “vernacula multitudo”; cf. Mommsen, _Hermes_, XIX (1884), p. 15, n. 1). Seeck’s statement of the system which he believes Augustus followed is: “Prätorianer und Stadtsoldaten rekrutirten sich aus Latium, Etrurien, Umbrien, und den frühesten Bürgercolonien; den übrigen Italikern sind die Legionen zugewiesen, den Bürgern der Provinz die Freiwilligencohorten; aus den Libertinen setzen sich die Mannschaften der Flotte und der Feuerwehr zusammen; die Nichtbürger bilden Cohorten und Alen und einen Theil der Flotte.”

[18] In B. C. 8 it was 4,233,000; in A. D. 14, 4,957,000. See the _Mon. Anc._, 8. Of course if we accept the view still defended by Gardthausen and Kornemann that this number represented only the male population (_Augustus_, II, 532; and _Jahrb. für Nationalökonomie u. Statistik_, III, 14 (1897), p. 291 ff.), a citizen army of more than a million men might have been raised, but the view of Beloch and Ed. Meyer that the numbers in the _Mon. Anc._ include women and children seems the only one possible. See Meyer’s complete refutation of Kornemann, _Jahrb. für Nationalökonomie_, III, 15 (1898), p. 59 ff.

[19] This figure, 800,000, is modest, amounting to roughly 1½% of the total population, about the same proportion which Germany and France have for some time past kept under arms in time of peace, while their war strength is several times as great as this. Rome did actually at one time, the crisis of the Second Punic War, have at least 7½% of her total population in the field, even according to the most conservative estimates. Cf. H. Delbrück, _Gesch. d. Kriegskunst_, I, 2nd ed. (1908), pp. 349, 355 ff.

[20] Mommsen, _Hermes_, XIX (1884), p. 3, n. 3, gives the number of Roman citizens who were engaged in the war between Octavian and Antony as 300,000, which makes a total of 600,000 troops or more.

[21] The details in Marquardt, _Röm. Staatsver._, V, 2 (2nd ed., 1884), p. 444 f.

[22] Or possibly 28; see von Domaszewski, “Zur Geschichte des Rheinheeres,” _Röm.-Germ. Korrespondenzblatt_, 1910, on the date of the establishment of the twenty-first and twenty-second legions. There is some question about the exact date at which the increase in the size of the legions was made (see the literature cited by Gardthausen, _Augustus_, II, p. 775), but that does not affect our argument. See above note 7.

[23] Mommsen, _op. cit._, p. 75; Liebenam in _Pauly-Wiss._, VI, 1605. We must remember that this number was somewhat low; and was gradually raised by succeeding emperors. Claudius added two legions, Nero one, and Galba two, so that Vespasian had thirty, and that number seems to have been maintained until the time of Septimius Severus, who added three more. It is significant that Trajan found 30 legions quite sufficient for extensive and difficult conquests, so that 25 would doubtless have been regarded even by him as adequate for the conquest of Germany. For the evidence of the gradual increase in the army see Marquardt, _op. cit._, p. 448 ff.

[24] The evidence for the size of the legion at this time is conveniently summarized by R. Cagnat, “Legio,” _Daremberg et Saglio_, III, p. 1050 f. The most elaborate discussion of the size of the legion (especially that of Caesar) is in Fr. Stolle, _Lager und Heer der Römer_, 1912, pp. 1-23. He finds what he regards as evidence for legions of varying size, from 3600 up to 5000 men. The standard legion of the empire, however, can hardly have been less than 6000. Cf. also Fröhlich’s review of Stolle’s work, _Berl. Philol. Wochenschr._, 1913, 530 ff.

[25] A list of these is given by Liebenam, _op. cit._, p. 1607 ff.

[26] Calculations as to the effective strength of the standing army of Augustus vary somewhat. H. Furneaux (_The Annals of Tacitus_, I (1884), p. 109), gives 350,000; Mommsen (_Hermes_, XIX (1884), p. 4—apparently excluding the naval forces), 300,000 as a maximum figure; Seeck (_Rh. Mus._, XLVIII (1893), p. 618) reckons on the basis of 20 legions (which would be applicable only down to the year 6 A. D.) 132,000 citizen soldiery out of Italy: in his _Gesch. des Untergangs d. ant. Welt_, 3rd ed., I (1910), p. 255, on a basis of 25 to 30 legions, from Augustus to Diocletian, he calculates the total forces of the empire at 300,000 to 350,000; H. Delbrück (_Gesch. d. Kriegskunst_, II, 2nd ed. (1904), p. 174) counting only the 25 legions, estimates 225,000 men; if other contingents be included the total would certainly exceed 250,000 even on the basis of his extremely low estimates; Gardthausen (_Augustus_, I, p. 635) estimates 250,000-300,000. The figure 200,000 which he gives on p. 637 seems to refer to the conditions before 6 A. D., when only 18 legions were maintained. G. Boissier’s number, 500,000 (_L’opposition sous les Césars_, 3rd ed. 1892, p. 4), seems to count the auxilia three times, once in making up the number 250,000 for the legions, and again in doubling that!

[27] For historical parallels to this condition compare Miss Ellen Semple, _Influences of Geographic Environment_, New York, 1911, p. 215 ff.

[28] E. M. Arndt, _Zeitschr. f. Geschichtswissenschaft_, III (1845), p. 244, calculated a population of 800-1000 per (German) square mile, but only then on the assumption, which no man would now accept, that the Roman reports about the primitive conditions of agriculture were incorrect. On this estimate the population of Germany between the Rhine, Elbe, and the Main-Saale line, which is the part generally considered in the question of conquest, would have been roughly 1,840,000 to 2,300,000. H. Von Sybel (_Entstehung d. deutschen Königtums_, 1881, p. 80) estimates the Germans at 12,000,000, basing his calculation on a highly problematic series of inferences regarding the extent of territory which the Sugambri once occupied, 40,000 of whom were said to have been transferred to the west bank of the Rhine by Tiberius. Karl Lamprecht, _Deutsche Geschichte_ (1894), I, p. 236 accepts the traditional statement that the Goths alone amounted to five-sixths of a million, a reckoning which would make the total population of Germany many times that number. Even G. Waitz, _Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte_ (1880), I, p. 19, takes at their face value such Roman exaggerations as 300,000 warriors for the Cimbri and Teutones, 60,000 for the Bructeri, and the like, figures which presuppose an incredibly dense population.

[29] _Histoire des Institutions politiques de l’ancienne France_, I (1875), “L’Invasion Germanique,” p. 310 ff. For Delbrück’s results see the chapter entitled “Zahlen,” _Gesch. d. Kriegskunst_, II, 2nd ed. (1909), p. 294 ff. On the actual number of the Vandals and their allies, a cardinal point in the discussion, compare H. Delbrück, _Preuss. Jahrb._, 81 (1895), 475 f. O. Seeck (_Jahrb. für Nationalökonomie u. Statistik_, III, 13 (1897), p. 173 ff.) argued unsuccessfully for the older view, but Delbrück (_Gesch. d. Kriegskunst_, II, 2nd ed. (1909), p. 308 f.) has completely settled this specific question.

[30] “Observations sur l’état et le nombre des populations germaniques dans la seconde moitié du IVe siècle, d’après Ammien Marcellin,” _Mélanges Cagnat_, Paris, 1912, pp. 247-267.

[31] “Der urgermanische Gau und Staat,” _Preussische Jahrbücher_, 81, (1895), p. 471 ff. The main arguments here presented (except the detailed criticism and comparison of a number of ancient estimates, p. 474 ff.) are repeated with some slight modifications in his _Gesch. d. Kriegskunst_, II, 2nd ed. (1909), p. 12 ff. L. Schmidt, _Gesch. der deutschen Stämme_, I (1904), p. 48, accepts Delbrück’s calculations indeed, though with some reserve; p. 46 f. he criticizes effectively the absurd exaggerations with which the pages of many ancient authors abound.

[32] _Preuss. Jahrb._, p. 482.

[33] _Grundriss der allgemeinen Volkswirtschaftslehre_, I, Leipzig, 1901, p. 158 ff., especially 159 f. and 183.

[34] Velleius, II, 109.

[35] _Op. cit._, I, p. 48; II, p. 209.

[36] See Gardthausen, _Augustus_, I. p. 1169 on this campaign.

[37] This is the calculation Caesar uses for the Helvetians (_Bell. Gall._, I, 29), and Velleius (II, 116) for the Pannonian rebels. Cf. Beloch, _Rh. Mus._, LIV (1899), p. 431, 1. L. Schmidt uses the ratio of one to five. It seems more reasonable, however, to use the Roman system of reckoning. Delbrück, _Preuss. Jahrb._, 81, p. 480, uses the one to five ratio for the proportion of warriors who might be expected to attend the war council, but that is a slightly different thing from the utmost that a tribe could do in a desperate situation.

[38] That the Cheruscan confederacy was originally not more powerful than the Marcomannic seems clear from the fact that, even after the defection of the Semnones, Longobardi and certain Suebian tribes (Tacitus, _Ann._, II, 45) Arminius and Maroboduus fought a drawn battle. Tacitus’ statement that the counter defection of Inguiomerus was a complete offset is most improbable; see L. Schmidt, _op. cit._, II, 2, 181.

[39] _La population française. Histoire de la population avant 1789_, I, Paris, 1889, p. 99 ff. Otto Hirschfeld (_Sitzungsber. d. Berl. Akad._, 1897, p. 1101) also uses this bit of evidence as a basis for calculations. Beloch, however, (_Rh. Mus._, LIV (1899), p. 414 f.) utterly rejects it, because he insists on taking the word ἄνδρες here as equivalent to fighting men. That is doubtless correct, but as it makes arrant nonsense of the calculation, it should not be ascribed to so well-informed a scientist as Posidonius, but only to the stupid Diodorus, who has thus changed what must have been an estimate only of the total population, into one of the number capable of bearing arms. Beloch’s remark that the ancient Gauls had no idea of the total population, but only of the fighting men, seems to go too far. If one number be known it is an easy matter to calculate the other. Certainly Posidonius was capable of multiplying any figures the Gauls may have given him for their fighting men by 4 or 5, in order to secure an estimate of the whole population. Besides, the Gauls must have had a certain accepted proportion between the total population of a district and the number of fighting men it could produce. They had a great many more occasions to make use of such calculations than any one in modern times would ever have; for questions of life and death depended only too frequently on just such estimates.

[40] Strabo, IV, 3, 2.

[41] _Rh. Mus._, LIV (1899), pp. 438, 443.

[42] Delbrück, _Preuss. Jahrb._, p. 47 f. Any exact calculation of the total number of tribes in Germany is impossible because our knowledge of the different tribal names comes from diverse periods, and the designations of clans and confederacies varied greatly from time to time.

[43] Delbrück, _Preuss. Jahrb._, p. 428, note, and _Geschichte der Kriegskunst_, I, 2nd ed. (1909), p. 14.

[44] _Deutsches Wirtschaftsleben im Mittelalter_, Leipzig, 1886, I, p. 148 ff., esp. 161 ff.

[45] Assuming that the region occupied by the Germans in the time of Augustus was approximately as large as the modern German empire. Agrippa’s imperfect calculation, even including Raetia and Noricum, was to be sure much smaller, i. e., 686 × 248 m.; Pliny, _Nat. Hist._, IV, 98.

[46] See Beloch, _Rh. Mus._, LIV (1899), pp. 418, 423, 428. In his _Bevölkerung_, p. 457, he had estimated one in ten, which was too large a fraction.

[47] Tac., _Ann._, I, 56.

[48] Tac., _Ann._, II, 16. This was the force later kept at the Rhine. Tacitus, _Ann._, IV, 5; Josephus, II, 16, 4.

[49] Delbrück, _Preuss. Jahrb._, p. 481 f., has well refuted the Roman claims of great numerical superiority on the part of the Germans, and concludes that the forces on both sides were about equal. Judging from the campaign against Maroboduus, which it may be noted, is the only one in which we have apparently reliable information regarding the strength of both sides, one might safely infer that, at least under Tiberius, the Romans enjoyed actual numerical superiority.

[50] Delbrück, _Preuss. Jahrb._, p. 481, exaggerates somewhat the advantage in cavalry which the Germans enjoyed.

[51] Velleius, II, 106.

[52] The overwhelmingly superior force of Rome is specifically admitted by some historians, but hardly seems as yet to be generally accepted. See especially Fustel de Coulanges, _Histoire des institutions politiques de l’ancienne France_, vol. II, 2nd ed. (by C. Jullian), Paris, 1891, p. 328; Ed. Meyer, _Kl. Schr._, p. 486; von Domaszewski, _Geschichte der_ _römischen Kaiser_, Leipzig, 1909, p. 245. The same thing is meant also by J. Beloch where he observes that the Romans recognized “dass die Eroberung grössere Anstrengungen kosten würde als das Objekt wert war” (_Griechische Geschichte_, 2nd ed., vol. I, 1 (1912), p. 14).

[53] See p. 37.

[54] Cf. Koepp, _Die Römer in Deutschland_, p. 35: “Kurz, als Tiberius am Rhein erschien, waren die Befürchtungen der ersten Aufregung schon zerstreut, die Folgen des Unglücksfalls eingedämmt. Rasch war das Heer ergänzt, ja vermehrt”; Hübner, _op. cit._, p. 111: “Nach des Varus Niederlage musste zeitweilig das rechtsrheinische Gebiet verlassen werden; Tiberius und Germanicus gewannen es wieder”; Mommsen, _Hist. of Rome_, V, 53: “The defeat was soon compensated, in so far as the Rhine army was immediately not simply made up to its strength, but considerably reinforced”; Gardthausen, I, p. 1223: “damals ... wurde die Rheinarmee auf acht Legionen verstärkt.” So Niese, _Röm. Gesch._, p. 298.

[55] Vell., II, 120: “mittitur [Tiberius] ad Germaniam ... ultro Rhenum cum exercitu transgreditur.”

[56] Suet., _Tib._, 18 and 19; Gardthausen, I, p. 1224.

[57] Gardthausen, I, p. 1225.

[58] Suet., _Tib._, 19.

[59] Cf. Tac., _Ann._, II, 26, 4: “Precante Germanico annum efficiendis coeptis.” This is the basis of Mommsen’s statement (_Hist. of Rome_, V, p. 59): [Germanicus] “reported to Rome that in the next campaign he should have the subjugation of Germany complete.” And just preceding this the same author says: “The second tropaeum of Germanicus [in the Teutoburg forest] spoke of the overthrow of all the Germanic tribes between the Rhine and the Elbe.” See also p. 54 f. for further discussion of the campaigns of Tiberius and Germanicus. Mommsen speaks of the campaigns of the summers 12, 13, and 14 as years of inaction, a mere continuance of the war, of which nothing at all is reported. This gap in the record Riese explains, _Forschungen_, etc., p. 13 by the meagerness of our sources (Velleius, Suetonius, and Dio) covering the last years of Augustus, as compared with the fuller account in Tacitus of the early years of the regency of Tiberius. So Koepp, _op. cit._, p. 34.

[60] _Hist. of Rome_, V, p. 62.

[61] I, p. 1201.

[62] Cf. p. 36.

[63] Cf. Gardthausen, I, p. 492: “Mit einem Worte Augustus ist derselbe geblieben: kalt, klar und klug sein ganzes Leben lang, keineswegs so genial wie Julius Caesar, aber entschieden verständiger.” These characteristics are uncontradicted save, of course, by the rhetorically embellished gossip about Augustus’ discomposure after the defeat of Varus; see Suet., _Aug._, 23; Dio, 56, 23. There is not the slightest evidence of a panic at Rome or of alarm on the part of any one except Augustus. Yet at the Pannonian-Dalmatian revolt, only a short time before (6-9 A. D.), the people were greatly wrought up because of wars and famines (Dio, 55, 31), and Augustus announced in the senate that in a few days the enemy might reach Rome, while Tiberius was provided with 15 legions (Velleius, II, 111, 1). So there was profound alarm at Rome at the time of the Marcomannic war (167-180 A. D. See Julius Capitolinus, _Marcus Antoninus_, 13, 1 and Ammianus, XXXI, 5, 13), while at the invasion of the Cimbri and Teutones all Italy was palsied with fear (Sall., _Jug._, 114; Orosius, 5, 15, 7; 6, 14, 2). But at the defeat of Varus we hear nothing of the kind. Besides, Augustus was now well advanced in years, his health was precarious, his daughter and granddaughter had humiliated and cruelly disappointed him, while the successive deaths in his family had forced him to adopt as his heir and successor Tiberius, whom he greatly disliked. It is small wonder that in his old age and bereavements he should give way to some momentary weakness. The Varus calamity, coming so soon after the Pannonian revolt, and just at the time when the strain from the latter had momentarily lifted, must have been too much for Augustus to bear.

[64] Gardthausen, I, p. 508. This view of Augustus is not invalidated by Gardthausen’s further statement: “Der Kaiser scheute sich nicht zurückzutreten, wenn der Widerstand grösser war als die Mittel, die er darauf verwenden wollte oder konnte.” These words are nothing more than an attempt to explain what all who hold to the traditional view are forced to explain, viz., Augustus’ reversal of policy in “die schwere Wahl zwischen der Politik des dauernden Friedens und der Politik der fortgesetzten Eroberung.”

[65] _Kleine Schriften_, p. 462.

[66] Meyer, _l. c._: “Der Vorwurf, dass er feige gewesen sei, ist gewiss unbegründet.”

[67] The reduction of the army after the battle of Actium shows that Augustus wished no larger standing forces than would be sufficient for the internal and external peace of the empire. See Gardthausen, I, p. 637; Furneaux, _Tacitus_, Introd., p. 121; Mommsen, _Germanische Politik_, etc., p. 8: “ja man darf sagen, dass Augustus das Militärwesen in einem Grade auf die Defensive beschränkte.”

[68] _Monumentum Ancyranum_, V, 14. Cf. Dio, 56, 33; Suet., _Aug._, 101; Tac., _Ann._, I, 11: “quae cuncta sua manu perscripserat Augustus addideratque consilium coercendi intra terminos imperii, incertum metu an per invidiam.” The sneer, “metu an per invidiam”, found in the words of Tacitus, who wrote in the time of the great expansive conquests of Trajan, and who had only contempt for the prudent foreign policy of Augustus (see Furneaux on this passage), has undoubtedly caused many to restrict Augustus’ peace policy to the period _after_ Varus’ defeat. But no such restriction should be made. We now know that the _Monum. Ancyr._ was not written at one time, nor at the end of Augustus’ life, but was finished in 6 A. D. See Chapter III, notes 84 and 88. This shows that his counsel of peace and his advice not to extend the limits of the empire was made prior to, and hence not as a result of, the defeat of Varus (9 A. D.), as has so frequently been asserted.

[69] _Aug._, 21: “nec ulli genti sine iustis et necessariis causis bellum intulit.”

[70] _Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire_, ed. 1910, I, p. 1 f.

[71] Gardthausen, I, p. 317: “Freude am Kriege und an Eroberungen ist bekanntlich das Letzte, was man dem jugendlichen und doch staatsklugen Caesar billiger Weise vorwerfen konnte.” Tacitus’ statement (_Ann._, I, 3), that Augustus’ later wars against the Germans were “abolendae magis infamiae ob amissum cum Quintilio Varo exercitum quam cupidine proferendi imperii”, does not necessarily mean, as is often inferred, that the earlier wars aimed to enlarge the empire.

[72] Vell., II, 89: “Finita vicesimo anno bella civilia, sepulta externa, revocata pax, sopitus ubique armorum furor, restituta vis legibus, iudiciis auctoritas.” This is well expressed by Botsford, _Hist. of Rome_, p. 205: “The chief aim of Augustus was to protect the frontiers, to maintain quiet by diplomacy and to wage war solely for the sake of peace.”

[73] _Kleine Schriften_, p. 455.

[74] Gardthausen, I, p. 477: “Der Friede war der Preis, um den Rom sich die Herrschaft des Augustus gefallen liess; und auch seine Nachfolger haben im Wesentlichen eine Politik des Friedens befolgt.” Cf. Lang, _op. cit._, p. 56: “Sein [Tiberius] Ziel war es daher, als er zur Herrschaft gekommen war, im Sinne und in Fortsetzung der Politik seines Adoptivvaters und Vorgängers Augustus, ihnen [den Provinzen] diese Ruhe und Ordnung zu verschaffen.”

[75] Suet., _Aug._, 22: “Ianum Quirinum, semel atque iterum a condita urbe ante memoriam suam clausum, in multo breviore temporis spatio terra marique pace parta ter clusit.”

[76] Davis, _Outline Hist. of the Rom. Empire_, New York, 1907, p. 59.

[77] Dio, 54, 20; Suet., _Aug._, 23.

[78] See Eduard Meyer, _Kleine Schriften_, p. 230: “He [Augustus] might have followed the precedent of Caesar and have aspired to world-conquest and absolute monarchy; by shrinking from it, by giving the state a new constitution and retaining for himself only limited powers, he made world-conquest impossible”; _Ibid._, p. 470 f.; Gardthausen, I, p. 1069; Drumann, _Röm. Gesch._, IV (1910), p. 300; Gibbon (see above p. 57). It is refuted also by the emperor Julian, who shows himself to be singularly well-informed regarding the history of the early empire (Cf. J. Geffcken, _Kaiser Julianus_, Leipzig, 1914, p. 150: “Julian zeigt ... wie gründlich er sich mit der Geschichte jener Zeit beschäftigt hat”). In _The Caesars_, 326 C, he represents Augustus as saying: “For I did not give way to boundless ambition and aim at enlarging her [Rome’s] empire at all costs, but assigned for it two boundaries defined as it were by nature herself, the Danube and the Euphrates. Then after conquering the Scythians and Thracians I did not employ the long reign that you gods vouchsafed me in making projects for war after war, but devoted my leisure to legislation and to reforming the evils that war had caused.” (Trans. by Wilmer Cave Wright).

[79] _Op. cit._, p. 12. There is at least consistency in von Ranke’s position. The only conceivable reason for the conquest of Germany would be precisely such a fantastic dream of universal empire. But the weakness of the whole argument of those who claim that Germany’s conquest was intended is that its logical consequences lead to absurd results, contradicting all that we know of the character of the emperor and of his times.

[80] II, 39.

[81] Cf. Drumann, _Gesch. Roms_,² 1910, IV, p. 300: “Octavian ergriff als Imperator das Schwert nur zu seiner Verteidigung; er führte nur gerechte Kriege; die Lorbeeren reizten ihn nicht, und darin, nicht in der Ueberzeugung, dass ein endloss vergrösserter Koloss in sich zusammenstürzt, lag die erste und vorzügliche Ursache seiner Mässigung. Gern hätte er den Tempel des Janus für immer geschlossen.”

[82] “Zum Monum. Ancyr.” _Beiträge zur alten Gesch._, II (1902), pp. 141-162.

[83] This view, together with the statement that the last addition was made by Augustus in 14 A. D., was subsequently modified by Kornemann in placing the number of revisions at seven (_Klio_, IV (1904), pp. 88-97), and the final revision at the end or middle of the year 6 A. D. (_Beiträge zur alten Gesch._, III (1903), p. 74 f.).

[84] “Zur Entstehung des Monum. Ancyr.,” _Hermes_, 38 (1903), pp. 618-628.

[85] Vulić, “Quando fu scritto il monumento Ancyrano,” _Riv. di Storia Ant._, XIII (1909), pp. 41-46, objects to the theory of interpolation in chapter 26. In it Augustus says: “Gallias et Hispanias provincias et Germaniam ... pacavi”, i. e. the Gauls and the Spains are considered real provinces, while Germany is a neighboring territory, over which for the time Rome’s beneficent influence was extended. The necessity of bringing out this distinction made imperative the repetition of the word “provinciae” (read two lines above), and this repetition justifies the abandonment of the geographical order.

[86] “Nochmals das Monum. Ancyr.,” _Klio_, IV (1904), pp. 88-97.

[87] “Récents Travaux sur les Res Gestae Divi Augusti,” _Mélanges Cagnat_, Paris, 1912, p. 144.