Chapter D: Hartley (1)

_P. S. January 8th, 1782._ Since writing this letter, I have seen Mr Alexander, and shall see him from time to time to communicate with him. I do not suppose I shall have an answer from Lord North till the preliminary points are so settled, as to enable him to give an answer in form. The Ministry might undoubtedly give a short negative, if they thought proper; but I do not expect that. You may be assured, that I have and shall continue to enforce every argument in the most conciliatory manner to induce a negotiation. I am very sorry for Mr A.'s confinement, on his own account, and on that of his friends, and because probably in the future state of this business his personal exertions may be very serviceable in the cause of peace. Every assistance and every exertion of mine will always be most heartily devoted to that cause. I have nothing further to add, either upon my own reflections or from my subsequent conversations with Mr Alexander, to what I have stated in the foregoing letter. If we once make a good beginning upon the plan there stated, I should hope that such a negotiation, founded on such principles, would promise fair to produce every salutary and pacific concequence in the event.

D. H.

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REMARKS ON THE CONCILIATORY BILL

_In the title and preamble_ of the bill, the words _Provinces of North America_ are used as general words, neither implying dependence or independence.

CLAUSE I. _The Truce_ is taken from the Conciliatory Act of 1778, and is indefinite as to the proposed duration of the truce. Under this clause it might be proposed to negotiate three points, viz. the removal of the British troops from the Thirteen Provinces of North America, and connectedly with this article, a stipulation for the security of the friends of the British government. The third article might be a stipulation, that the respective parties, during the continuance of the truce, should not either directly or indirectly give assistance to the enemies of each other.

CLAUSE II. _Articles of Intercourse and Pacification._ Under this clause some arrangements might be settled, for establishing a free and mutual intercourse, civil and commercial, between Great Britain and the aforesaid Provinces of North America.

CLAUSE III. _Suspension of certain Acts of Parliament._ By this clause a free communication may be kept open between the two countries, during the negotiation for peace, without stumbling against any claim of rights, which might draw into contest the question of dependence or independence.

CLAUSE IV. _The Ratification by Parliament._ The object of this clause is to consolidate peace and conciliation, step by step, as the negotiation may proceed; and to prevent, as far as possible, any return of war, after the first declaration of a truce. By the operation of this clause, a temporary truce may be converted into a perpetual and permanent peace.

CLAUSE V. _A Temporary Act._ This clause, creating a temporary act for a specific purpose of negotiation in view, is taken from the act of 1778.

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ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO B. FRANKLIN.

Philadelphia, January 7th, 1782.

Dear Sir,

As it does not appear improbable, that the humiliation and misfortunes of Great Britain may produce the same sentiments, which a spirit of moderation dictates to the other belligerent powers, and lead her to concur with them in their wishes for peace, it cannot be improper to acquaint you with the objects America most wishes to attain, and to furnish you with the arguments on which they found their claim to them. For such is the confidence, not only in the justice of His Most Christian Majesty, but in his friendship, that they firmly persuade themselves, that he will not only preserve for them their undoubted rights, but that he will even go so far as to procure for them those advantages they may reasonably demand, on the close of a successful war; and I am perfectly satisfied, that the loose hints that a detail of their sentiments may afford you, and our other Commissioners, will be strengthened and improved by your lights in such manner, as to come before his Majesty in the most advantageous form.

The first point of discussion will be the limits of the United States. The instructions given Mr Adams on the ---- day of ---- last, explain the wishes of Congress on that subject, nor can they admit of many doubts, except so far as they relate to our southern extent. The boundary between us and Canada being very well ascertained by grants, charters, proclamations, and other acts of government, and more particularly by the settlements of people, who are engaged in the same cause with us, and who have the same rights with the rest of the subjects of the United States.

Our western and northwestern extent will probably be contested with some warmth, and the reasoning on that subject be deduced from general principles, and from proclamations and treaties with the Indians.

The subject is undoubtedly intricate and delicate, yet, upon candid investigation, I believe it will appear, that our extension to the Mississippi is founded in justice; and that our claims are at least such as the events of the war give us a right to insist upon. Your situation, furnishing you amply with the various documents on which Great Britain founded her claim to all the country east of the Mississippi previous to the treaty of Paris, I will not trouble you with references to them, which would at any rate be imperfect, from the want which prevails here of books and papers. Taking it for granted, that the King of Great Britain was entitled to that extent of country, (which he at least cannot contravene) it only remains to examine how far he considers it as within the limits of some of the United States, because he can no more pretend to abridge those limits, than claim any other right of which the United States are in possession.

His idea of these limits is apparent from charters granted by the crown, and from recent grants made by its representatives in several of the States, it appears that they considered their authority to grant lands to the westward, as coextensive with the right of Great Britain, unless they were restricted by their interference with other governments. Upon this principle, the servants of the crown in New York granted land on the borders of Lake Erie, to the westward of Niagara. And Virginia, even after the proclamation in 1763, patented considerable tracts upon the Ohio, far beyond the Appalachian mountains. It is true, the several governments were prohibited at different times from granting lands beyond certain limits, but these were clearly temporary restrictions, which the policy of maintaining a good understanding with the natives dictated, and were always broken through after a short period, as is evinced by the grants abovementioned, made subsequent to the proclamation in 1763. And indeed the proclamation itself furnishes a substantial argument of the opinion of Britain, with respect to the right which some of the States had to extend to the westward of the limits it prescribed, otherwise it would not have been necessary to prohibit their governors from granting, as their patents would, in such cases, have been invalid, and themselves subjected to the censure of their master upon whom they were dependent. Unless, therefore, these proclamations absolutely destroyed the right, they must be considered as proofs of its existence at least, and after they were issued. The slightest examination of them shows, that they did not take away, but restrained an existing right, and the subsequent grants by the governors evidence that they were, as is before asserted, mere temporary restrictions. The same reasoning applies to the treaty at Fort Stanwix, and to other agreements taken from treaties with the Indians. Strong evidence in our favor is also found in the map made by the King's geographer, in which Virginia and the Carolinas are laid down as extending to the Mississippi, shortly after the last war. Arguments may be drawn against us by the Quebec Bill, but as this is one of the laws that occasioned the war, to build anything upon it would be to urge one wrong in support of another. But this matter may perhaps be seen in a different light, and our pretensions placed upon a more extensive basis by recurring to general principles, and asking whence Great Britain derived her right to the waste lands in America.

Evidently, from the allegiance which a subject is supposed to carry with him wherever he goes, even though he dislikes his constitution and seeks one that pleases him better, upon this false principle, the oppressed subjects of Great Britain, seeking freedom in the wilds of America, were supposed to extend to it the sovereignty of the kingdom they had left. The rights of the King of Great Britain then to America were incident to his right of sovereignty over those of his subjects that settled America, and explored the lands he claims. For the idea of right derived from mere discovery, and the vain ceremony of taking possession without planting and continuing that possession, is now fully exploded. If then we admit what is necessary to our independence, that the right of sovereignty over the people of America is forfeited, it must follow, that all rights founded in that sovereignty are forfeited with it; and that upon our setting up a new sovereign in America, the rights which the first claimed as such, devolve upon the second. Upon this principle, Great Britain is left without a foot of land in America beyond the limits of those governments which acknowledge her jurisdiction.

It is in vain to say, that the King of Great Britain holds these back lands by a cession from other powers. Since those cessions were grounded upon a prior claim, derived through the people of America, and only served to confirm the right which they gave the King of Great Britain while he was their sovereign, and which he loses with his sovereignty over them. This mode of reasoning is warranted by the practice Great Britain uniformly held of treating with the Indian nations through their American governors, who have frequently executed with them the most solemn acts, and sometimes extended the King's protection to the nations who occupy the waste lands, which are the subject of our present claim. The expense of retaining these in friendship, almost always devolved upon the respective States, who, till lately, particularly in New York, voted the sums necessary to support smiths among them, and to procure the presents which were annually made them. From hence, then, it follows, that if the King of Great Britain has any right over the back lands in America, it must be as King of the people of America; ceasing to be King of those people, his right also ceases. If he has no right over the back lands, but merely as protector of the savage nations that inhabit them, that connexion and duty also devolve upon us, since they evidently claimed that protection from him as King of the Colonies, and through the governors of those Colonies, and not as sovereign of a country three thousand miles from them. This country having chosen a new sovereign, they may rightfully claim its protection.

There is some reason to believe, that Great Britain considered their rights in many instances as extending no further than their right of preemption and protection, as may be inferred from passages in the negotiations for a peace with France in the year 1761, referred to in the margin. This suggests a new idea, which, however, I am not warranted by any act of Congress in mentioning, and therefore you will only consider it as the sentiment of an individual. If the mediators should not incline to admit our claim, but determine on restricting our limits, either by the extent of our grants, the course of the mountains, the sources of the rivers, or any other of those arbitrary rules that must be sought for when solid principles are relinquished, perhaps it would not be difficult to bring them to agree, that the country beyond those limits belongs to the nations which inhabit it; that it should enjoy its independence under the guarantee of France, Spain, Great Britain, and America, and be open to the trade of those whose lands border upon them.

This, though restrictive of our rights, would free us from the well grounded apprehensions, that the vicinity of Great Britain and her command of the savages would give us. They already possess Canada and Nova Scotia; should that immense territory, which lies upon the rear of the States, from the Gulf of St Lawrence to the Gulf of Mexico, be acknowledged to be vested in Great Britain, it will render our situation truly hazardous. The lands, as you know, are infinitely better than those on the coast; they have an open communication with the sea by the rivers St Lawrence and the Mississippi, and with each other by those extensive inland seas with which America abounds. They will be settled with the utmost rapidity from Europe, but more particularly from these States. Attachment to the government, freedom from taxes, a prospect of bettering their fortunes, and the fertility of the soil, will invite numbers to leave us. This, co-operating with the leaven of dissatisfaction, which will continue to work here for many years, may produce the most dangerous effects, especially upon the Southern States, which will, from the nature of their soil and husbandry, be thinly settled for many years, while the lands, which lie near them beyond the mountains, will soon be filled with a hardy race of people inimical to them, who to their own strength will be enabled to join that of the savages, subject to their command.

If it is an object with the maritime powers to lessen the power, and by that means diminish the dangerous dominion that Great Britain has in some measure usurped over the ocean, they must prevent her possessing herself of the country in question, since, besides the whole fur and peltry trade, that she will thereby engross, the demands of this great country will give a new spring to her manufactures, which, though the Floridas should be ceded to Spain, will find their way into it by the river St Lawrence, and through the numerous lakes and rivers which communicate with it. Add to this, that settlements are already formed beyond the Appalachian mountains by people who acknowledge the United States, which not only give force to our claims, but render a relinquishment of their interest highly impolitic and unjust. These, and a variety of other reasons, which will suggest themselves to you and the gentlemen joined in the commission with you, will doubtless be urged in such terms as to convince the Court of France, that our mutual interests conspire to keep Great Britain from any territory on this continent beyond the bounds of Canada. Should the Floridas be ceded to Spain, she will certainly unite with you on this point, as the security of that cession will depend upon its success.

The _Fisheries_ will probably be another source of litigation, not because our rights are doubtful, but because Great Britain has never paid much attention to rights, which interfere with her views.

The arguments on which the people of America found their claim to fish on the Banks of Newfoundland arise, first, from their having once formed a part of the British empire, in which state they always enjoyed, as fully as the people of Britain themselves, the right of fishing on those Banks. They have shared in all the wars for the extension of that right, and Britain could with no more justice have excluded them from the enjoyment of it, (even supposing that one nation could possess it to the exclusion of another,) while they formed a part of that empire, than they could exclude the people of London or Bristol. If so, the only inquiry is, how have we lost this right. If we were tenants in common with Great Britain, while united with her, we still continue so, unless by our own act we have relinquished our title. Had we parted with mutual consent, we should doubtless have made partition of our common rights by treaty. But the oppressions of Great Britain forced us to a separation, (which must be admitted, or we have no right to be independent) and it cannot certainly be contended that those oppressions abridged our rights, or gave new ones to Britain. Our rights then are not invalidated by this separation, more particularly as we have kept up our claim from the commencement of the war, and assigned the attempt of Great Britain to exclude us from the fisheries as one of the causes of our recurring to arms.

The second ground upon which we place our right to fish on the Banks of Newfoundland, provided we do not come within such distance of the coasts of other powers, as the law of nations allows them to appropriate, is the right which nature gives to all mankind to use its common benefit, so far as not to exclude others. The sea cannot in its nature be appropriated; no nation can put its mark upon it. Though attempts have sometimes been made to set up an empire over it, they have been considered as unjust usurpations, and resisted as such, in turn, by every maritime nation in Europe. The idea of such empire is now fully exploded by the best writers.

The whale fishery in every sea, and even upon the coasts of princes, who do not exercise it themselves, is considered as a common right, and is enjoyed by those nations that choose to pursue it. The cod fishery, upon the Dogger Bank, and other parts of the European seas, is claimed exclusively by no nation. The herring fishery is carried on daily by the Dutch on the coast of England, and if the Banks of Newfoundland are not equally common, it is because some nations have relinquished their rights, and others find it impossible to exercise them, for want of harbors to receive their vessels, or shores to dry their fish on.

When we say we are willing to exercise it under these inconveniences, there can certainly be no further dispute about our right, and the only remaining questions will be the distance that we ought to keep from the shores possessed by the enemy; though, strictly speaking, from our first principle, we have a common right in them.

This subject is treated so much at large by Grotius and Vattel, that I do not think it necessary to detail arguments, which, though urged by people here from their feelings, you will find much better stated there. Give me leave however to urge some, that may arise from our particular circumstances. All the New England States are much interested in this point; the State of Massachusetts more particularly; it has no staple; it does not raise its own bread; its principal commerce consisted before the war in fish, which it supplied to the rest of the continent in exchange for rice, flour, &c, and to the West Indies for rum, sugar, and molasses. It shipped little to Europe; first, because it could not fish so cheap as the people of England; secondly, because their fish was not so well cured in general, owing to their fishing at improper seasons, and to their using salt which is said to be of a more harsh nature, than what the European vessels bring out with them. Should this State and New Hampshire, which is almost in similar circumstances, be excluded from the fisheries, they must be reduced to great distress. It will be impossible for them to pay for the necessaries they must receive from abroad. They will see with pain their sister States in the full enjoyment of the benefits, which will result from their independence, while their own commerce is checked, and their State impoverished. They will consider their interests as sacrificed to the happiness of others, and can hardly forbear to foster that discontent, which may be productive of disunion, and the most dangerous divisions.

An idea has also gone forth, and it is fomented by the disaffected, that France wishes, from interested views, to monopolise the fisheries; or, at least to exclude all other competitors but Great Britain. Those, who have attended to the disinterested conduct of France during the war, oppose to this sentiment the honor and good faith of their ally, the little interest that he can have in excluding a people from a right, which would not interfere with his, since France does little more than supply herself; and the New England fishery, for the most part, only supplies the continent and islands of America. They see the care with which France has endeavored to cultivate a good understanding between that Kingdom and these States, and they are persuaded so inconsiderable an object will not be put in competition with the harmony, which ought to subsist between them, or administer food to those unworthy jealousies. And so much does this sentiment prevail in Congress, that their prospects have not induced them to alter your instructions; more particularly as they have received through the Minister of France assurances, that his Majesty was pleased with the proof Congress had given him of their confidence, and that he would in no event make any sacrifices of their essential interests, which necessity should not compel him to do; that he had no reason to apprehend from the events of the war, that such necessity would exist. These events have become so much more favorable since the date of the letter, which contained these assurances, that Congress persuade themselves his Majesty will not be driven to make sacrifices equally painful to him and injurious to us; but that, as we owe our success in war to his magnanimity and generosity, we may be equally indebted to his justice and firmness for an honorable peace.

It is not improbable, that Great Britain will endeavor to make some stipulations in favor of their American partisans, who have been banished the country, or whose property has been forfeited. You will doubtless be sensible of the inconvenience and danger, to which their return will subject us, and the injustice of restoring to them what they have so justly forfeited; while no compensation is made to us for the loss of property, and the calamities they have occasioned.

There can be little doubt, that every society may rightfully banish from among them those, who aim at its subversion, and forfeit the property, which they can only be entitled to by the laws, and under the protection of the society, which they attempt to destroy. Without troubling you, therefore, on the point of right, I will just mention a few of the consequences that would result from a stipulation in their favor.

In the first place, it will excite general dissatisfaction and tumults. They are considered here as the authors of the war. Those who have lost relations and friends by it, those who have been insulted by them while starving in prisons and prison-ships, those who have been robbed and plundered, or who have had their houses burned and their families ill treated by them, will, in despite of all law, or treaties, avenge themselves, if the real or supposed authors of these calamities ever put themselves in their power; nor will the government be able to prevent what the feeling of the body of the people will justify.

Should they be permitted to reside among us, they will neglect no means to injure and subvert our constitution and government, and to sow divisions among us in order to pave the way for the introduction of the old system. They will be dangerous partisans of the enemy, equally unfriendly to France and to us, and will show themselves such upon every occasion. To restore their property in many instances is now become impossible. It has been sold from hand to hand; the money arising from it has been sunk by depreciation in the public treasury. To raise the value by taxes, or to wrest the lands from the hands of the proprietors, is equally unjust and impossible. Many of the very people, who would demand the restitution, have grown rich by the spoil and plunder of this country. Many others, who were beggars at the beginning of this war, owe their present affluence to the same cause.

So that at least the account between the two nations should be liquidated, before any claim can be set up by the aggressors. How far it will be possible to obtain a compensation for the injuries wantonly done by the enemy, you will be best able to judge; be assured that it is anxiously desired.

Give me leave to mention to you the necessity of stipulating for the safe delivery of all records, and other papers of a public and private nature, which the enemy have possessed themselves of; particularly of the records of New York, which Mr Tryon sent to England; and the private papers of many gentlemen of the law in different parts of the continent, by which the rights of individuals may be materially affected.

Thus, Sir, I have touched upon the principal points, that America wishes to attain in the peace, which must end this bloody war. Perhaps in so doing I have given both you and myself unnecessary trouble, since I have urged nothing but what your own knowledge of the country, and that of the other gentlemen in the commission, would have suggested to you. However, conceiving that circumstances might render it necessary for you to declare, that you spoke nothing more than the prevailing sentiments of your Court, this letter will serve to vouch for the assertion.

Should the Floridas be ceded to Spain, as there is nothing Congress have more at heart than to maintain that friendly intercourse with them, which this revolution has happily begun, it will be essential to fix their limits precisely, for which purpose the instructions to Mr Adams will serve as your directions.

Affairs here are in the same state that they were when I last wrote, except that the enemy in South Carolina have called in all their outposts, and shut themselves up in Charleston, where they will be closely invested when General St Clair joins, which must have happened about the last of December. The brilliant expedition to St Eustatia does the highest honor to the Marquis de Bouillé and the French nation. I flatter myself that it will be of singular use to Mr Adam's negotiations.

I have the honor to be, dear Sir, &c. &c.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

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TO DAVID HARTLEY.

Passy, January 15th, 1782.

Dear Sir,

I received a few days since your favor of the 2d instant, in which you tell me, that Mr Alexander had informed you, "America was disposed to enter into a separate treaty with Great Britain." I am persuaded, that your strong desire for peace has misled you, and occasioned your greatly misunderstanding Mr Alexander; as I think it scarce possible he should have asserted a thing _so utterly void of foundation_. I remember that you have, as you say, often urged this on former occasions, and that it always gave me more disgust than my friendship for you permitted me to express. But since you have now gone so far as to carry such a proposition to Lord North, as arising from us, it is necessary that I should be explicit with you, and tell you plainly, that I never had such an idea, and I believe there is not a man in America, a few _English tories_ excepted, that would not spurn at the thought of deserting a noble and generous friend, for the sake of a truce with an unjust and cruel enemy.

I have again read over your Conciliatory Bill, with the manuscript propositions that accompany it, and am concerned to find, that one cannot give vent to a simple wish for peace, a mere sentiment of humanity, without having it interpreted as _a disposition to submit to any base conditions_ that may be offered us, rather than continue the war; for, on no other supposition could you propose to us a truce of ten years, during which we are to engage not to assist France, while you continue the war with her. A truce too, wherein nothing is to be mentioned that may weaken your pretensions to dominion over us, which you may therefore resume at the end of the term, or at pleasure; when we should have so covered ourselves with infamy, by our treachery to our first friend, as that no other nation can ever after be disposed to assist us, however cruelly you might think fit to treat us. Believe me, my dear friend, America has too much understanding, and is too sensible of the value of the world's good opinion, to forfeit it all by such perfidy. The Congress will never instruct their Commissioners to obtain a peace on such ignominious terms; and though there can be but few things in which I should venture to disobey their orders, yet, if it were possible for them to give me such an order as this, I should certainly refuse to act; I should instantly renounce their commission, and banish myself forever from so infamous a country.

We are a little ambitious too of your esteem; and as I think we have acquired some share of it, by our manner of making war with you, I trust we shall not hazard the loss of it, by consenting meanly to a dishonorable peace.

Lord North was wise in demanding of you some authorised acknowledgment of the proposition from authorised persons. He justly thought it too improbable to be relied on, so as to lay it before the Privy Council. You can now inform him, that the whole has been a mistake, and that no such proposition as that of a separate peace has been, is, or is ever likely to be made by me; and I believe by no other authorised person whatever in behalf of America. You may further, if you please, inform his Lordship, that Mr Adams, Mr Laurens, Mr Jay, and myself, have long since been empowered, by a special commission, to treat of peace whenever a negotiation shall be opened for that purpose; but it must always be understood, that this is to be in conjunction with our allies, conformably to the solemn treaties made with them.

You have, my dear friend, a strong desire to promote peace, and it is a most laudable and virtuous desire. Permit me then to wish, that you would, in order to succeed as a mediator, avoid such invidious expressions as may have an effect in preventing your purpose. You tell me that no stipulation for our independence must be in the treaty, because you "verily believe, so deep is the jealousy between England and France, that England would fight for a straw, to the last man and the last shilling, rather than be _dictated to_ by France." And again, that, "the nation would proceed to every extremity, rather than be brought to a formal recognition of independence at the _haughty command_ of France." My dear Sir, if every proposition of terms for peace, that may be made by one of the parties at war, is to be called and considered by the other as _dictating_, and a _haughty command_, and for that reason rejected, with a resolution of fighting to the last man rather than agree to it, you see that in such case no treaty of peace is possible.

In fact we began the war for independence on your government, which we found tyrannical, and this before France had anything to do with our affairs; the article in our treaty whereby the "two parties engage, that neither of them shall conclude either truce or peace with Great Britain, without the formal consent of the other first obtained; and mutually engage, not to lay down their arms until the independence of the United States shall have been formally or _tacitly_ assured, by the treaty or treaties, that shall terminate the war," was an article inserted at our instance, being in our favor. And you see, by the article itself, that your great difficulty may be easily got over, as a formal acknowledgment of our independence is not made necessary. But we hope by God's help to enjoy it; and I suppose we shall fight for it as long as we are able.

I do not make any remarks upon the other propositions, because I think that unless they were made by authority, the discussion of them is unnecessary and may be inconvenient. The supposition of our being disposed to make a separate peace I could not be silent upon, as it materially affected our reputation and its essential interests. If I have been a little warm on that offensive point, reflect on your repeatedly urging it, and endeavor to excuse me.

Whatever may be the fate of our poor countries, let you and me die as we have lived, in peace with each other.

Assuredly I continue, with great and sincere esteem, my dear friend, yours most affectionately,

B. FRANKLIN.

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TO THE COUNT DE VERGENNES.

Passy, January 18th, 1782.

Sir,

I received the letter your Excellency did me the honor of writing to me this day enclosing a Memorial,[28] which relates to the interests of some subjects of the Emperor, residing at Ostend, who allege that a ship of theirs has been taken by an American privateer, and carried into Boston, on pretence that the property was English, &c. I shall immediately transmit the Memorial to Congress, as desired. But there being Courts of Admiralty established in each of the United States, I conceive, that the regular steps to be taken by the complainants would be an application for justice to those Courts by some person on the spot, duly authorised by them as their agents, and in case the judgment of the Court is not satisfactory, that then they appeal to the Congress, which cannot well take cognisance of such matters in the first instance.

[28] See this Memorial in Franklin's Works, Vol. V p. 122

The merchants of Ostend may possibly not have as yet correspondents established in all the States, but any merchant of credit in the country would transact such business on receiving their request, with the proper power of attorney; or if His Imperial Majesty should think fit to appoint a Consul General to reside in those States, such an officer might at all times assist his compatriots with his counsels and protection, in any affairs that they might have in that country. I am the more particular in mentioning this to your Excellency, because I apprehend these cases may hereafter be frequent, and if the complaints are to be addressed to you and me, we are likely to have a great deal of trouble, as I am informed that it is become a daily practice for outward bound English ships to put into Ostend, make a formal pretended sale of ship and cargo to a merchant of the place, who furnishes imperial papers for the voyage under his own name, and receives a certain sum per cent for the operation.

This is said to be a branch of great profit to the Flemish merchants, and that a very great number of English ships are now at sea with such papers, and I suspect even from their own manner of stating the transaction, that the ship and cargo reclaimed by the complainants are of that kind. This seems to me an abuse of the neutrality, as these fictitious profits are added to the advantage of real carriage for the belligerent nations, they make it too much the interest of neutral neighbors to foment wars and obstruct peace, that such profits may continue. And if it is to be understood as a settled point, that such papers are to protect English property, the fitters out of privateers from France, Spain, Holland, and America, will in another year be all ruined, for they will find none but Flemish ships upon the ocean.

With the greatest respect, &c.

B. FRANKLIN.

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ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO B. FRANKLIN.

Philadelphia, January 23d, 1782.

Dear Sir,

An express just going to the Chesapeake, gives me an opportunity of sending by the Hermione, a resolution passed yesterday. My letters by this conveyance are so long, that they leave me nothing to add, unless it be, that we have just received letters from Mr Deane, (copies are enclosed) which confirm the authenticity of those published in his name by Mr Rivington, mentioned in my former letters. In one of those publications he expressly advises a return to the government of Great Britain; and, as this could not be effected through Congress, that it should be done by committees, which the people should choose for that express purpose. These, of which I now send you copies, were delivered here by the person to whom Mr Deane gave them, so that there can be no doubt of their authenticity.

We have nothing new except what you will learn from the papers herewith transmitted. As I doubt not you are upon the most confidential terms with the Marquis de Lafayette, I could wish him to see my last letter. You will observe, that I have omitted (for reasons, that you will easily conceive) to make use of the arguments, which may be derived from the 11th and 12th articles of our treaty with France. The Commissioners will exercise their own discretion in applying them, when a negotiation shall be opened.

We were much surprised at not receiving a single line by the frigate, which lately arrived at the Chesapeake, from any one of our foreign Ministers. It is upwards of three months since we have had a letter of intelligence from Europe. Congress complains of these neglects, (for such they consider them) and I flatter myself, that in future, as a channel is now open through this office for a regular correspondence, this cause of complaint will be removed, and that letters and papers will be lodged with our consuls to go by every conveyance.

Be persuaded, Sir, that I shall omit no opportunity to give you every information, which may contribute to your private amusements or the public benefit.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

_P. S._ I have this moment received resolutions from Congress, (copies of which I enclose), which serve to show their sense of the importance of the fisheries and their western extent, and add new weight to the arguments which I had the honor to urge. You will be pleased to transmit copies of them to Mr Jay and Mr Adams.

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DAVID HARTLEY TO B. FRANKLIN.

London, January 24th, 1782.

My Dear Sir,

I received yours of the 15th instant this day. I must take the earliest opportunity of setting you right in one mistake, which runs through your whole letter, and which to you, under that mistake, must be a very delicate point. You seem to apprehend that America has been stated in the proposition to Lord North, as "disposed to enter into a separate treaty with Great Britain;" but you meet the condition, viz. in the words immediately following, "_and that their allies were disposed to consent to it_." There cannot possibly be any supposition of treachery to allies, in any proposition to which they may _consent_. A separate treaty, with the _consent_ of the allies of America, was the proposition communicated to me by Mr Alexander, and which I laid before the Minister, and which I reported back again to Mr Alexander in writing, when I showed him the paper entitled "Conciliatory Propositions," which I took care to reduce to writing, with a view of avoiding mistakes; therefore, I have not _misunderstood_ Mr Alexander. I have since seen Mr A. many times, and he has always stated one and the same proposition, viz. that America was disposed to enter into a separate treaty, because their _allies were disposed to consent that they should_; therefore there cannot exist a suspicion of treachery. It occurred to me once while I was writing, to bar against that misconstruction, but having specified the _consent of the allies of America_ in the same sentence, I could not conceive such a misconstruction to have been possible.

You have mistaken another point greatly. You say, "a truce for _ten_ years." There is not in the bill any such disposition or thought; on the contrary, it is specified in the enclosed paper that it is kept _indefinite_, for the sole purpose of avoiding the suspicion which you have suggested. The truce may be for twenty, or fifty, or one hundred years; in my opinion the longer the better. But in any case, what I mean now to state is the _indefinite_ term in the bill. The articles of intercourse are only proposed for ten years certain, just to strew the way with inviting and conciliatory facilities, in the hope that _a little time given for cooling_ would confirm a perpetual peace. If I were permitted to be the mediator, I should certainly propose the truce for twenty years; but if no more than ten years could be obtained, I would certainly not refuse such a ground of pacification and treaty. I refer you to several of my letters two or three years ago, for the justification of my sentiments on that head.

Another point; look at all my letters since 1778, and see if I have at any time suggested any breach of treaty or of honor; on the contrary, I think a faithless nation, if exterminated, would not deserve the pity of mankind. I speak of all I know in the treaty between America and France, and what I think reasonable upon the case itself. If America is further bound than we know of, they must abide by it. I speak to the apparent and public foundation of the treaty, article second, with the provision of _tacitly_, from article eighth; and now I refer you to my letter to you, as long ago as April 10th, 1779; "If beyond this essential and directed end, and upon grounds totally unconnected with that alliance, not upon motives of magnanimity _for the relief of an innocent people_, but from distinct and unconnected motives of private European sentiments, America should be dragged into the consequence of a general European war, she may apply to France the apostrophe of the poet, speaking in the person of Helen to Paris, _non hoc pollicitus tuæ_." You see, therefore, that our sentiments have been uniform, and as I think, reasonable, because I still remain in those sentiments.

Suppose, for instance, (and you may call it the case of a straw if you please) that Great Britain and France should continue the war for ten years, on the point of a commissary at Dunkirk, aye or no;--would it be _reasonable_, or a _casus foederis_, that America should be precluded from a separate treaty for ten years, and therefore involved in the consequential war, after the _essential and direct ends_ of the treaty of February 6th, 1778, were accomplished? As far as my judgment goes, upon the knowledge of such facts as are public, I should think it was neither _reasonable_ nor a _casus foederis_. This is the breviate of the argument, in which there is no thought or suggestion of any breach of faith or honor. I did conclude that France was disposed to give their _consent_, because Mr Alexander informed me so, and because I thought it reasonable that France should consent, and reasonable that America should enjoy the benefit of that consent. I transmitted it to Lord North, as a proposition temperate and pacific on the part of America, and consented to by their allies, and on no other ground did I transmit or propose it. All that your letter tells me, is, "that America will not break with her allies, and that her Commissioners will not entertain such a thought;" but give me leave to add, that they, as honest men, cannot disdain such a thought more than I do; every honest man ought to disdain the office, or the thought of proposing a breach of faith to them. I have often told you, that such an office or such a thought shall never be mine.

But you have not told me that France would not be disposed to consent to a separate treaty of peace, for that ally whose peace was the original declared object of the alliance, in the case supposed, viz. of certain supposed or real punctillios between two proud and belligerent nations, which might possibly involve America for years in a war totally unconnected with the objects of the alliance. Besides, if any rubs should occur in the road to a general peace, France is too proud a nation to say, that beyond the _policy_ of contributing to the separation of America from Great Britain in any contest of rivalship, they cannot meet their rivals in war, without the assistance of America. I cannot conceive that the Minister of a great belligerent nation could entertain such a thought, as affecting their own sense of honor, or be so unreasonable to their allies, as to withhold consent to their peace, when _the essential and direct ends_ of the alliance were satisfied. Observe, I do not contend against a general peace; on the contrary, I mean to recommend the most prudent means for producing it. But, as an anxious lover of peace, I feel terrors which dismay me, and I consider the dangers which may obstruct a general peace, arising from the pride and prejudices of nations, which are not to be controlled in their heat by arguments of reason or philosophy.

Can any man in reason and philosophy tell me, why any two nations in the world are called natural enemies, as if it were the ordinance of God and nature? I fear it is too deeply engraved in the passions of man, and for that reason I would elude and evade the contest with such passions. I would strew the road to peace with flowers, and not with thorns. _Haughty_, and _dictating_, and _commands_, are no words of mine; I abhor them, and I fear them. I would elude their force by gentle means, and step by step. In article eighth, there are the following words; "By the treaty or treaties that shall terminate the war." Let us have one treaty begun, and I think the rest would follow. I fear when contending passions are raised, lest we should lose all by grasping at too much.

_January 25th._ I have just seen Mr Alexander, and have talked the matter over with him. I send you a copy of his sentiments upon it, which, for the sake of avoiding further mistakes, he committed to paper, and which, I think, justify me in saying, that I understood from him, that France was _disposed to give their consent_, as he _explained_ it to me, and as I explained it to the Minister. He did not say, nor did I understand him to say, that he was _authorised_ by the French Ministry, or by any one else, to declare that France had bound herself to consent, or that any such requisition had been made to her; but that it was his opinion that France would consent, and that I might proceed upon that presumption, so far as to recommend overtures of negotiation. Accordingly, the phrase of my letter to you is, that he _explained_ to me, _that their allies were disposed to consent_. You see what his opinion is on this day; and as you have not told me that France will consent, the _reasonable_ probability which still remains with me, for the hopes of opening an amicable treaty, remains as it did.

I could not delay saying thus by the very first mail, upon a point equally delicate to me as well as to yourself. My dear friend, I beg of you not to think, either that you can be considered as capable of entertaining, or that I should be capable of suggesting any unworthy or dishonorable propositions. If there has been any misunderstanding, it is now cleared up; and the ground for negotiation remains open as before. I therefore still entertain my hopes.

I am ever your affectionate,
D. HARTLEY.

* * * * *

_Explanatory Letter to Mr Hartley, referred to in the preceding._

Dear Sir,

As I had not the opportunity of seeing your correspondence at this time, I was unable to prevent the misunderstanding that seems to have arisen. There is no proposition of which I am more convinced, than that, "Nothing can be done without the concurrence of allies." But, as the chief obstruction towards an accommodation seemed to me to lie in the personal character of some, who have great weight in this matter, and as the object of the war (the independence of America) seems, in the opinion of all men, to be secured, my own opinion was, and still is, that there was so much wisdom and moderation where prejudice prevents us from seeing it, that, provided the ends of the war are accomplished to the satisfaction of all parties, they will be very ready to let us out of it in the most gentle manner, by consenting equally that the business shall go on in one, two, or three separate deeds, as shall be most palatable here; and to doubt that our friends are desirous of finishing the contest, with the approbation of their allies, is to doubt their understanding.

I am, with the greatest esteem, yours, &c.

W. ALEXANDER.

* * * * *

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO B. FRANKLIN.

Philadelphia, January 26th, 1782.

Dear Sir,

I do myself the honor to enclose you a convention for the establishment of Consul, which has just passed Congress. You will find that you are empowered either to sign it in France, or if any alterations are made to send it here to be executed.

Nothing new since I wrote you; we are still in the dark with respect to European intelligence, not having heard from any gentleman in public character since the 5th of October, when we had a short letter from Mr Carmichael.

I have the honor to be, Sir, with great respect and esteem, your most obedient humble servant.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON, SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Passy, January 28th, 1782.

Sir,

I received at the same time, your several letters of October 20th, 24th, and November 26th, which I purpose to answer fully by the return of the Alliance. Having just had a very short notice of the departure of this ship, I can only at present mention the great pleasure your appointment gives me, and my intention of corresponding with you regularly and frequently, as you desire. The information contained in your letters is full and clear; I shall endeavor that mine, of the state of affairs here, may be as satisfactory.

With great esteem, &c.

B. FRANKLIN.

* * * * *

DAVID HARTLEY TO B. FRANKLIN.

London, February 1st, 1782.

My Dear Friend,

I write to you one line by this mail, only to tell you that I have seen the Minister since I last wrote to you, and that he never did entertain the idea one moment of any propositions being thrown out on your part, in the least degree inconsistent with the strictest honor and faith to the allies. I had no occasion to guard against, or to explain any such thought, having at all times conveyed the contrary to him in the most explicit terms. I transmit this to you for your full satisfaction. We have had much conversation on the subject of peace, which you may be sure I have most zealously endeavored to enforce. I should not do him justice, if I did not add that I believe his wishes are for peace, and that he gives the most serious attention to every argument, and to the suggestion of every practicable means on that subject. I have stated many things for his consideration, and for consultation with others, after which I shall see him again. I heartily wish the result may be favorable to the prospect of peace.

I am ever your affectionate,
DAVID HARTLEY.

* * * * *

THE DANISH MINISTER TO THE COUNT DE VERGENNES.

Translation.

Paris, February 6th, 1782.