Chapter IX: Russia in the Napoleonic Epoch (3)

Schladen informs us that all those who were about the king of Prussia had so completely lost courage, that Von Hardenberg, Von Stein, Von Schladen himself, and many others who recommended perseverance, found none upon whom they could reckon. With respect to the Russians, he informs us that there was a party who assumed a threatening aspect--that the army was dissatisfied with the war--that the grand duke Constantine behaved often very rudely towards the Prussians, and allowed himself to be used as an instrument for working on the fears of his brother Alexander. On the 7th of June, the emperor manifested a disposition altogether contrary to the agreements and partition-projects of the convention of Bartenstein. He was dissatisfied with England, and perceived that the Austrians had no other object than to fish in troubled water, and he was, therefore, desirous, as much as possible, to withdraw from the whole affair. He proposed a truce for himself, with a clause that the Prussians also should obtain a cessation of hostilities; but the Russians and Prussians were to negotiate each for themselves respecting the conditions. Napoleon having entertained the proposal, Russia agreed, that during the continuance of the truce, the French should retain possession of the whole of Poland, except the circle of Bielostok. The agreement was signed on the 21st, and a four weeks’ notice of the renewal of hostilities was reserved. By the terms of the truce granted to Prussia, the French remained in possession of the whole kingdom; and the few fortresses which were not yet reduced were not to be supplied either with new works, ammunition, or provisions. Blücher, who commanded the Prussian auxiliary forces in Pomerania, was to leave the king of Sweden to his fate. The peace was to be negotiated at Tilsit, and for that purpose one half of the town was to be declared neutral.[k]

_Meeting of Alexander and Napoleon at Tilsit (1807 A.D.)_

Napoleon desired, as far as means and powers would allow, to give all possible pomp and solemnity to the interview with his mighty adversary. With this object, in the middle of the Niemen, opposite Tilsit, a raft was constructed, on which were two pavilions, covered in white cloth. The one which was destined for the two monarchs was of vaster dimensions and was adorned with all possible luxury; the other and smaller one was for their suites. On the frontals of the pavilions were painted in green, on the Russian side, an enormous A, and on the side turned towards Tilsit an N of equal size. To the annoyance of the Prussians, the monogram of Frederick William III was absent from the decorations of the Niemen raft. The French guards were ranged in lines, fronting the river. “All this army,” writes an eye-witness, “awaited the appearance of their invincible leader, their thunder-bearing semi-divinity, in order to greet him at the moment of his swift passage to the wharf.” Thousands of the inhabitants of Tilsit and French soldiers covered the high left bank of the Niemen.

The emperors got into the boats simultaneously. When both boats put off, the grandeur of the spectacle, the expectation of an event of world-wide importance took the ascendency over all other feelings. Universal attention was concentrated upon the boat that carried that wonderful man, that leader of armies, the like of whom had never been seen or heard of since the times of Alexander the Great and Julius Cæsar. Napoleon stood on the boat in front of his suite, solitary and silent, his arms folded on his breast as he is represented in pictures. He wore the uniform of the Old Guard and the ribbon of the Legion of Honour across his shoulder, and on his head that little historical hat, the form of which has become famous throughout the world. Reaching the raft somewhat sooner than Alexander, Napoleon rapidly got onto it, and hastened to meet the emperor. The rivals embraced and silently entered the pavilion, accompanied by the joyful acclamations of the troops and the inhabitants, who were witnesses of a world-wide event--the reconciliation of Russia and France. At that moment a large boat put off from the left bank of the Niemen, having on it about twenty armed soldiers--and remained between the raft and the Russian shore. Evidently Napoleon did not hesitate to take open measures of safeguarding against any possible unforeseen occurrences.

That day the king of Prussia did not assist at the interview: Napoleon did not wish to see him, and Frederick William remained on the right bank of the Niemen. “In that fateful hour, whilst the destiny of his monarchy was being decided, his gaze was constantly fixed and his ear directed towards the raft, as though he desired to listen to the conversation between the two emperors. Once he went down to the edge of the river and only stopped when the water was up to his horse’s middle.” The first interview between Alexander and Napoleon lasted an hour and fifteen minutes. “I detest the English no less than you do,” were the first words of the emperor Alexander, “and I am ready to support you in everything that you undertake against them.” “If such is the case,” answered Napoleon, “then everything can be arranged and peace secured.”

Taking advantage of Alexander’s inimical disposition towards Great Britain, Napoleon entered upon a terrible philippic against the perfidy of Albion, representing it as a greedy, extortionate nation ever ready to sacrifice everyone, even its most faithful allies, for its own profit. In further conversation Napoleon strove to instil into Alexander that he was victimised by his allies, that he was mistaken in protecting the Germans, those ungrateful and envious neighbours, and in supporting the interests of a set of greedy merchants who showed themselves to be the representatives of England; all this was occasioned, according to him, by a feeling of generosity carried to excess, and by doubts which arose from the incapacity or corruption of ministers. After this Napoleon began to praise the valour and bravery of the Russian troops, with which he had been much struck at Austerlitz, Eylau, and Friedland; he considered that the soldiers on both sides had fought like veritable Titans and was of the opinion that the united armies of Russia and France might dominate the world, and give to it prosperity and tranquillity. Up till now Russia had squandered her forces, without having any recompense in view; by an alliance with France she would acquire glory, and in any case reap substantial advantages. Of course Russia was bound by certain obligations to Prussia, and in that respect it was indispensable that the honour of the emperor Alexander should be carefully guarded. In conclusion Napoleon expressed his intention of restoring to Prussia sufficient territory honourably to rid the emperor of his ally; after that, he affirmed, the Russian cabinet would be in a position to pursue a fresh line of policy similar in everything to that of the great Catherine. Only such a policy, in Napoleon’s opinion, could be possible and advantageous for Russia.

Having flattered Alexander as emperor, Napoleon in order to complete the charm proceeded to flatter him as a man. “We shall come to an agreement sooner,” said he, “if we enter upon negotiations without intermediaries, setting aside ministers, who frequently deceive or do not understand us; we two together shall advance matters more in a single hour than our intermediaries in several days. Nobody must come between you and me; I will be your secretary and you shall be mine,” added Napoleon. Upon this basis he proposed to the emperor Alexander for convenience’s sake to transfer the negotiations to Tilsit, declaring the position of the town to be a central one. The emperor gladly accepted Napoleon’s invitation, and it was settled that negotiations should at once be entered upon in order to come to a definitive agreement[55] on the matter.[g]

RUSSIA DECLARES WAR AGAINST ENGLAND (1807 A.D.)

The English government, alleging that in the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, of which they had possessed themselves, they had proof of Napoleon’s design to seize the Danish fleet, fitted out an expedition against Denmark with extraordinary celerity. Copenhagen was bombarded for three days, and a great part of the city destroyed. The Danes then capitulated (September 7), and surrendered their fleet to the English, with all their naval stores in their arsenals and dockyards.

The expedition against Copenhagen was soon followed by a declaration of war on the part of Russia against England. In the manifesto published on this occasion (September 16th), Alexander complained bitterly of the bad faith of England, as manifested especially in the little aid she had afforded to the allies who had taken up arms in a cause in which she was more directly interested than any other power, and in the robber-like act of aggression she had committed against Denmark. He annulled all former conventions between Russia and England, especially that of 1801; proclaimed anew the principle of the armed neutrality; and declared that there should be no communication between the two powers until Denmark had received just compensation, and peace was concluded between France and England. In consequence of this declaration, an embargo was laid on all the English vessels in Russian ports, and Prussia was compelled to follow this example.

THE CONQUEST OF FINLAND (1807 A.D.)

It was not till the 6th of October that a formal demand was made upon Sweden to close the ports of the Baltic against English ships and trade. The king persevered in his alliance with England; and finally, because the emperor of Russia had conferred upon Napoleon the order of St. Andrew, he sent back his insignia; whereupon Alexander not only returned his Swedish order, but quietly adopted measures to take possession of Finland, whilst the Danes were preparing, in concert with the French, to invade the western provinces of Sweden. Although in the months of November and December, Gustavus repeatedly declined the proposals of the Russians for a union against England, everything went on in Sweden as in times of the most profound peace; and even when the Russian forces were collected on the very frontiers of Finland, the unfortunate king adopted no measures of defence whatever. On the 21st of January he was, for the last time, called upon to declare war against England; he replied by concluding a new alliance with her on the 8th of February. On the 21st, the Russians invaded Finland, without any specific declaration of war, and on the 14th of March, 1808, Denmark declared war against Sweden. The whole of Finland as far as Vasa, the island of Åland, and even the islands of Gotland, Åbo, Sveaborg, and all the fortresses, were taken possession of by the Russians even before the Swedish army and fleet were prepared. It was not till the end of April and beginning of May that a Swedish army under Klingspor and Aldercreutz, supported by a Swedish fleet, appeared in the field, and fought with various success.

We have lately seen Alexander take military possession of the Danubian provinces as a “material guarantee,” whilst affecting not to be at war with Turkey. This was in exact conformity with Russian precedents. Finland, as we have said, was occupied without a declaration of war; but manifestoes were issued by General Buxhövden, one of which contained the following passage: “Good neighbours, it is with the greatest regret that my most gracious master, the emperor of all the Russias, sees himself forced to send into your country the troops under my orders. But his majesty the king of Sweden, whilst withdrawing more and more from the happy alliance of the two greatest empires in the world, draws closer his connections with the common enemy, whose oppressive system and unparalleled conduct towards the most intimate allies of Russia and of Sweden herself cannot be coolly endured by his imperial majesty. These motives, as well as the regard which his imperial majesty owes to the safety of his own states, oblige him to place your country under his protection, and to take possession of it in order to procure by these means a sufficient guarantee in case his Swedish majesty should persevere in the resolution not to accept the equitable conditions of peace that have been proposed to him, etc.”

When the Russians took possession of Finland, the king gave them a pretence for incorporating it with their empire, which, however, they would no doubt have done in any case. He caused Alopeus, the Russian ambassador, to be arrested. This took place on the 3rd of March, and on the 25th a declaration was published on the part of the emperor of Russia, announcing to all the powers that “from that moment he regards the part of Finland hitherto reputed Swedish, and which his troops had only been able to occupy after divers battles, as a province conquered by his arms, and that he unites it forever to his empire.”

It was easy to anticipate that the superior force of the Russians must in the end prevail; although the Russian garrison in Gotland, and that in the island of Åland, were at first taken prisoners, the island occupied, and the Russians beaten by land at Vasa on the 26th of July, and by sea at Roggerwick on the 26th of August. The Swedes lost all the advantages they had thus gained by the bloody battle fought at Ormais on the 14th of September, and by the defeat at Lokalar on the 18th. The Russian generals, probably in order to give courage to the malcontents, who were very numerous in Sweden, issued orders not to receive any letters or any flags of truce which were sent in the king’s name, and carried on negotiations with the Swedish generals alone, for a suspension of arms, which was concluded for an indefinite time, on the 20th of September, but only continued till the 27th of October, when the Russians resumed hostilities, and the Swedes were driven to the north, across the Kemistrom. On the 20th of November a new truce was agreed upon between the Swedish general Adlercreutz and the Russian general Kamenskoi, with the reserve of fourteen days’ notice before renewal of operations. By the conditions of this agreement the Swedes were to evacuate the whole of Uleåborg, and to retire completely behind the Kemistrom, with all their artillery, arms, and stores.

On the 13th of March in the following year a revolution was effected in Sweden, by which Gustavus was deposed; his uncle, the duke of Södermanland, became regent, and was afterwards proclaimed king (June 5, 1809) under the title of Charles XIII. At Stockholm the people flattered themselves that the dethronement of Gustavus would speedily bring peace to Sweden; but it was not so. Alexander refused to treat with a government so insecure as a regency, and hostilities continued. General Knorring who had passed the Gulf of Bothnia on the ice with twenty-five thousand Russians, took possession of the Åland islands, and granted the Swedes a cessation of hostilities, to allow them time to make overtures of peace. Apprised of this arrangement, Barclay de Tolly, who had crossed the gulf with another body of Russians towards Vasa, and taken possession of Umeå, evacuated west Bothnia, and returned to Finland. A third Russian army, under Shuvalov penetrated into west Bothnia by the Torneå route, and compelled the Swedish army of the north under Gripenberg to lay down their arms (March 25th). This sanguinary affair occurred entirely through ignorance; because in that country, lying under the 66th degree of north latitude, they were not aware of the armistice granted by Knorring. On the expiry of the truce, hostilities began again in May, and the Russians took possession of the part of west Bothnia lying north of Umeå.

The peace between Russia and Sweden was signed at Frederikshamm on the 17th of September. The latter power adhered to the continental system, reserving to herself the importation of salt and such colonial produce as she could not do without. She surrendered Finland, with the whole of east Bothnia, and a part of west Bothnia lying eastward of the river Torneå. The cession of these provinces, which formed the granary of Sweden and contained a population of 900,000 souls, was an irreparable loss to that kingdom which had only 2,344,000 inhabitants left. In the following year Bernadotte, prince of Ponte Corvo, was elected crown prince of Sweden, and eventual successor to the throne, under the name of Charles John.

The loss of Finland had been but slightly retarded by some advantages gained over the Russian fleet by the combined squadrons of England and Sweden. The Russian vessels remained blockaded on the coast of Esthonia, but in an unassailable position, from which they were at last delivered by the weather and the exigencies of navigation in those dangerous seas. Another Russian fleet under Admiral Siniavin, which sailed to Portugal to co-operate with the French against the English, was obliged to surrender to Admiral Cotton after the convention of Cintra. It was afterwards restored to Russia. The war declared by that power against England in 1807, was little more than nominal, and was marked by no events of importance.

WAR WITH PERSIA AND WITH TURKEY

The annexation of Georgia to Russia, effected as we have seen, in the beginning of Alexander’s reign, drew him into a war with Persia, which did not terminate until 1813. The principal events of that war were the defeat of the Persians at Etchmiadzin by Prince Zitzianov (June 20, 1804); the conquest of the province of Shirvan by the same commander (January, 1806); the taking of Derbent by the Russians (July 3rd); and the defeat of the Persians by Paulucci, at Alkolwalaki (September 1st, 1810).

About 1805 the condition of the Ottoman Empire, badly organised and worse governed, was such that everything presaged its approaching dissolution. Everywhere the sultan’s authority was disregarded. Paswan Oglu, pasha of Widdin, was in open revolt. Ali Pasha of Janina was obedient only when it suited his convenience. Djezzar, the pasha of Syria, without declaring himself an enemy to the Porte, enjoyed an absolute independence. The sect of the Wahhabees was in possession of Arabia. After the departure of the English from Egypt, first the beys, and afterwards Muhammed Ali reigned over that country, and only paid their yearly tribute to the sultan when they pleased. In Servia, Czerni George was making himself independent prince of the Slavonians of the Danube. Ipsilanti and Morusi, both Greeks, by the permission, or rather by the command of Russia, were appointed hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia, for seven years at least, and were therefore rather subjects of the Russians than of the Turks. Selim III, who had reigned since 1789, convinced that the Porte could never re-establish its authority except by better organising the army, had endeavoured to model it on the European system. This attempt afterwards cost him his throne.

The English and Russian ambassadors ruled either alternately or together in Constantinople. But for their interference the old friendship between France and the Porte would most likely have been restored in July, 1802. At the time of the foundation of the empire in France, the sultan hesitated long whether he would lean upon the English and Russian, or upon the French influence, for he felt a great want of confidence in Napoleon, since he had been informed by the English of the language which fell from the emperor in conversation with Lord Whitworth. He was reported to have taken the partition of Turkey for granted--as a thing unavoidable; and that on such partition the province of Egypt ought necessarily to fall to the share of France. This conversation was printed, in 1803, among the documents connected with the renewal of the war between England and France, and was communicated to the sultan. The French, indeed, in their official journals, contradicted the allegation; but who ever put any faith in their official journals?

On this ground we must explain the fact that the Turks favoured the Russians in the war which they were carrying on with the Persians; suffered them to sail up the Rion (ancient Phasis), and even to build a fort at its mouth. They were even desirous of renewing the friendly alliance formed with Russia in 1798, which renewal, indeed, the emperor of Russia was afterwards unwilling to confirm, because the English had taken care to have the inviolability of the Turkish Empire incorporated in the treaty of 1798. Had, therefore, the emperor of Russia ratified the alliance, he would have guaranteed to the Turks the actual condition of their empire in Europe, which he did not wish to do. This excited the suspicion of the Turks, who inclined more and more towards the French, and did not suffer themselves to be frightened by the threats of the English and Russians. Immediately after the Peace of Presburg, the Turks, who had previously acknowledged Napoleon’s empire, sent a new ambassador to Paris. In return, Napoleon sent engineers, officers, artillerymen, workmen, and materials, in order to enable the sultan to improve his army, artillery, and the bulwarks of his empire; whilst, on the other hand, the Russian ambassador, Italinski, and the English ambassador, Arbuthnot, threatened war if the alliance with the French was not relinquished; and Italinski’s threats fell with a double weight because a corps of Russians were ready for action on the Bug.

About the time at which Napoleon adopted the resolution of attacking Prussia also, and therefore foresaw a war with Russia, a Turkish army was assembled to take the field against the Russians on the Turkish frontiers, and Napoleon clearly saw how advantageous to him a war between the Russians and the Turks would be. He therefore sent General Sébastiani as ambassador extraordinary to Constantinople. Sébastiani arrived there in August, 1806; and soon gained so great an influence that for some time the Divan was entirely under his direction. At his instance it refused to renew the treaty of alliance with England, which was on the point of expiring; and it dismissed Ipsilanti and Morusi, as creatures of Russia, from their offices. In consequence of the threatening language held by Arbuthnot, the English ambassador, they were reinstated; but when this took place hostilities had already begun. The emperor Alexander had ordered General Michelson to enter Moldavia and Wallachia. The Porte then declared war against Russia (December 30th); but deviating for the first time from a barbarous custom, it allowed Italinski, the Russian minister, to depart unmolested.

A few days afterwards, Arbuthnot quitted Constantinople, after having repeatedly demanded the renewal of the alliance and the expulsion of Sébastiani. On the 19th of February, 1807, an English fleet, commanded by Vice-Admiral Duckworth, forced the passage of the Dardanelles, and appeared before Constantinople. Duckworth demanded of the Divan that the forts of the Dardanelles and the Turkish fleet should be surrendered to him; that the Porte should cede Moldavia and Wallachia to Russia, and break off alliance with Napoleon. But instead of profiting by the sudden panic which his appearance had excited, he allowed the Turks time to put themselves in a posture of defence. Encouraged and instructed by Sébastiani, they made their preparations with such energy and success that in the course of eight days the English vice-admiral found that he could not do better than weigh anchor and repass the Dardanelles.

Shortly afterwards Admiral Siniavin appeared in the Archipelago, and incited the Greek islanders to throw off the Turkish yoke; whilst Duckworth sailed to Egypt upon a fruitless expedition in favour of the mameluke beys against Muhammed Ali. Siniavin defeated the Turkish fleet on the 4th of April, captured several ships, and took possession of some islands. The bad condition of his ships, however, compelled him to give up the blockade of the Dardanelles, and to retire, in order to refit, after having another time defeated the Turkish fleet. Meanwhile, Selim had been deposed. His successor, Mustapha IV, declared that he would continue to prosecute the war with England and Russia. But Siniavin, before he retired to refit, met the Turkish fleet off Lemnos, on the 1st of July: the Turks were beaten, lost several ships, and a great many men.

The campaign of the Russians on the Danube, in 1807, was not productive of any decisive result, as General Michelson received orders to detach the third army corps to oppose the French in Poland, Czerni George, the leader of the revolted Servians, took Belgrade, Shabatz, and Nish, penetrated into Bulgaria, where he was reinforced by some Russian troops, and gained divers signal advantages. The war was conducted with more success on the frontiers of the two empires in Asia. The seraskier of Erzerum was entirely defeated by General Gudovitch (June 18); and that victory was the more important, as it prevented the Persians from making a bold diversion in favour of the Turks.

The emperor Alexander had agreed by the public articles of the Treaty of Tilsit (July, 1807) to evacuate Moldavia and Wallachia; but this was only a collusion between the two contracting parties. The Russians not only aimed at the permanent possession of the two provinces, but regarded all the Slavonians of the Danube as allies or subjects of the czar. When the Turks, on the 14th of July, concluded a peace with Czerni George, whereby Servia became in some measure independent--and Czerni George afterwards called himself prince of Servia--a Russian general guaranteed the treaty by his signature, as one of the parties to the agreement. In the following year Radovinikin, a Russian envoy, repaired to Belgrade to establish the new principality; called an assembly of the nobles; drew up a sketch of a constitution for Servia, and tried to organise the administration.

The French general, Guilleminot, was sent to the Turkish camp to negotiate a truce on the terms ostensibly laid down in the Treaty of Tilsit: namely, that the Russians should evacuate Moldavia and Wallachia, but that the Turks should not occupy the two provinces until after the conclusion of a definitive peace. But Guilleminot’s instructions contained a direct command to use the whole weight of the French influence in favour of the Russians and against the Turks; even one of Napoleon’s greatest admirers, although owning occasional republican scruples, admits that their tone was very equivocal. In fact, it very soon became obvious that the whole mission of the general was a mere piece of diplomatic imposture and treachery. A congress was held at Slobozia, in the neighbourhood of Giurgevo, on the 24th of August, 1807, and a truce was signed, which, it was said, was to continue till the 30th of April, 1808. The Russians were to withdraw; the fortresses of Ismail, Braila, and Giurgevo to be given up to the Turks, whose troops, however, were to evacuate Moldavia and Wallachia in thirty-five days. Everything, however, which afterwards took place in consultation between the French and Russians, in reference to Turkey, bore upon a scheme of partition.

The Russians at length, on the 7th of August, had left Cattaro and the other strong places in Dalmatia to the French; their emperor, on the 9th, had ceded all his rights as protector of the republic of the seven united islands to Napoleon, and the latter was busy making preparations thence to extend his operations and his dominion further to the east. Marmont, who administered the province of Dalmatia, received orders to fortify Ragusa more strongly, and to make a report on the best plan to be adopted in case it should be desirable to send an army quickly from Corfu, through Albania, Macedonia, and Thrace. The Russians continued to be quiet observers of all this, and in the mean time made firm their footing in the provinces on the Danube. They made a pretence of the conduct of the Turks on the occupation of Galatz, and their ill-treatment of the inhabitants of Moldavia, for not fulfilling the agreement entered into at Slobozia. The Russian troops, who, according to the terms of the treaty, were already retiring, received contrary orders; and the Turks, again driven out of the two provinces, occupied Galatz anew.

The conduct of the negotiation respecting the division of the Turkish booty, was committed to the chief of Napoleon’s secret police, who had been actively engaged in the murder of the duke d’Enghien. He now held a princely rank as the duke of Rovigo, and was sent to St. Petersburg with this and similar commissions. In the Russian capital the emperor Alexander and the duke acted as rivals in the art of dissimulation; the emperor loaded him with civilities of all kinds, as some compensation for the coolness and contempt with which he was at first treated, to a surprising extent, by the empress-mother and the Russian nobility. He was, indeed, soon consoled, for the slaves of the czar were as zealous in showing respect in the presence of their master, as they were gross in their insolence when not under his observation. The accounts which Savary gives us of the political principles of the pious emperor and his chancellor, and their complete agreement with Napoleon’s morality and his own, would be quite incredible to us, did he not literally quote their words. Savary’s secret report to the emperor Napoleon, partly written in the form of a dialogue, is to be found among the fragments of Napoleon’s unprinted correspondence. A contempt for public agreements, and the plunder of Sweden, even before the declaration of war, astonish us less than Romanzov’s audacious contempt of the opinion of all Europe; he thought it not worth a moment’s consideration; and this was quite in accordance with the language held by his master in speaking on the subject of Turkey. Thibaudeau has given so correct an opinion of both the emperors--of the nature of their consultations--of Savary and Romanzov that we cannot do better than refer the reader to the words of that writer.

Turkey would at that time undoubtedly have been partitioned, had Austria been willing to follow the numerous gentle hints to join the alliance of the emperors, who imagined themselves able to make their will the right and law of all nations; or if Napoleon had not found it inconsistent with his plans to bring on at an unfavourable moment a new war with Austria, which he clearly foresaw in 1808. The Russians, in the mean time, remained, throughout the whole of the year 1808, in quiet possession of the provinces which had been previously evacuated by them, and ruled not only in them, but extended their dominion as far as Belgrade, for the new prince of Servia was likewise under Russian protection. The army under the command of the grand vizir, which lay at Adrianople during the winter of 1807-1808, dwindled, during the continuance of the truce of Slobozia, to a few thousand men, because, according to ancient custom, the janissaries returned to their homes in winter; it again increased, however, in the beginning of summer. Bairaktar’s army, which was organised on the new European principle, was computed at from twenty to thirty thousand men; it remained on the Danube till its leader, at length, resolved to put an end to the anarchy prevailing in Constantinople. He deposed Mustapha IV, who supported the faction of the janissaries, and placed his brother, Mahmud, on the throne. Bairaktar perished, however, in an insurrection (November 14th), and Mahmud, too, would have been murdered, had he not been the last scion of the imperial family. But he was compelled entirely to change his ministry, and to resign the government into the hands of those who enjoyed the favour of the ulemas and the janissaries.

During the disturbances in the internal affairs of the Turkish Empire, the foreign relations continued the same as they were in the year 1807, immediately after the truce of Slobozia. When Napoleon’s plan of removing the negotiations respecting a peace between the Russians and the Turks to Paris failed of success, he found it advisable, in consequence of an impending war with Austria, to give the Turks into the hands of the Russians. One of the chief causes of the war between France and Austria in 1809 was the close union between the latter power and England in reference to Turkish affairs, which appeared in the co-operation of Lord Paget and Baron von Stürmer, the English and Austrian ambassadors in Constantinople. It was the Austrians who mediated the peace between England and the Porte of the 5th of January, 1809, after the conclusion of which the Turks refused to cede Moldavia and Wallachia to the Russians, at the congress of Jassy, as they had formerly done at Bucharest. This led to a new war, of which we shall have to speak hereafter.

CONGRESS OF ERFURT (1808 A.D.)

[Sidenote: [1808 A.D.]]

In consequence of the complete stoppage of trade which followed the declaration of war in 1807, Russia suffered much more severely than England, and the Russian magnates, supported by the aversion of the emperor’s mother to Napoleon, were very far from showing that good-will to the French which their emperor manifested for Napoleon and his representatives. This was soon experienced by Savary, duke of Rovigo, who, though overloaded with marks of politeness by the emperor, in reality proved unable to make any way at the court of St. Petersburg. Caulaincourt, duke of Vicenza, was afterwards deceived for some years by appearances, and by Alexander’s masterly art of dissimulation; but Napoleon soon came to experience in Spain that the personal proofs of friendship exhibited by the emperor were by no means always in accordance with the Russian policy. The emperor Alexander himself, for example, on the urgent request of Caulaincourt, acknowledged Joseph Bonaparte as king of Spain; whilst Strogonov, the Russian ambassador in Madrid, alleged that he had no instructions to that effect, and corresponded with the insurgents. In the same way, Admiral Siniavin, who, on the breaking out of war with England, had taken refuge in Lisbon with nine ships of the line and a frigate, not only refused to render any assistance to Marshal Junot, who was threatened in that city by the English, but even to make a demonstration as if he were prepared to assist him. The manner in which he afterwards capitulated, on the 3rd of September, 1808, to Admiral Cotton, who caused his ships to be taken to England, might indicate a very different disposition, especially as the ten ships were afterwards given back.

There was, indeed, no want of interchange of civilities between the two emperors. Whoever compares the attentions and marks of regard which have been recorded as shown by the one to the other with the secret intrigues which they were at the same moment weaving against each other in Turkey and Spain, and with the open enmity which was shown as early as 1811, will learn from such a comparison what is the real worth of diplomatic and princely friendships. The emperor of Russia made presents to his imperial brother of vessels and ornaments of malachite and other precious stones, which the latter exhibited in the Salon du Prix in the Tuileries, in order to be able to boast of the friendship of the emperor of Russia in presence of the circles of the faubourg St. Germain. Busts of Alexander were manufactured in the imperial porcelain manufactory at Sèvres, and were everywhere to be seen in the palace and rooms of the imperial family. All who had access to the court, or wished to make themselves agreeable to the emperor, found it necessary to purchase these ornaments, and place them conspicuously in their houses. The friendship was so intimate that one of the emperor of Russia’s adjutants accompanied the emperor of the French when he went to Bayonne to set aside the whole reigning family of Spain. This adjutant, however, was the same Tchernitchev who was engaged in constantly travelling backwards and forwards between St. Petersburg and Paris, who surrounded Napoleon, in spite of all his police, with a net of Russian espionage, and bribed all the employés who were venal in order to obtain papers. He intrigued with ladies to elicit secrets from them; and finally, in 1812, he even purchased a copy of the plan of operations for the war, when it was too late to change it.

Napoleon knew that Austria was thinking of taking advantage of the general discontent and the secret associations in Germany to frustrate the plans of France and Russia with respect to Poland and Turkey; he was, therefore, very desirous of assuring himself once more of the Russian emperor before his journey to Spain. This design was a cause of great anxiety to the very numerous partisans of the English and Prussian policy at the Russian court, when the question was raised of a conference between the two emperors in Erfurt. Von Schladen, the friend of the minister von Stein, therefore presented a memorial to the emperor of Russia, shortly before his departure to Erfurt on the 7th of September, 1808, in which Alexander was forewarned of all that would take place there. From this it may be seen that the emperor of Russia was continually receiving secret counsel and warning from the enemies of the French, and that he played his part in Erfurt more ably than Napoleon, from whom he separated, as even the French writers report, with all the outward signs of indescribable friendship and esteem, but inwardly full of distrust. Von Schladen says very freely to the emperor, that he had given him the advice laid down in his memorial, “in order that he might see through the sophisms, falsehoods, and deceptions which were prepared for him by Napoleon, and awaited him in Erfurt.”

On his way to the congress, the emperor visited the king and queen of Prussia in Königsberg, and arrived on the 26th of September in Weimar, where his brother Constantine had been staying since the 24th. On the 27th Napoleon entered Erfurt, and at one o’clock drove out a distance of several miles from the town to meet the emperor of Russia, who was coming from Weimar. Our modest object does not permit us to incorporate in our prose the poetry of the subsequent festivities, nor in glowing language to extol the skill displayed by the masters of the ceremonies. That splendour enough was exhibited in Erfurt may be sufficiently gathered from the fact that the four vassal-kings of the confederation of the Rhine, thirty-four princes, twenty-four ministers of state, and thirty generals, were by express command to summon up for the occasion everything which imagination could suggest in the way of courtly splendour and extravagance. Talma and the Parisian company of actors had been sent to Erfurt, to act, as Napoleon said, before a pit of kings. Two armchairs were placed for the two emperors, whilst the other rulers sat behind them on common chairs. We know not what truth there was in the story, which was at that time in every mouth, and related in all the French works written for effect, that the emperor Alexander, whilst Talma was being applauded on the stage, played his own part with Napoleon in the pit in quite as masterly a manner. The latter, amidst applause, pronounced the following line:

The friendship of a great man is a favour of the gods.

when the emperor seized Napoleon’s hand, made a profound bow, and feelingly exclaimed: “That I have never more truly felt than at the present moment.” The festivities continued from the 27th of September till the 14th of October, and furnished to the Germans the most melancholy spectacle of their princes and nobles conducting themselves publicly, not only as slaves of Napoleon, but even as servants and flatterers of all his generals and courtiers.

In order to flatter the emperor of Russia, Napoleon acted as if he had been influenced by Alexander’s application in favour of Prussia; but in reality, oppressed the king and his subjects afterwards just as before. He profited by Alexander’s admiration and friendship to make a show of his pretended willingness to conclude a peace with England. Though he had written three times directly to the king of England, and had always been referred to the minister, he nevertheless prevailed upon Alexander to unite with him in signing another letter addressed to King George. The result was such as might have been foreseen; the object, however, was attained: the letters and answers were printed, and officially commented upon in the journals.

The negotiations were carried on personally in Erfurt between the two emperors themselves, and much was agreed upon which neither the one nor the other intended to observe. A written treaty of alliance was besides concluded by Romanzov and Champagny, which was calculated with a view to a new war with Austria. The substance of the agreement consists in a closer alliance of the two powers against England, and the cession of Moldavia and Wallachia to Russia. Hitherto Napoleon had only been willing to concede this last point on conditions which referred to Silesia. In the fifth article of the Treaty of Erfurt, which was kept strictly secret, the two emperors agreed to conclude a peace with England on condition only that that country should acknowledge Moldavia and Wallachia as a part of the Russian Empire. Then follow several articles on the cession of those Turkish provinces. In the eleventh article it is stated, that further negotiations were to be carried on respecting a further partition. It was agreed, too, that the treaty was to be kept secret for ten years. Buturlin boasts, with reason, that the emperor Alexander in Erfurt, by his Greco-Slavonian arts of deception, gained a victory over the Italo-Gallic talents of Napoleon; and, in fact, the very highest triumph is to outwit the deceiver.

Even as early as this Napoleon is said to have thrown out the idea of a marriage with Catherine Pavlovna, Alexander’s sister, which inferred, of course, a previous separation from the empress Josephine. Alexander, on his part, is said to have raised difficulties on the question of religion, and to have referred the matter to his mother, who very speedily had the princess betrothed to Duke Peter of Oldenburg. Moreover, the reception of the duke of Oldenburg into the confederation of the Rhine was one of the results of the meeting in Erfurt.

[Sidenote: [1809-1810 A.D.]]

The war which broke out in April, 1809, between France and Austria, put the sincerity of the Russo-French alliance to a practical test. Russia complied with the letter of her engagements to the one belligerent power by declaring war against the other; but Prince Galitzin, who was to have made a powerful diversion in Galicia, came so late into the field and his movements were so dilatory that it was evident he had no desire to contribute to the success of his sovereign’s ally. There was no longer any show of cordiality in the diplomatic intercourse between France and Russia; but both parties found it convenient for the present to dissemble their mutual alienation. By the Treaty of Schönbrunn, signed by vanquished Austria (October 14th, 1809), that power ceded, partly to France and partly to the confederation of the Rhine, several towns in Germany and Italy, with their dependencies; she was despoiled, in favour of the duchy of Warsaw, of all western Galicia and the city of Cracow; and surrendered to Russia a territory whose population was estimated at 400,000 souls. The emperor of Austria, moreover, recognised the rights which Napoleon arrogated over the monarchies of the south of Europe, adhered to his continental system, and renounced all the countries comprised under the name of the Illyrian Provinces. But the house of Habsburg, true to the adage, _Tu, felix Austria, nube_, retrieved its fortunes at the expense of its pride, by bestowing a daughter in marriage on the conqueror.

RENEWED WAR WITH TURKEY (1810 A.D.)

Immediately after Alexander’s return from Erfurt orders were given to open negotiations with the Turks. The conference took place at Jassy; but it was immediately broken off after the Russian plenipotentiaries had demanded, as preliminary conditions, the cession of Moldavia and Wallachia, and the expulsion of the British minister from Constantinople. Hostilities were then resumed. The Russians were commanded by Prince Prosorovski, and after his death by Prince Bagration. With the exception of Giurgevo, all the fortresses attacked by them fell into their hands, until they encountered the army of the grand vizir, near Silistria, and being defeated with a loss of ten thousand men (September 26th), were compelled to evacuate Bulgaria. The grand vizir, without taking advantage of his victory, retired to winter quarters.

In May, 1810, the Russian main army, under Kamenskoi, again crossed the Danube at Hirsova, passed through the Dobrudja, and marched straight against the Turkish main army to Shumla and Varna. At the same time, the corps of Generals Langeron and Sacken proceeded to blockade Silistria and Rustchuk. The Turks could nowhere keep the field. At Kavarna they were routed; at the storming of Bazardjik they lost ten thousand men; at the storming of Rasgrad three thousand. Silistria was reduced in seven days by Langeron. So far everything was favourable for the Russians. If they had added to their advantages the conquest of Rustchuk, the passes of Tirnova and of Sophia towards Adrianople would have been open, the fortress of Shumla would have been avoided, and the main army of the enemy would have been manœuvred out of it. The taking of Rustchuk, and above all the sparing of the troops, was consequently the next problem for General Kamenskoi. Instead of doing this, the Russians attempted to storm almost simultaneously the fortifications of Varna, Shumla, and Rustchuk, were repulsed from these three places, the defence of which was conducted by English officers, and suffered so enormously, that the Turks felt themselves strong enough to come out from behind their intrenchments, and attack the Russian camp before Shumla. They failed, however, in their attempt to storm it.

[Sidenote: [1810-1811 A.D.]]

To relieve Rustchuk, the grand vizir sent Mukhtar Pasha with picked troops, by way of Tirnova, to the Danube. But if the Turks with their united forces were too weak to force the Russians to abandon the intrenchments before Shumla, they could certainly not expect with a part of their army to rout the enemy near Rustchuk, where he stood with his united forces between their separate wings. Only in case Mukhtar Pasha, who had increased his forces to forty thousand men, entered Wallachia at Turna, and marched against Giurgevo, could the offensive have a meaning, or any influence, upon the siege of Rustchuk, because here it met with the weak point of the enemy. But to enter upon the offensive with an army in Wallachia, whilst the Russians stood before the fortresses of the Danube in Bulgaria, never came into the heads of the Turks. Mukhtar Pasha intrenched himself at the mouth of the Yantra to cover the passes of Tirnova and Sophia. On the 7th of September he was attacked in front, flank, and rear, held out with his best troops till the next morning, and then surrendered with five thousand men, and all his artillery. After this Sistovo and Cladova capitulated, and on the 27th of September Rustchuk and Giurgevo surrendered.

The road to Adrianople was now open for the Russians, but their enormous losses, caused by their own folly, would have prevented their assuming the offensive beyond the Balkan for this year, even if the season had not been so far advanced. Reinforcements for the next year could not be expected, as Napoleon was preparing to attack Russia, and therefore they began to negotiate. Another insurrection of the janissaries interrupted these negotiations, but did not induce the grand vizir to profit by this opportunity, and fall with his whole force upon the Russians, who, at this time, were scattered over the country from Widdin to Sophia and thence as far as Varna. Not until Czerni George, in February, 1811, had placed the principality of Servia under the protection of Russia, did the grand vizir awake from his apathy in Thrace, and cross the Balkan, with only fifteen thousand men. He, however, proceeded so slowly that Kamenskoi had time enough to assemble sufficient forces.

They met at Lofteh on the Osma; the Turks were defeated, and lost three thousand men. Achmed Pasha, however, a violent and sturdy soldier, without any higher military education, led fifty thousand fresh troops to Shumla, and insisted upon their taking the offensive. The Russians had received no reinforcements, but Kutusov had taken the command. Without any considerable losses, he concentrated his small army at Silistria and Rustchuk, and abandoned Bulgaria as far as the latter place, after having rased the fortresses. In the battle before Rustchuk, on the 4th of July, the Turks were driven back, but on the 7th, they forced the twenty thousand Russians who stood on the right bank of the Danube to give up Rustchuk also, though not until its works had been rased.

Instead of crossing the river from the Dobrudja, and operating with a superior force upon the Russian lines of communication, the grand vizir allowed himself to be induced, by the retreat of Kutusov, to cross the Danube at Rustchuk, without a fortress in his rear. Arrived on the left bank with his main army, a Russian flotilla barred his retreat, while Russian corps recrossed the Danube above and below Rustchuk, and took possession of the town (no longer fortified) and of the Turkish camp (September 7th). The grand vizir fled, but his main army, still consisting of 25,000 men and 56 pieces of artillery, was forced to surrender in the vicinity of Giurgevo. A few days afterwards Count St. Priest took Shirtov, with the whole of the Turkish flotilla on the Danube. Nicopoli and Widdin next surrendered, so that by the end of the campaign the Russians were masters of the whole right bank of the Danube. The Servians, also, aided by a body of Russians, had wrested from the Turks the last fortresses they held in the principality.

The grand vizir asked for a suspension of arms, with a view to negotiating a peace; but the terms now demanded by the victorious Russians were such as the Porte would not accede to. The war was continued in 1811, but always to the disadvantage of the Turks. Resolved on a last desperate effort, they assembled a formidable army whilst the conference at Bucharest was still pending. At last, the rupture between France and Russia changed the aspect of affairs, and compelled the latter power to abandon the long-coveted prey when it was already in its grasp. The Russian minister, Italinski, contented himself with requiring that the Pruth should for the future form the boundary between the two empires. The sultan regarded even this concession as disgraceful; but the Russians carried their point by bribery, and the Treaty of Bucharest was concluded. Its chief provisions were these:

Article 4. The Pruth, from the point where it enters Moldavia to its confluence with the Danube, and thence the left bank of the latter to its embouchure on the Black Sea at Kilia, shall be the boundary between the two empires. Thus the Porte surrendered to Russia a third of Moldavia, with the fortresses of Khoczim and Bender, and all Bessarabia, with Ismail and Kilia. By the same article, the navigation of the Danube is common to the subjects of Russia and Turkey. The islands enclosed between the several arms of the river below Ismail are to remain waste. The rest of Moldavia and Wallachia are to be restored to the Turks in their actual condition. Article 6. The Asiatic frontier remains the same as it was before the war. Article 8 relates to the Servians, to whom the Porte grants an amnesty and some privileges, the interpretation of which offers a wide field for the exercise of diplomatic subtlety. Article 13. Russia accepts the mediation of the Porte for the conclusion of a peace with Persia, where hostilities had begun anew, at the instigation of the English ambassador.

WAR WITH NAPOLEON

Notwithstanding all the demonstrations to the contrary made since the Peace of Tilsit, England, Russia, Prussia, and also Austria partially, always continued to maintain a certain mutual understanding, which was, however, kept very secret, and somewhat resembled a conspiracy. The most distinguished statesmen both in Russia and Prussia felt how unnatural was an alliance between Napoleon, Alexander, and Frederick William III, and directed attention to the subject. This was also done on the part of England, and it is certain that the emperor Alexander, as early as the meeting in Erfurt in 1808, expressed his doubts respecting the duration of his alliance with France. The conduct of Russia in the campaign against Austria, in 1809, first shook Napoleon’s confidence in his ally. Mutual complaints and recriminations ensued; but neither party thought it advisable to give any prominence to their disunion, and Napoleon, even when he had entered, through Thugut, upon the subject of an Austrian marriage, still continued to carry on negotiations for an alliance with a Russian princess.