Chapter II: Book XXXVII (2)

20. By chance, at this time, one thousand foot with one hundred horse came to Elæa from Achaia, Diophanes being commander of all these forces; whom, on their landing, persons, sent by Eumenes to meet them, conducted by night to Pergamus. Veterans they all were, well skilled in war; and their commander was a disciple of Philopœmen, the most consummate general among the Greeks in that age. They set apart two days to give rest to the men and horses, and, at the same time, to view the posts of the enemy, and to learn at what places, and what times, they advanced and retired. The king’s troops generally approached to the foot of the hill on which the town stands; so that the plundering in the rear was unimpeded, as not a man ever sallied out, even to throw darts from a distance, against their guards. After that they were once driven in, and with fear confined themselves within the walls, a contempt for them arises among the king’s troops, and consequently negligence. The greater number did not keep their horses either saddled or bridled; while few remained under arms, and in the ranks; the rest, slipping away, had scattered themselves every where over the entire plain, some diverting themselves with youthful sports and amusements, others eating in the shade, and some even stretched on the ground asleep. Diophanes, having observed all these particulars from the lofty city of Pergamus, ordered his men to take arms, and to be ready at a particular gate. He himself went to Attalus, and told him that he intended to attack the out-posts of the enemy. Attalus giving his consent with reluctance, as he saw that one hundred horse must fight against six hundred, one thousand foot against four thousand, Diophanes then marched out of the gate, and took post at a small distance from the enemy’s guard, waiting his opportunity. Both the people in Pergamus thought that it was madness rather than daring, and the enemy, after observing his party for a short time, as soon as they saw no movement among them, did not change their usual negligence, ridiculing moreover the smallness of their number. Diophanes for a long time kept his men quiet, as if they had been brought out merely for the purpose of looking about them; but as soon as he perceived that the enemy had quitted their ranks, ordering the infantry to follow as fast as they could, he himself, with his own troop, led the way at the head of the cavalry, and pushing on, with all possible speed, made a sudden charge on the enemy’s party, while a shout was raised by every horseman and footman at once. Not only were the men so attacked terrified, but the horses also; and when they broke their collars, they caused great confusion and tumult throughout. A few of the horses, indeed, stood unaffrighted; but even these the troopers could not easily saddle, or bridle, or mount; for the Achæans struck much greater terror than would be supposed from so small a party of horse. But now the infantry, in due order and preparation, assailed the enemy, dispersed through their own negligence, and almost half asleep; and slaughter and flight ensued in every part of the plain. Diophanes pursued the runaways as far as he could with safety, and then returned into garrison, after acquiring very great honour for the Achæan nation; for not only the men, but also the women, had been spectators from the walls of Pergamus.

21. Next day the enemy’s guard, in more regular and orderly condition, pitched their camp five hundred paces farther from the city, and the Achæans marched out at nearly the same time as before, and to the same place. During many hours, both parties intently awaited the assault, as if it were about to take place immediately. When it was not far from sun-set, the usual time of their returning to the main camp, the king’s troops, forming in close order, began to retire in a body, arranged for a march rather than for a battle. Diophanes did not stir until they were out of sight; and then he rushed on their rear-guard with the same vehemence as before, and again excited such dismay and confusion, that, though the hindmost were put to the sword, not one of them halted to fight; they were driven into their camp in confusion, and scarcely observing any order in their march. These daring exertions of the Achæans obliged Seleucus to decamp, and quit the territory of Pergamus. Antiochus, having learned that the Romans and Eumenes were come to protect Adramyttium, made no attempt on that city, but ravaged the country adjoining. He afterwards reduced Peræa, a colony of Mityleneans; Cotton, Corylenus, Aphrodisias, and Crene, were all taken at the first assault. He then returned through Thyatira to Sardis. Seleucus, remaining on the sea-coast, was a terror to one party, a protection to the other. The Roman fleet, with Eumenes and the Rhodians, retired, first to Mitylene, and then to Elæa, whence they had set out. On their way to Phocæa, they put in at an island called Bachius; it is near the city of Phocæa; and when they had plundered the temples and statues, which they had before spared, (for the island was surpassingly adorned with them,) they then passed over to the city. When they, having divided the quarters among themselves, assaulted it, and saw that it could not be taken by arms and scaling-ladders, without regular works; after that a reinforcement of three thousand soldiers, sent by Antiochus, had got into the city, they immediately broke up the siege, and the fleet retired to the island, without having effected any thing more than the devastation of the enemy’s country in the neighbourhood.

22. It was then resolved that Eumenes should return home, and make every necessary preparation for the passage of the consul and his army over the Hellespont; and that the Roman and Rhodian fleets should sail back to Samos, and remain stationed there, that Polyxenidas might not make any movement from Ephesus. The king returned to Elæa, the Romans and Rhodians to Samos. There, Marcus Æmilius, brother of the prætor, died. After his obsequies were performed, the Rhodians sailed, with thirteen of their own ships, one Coan, and one Cnidian quinquereme, to Rhodes, in order that they might take up a position there, against a fleet which was reported to be coming from Syria. Two days before the arrival of Eudamus and the fleet from Samos, another fleet of thirteen ships, under the command of Pamphilidas, had been sent out against the same Syrian fleet; and taking with them four ships, which had been left to protect Caria, they relieved from blockade Dædala, and several other fortresses of Peræa, which the king’s troops were besieging. It was determined that Eudamus should put to sea directly, and an addition of six undecked ships was made to his fleet. He accordingly set sail; and using all possible expedition, overtook the first squadron at a port called Magiste, from whence they proceeded in one body to Phaselis, resolving to wait there for the enemy.

23. Phaselis stands on the confines of Lycia and Pamphylia; it projects far into the sea, and is the first land seen by persons coming from Cilicia to Rhodes, and from hence ships can be seen at a great distance. For this reason, chiefly, this place was made choice of, that they may lie in the way of the enemy’s fleet. But in consequence of the unwholesomeness of the place, and of the season of the year, (for it was now the middle of summer,) and of the unusual stench, diseases began to spread with violence, particularly among the rowers, an event which they did not foresee. And having left the place from fear of this pestilence, when they were sailing by the Pamphylian bay, their fleet putting into port at the river Eurymedon, they hear from the people of Aspendus, that the enemy are now at Sida. The king’s fleet had been the slower in its passage, the season of the Etesiæ being opposed to them, for this is the periodical time for the north-west winds. The Rhodians had thirty-two quadriremes and four triremes. In the king’s fleet were thirty-seven ships of the larger rates; among which were three of seven, and four of six banks of oars; and besides these, ten triremes. They discovered too, from some watch-tower, that the Rhodians were at hand. Both fleets, at the dawn of the next day, moved out of port, as if resolved to come to an immediate engagement; and, as soon as the Rhodians passed the promontory that stretches into the deep from Sida, they descried the enemy, and were observed by them. On the king’s side, Hannibal had the command of the left squadron, which stretched away seaward; Apollonius, one of the nobles, had the command of the right, and they had their ships already formed in a line a-head. The Rhodians approached in a long line. First was the admiral’s ship, with Eudamus in it; Chariclitus brought up the rear; and Pamphilidas commanded the centre division. When Eudamus saw the enemy’s line formed and ready for battle, he pushed out towards the main, ordering the ships that followed to form, regularly, as they came up, in line of battle. This caused confusion at first; for he had not stretched out to the main far enough for the line of all the ships to form in the direction of the land, and he himself hurrying on with precipitation, with only five ships, engaged with Hannibal; the rest, having received orders to form their line, did not come up. The rear division had no room left for it next to the land; and, while they were in disorder, the fight was already begun on the right against Hannibal.

24. But the goodness of their ships, and the expertness of their men in nautical business, quickly freed the Rhodians from all embarrassment. They pushed out hastily towards the main, and each made room next the land for the one immediately behind; and when any made a stroke with its beak against a ship of the enemy, it either shattered its prow, or swept off its oars; or passing by it in the clear space between the vessels, made an attack on its stern. One of the king’s seven-banked ships being sunk with one stroke, by a Rhodian vessel of much smaller size, discouraged them very much. Therefore the right wing of the enemy was now undoubtedly verging to flight. Hannibal, in the open sea, by means chiefly of his superior number of ships, pressed hard on Eudamus, who surpassed him in every other respect: and he would have surrounded him were it not that, on the signal being given from the admiral’s fleet, (by which it is usual to collect together the fleet when dispersed,) all the ships which had conquered on the right wing came speedily to bear aid to their own party. This made Hannibal himself, with all his division, betake themselves to flight; while the Rhodians could not pursue, because their rowers being most of them sick, were therefore the sooner wearied. When they were recruiting their strength with food on the sea where they brought to, Eudamus, observing the enemy towing, by means of their open vessels, several damaged and crippled ships, and seeing little more than twenty that were going off uninjured, commanded silence from the castle of the commander’s ship, and then called out, “Arise, and feast your eyes with an extraordinary sight.” They all started up, and perceiving the disorderly flight of the enemy, cried out, almost with one voice, that they ought to pursue. Eudamus’s ship was bulged in many places; he therefore ordered Pamphilidas and Chariclitus to pursue as far as they should think it safe. They, accordingly, pursued for a considerable time: but after that Hannibal make-in close to the land, fearing to be wind-bound on an enemy’s coast, they steered back to Eudamus, and with difficulty towed to Phaselis a captured seven-banked ship, which had been damaged in the beginning of the engagement. They then sailed home to Rhodes, not so much exulting in their victory as blaming one another because the entire fleet had not been taken or sunk, when it could have been done. Hannibal, disheartened by the loss of this one battle, did not even then dare to sail past the coast of Lycia, though he wished to join the king’s main fleet as soon as possible. And that this action might not be unimpeded, the Rhodians sent Chariclitus with twenty ships of war to Patara and the harbour of Megiste. They then ordered Eudamus, with seven of the largest vessels belonging to the fleet which he had commanded, to rejoin the Romans at Samos, and to endeavour by every argument, and by all his influence, to prevail on the Romans to besiege Patara.

25. Now first of all the intelligence of the victory, and subsequently the arrival of the Rhodians, caused great joy to the Romans, and it appeared to them that if that anxiety was taken away from the Rhodians, they would when at leisure render the seas of that country safe. But the march of Antiochus from Sardis did not allow them to quit the guard of Ionia and Æolia, lest the maritime cities should be crushed by his arms. However, they sent Pamphilidas, with four decked ships, to join the fleet which was at Patara. Antiochus not only collected aids from the states that lay around, but also sent to Prusias, king of Bithynia, ambassadors and letters, in which he inveighed against the pressing of the Romans into Asia. “They were coming,” he said, “to abolish all kingly governments; so that there should be no empire in any part of the world, save that of Rome. Philip and Nabis were subdued: he was the third object of attack. Thus the conflagration would spread, without interruption, from one to another, as each lay nearest to the one last ruined, until it enveloped them all. From him there was but one step to Bithynia, now that Eumenes had submitted to voluntary servitude.” Though Prusias was greatly affected by these observations, his mind was relieved from all such doubts by a letter from Scipio, the consul, and still more so by one from his brother Africanus, who, besides urging the invariable practice of the Roman people of augmenting, by every honourable addition, the grandeur of kings in alliance with them, by instances taken from his own family, induced Prusias to earn their friendship. “The petty chieftains in Spain,” he said, “who had been received into alliance, he had left kings. Masinissa he had not only re-established in his father’s kingdom, but had put him in possession of that of Syphax, by whom he had been formerly dethroned: so that he was, at the present, not only by far the most powerful of all the kings in Africa, but equal, both in dignity and strength, to any monarch in any part of the world. Philip and Nabis, avowed enemies, were conquered in war by Titus Quintius; nevertheless, they were left in possession of their kingdoms. Philip even had the tributes remitted to him last year, and his son, who was a hostage, restored. Through the indulgence of the Roman commanders, he had also got possession of several states beyond the boundaries of Macedonia. As to Nabis, he might have remained in the same honourable rank, had not first his own madness, and afterwards the treachery of the Ætolians, brought him to ruin.” The king’s resolution was especially confirmed after that Caius Livius, who had commanded the fleet as prætor, came to him as ambassador from Rome, and informed him how much better hope the Romans had of success than Antiochus; and how much more sacred and lasting an alliance with them would be.

26. Antiochus, after he lost the hope of an alliance with Prusias, went from Sardis to Ephesus, to review the fleet which was fitted out, and lay there ready, for several months; rather because he saw it impossible, with his land forces, to make any stand against the Roman army and its commanders, the two Scipios, than that his naval force by itself had ever been tried by him successfully, or afforded at this juncture any great or well-grounded confidence. Yet there was an incentive to hope on the present occasion; for he had heard that a large portion of the Rhodian fleet was at Patara, and that king Eumenes had gone to the Hellespont, with all his ships, to meet the consul. Besides, the destruction of the Rhodian fleet at Samos, on an opportunity prepared by treachery, inspired some degree of confidence. Relying on these things, he sent Polyxenidas with orders to try, at all events, the fortune of a naval engagement; while he himself marched his land forces to Notium. This town, which belongs to Colophon, stands close to the sea, and is distant about two miles from Old Colophon. He wished to get this city into his power, because it was so near to Ephesus that nothing could be done there, on sea or land, that was not open to the view of the Colophonians, and, through them, instantly made known to the Romans; and he had no doubt that the latter, having heard of the siege, would bring their fleet from Samos to the relief of an ally, which would give Polyxenidas an opportunity of coming to action. He therefore began to lay regular siege to the city, making his approaches at the same time on the two sides next the sea; in both places he joined his engines and mounds to the wall, and brought up the rams under covered galleries. By which dangers the Colophonians being terrified, sent envoys to Lucius Æmilius, at Samos, imploring the protection of the prætor and people of Rome. His lying so long inactive at Samos offended Æmilius, thinking nothing more improbable than that Polyxenidas, whom he had twice challenged in vain to fight, should ever offer him battle; and he considered it as dishonourable, that the fleet of Eumenes should assist the consul in conveying the legions into Asia, that he should be fettered by bearing to the besieged Colophon an assistance destined to have an uncertain end. Eudamus, the Rhodian, (who had before prevailed upon him to stay at Samos, when he wished to go to the Hellespont,) with all the other officers, pressed him to comply, representing “how much more eligible it would be, either to relieve confederates from a siege, or to vanquish that fleet which he had vanquished before, and to take from the enemy the entire possession of the sea, than, deserting his allies, and delivering Asia to Antiochus by land and sea, to depart from his own part of the war to the Hellespont, when the fleet of Eumenes was sufficient for that station.”

27. They accordingly, having set sail from Samos in quest of provisions, their stock being consumed, were preparing to pass over to Chios. Samos served as a granary to the Romans, and thither all the store-ships sent from Rome directed their course. When they had sailed round from the city to the back of the island, which looks northward towards Chios and Erythræ, and were preparing to cross over, the prætor is informed by a letter, that a vast quantity of corn had arrived at Chios, from Italy; but that the vessels laden with wine were detained by storms. At the same time accounts were received, that the people of Teos had furnished large supplies of provisions to the king’s fleet, and had promised five thousand vessels of wine. On this the prætor immediately changed his course, and steered away to Teos, resolved either to make use of the provisions prepared for the enemy, with the consent of the inhabitants, or to treat them as foes. When they had turned their prows to the land, about fifteen vessels appeared in sight near Myonnesus, which the prætor at first supposed to belong to the king’s fleet, and hastened to pursue. It appeared afterwards, that they were piratical cutters and galleys. They, having ravaged the sea-coast of Chios, returning with booty of every kind, betook themselves to flight when they saw the fleet on the open sea. They had much the advantage in swiftness, their galleys being lighter and constructed for the purpose, and were nearer the land; therefore before the fleet could overtake them, they made their escape to Myonnesus. And the prætor, unacquainted with the place, followed in expectation of forcing their ships from it out of the harbour. Myonnesus is a promontory between Teos and Samos. It consists of a hill rising from a pretty large base to a sharp top, in the shape of an obelisk. From the land it has access by a narrow path towards the sea, cliffs undermined by the waves terminate it, so that in some places the superimpending rocks project beyond the vessels that lie at anchor. The ships not daring to approach lest they should be exposed to the weapons of the pirates, who stood above on the cliffs, wasted the day to no purpose. At length, after they had desisted from this useless undertaking a little before night, they the next day reached Teos. Here the prætor, after mooring in the port at the back of the city, which the inhabitants call Geræsticum, sent out the soldiers to ravage the land about the city.

28. The Teians, as these ravages passed under their eyes, sent deputies to the Roman commander, carrying fillets, and other badges of suppliants. And when they were exculpating their state from every hostile act or word against the Romans, he strongly charged them with “having assisted the enemy’s fleet with provisions, and with having promised a quantity of wine to Polyxenidas.” He further told them, that “if they would furnish the same supplies to the Roman fleet, he would recall his troops from plundering; otherwise, he would treat them as enemies.” When the deputies carried back this distressing answer, the people were summoned to an assembly by the magistrates, to consult on what they should do. It happened that Polyxenidas, who had sailed with the king’s fleet from Colophon, after he heard that the Romans had left Samos and pursued the pirates to Myonnesus, and that they were laying waste the lands of the Teians, and that their fleet lay in the harbour of Geræsticus, cast anchor, in a retired harbour of an island called by the sailors Macris, opposite to Myonnesus. Then from his neighbouring position, exploring what his enemies were doing, at first he was in great hopes of vanquishing the Roman fleet here, in like manner as he had vanquished the Rhodian at Samos, by besetting the narrow entrance at the mouth of the port. Nor is the nature of the place unlike: by the promontories advancing towards each other, the harbour is enclosed in such a manner, that two ships can scarcely go out together. Polyxenidas intended to seize this narrow pass in the night; and, while ten ships stood at each of the promontories, to attack, from the right and left, both sides of the enemy’s fleet sailing out, having landed his armed men from the fleet, as he had done at Panormus, to overpower the Romans on land and sea at once. And this design would not have been formed by him in vain, had it not appeared to the Romans better for receiving the provisions, when the Teians had promised to execute their commands, that the fleet should pass into that harbour, which is before the city. It is said, also, that Eudamus, the Rhodian, had pointed out the fault of the outer harbour, when two ships broke their oars locked together in the narrow entrance. Among other motives, this too induced the prætor to remove his fleet, because there was danger from the land, as Antiochus kept his camp not far from it.

29. When the fleet was brought round to the city, all being ignorant of the approach of the enemy, both soldiers and sailors went on shore to divide the provisions, and the wine particularly, among the ships; when, about mid-day, a peasant happened to be brought before the prætor, who told him, that the enemy’s fleet was lying at the island of Macris these two days; and that, a little while ago, some of them were observed to be in motion, as if preparing to sail. Greatly alarmed at this unexpected event, the prætor ordered the trumpets to sound, to call in such as might have straggled into the country, and sent the tribunes into the city, to hasten the soldiers and sailors on board. The confusion was not less than if the place were on fire, or taken by an enemy; some running to call out the men; others hurrying to the ships, while the orders of the officers were confounded by irregular shouts, amid which the trumpets raised their din, until at length the crowd collected at the ships. Here scarcely could each know his own ship, or make his way through the tumult; and the disorder would probably have been productive of much mischief, on land and sea had not Æmilius, in the commander’s ship, sailed out first into the main; where, receiving those following, he put each into its own place, so as to form a line abreast: and Eudamus, with the Rhodian fleet, waited at the shore, that the men might be embarked without confusion, and that every ship might leave the harbour as soon as it was ready. By these means, the foremost division formed under the eye of the prætor, while the rear was brought up by the Rhodians; and then the whole line, in as regular order as if within sight of the foe, advanced into the open sea. They were between Myonnesus and the promontory of Corycus, when they first got sight of the enemy. The king’s fleet, which was coming in a long line, with only two vessels abreast, then formed themselves in order of battle, stretching out their left division so far, as that it might enclose the right of the Romans. When Eudamus, who commanded in the rear, perceived that the Romans could not form an equal front, but were just on the point of being surrounded, he pushed up his ships. They were Rhodians, by far the fastest sailers of any of the fleet; and having filled up the deficiency in the extent of the line, he opposed his own ship to the commander’s, on board of which was Polyxenidas.

30. Now the entire fleets in every part were engaged in action. On the side of the Romans eighty ships were fighting, of which twenty-two were Rhodian. The enemy’s fleet consisted of eighty-nine ships, and they had of the largest rates, three of six, and two of seven banks. In the strength of the vessels, and valour of the soldiers, the Romans had greatly the advantage of the king’s party, as had the Rhodians in the activity of their vessels, the skill of the pilots, and the dexterity of the rowers. However, those which carried fire before them were the greatest terror to the enemy: and what was the sole cause of their preservation when they were surrounded at Panormus, proved here the principal means of victory. For when the king’s ships, through fear of the fire, had turned aside, in order to avoid at the same time encountering the enemy’s prow with their own, they could not strike their antagonist with the beaks, but exposed the side of their ships to his strokes; and if any did venture an encounter, it was immediately overspread with the fire that was poured in; while the men were more alarmed at the fire than the battle. However, the bravery of the soldiers, as is generally the case, chiefly availed in deciding the battle. For the Romans, having broke through the centre of the enemy’s line, tacked about and fell upon the rear of the division which was engaged with the Rhodians; and, in an instant of time, both Antiochus’s centre division, and the ships on the left, were surrounded and sunk. The squadron on the right, which was still entire, was terrified rather by the disaster of their friends, than by any immediate danger threatening themselves; but, when they saw the others surrounded, and Polyxenidas’s ship deserting its associates, and sailing away, having quickly hoisted their topsails, they betook themselves to flight, (and they steering for Ephesus had a favourable wind,) having lost forty-two ships in that battle; of which thirteen struck, and fell into the hands of the Romans; the rest were burned or sunk. Two Roman ships were shattered, and several were much damaged. One Rhodian vessel was taken by an extraordinary casualty; for, on its striking a Sidonian ship with its beak, its anchor, thrown out by the force of the shock, caught fast hold of the other’s prow with its fluke, as if it were a grappling-iron thrown in. Great confusion ensuing thereon, when the Rhodians, who wished to disengage themselves from the enemy, pulled back, its cable being dragged forcibly, and at the same time entangled with the oars, swept off one side of them. The very ship, which, when struck, had grappled with it, took the Rhodian galley in its weakened state. The naval battle at Myonnesus was fought principally in this manner.

31. By which Antiochus being terrified, because, as he was driven from the possession of the sea, he despaired of being able to defend his distant possessions, ordered the garrison to be withdrawn from Lysimachia, which plan was ill devised, as the event subsequently proved, lest it should be there cut off by the Romans. As it was easy for him, not only to defend Lysimachia from the first attack of the Romans, but to protract the siege through the whole winter; and by thus prolonging the time, to reduce the besiegers to the extremity of want; and in the mean time try the hope of peace, as opportunities should present themselves. But, after the defeat at sea, he not only gave up Lysimachia, but even raised the siege of Colophon, and retired to Sardis. Here, bending all his thoughts to one single object, that of meeting the enemy in the field, he sent into Cappadocia, to Ariarathes, to request assistance, and to every other place within his power, to collect forces. Æmilius Regillus, after his victory at sea, proceeded to Ephesus, having drawn up his ships before the harbour, when he had extorted from the enemy a final acknowledgment of their having surrendered the dominion of the sea, sailed to Chios, to which he had directed his course from Samos, before the sea-fight. As soon as he had refitted the ships that had been damaged in the battle, he sent off Lucius Æmilius Scaurus, with thirty others, to the Hellespont, to transport the army; and decorating the Rhodian vessels with naval spoils, and allowing them a part of the booty, he ordered them to return home. The Rhodians energetically took the lead, and proceeded to assist in transporting the consul’s forces, and when they had completed that service also, then at length returned to Rhodes. The Roman fleet sailed from Chios to Phocæa. This city stands at the bottom of a bay, and is of an oblong shape. The wall encompasses a space of two miles and a half in length, and then contracts on both sides into a very narrow wedge-like form, which place they call Lampter (or the light-house). The breadth here extends one thousand two hundred paces; and a tongue of land stretching out about a mile into the sea, divides the bay nearly in the middle, as if with a line; where it is connected with the main land by a narrow isthmus, it has two very safe harbours, turned to each side. The one that fronts the south they call Naustathmos, (the station for ships,) from the circumstance of its being capable of containing a vast number of ships; the other is close to Lampter.

32. When the Roman fleet had taken possession of these very safe harbours, the prætor thought proper, before he attempted the fortifications, either by escalade or works, that persons should be sent to sound the disposition of the magistrates and principal people in the place: when he saw them obstinate, he determined to attack the city in two places at the same time. One part was thinly occupied by private dwellings, temples of the gods occupying a great deal of the ground. In that part first, having brought up the battering-ram, he began to shake the wall and towers; and when the multitude within ran thither to defend that spot, the battering-rams were applied in the other quarter, and the walls were now knocked down in both places. On the fall of which, when some of the Roman soldiers were making an assault over the scattered masses of ruins, others attempted to scale walls; the townsmen made such an obstinate resistance, as plainly showed that they had a firmer dependence on their arms and courage, than on their fortifications. The prætor, compelled by the danger of the soldiers, sounded a retreat, that he might not expose them incautious to his opponents, maddened with despair and rage. The fighting being ended, the besieged did not, even then, think of rest; but all hastened from every quarter, to strengthen the walls, and to raise new ones in the place of those that had been demolished. While they were busily employed in this manner, Quintus Antonius, being sent by the prætor, came to them, who, after having blamed their obstinacy, assured them that “the Romans were more anxious than they were themselves that the battle should not be carried on to the destruction of the city. If they would desist from their madness, Æmilius would allow them to capitulate on the same terms on which they had formerly surrendered to Caius Livius.” When they heard this, having taken five days’ time to deliberate, and having in the mean time tried the hope of aid from Antiochus, after that the ambassadors sent to the king had brought back word that there was no aid in him, they opened their gates, stipulating that they should suffer nothing hostile. When the troops were marching into the city, and the prætor had proclaimed that it was his pleasure that the surrendered townsmen should be spared, there arose an universal clamour, “that it was shameful that the Phocæans, who had never been faithful to any alliance, and had always been bitter in enmity, should escape with impunity.” After which words, as if a signal had been given by the prætor, they ran, in parties, every way, to plunder the city. Æmilius, at first, began to resist, and call them back, saying, that “towns taken by storm, and not such as surrendered, were plundered; and that, even with regard to the former, the determination lay with the commander, not with the soldiers.” But rage and avarice were too strong for his authority; wherefore, despatching heralds through all parts of the city, he ordered, that all persons of free condition should come to him in the forum, that they should not be injured: and in all things which were in his power, the promise of the prætor was observed. He restored to them their city, their lands, and their laws; and, as the winter now approached, he chose the harbour of Phocæa for his fleet to pass the winter in.

33. About the same time it was announced to the consul, as he was marching along the frontiers of the Ænians and Maronites, that the king’s fleet was conquered at Myonnesus, and that Lysimachia was evacuated by its garrison. This latter event gave much more satisfaction than even the success at sea; especially after they came thither, and were hospitably received in the city, filled with provisions of all sorts, as if provided for the arrival of the army; when, in besieging the city, they had anticipated extreme want and hardship. There they made a halt for a few days, that the baggage and sick might overtake them, who, overcome by diseases, or the length of the way, had been left behind in all the forts of Thrace. When all had joined, they began again their march through the Chersonese, and arrived at the Hellespont; where every thing requisite for their passage having been previously got ready, by the care of king Eumenes, they crossed over, without confusion, as if to friendly shores, no one opposing, and the ships putting in at several different places. This raised to a high degree the spirits of the Romans, who saw the passage into Asia left open to them; which thing they supposed would cost them a severe struggle. They afterwards remained encamped a considerable time at the Hellespont, because it happened to be a period too holy for marching, during which the sacred shields are moved. The same festival had separated Publius Scipio from the army, as the religious ceremony was more incumbent on him, because he was one of the Salian priests; and he himself was a source of delay, till he overtook the rest of the army.

34. In the mean time an ambassador came from Antiochus to the camp,—Heraclides, a Byzantian, having mandates concerning peace. The delay and tardiness of the Romans gave him great hope that this might be attained; for he had imagined, that as soon as they set foot in Asia, they would advance in a rapid march against the king. He resolved, however, not to address himself to the consul until he had first applied to Publius Scipio, and instructions to that effect were given him by the king. In him he had the greatest hope, besides that his greatness of soul, and the fulness of his glory, tended very much to make him inclined to peace, and it was known to all nations what sort of a conqueror he had been, both in Spain and afterwards in Africa; and also because his son was then a prisoner with Antiochus. Where, and when, and by what accident he became a prisoner, is, like very many other things, not ascertained among writers. Some say, that in the beginning of the war, as he was going from Chalcis to Oreum, he was intercepted by some of the king’s ships; others, that after the army came into Asia, he was sent with a troop of Fregellans to Antiochus’s camp, to gain intelligence; that on the cavalry sallying out against him, he retreated, and having fallen from his horse in the confusion, he was together with two horsemen, overpowered, and thus conducted to the king. This however is fully ascertained, that if peace had still subsisted with the Romans, and likewise a personal friendship between the king and the Scipios, the young man could not have been treated and courted with greater kindness than he was. When the ambassador, for these reasons, had waited the arrival of Publius Scipio, as soon as he came he applied to the consul, and requested that he should hear his instructions.

35. A full council being assembled, audience was given to the ambassador, who said, that, “though many embassies about peace had already been sent backwards and forwards, without producing any effect, yet he conceived strong hopes of obtaining it, because the former ambassadors had obtained nothing. For the objects of contention in those discussions were Smyrna and Lampsacus, Alexandria in the Troad, and Lysimachia in Europe. Of these, the king had already ceded Lysimachia, that they might not say that he possessed any thing in Europe; and those cities which lay in Asia, he was now ready to deliver up as well as any others, which the Romans might wish to render independent of the king’s government, because they belonged to their party. The king was also willing to pay to the Roman people half the expense of the war.” These were the conditions of peace. The rest of his discourse was, “that, mindful of human affairs, they should use with moderation their own good fortune, and not press too severely on the misfortune of others; that they should limit their empire by Europe; that single acquisitions could be made with more ease than that necessary for holding them collectively. But if they would wish to take away some part of Asia, provided that they would define it by indisputable limits, the king, for the sake of peace and harmony, would willingly suffer his own moderate temper to be overcome by the insatiableness of the Romans.” These concessions, which appeared to the ambassador of great moment towards obtaining a peace, the Romans deemed trifling. They thought it just, that “the king should defray the whole expense occasioned by the war, because it was through his fault that it was begun. And that, not only Ionia and Æolia ought to be evacuated by the king’s troops, but as all Greece had been set free, so all the cities of that nation in Asia should also be free. That this could be effected in no other way, than by Antiochus relinquishing the possession of that part of Asia on the hither side of Mount Taurus.”

36. The ambassador, after he came to the conclusion that he could obtain no reasonable terms in the council, tried to influence the mind of Publius Scipio in private (for such were his orders). First of all he told him that the king would restore him his son without a ransom; and then, as ignorant of the disposition of Scipio as he was of the Roman manners, he promised an immense weight of gold, and, excepting the title of king, an absolute partnership in the sovereignty, if through his means he should obtain a peace. To which Scipio answered, “I am the less surprised that you are ignorant of the Romans in general, and of me, to whom you have been sent, when I see that you are unacquainted with the situation even of the person from whom you come. You ought to have kept Lysimachia to prevent our entering the Chersonese, or to have opposed us at the Hellespont to hinder our passing into Asia, if you meant to ask peace from us as from people solicitous about the issue of war. But after leaving the passage into Asia open, and receiving not only a bridle, but also a yoke, what negotiation on an equality has been left you, when you must submit to orders? I shall consider my son as a very great gift from the munificence of the king; I pray to the gods that my circumstances may never require others, my mind certainly never will require any. For such an act of generosity to me he shall find me grateful, if for a personal favour he will accept a personal return of gratitude. In my public capacity, I will neither accept from him nor give him any thing. All that I can give at present is sincere advice. Go then, and desire him in my name, to cease hostilities, and to refuse no terms of peace.” These words had no effect on the king, who thought that the chance of war would be comparatively safe, since terms were dictated to him already as if he were totally vanquished. Laying aside, therefore, for the present, all farther mention of peace, he turned his whole attention to the preparations for war.

37. The consul having made every preparation for the execution of his designs, when he had quitted the post where he lay, marched first to Dardanus, and then to Rhœteum; from both states the people came out in crowds to meet him. He then advanced to Troy, and having pitched his camp in the plain which is under the walls, when he had gone up to the city and into the citadel, he offered sacrifices to Minerva, the guardian of the citadel; the Trojans, by every act and expression of respect, showing themselves proud of the Romans being descended from them, and the Romans expressing their delight in their origin. The army marching thence, arrived, on the sixth encampment, at the source of the Caicus. To this place also king Eumenes came. He at first endeavoured to bring back his fleet from the Hellespont to Elæa, for the winter; subsequently, when by adverse winds he could not, for several days, pass the promontory of Lectos, that he might not be absent at the commencement of operations, he landed and came, with a small body of men, by the shortest road to the Roman camp. From the camp he was sent home to Pergamus, to hasten supplies of provisions; and when the corn was delivered to the persons whom the consul had ordered to receive it, he returned to the same camp. The plan was, provisions for several days being prepared, to march hence against the enemy, before the winter should prevent them. The king’s camp was near Thyatira; and Antiochus, hearing there that Publius Scipio had fallen sick and was conveyed to Elæa, sent ambassadors to conduct his son to him. As this present was highly grateful to the mind of the father, so was the satisfaction which it gave no less salutary to his body. At length, being sated with the embraces of his son, he said to the ambassadors, “Tell the king that I return him thanks; that at present I can make him no other requital than my advice; which is, not to come to an engagement, until he shall have heard that I have rejoined the army.” Although sixty-two thousand foot, and more than twelve thousand horse, inspired the king at times with hopes in the result of a battle; yet, moved by the advice of so great a man as Scipio, in whom, when he considered the uncertainty of the events of war, he placed safety in any reverse of fortune, he retired, and having crossed the Phrygian river, pitched his camp near Magnesia, which is at Sipylus. And lest, if he wished to prolong the time, the Romans might attack his works, he drew round it a fosse six cubits deep and twelve broad, and on the outside surrounded the fosse with a double rampart: on the inside bank, he raised a wall flanked with towers at small distances, by which the enemy could easily be prevented from crossing the fosse.

38. The consul, thinking that the king was still in the neighbourhood of Thyatira, came down by continued marches on the fifth day into the Hyrcanian plains. Then when he heard that the other had departed, he followed his track, and pitched his camp on the hither side of the Phrygian river, at the distance of four miles from the enemy. Here, a body of about one thousand horse, (the greatest part of whom were Gallogræcians, the rest Dahans, and archers on horseback, of other nations intermixed,) passing the river with great tumult, made an attack on the advanced Roman guards. First of all they threw into confusion those unprepared; then, when the contest continued longer, and the number of the Romans increased, as succours were easily sent from the neighbouring camp, the king’s troops, becoming weary and unable to withstand superior numbers, endeavoured to retreat; but, before they could reach the river, very many were killed on the bank, by the enemy pressing on their rear. For two days after there was quiet, neither party passing the river. On the third, the Romans passed it with their whole force, and encamped at the distance of about two miles and a half from the enemy. While they were employed in measuring and fortifying the camp, a body of the king’s troops, consisting of three thousand chosen horse and foot, approached with great rapidity and violence. The party on guard, though much inferior in number, (being only two thousand,) without calling off any of the soldiers from the fortifying of the camp, sustained the combat with equal success at first, and, in the progress of the contest, repulsed the enemy, killing a hundred, and taking about the same number. During the four ensuing days, both armies stood in order of battle, before their respective camps. On the fifth, the Romans advanced into the middle of the plain, but Antiochus did not stir; so that his rear was not so far as a thousand feet from his rampart.

39. The consul, after perceiving that he declined the contest, called a council next day, and asked their opinion, “how he ought to act if Antiochus would not give him an opportunity of engaging. For the winter was at hand, and he must either keep the soldiers in camp; or, if they chose to retire to winter quarters, defer the business of the war until summer.” The Romans never despised any enemy so much. The assembly on every side called on him to lead on immediately, and make use of the present ardour of the troops; who, as if the business were not to fight against so many thousands, but to slaughter an equal number of cattle, were ready to force their way, through trenches and ramparts, into the camp, if the enemy would not come out to battle. Cneius Domitius was sent to discover the nature of the ground, and on what side the enemies’ rampart could be approached; after he returned with a full account of every particular, it was resolved that the camp should next day be moved nearer to the enemy. On the third day, the standards were carried forward into the middle of the plain, and the soldiers began to form line. Antiochus, thinking that he could hesitate no longer, lest, by declining a battle, he should damp the courage of his men, and add to the confidence of the enemy, drew out his forces in person, advancing only so far from the enemy’s camp as to make it apparent that he was willing to come to an engagement. The Roman line was nearly uniform throughout with respect to both men and armour. There were two Roman legions, and two brigades of allies and Latins, each containing five thousand four hundred men. The Romans formed the centre, the Latins the wings. The spearmen composed the first line, the first-rank men the second, and the veterans closed the rear. Beyond this, which formed as it were the regular line of battle, the consul formed on the right of it, and in one continued line, the auxiliary troops of Eumenes, intermixed with Achæan targeteers, making about three thousand foot; beyond these he posted somewhat less than three thousand horse, of which, eight hundred belonged to Eumenes; all the rest of the cavalry were Roman: and in the extremity of the line he placed bodies of Trallians and Cretans, equal in number, who were composed of five hundred men each. His left wing did not appear to require such supports, because a river and steep banks flanked it. However, four troops of horse were posted there. This was the whole amount of the Roman force, besides two thousand Macedonians and Thracians, who had, as volunteers, accompanied the army. These were left to guard the camp. They placed sixteen elephants behind the veterans, in reserve. For besides that they were not supposed capable of withstanding the great number of the king’s elephants, which were no less than fifty-four, the African elephants are not able to cope with an equal number of Indians, either because they are inferior to them in size, (in which the Indian have much the advantage,) or in unyielding courage.