Chapter IV: , Note 16

Of course this assumes that Aliso was at Haltern, which is far from being well established (see below). Even Oberaden is not so very much farther away from the Rhine, but it seems not to have been occupied any great number of years, as Aliso certainly was. Koepp’s remark (_Die Römer in Deutschland_, p. 102) that the extent of the fortifications at Aliso sets a minimum figure for the number of the troops that occupied it permanently, seems to be the reverse of probability. The camp was more likely laid out on a large scale so as to be able to hold the largest army that might be expected to operate in that region on its way forward and back, as well as great quantities of war supplies, but the actual number of troops which held the fort year in and year out was probably very small, since our literary sources are unanimous in representing the left bank of the Rhine as the permanent headquarters of the army. As for the camp at Oberaden, it has yet to be proved that it was occupied in force throughout the winter, as Koepp (_loc. cit._) believes, and so accuses Velleius of an outright falsehood in a plain statement of fact, where he must have known better. Certainly its size does not prove this, as it might not have been occupied at full capacity all the time; nor does the ornamentation of certain wall posts upon which Koepp lays such stress. That beams were artistically shaped shows merely that the builders had plenty of time in which to do their work, or else loved a bit of ornamentation, not that whole armies wintered in these quarters. The probability is that if occupied at all during the winter, it was held by only a small body of troops. Finally, if it could be shown that it was occupied during the winter, is it impossible that this may have been one of the camps of Tiberius, who wintered once in Germany? Can the archaeologist really date a structure like a camp within a limit of 15 years (only 13 years separated Drusus’ death from Tiberius’ winter in Germany), in the case of a simple construction, whose general plan never varied greatly, and without the evidence of superposition and modification of structure? That a thing is “Augustan” may well be asserted; to claim that a fortification belongs to Drusus, and not to Tiberius, is perhaps going too far, particularly when one must reject utterly the literary evidence in order to do so. Koepp is at pains to insist upon this matter of permanent occupation, because, as he rightly observes, “ein grosses Land schwerlich erobert werden kann, wenn der Eroberer alljährlich bis zu seinem Ausgangspunkt zurückgeht, und nicht vielmehr einen von Jahr zu Jahr wachsenden Gebietsteil besetzt hält.” But even if one granted that Oberaden is Drusus’ first fort and Haltern a later or contemporary establishment (as Kropatschek, and Koepp, p. 20, believe), nothing is gained regarding an ever advancing limit of possession, for Haltern is nearer the Rhine than Oberaden. In order to prove that the Romans were actually moving forward in this systematic fashion, as indeed they must have done, if conquest was their purpose, one would have to be able to show not two neighboring camps of the same period, but a whole series of advancing forts, the later situated ever farther inland than the earlier. This has not been done, and one is inclined to doubt greatly if it ever can be.——Delbrück’s arguments against Haltern or Oberaden as Aliso (_Gesch. d. Kriegskunst_, 2nd ed., II, pp. 131-150) seem very convincing, but there are also grave difficulties in the way of setting Aliso near Paderborn. However, no matter in which place Aliso be located, the upper or the lower Lippe, our argument is not affected, for though the location near Paderborn is far inland, and, if held in great force, must have overawed the surrounding tribes, it is perfectly clear from Delbrück’s arguments (pp. 48-50, 130 ff.) that Aliso was never a “Zwingburg”, but only a center for munitions and supplies, probably as small as it could possibly have been made for easy defense. He has well emphasized the fallacy of parcelling out an army in fortresses so long as there remains a hostile force in the field. The point we wish to make, however, is that, if the whole country was subdued, or even any substantial portion thereof, it must have been necessary to move forward the legions into great permanent fortresses either in its midst, or on its farther borders, and that this was never done in Germany; the few _castella_ of which we hear were certainly not far extended points held in full force by an army of permanent occupation.——We have hitherto paid no attention to the statement of Florus that “Drusus castella ubique disposuit per Mosam flumen, per Albin, per Visurgin” (II, 30, 26). Of course no one accepts this as being in any sense literally true of the Elbe and the Weser (cf. Abraham, _Zur Gesch. d. germ, u. pannon. Kriege_, etc., p. 4) and there is grave doubt even of the correctness of the statement regarding the “quinquaginta amplius castella”, that Drusus is supposed to have built along the Rhine (cf. Hübner, _Römische Herrschaft_, p. 110). So much however is clear, that the Romans did make a serious effort to pacify and control the coast, and _castella_ may very well have been located at or near the mouth of the Weser and the Elbe (cf. Delbrück, _op. cit._, p. 51). The strategical value of such naval bases has already been pointed out (above, p. 51); their commercial significance is quite as great. Ancient commerce was, whenever possible, water-borne. With Germany, in the absence of even tolerable roads, it must have been almost wholly so. A close parallel is furnished by the conditions which prevailed in the American Middle West during the period of French occupation and even later. For the Roman trade with Germany see K. T. von Inama-Sternegg, _Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte_, 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1909, I, p. 229 ff., a good though somewhat cursory summary, with references to the literature. The very carefully worded official statement of Augustus regarding the results of his activities in Germany, mentions this feature, and it alone, as a solid achievement: “Gallias et Hispanias provincias et Germaniam qua includit oceanus a Gadibus ad ostium Albis fluminis pacavi” (c. 26). “Pacavi” seems to be chosen in order to indicate that peaceful commercial enterprises had been made possible.