Chapter III: Criticism of the Accepted View (3)

[88] Cf. Bésnier, _op. cit._, p. 145: “nous savons en tout cas, qu’ Auguste n’a pas improvisé son apologie à la veille de sa mort, qu’il a commencé de bonne heure à la rédiger, au moins dès l’an 12 av. J.-C. et peut-être plus tot encore, qu’en l’an 6 de notre ére il a cessé d’y travailler, et que dans l’intervalle il l’a enrichie graduellement d’additions nombreuses et significatives.... Le souple génie politique d’Auguste s’y manifeste tout entier et l’on y retrouve, présentées sous le meilleur jour, les grandes pensées dont il s’est inspire tour à tour pendant son règne si long et si bien rempli.”

[89] Cf. Ritterling, _op. cit._, p. 176: “Aber eine durchgreifende Aenderung ist sicher erst infolge der lollianischen Niederlage und des durch diese hervorgerufenen Umschwunges der römischen Politik gegenüber den Germanen vorgenommen worden. Bisher war die Kriegführung gegen die Germanen eine in der Hauptsache rein defensive gewesen ... Eine Eroberung des rechtsrheinischen Gebietes lag der bisherigen römischen Politik durchaus fern. Jetzt fasste Augustus die völlige Einverleibung Germaniens bis an die Elbe ins Auge und traf während seiner mehrjährigen Anwesenheit in Gallien von 16 bis 13 die in grossem Stile angelegten Vorbereitungen zur Ausführung dieses Planes.”

[90] _Op. cit._, p. 25.

[91] _Monumentum Ancyranum_, VI, 3.

[92] Mommsen, _Röm. Gesch._, V, p. 23; Gardthausen, I, p. 1066; Jullian, _Histoire de la Gaule_, Paris, 1914, IV, p. 108.

[93] Dio, 54, 20; Vell., II, 97; Suet., _Aug._, 23.

[94] Paul Meyer, _Der Triumphzug des Germanicus_, p. 85.

[95] I, p. 1067. According to Niese, _op. cit._, p. 295, the decision came later, and by reason of a new attack from the Sugambri: “Dann erfolgte 12 v. Chr. ein neuer Angriff des Sugambrers Melo, und nun ward beschlossen, um Gallien zu sichern und zu beruhigen, über den Rhein hinüberzugreifen und die Germanen zu unterwerfen.”

[96] _Kleine Schriften_, p. 471.

[97] _Op. cit._, p. 214: “Der Kaiser entschloss sich jetzt von seinem Grundsatz, das Reich nicht durch Eroberung zu mehren, abzugehen und ... auf diese Weise eine Grenze herzustellen welche leichter zu vertheidigen und kürzer war als die jetzt bestehende.”

[98] _Germanische Politik_, etc., p. 9.

[99] _Op. cit._, 29.

[100] The same statement is made by other historians, e. g., Merivale, _General Hist. of Rome_, New York, 1876, p. 431; Bury (_Hist. of the Roman Empire_, New York, 1893, p. 125), who speaks of “The project of extending the empire to the Albis, into which perhaps the cautious emperor was persuaded by the ardor of his favorite stepson, Drusus.” Cf. Mommsen, _Germanische Politik_, etc., p. 10: “Ob Augustus ganz von freien Stücken sich dazu entschloss, die Friedenspolitik zu verlassen, oder ob er dem Drängen der Seinigen [Agrippa, Tiberius, and Drusus] nachgab, die Niederlage des Lollius gab den Ausschlag.”

[101] I, p. 1049 f.

[102] _Op. cit._, V, p. 142.

[103] Eduard Meyer, _Kleine Schriften_, p. 230, citing Augustus’ decision against imperial expansion, as a remarkable instance of the power and consequence of the individual action in history, says: “If we put the question, how it came to pass that the ... Germans were not bent under the yoke of Rome ... the only reason history can give is that it was the result of the decision which Augustus made concerning the internal organization of the empire, when he had become its absolute master by the battle of Actium. This decision sprang from his character and his own free will.” On the other hand Beloch, _Griech. Gesch.²_, I, 1 (1912), p. 15, takes the traditional view: “nicht der Wille zur Eroberung hat den Römern gefehlt, sondern die Macht; wenn man lieber will, sie erkannten dass die Eroberung grössere Anstrengungen kosten würde, als das Objekt wert war.”

[104] _Kaiser Augustus_, p. 111.

[105] I, p. 1048 f.

[106] _Op. cit._, V, p. 153 f.

[107] Mommsen, _Germanische Politik_, etc., p. 13: “wie Gallien durch Caesar, so war vierzig Jahre später Germanien zum römischen Reiche gebracht, die neue Monarchie mit Waffenruhm und Siegesglanz geschmückt worden.” In explanation of the fact that still later, in Tiberius’ time, Germany is spoken of as “almost a province” (Vell., II, 97, 4), Mommsen says: “so ist es begreiflich genug, dass man das nachherige Aufgeben desselben mit dem Willen des Augustus zu beschönigen bemüht war.” Niese, _Grundriss der röm. Gesch._, 1910, p. 297; Gardthausen, II, p. 1197; Fr. Kauffman, “Deutsche Altertumskunde” (in _Matthias’ Handbuch d. deutschen Unterrichts_, München, 1913, p. 317): “In den Jahren 12 v. Ch. Geb. bestand offiziell eine römische Provinz Germanien, die das Land vom Rhein bis zur Elbe unfasste.”

[108] But see the evidence to prove that as late as 6 A. D. Augustus did not consider Germany a province. (See Chapter III, note 85). Augustus’ own opinion as to whether it was or was not a province at this date is of the highest value for our question. For if he did not so consider it, then a great deal of first class documentary evidence is necessary to establish the fact that it really was a province. Similarly some convincing reason must be given to account for his failure to call it a province. Such evidence is not forthcoming. On the other hand there is no evidence to show that Augustus did regard it as a province but was hindered by the defeat of Varus from formally organizing it as such. For since no part of the _Monum. Ancyr._ was written after 6 A. D., it cannot be cited as evidence of any change in Augustus’ views after 9 A. D., as is often done on the assumption that the final revision of that document took place in 14 A. D.

[109] II, p. 1089.

[110] I, p. 1198: “Wenn auch die von Schuchhardt gefundenen Reste zweifelhaft sind, so bleibt doch immer die Thatsache bestehen, dass die Römer im Innern von Deutschland Castelle angelegt haben.”

[111] _Die Römer in Deutschland_, p. 34. Eduard Meyer, in _Kleine Schriften_, p. 230, expresses the same view in different words: “Now the very existence of Teutonic languages is a consequence of the fact that Germany was not subdued by the Romans.... Caesar would have subdued Germany as well as he did Gaul when he had once begun; but for the military and financial organization which Augustus gave to the Roman world, the task was too great indeed. So the emperor left Germany to herself.”

[112] _Westfalen_, p. 40: “das rechtsrheinische Germanien ist niemals eigentlich Provinz gewesen, auch nicht vor der Varusschlacht.”

[113] _Studia Romana_, 1859, P. 130.

[114] _Röm. Gesch._, V, p. 23 f.

[115] In _Germanische Politik_, etc., p. 13, Mommsen suggests that these terms, Upper and Lower Germany, later and improperly applied to the small territory on the left bank of the Rhine, were probably original designations for Germany between the Rhine and the Elbe. For the correct status, see Riese’s view as given below, p. 73 ff.

[116] “Die Verwaltung der Rheingrenze,” etc., _Commentationes philologae in honorem Th. Mommseni_, p. 434.

[117] _Röm. Staatsverwaltung_, I (1881), p. 271.

[118] _Op. cit._, p. 212.

[119] p. 219.

[120] p. 229.

[121] p. 233. Pelham, “The Roman Frontier in Southern Germany” (in _Essays on Roman History_, 1910, p. 179 f.), while speaking repeatedly of Upper and Lower Germany, limits his discussion for the most part to the period after Augustus’ time and specifically to the territory lying along the left bank of the Rhine. He says, referring to Tacitus’ statement (_Germ._, 29) to the effect that a stretch of territory beyond the Upper Rhine had been annexed by Rome and made a part of the province, that Upper Germany must be the province meant; that the land annexed to it was in reality “debatable land” (_dubiae possessionis_ of Tacitus), and had been so for more than 150 years. The last sentence clearly indicates that, in the writer’s view, Rome had never had the land organized as her own territory.

[122] _Forschungen zur Gesch. der Rheinlande in der Römerzeit_, p. 5 f. See also Riese in _Westdeutsche Zeitschrift f. Gesch. u. Kunst, Korrespondenz-Blatt_, xiv (1895), p. 156 f. He shows here that the two provinces, Upper and Lower Germany, were not established until the time of Domitian, some time between 82-90 A. D.: “Vor dem Jahre 90 gab es also ... nur eine Germania, in der ein exercitus Germanicus als superior und inferior unter zwei zu gegenseitiger Hülfe verbundenen Heereslegaten standen; dagegen gab es keine Germania superior und keine Germania inferior.... Auch ist jene Germania keine Provinz, sondern der Heeresbezirk der gallischen Provinzen.”

[123] Plin., _N. H._, iv, 105; Dio, 53, 12; Oros., I, 2.

[124] Ritterling (_op. cit._, p. 162) believes, however, that there were only two Gauls, and that the division took place at the beginning of Augustus’ reign: “Bei der Neuordnung des Reiches nach Beendigung der Bürgerkriege, i. J. 727-27, war ganz Gallien in zwei Kommandobezirke geteilt worden: der eine umfasste Aquitania und Narbonensis, der andere Gallia comata, also die Gebiete der späteren Provinzen Lugdunensis und Belgica.” See also Gardthausen, I, 662; II, 355.

[125] See p. 27 and note.

[126] Marquardt, _Röm. Staatsverwaltung_, I², 504.

[127] There seems to be no doubt that the military forces of all the Gauls were at this time under the direction of one commander; further that this position was in the nature of a commandership-in-chief of all the forces, on the lower, middle, and upper Rhine. Cf. Ritterling, _op. cit._, p. 187: “die Neuordnung der politischen und militärischen Verhältnisse Galliens durch Augustus seit dem Jahre 739-15 musste notwendig auch eine Aenderung in der Organisation des Heereskommandos zur Folge haben. Dem Statthalter der neugebildeten Provinz Belgica, in deren Gebiet jetzt beide gallischen Heere ihre Standlager hatten, konnte unmöglich diese bedeutendste Streitmacht des Reiches und die Führung des Krieges gegen die Germanen anvertraut werden. Anderseits machte die Grösse der militärischen Aufgaben und das Ineinandergreifen der geplanten Operationen am Mittel- und Niederrhein ein einheitliches Oberkommando notwendig.”

[128] _Characters and Events of Roman History_, p. 165.

[129] See also Sadée, _Römer und Germanen_, II. Theil, p. 99 (the chapter “Die Befreiung Deutschlands durch Arminius”); Wolf, _Die That des Arminius_, p. 41 f. (“Der Befreiungskampf”). Eduard Meyer’s statement that it was not possible for Rome to raise sufficient citizen troops to win back the advantage lost in 9 A. D. has already been answered (see p. 38).

[130] Reitzenstein, “Das deutsche Heldenlied bei Tacitus,” _Hermes_, 48 (1913), p. 268, quite correctly observes that the defeat of Varus had no such significance; that there was no change in Rome’s policy until Germanicus’ time, and that Rome’s contest with Germany through three decades did nothing to unite the strength of her antagonist, for hatred toward Arminius and the desire for his downfall characterize a political situation which is found at a much later time.

[131] Cf. also Mommsen, _Germanische Politik_, etc., p. 14 f.: “Die Unterwerfung Germaniens ... stockt mit dem Jahre 747 [7 B. C.] plötzlich. Wenn die sachlichen Verhältnisse dafür schlechterdings keinen Grund an die Hand geben, so liegt derselbe in den persönlichen klar genug vor.” As reasons of a private character he mentions: (1) the deaths of Agrippa and Drusus; (2) the estrangement of Tiberius. Then, after Tiberius’ return and the beginning of the war anew (4 A. D.), the following events: (1) the Dalmatian-Pannonian uprising; (2) the defeat of Varus; (3) the recall of Germanicus and the conditions surrounding the absolute monarchy of Tiberius.

[132] II, p. 1214; this is also the view of Ferrero, _Characters and Events_, p. 165.

[133] _Op. cit._, p. 117: “Freilich gehörte dazu eine sehr grosse Anstrengung; nur Heere von mehreren Legionen durften sich in das germanische Gebiet tiefer hineinwagen. Aber Cäsar hatte zuletzt in Gallien zum wenigsten 11 oder 12 Legionen gehabt. Germanicus hatte nur 8. Man sieht nicht weshalb das römische Reich nicht diese oder eine noch grössere Zahl Legionen viele Jahre hintereinander hätte über den Rhein schicken, oder wie die germanischen Grenzvölker sich dagegen hätten wehren können.”

[134] Practically the same point is made by Paul Meyer, _op. cit._, p. 86. That is, Germanicus was making notable progress in his campaigns, but was forced by the suspicions and jealousy of Tiberius to sheathe his sword. For the purpose of closing his career an elaborate and well deserved triumph was given him May 26, 17 A. D. Von Ranke, _op. cit._, p. 28, on the other hand, does not believe that hostilities were renewed against the Germans under Tiberius for purposes of conquest “sondern nur darauf, die Ehre der römischen Waffen herzustellen.” Hence the Roman troops were withdrawn because “die Germanen wurden, wie Tiberius mit Recht bemerkt, für die römische Welt durch ihre inneren Entzweiungen unschädlich.”

[135] _Die Römer in Deutschland_, p. 45.

[136] This is not convincing to Riese (p. 12, n. 1): “Allerdings bildeten diese Schädigungen ... nur einen und zwar nicht den wichtigsten Grund der Abberufung des Germanicus.” As for the matter of the great costs of such a campaign, one should bear in mind that the difference in cost between maintaining an ancient army on a war footing and on a peace footing was relatively slight. There was no great expense involved in the wastage of artillery and of equipment, when most of the fighting was done hand to hand, and when the soldiers required less rather than more supplies while living in part from the enemy’s country. As a professional standing army was always ready, and no new levies of troops required, not even in the greater wars, regular campaigns in Germany would have been a very slight drain on the treasury.

[137] See _op. cit._, p. 20.

[138] Cf. Merivale: _History of the Romans under the Empire_, IV, p. 240: “These repeated advances ... though far from having the character of conquests, could not altogether fail in extending the influence of Rome throughout a great portion of central Europe. They inspired a strong sense of her invincibility, and of her conquering destiny; at the same time they exalted the respect of the barbarians for the southern civilization, which could marshal such irresistible forces at so vast a distance from the sources of its power.”