Chapter XXIV: Book XLIV (3)

35. _In the mean time, a report announced that king Gentius had been defeated, in Illyria, by the prætor Anicius; and that himself, his family, and his whole kingdom, were in the hands of the Romans_; which event greatly raised the spirits of the Romans, and struck no small degree of terror into the Macedonians and their king. At first, Perseus endeavoured to suppress the intelligence, and sent messengers to Pantauchus, who was on his way from that country, forbidding him to come near the camp; but some of his people had already seen certain boys, carried away among the Illyrian hostages; and it is certain that the more pains there are used to conceal any circumstances, the more readily they are divulged, through the gossiping disposition of the attendants of kings. About this time, ambassadors came to the camp from Rhodes, with the same message which had excited so much resentment in the Roman senate. They were now heard by the council in the camp with much greater indignation than at Rome; some _even advised_ that they should be instantly driven out of the camp without any reply; but the consul said, that he would give them an answer in fifteen days. Meanwhile, to show how far the influence of the Rhodians as mediators extended, he began to consult on the plan of carrying forward the war. Some, particularly the older officers, advised to force their way across the Enipeus, and through the enemy’s works. “When they should advance in close order and make an assault, the Macedonians,” they said, “would never be able to withstand them. They had been, last year, beaten out of many fortresses much higher and better fortified, which they had occupied with much stronger garrisons.” Others recommended, that Octavius, with the fleet, should sail to Thessalonica; and, by committing depredations on the sea-coast, to divide the king’s forces; so that when, on the appearance of another enemy behind him, he should turn about to protect the interior part of the kingdom, he would be forced to leave a passage over the Enipeus open in some place or other. The consul himself was of opinion, that the nature of the bank, and the works erected on it, presented insuperable difficulties; and, besides its being every where furnished with engines, he had been informed, that the enemy were remarkable for using missile weapons with uncommon skill, and with a very certain aim. The consul’s full conviction leaned quite another way; as soon, therefore, as the council broke up, he sent for Schœnus and Menophilus, Perrhæbian merchants, whom he knew to be men of probity and good sense, and examined them in private about the nature of the passes leading into Perrhæbia. They told him, that the places themselves were not difficult; but that they were occupied by parties of the king’s troops; from which he conceived hopes of being able to beat off those parties, by making a sudden attack with a strong force in the night, when they were off their guard. For he considered that “javelins, and arrows, and other missile weapons, were useless in the dark, when one cannot see at distance what to aim at; but that, when combatants closed together in a throng, the business must depend on the sword, in which the Roman soldier was superior.” He resolved to employ those two men as guides; and, sending for the prætor Octavius, explained to him what he intended, ordering him to sail directly with the fleet to Heracleum, and to have in readiness, there, ten days’ provisions for one thousand men. He then sent Publius Scipio Nasica, and Quintus Fabius Maximus, his own son, with five thousand chosen men, to Heracleum, as if they were to embark in the fleet, to ravage the coast of the interior parts of Macedonia, as had been proposed in the council. He told them, in private, that there were provisions prepared for them on board, so that they should have no delay. He then ordered the guides to divide the road in such a manner that they might attack Pythium at the fourth watch on the third day. He himself, on the day following, in order to withdraw the king from the observation of other matters, attacked his advanced guards as soon as it was light in the middle of the channel of the river, where the fight was maintained by the light infantry on both sides, for the bottom was so uneven, that heavy arms could not be used. The slope of each bank was three hundred paces long, and the breadth of the channel, which was of various depths, somewhat more than a mile. In this middle space the fight was carried on, while the king on one side, and the consul with his legions on the other, stood spectators on the ramparts of their camps. At a distance, the king’s troops had the advantage in fighting with missile weapons; but in close fight the Roman soldier was more steady, and was better defended, either with a target or a Ligurian buckler. About noon, the consul ordered the signal of retreat to be given, and thus the battle ended for that day, after considerable numbers had fallen on both sides. Next morning at sun-rise, the fight was renewed with greater fury, as their passions had been irritated by the former contest; but the Romans were wounded, not only by those with whom they were immediately engaged, but much more by the multitudes that stood posted in the towers, with missiles of every sort, particularly stones; so that whenever they advanced towards the enemy’s bank, the weapons thrown from the engines reached even the hindmost of their men. The consul, having lost far more men on that day, somewhat later called off his men. On the third day he declined fighting, and moved down to the lowest side of the camp, as if intending to attempt a passage through an intrenchment which stretched down to the sea. Perseus, _who did not extend his cares beyond_ the objects that lay before his eyes, _bent all his thoughts and exertions to stop the progress of the enemy in the quarter where he lay, careful of nought beside. In the mean time, Publius Nasica, with the detachment assigned to him, having departed towards the sea to Heracleum, when he arrived there, waited for nightfall, ordering his soldiers to refresh themselves. He then explained to the principal of his officers the real directions of the consul, and when first the darkness spread itself, bending his course to the mountain, he led his troops in silence to Pythium, as he had been commanded. When they had arrived at the very summit, which rises to a height of more than ten stadia, some repose was given to the wearied soldiers. This height, as has been already stated, Medon, Histiæus, and Theogenes, who were sent by Perseus, were occupying with five thousand Macedonians, but so great was the negligence of the king’s generals, that no one perceived that the Romans were approaching. If we are to believe Polybius, Nasica, having attacked them while asleep, easily dislodged them from the height. Nasica himself however, narrates the affair very differently in a letter to one of the kings. He says, that the mountain was of steep ascent, but so unguarded that he could have taken possession of the pass with no trouble, had not a deserter from those Cretans, whom he was taking with him, fled to Perseus, and informed him what was being done. That the king himself remained in his camp, but sent two thousand Macedonians and ten thousand auxiliaries, with Medon as their leader, to take possession of the pass. That with these a most fierce engagement took place on the top of the hill, and, among other things, that he himself was thrust at with a sword by a Thracian soldier, whom he transfixed by driving his spear through his breast. That at length the Macedonians, being conquered, gave way, and that their leader himself, throwing away his arms, sought safety in a disgraceful flight. The Romans pursuing the fugitives had an easy descent, without any danger, to the plain. In this stale of things Perseus was in perplexity as to what was necessary to be done, as he feared lest, now that a way through the pass had been opened, he should be hemmed in by the Romans. It was absolutely necessary that he should either retire to Pydna, and await the enemy there, so as to fight with less danger under the walls of a fortified city; or that, dispersing his forces through the cities of Macedonia, conveying the corn and cattle into more fortified places, and devastating the fields, he, should leave the bare soil to the enemy. The mind of the king fluctuated irresolute between these two propositions: his friends, thinking that that which was the most honourable would also be the safer, advised him to try the fortune of a battle, alleging both that he was superior in the number of his soldiers, and that he ought surely to trust to that valour which, while it was natural to their minds, would be inflamed by the most powerful and sacred incitements to a valiant opposition which could act upon men;—their altars, their hearths, and their religious institutions, amidst which and for which they had to fight; their parents and their wives, and, lastly, their king himself observing them, and exposing himself to a share of the danger. Influenced by these suggestions, the king prepared himself for a battle, and when he had retired to Pydna, at once pitched his camp, drew up his army, and assigned to each of his leaders his position and duty, as if about to fight immediately after the march. The locality was of this hind; the plain was suited for the ranging of the phalanx, which requires an open and even space, not, however, such as that it could be easily moved forward; then there were continuous hills which afforded to the light-armed troops the means of retreating at one time, and at another of wheeling round. Two streams, the one of which the inhabitants called Œson, the other Leucus, though they flowed with but a scanty supply of water, yet seemed likely to occasion some trouble to the Romans. Æmilius, having united his forces with Nasica, set out directly against the enemy, but at the sight of their army, which was most effective both as to the number and the strength of the soldiers, and admirably drawn up and ranged for battle, he stopped, struck with awe, and revolving many considerations within himself._

36. _The season of the year_[96] was a little after the summer solstice; the time of the day was approaching towards noon; and his march had been performed amidst great quantities of dust, and the increasing heat of the sun. Lassitude and thirst were already felt, and both would certainly be aggravated by mid-day coming on. He resolved, therefore, not to expose his men in that condition to an enemy, fresh and in full vigour; but so great was the ardour for battle in the minds of both parties, that the general had occasion for as much art to elude the wishes of his own men, as those of the enemy. He urged the military tribunes to hasten the forming of the troops, went himself round the ranks, and with exhortations inflamed their courage for the fight. At first, they called to him for the signal briskly; but afterwards, as the beat increased, their looks became less lively, and their voices fainter, while many stood resting on their shields, or leaning on their javelins. He then, at length, openly ordered the foremost ranks to measure out the front of a camp, and store the baggage; on seeing which, some undisguisedly rejoiced that he had not compelled them to fight when they were wearied with marching and with the scorching heat. Immediately about the general were the lieutenants-general, and the commanders of the foreign troops; among others Attalus, who, when they thought that the consul intended to fight, (for even to them he did not disclose his intention of delaying,) had all approved the measure. On this sudden alteration of his plan, while the rest were silent, Nasica alone of them all ventured to advise the consul, not to let slip from his hands an enemy, who, by shunning a battle, had baffled former commanders. “There was reason to fear,” he said, “that if he should march off in the night, he would have to be pursued with extreme toil and danger, into the heart of Macedonia; and the troops must be led about, as under former generals, wandering through the glens and forests of the Macedonian mountains. He therefore earnestly recommended to attack the enemy while he had him in an open plain, and not to lose the opportunity of obtaining a victory, which now presented itself.” The consul, not in the least offended at the frank advice of so illustrious a youth, answered: “Nasica, I once thought as you do now; hereafter you will come to think as I do. By the many chances of war, I have learned when it is proper to fight, when to abstain from fighting. It would not be right in me, at present, standing at the head of the troops to explain to you the causes that render it better to rest to-day. Ask my reasons some other time. At present you will acquiesce in the judgment of an old commander.” The youth was silent, concluding that the consul certainly saw some objections to fighting, which did not appear to him.

37. Paullus, as soon as he saw the camp marked out, and the baggage laid up, drew off, first, the veterans from the rear line, then the first-rank men, while the spearmen stood in the front, lest the enemy might make any attempt; and lastly, the spearmen, beginning at the right wing, and leading them away, gradually, by single companies. Thus were the infantry drawn off without tumult; and, in the mean time, the cavalry and light infantry faced the enemy; nor were the cavalry recalled from their station, until the rampart and trench were finished. The king, though he was disposed to have given battle that day, was yet satisfied; since his men knew, that, the delay was owing to the enemy: and he led back his troops to their station. When the camp had been thoroughly fortified, Caius Sulpicius Gallus, a military tribune of the second legion, who had been prætor the year before, with the consul’s permission collected the soldiers in assembly, and gave them notice, lest they should any of them consider the matter as a prodigy, that, “on the following night, the moon would be eclipsed, from the second hour to the fourth.” He mentioned that, “as this happened in the course of nature, at stated times, it could be known, and foretold. As, therefore, they did not wonder at the regular rising and setting of the sun and moon, or at the moon’s sometimes shining with a full orb, and sometimes in its wane, showing only small horns, so neither ought they to construe as a portent, its being obscured when covered with the shadow of the earth.” When on the night preceding the day before the nones of September, at the hour mentioned, the eclipse took place, the Roman soldiers thought the wisdom of Gallus almost divine; but the Macedonians were shocked, as at a dismal prodigy, foreboding the fall of their kingdom and the ruin of their nation; nor did their soothsayers explain it otherwise. There was shouting and yelling in the camp of the Macedonians, until the moon emerged forth into its full light. Both armies had been so eager for an engagement, that, next day, both the king and the consul were censured by many of their respective men for having separated without a battle. The king could readily excuse himself, not only as the enemy had led back his troops into camp, openly declining a battle; but, also, as he had posted his men on ground of such a nature, that the phalanx (which even a small inequality of surface renders useless) could not advance on it. The consul, besides appearing to have neglected an opportunity of fighting, and to have given the enemy room to go off in the night, if he were so inclined, was thought to waste time at the present, under pretence of offering sacrifice, though the signal had been displayed, at the first light, for going out to the field. At last, about the third hour, the sacrifices being duly performed, he summoned a council, and there, too, he was deemed by several to spin out, in talking and unseasonable consultation, the time that ought to be employed in action; after the conversation, however, the consul addressed to them the following speech.

38. “Publius Nasica, a youth of uncommon merit, was the only one of those who were for fighting yesterday, that disclosed his sentiments to me; and even he was afterwards silent, so that he seems to have come over to my opinion. Some others have thought proper, rather to carp at their general in his absence, than to offer advice in his presence. Now, I shall, without the least reluctance, make known to you, Publius Nasica, and to any who, with less openness, entertained the same opinion with you, my reasons for deferring an engagement. For, so far am I from being sorry for yesterday’s inaction, that I am convinced that by that course I preserved the army. And if any of you think that I hold this opinion groundlessly, let him come forward, if he pleases, and take with me a review of how many things were favourable to the enemy and adverse to us. In the first place, how far they surpass us in numbers, I am sure not one of you was at any time ignorant; and yesterday, I am convinced that you must have observed it, when you saw their line drawn out. Of our small force, a fourth part had been left to guard the baggage; and you know that they are not the worst of the soldiers who are left in custody of the baggage. But suppose we were all here, can we believe it a matter of little moment, that, with the blessing of the gods, we shall this day, if judged proper, or tomorrow at farthest, march to battle out of this our own camp, where we have lodged last night? Is there no difference whether you order a soldier to take arms in his own tent, when he has not suffered any fatigue on that day, either from a long march or laborious work; after he has enjoyed his natural rest, and is fresh; so as to lead him into the field vigorous both in body and mind; or whether, when he is wearied by such a march, or fatigued with carrying a load; while he is wet with sweat, and while his throat is parched with thirst, and his mouth and eyes filled with dust, you oppose him, under a scorching noon-day sun, to an enemy who has had full repose, and who brings into the battle his strength unimpaired by any previous circumstance? Is there, in the name of the gods, any one so dastardly, that, if matched in this manner, he would not overcome the bravest man? We must consider, that the enemy had, quite at their leisure, formed their line of battle; had recruited their spirits, and were standing in regular order; whereas we must have formed our line in hurry and confusion, and have engaged before it was completed.

39. “We should then confessedly have an irregular and disorderly line, but should we have had a camp fortified, a watering-place provided, and the passage to it secured by troops, and all the country round reconnoitred; or should we have been without any one spot of our own, except the naked field on which we fought? Your fathers considered a fortified camp as a harbour of safety in all the emergencies of an army; out of which they were to march to battle, and in which, after being tossed in the storm of the fight, they had a safe retreat. For that reason, besides enclosing it with works, they strengthened it further with a numerous guard; for any general who lost his camp, though he should have been victorious in the field, yet was deemed vanquished. A camp is a residence for the victorious, a refuge for the conquered. How many armies, to whom the fortune of the fight has been adverse, when driven within their ramparts, have, at their own time, and sometimes the next moment, sallied out and defeated their victors! This military settlement is another native country to every soldier: the rampart is as the wall of his city, and his own tent his habitation and his home. Should we have fought while in that unsettled state, and without quarters prepared, to which, even if victorious, we might retire? In opposition to these considerations of the difficulties and impediments to the fighting at that time, one argument is urged: What if the enemy had marched off in the course of last night? What immense fatigue, it is observed, must have been undergone in pursuing him to the remotest parts of Macedonia! But, for my part, I take it as a certainty, that if he had had any intention of retreating, he would neither have waited, nor drawn out his troops to battle. For, how much more easily could he have gone off while we were at a great distance, than now, when we are close behind him! Nor could he escape observation in departing either by day or by night. What could be more desirable to us, who were obliged to attack their camp, defended as it was by a very high bank of a river, and enclosed likewise with a rampart and a number of towers, than that they should quit their fortifications, and, marching off with haste, give us an opportunity of attacking their rear in an open plain? These were the reasons for deferring a battle from yesterday to this day. For I am myself also inclined to fight; and for that reason, as the way to come at the enemy over the river Enipeus was stopped, I have opened a new way, by dislodging the enemy’s guards from another pass. Nor will I rest until I shall have brought the war to a conclusion.”

40. Silence ensued after this address; for some were convinced by his arguments, and the rest were fearful of giving offence needlessly in a matter which, from whatever cause overlooked, could not now be regained. Even on that day, neither the king nor the consul was desirous of engaging; not the king, because he was not going, as on the day before, to attack men who were fatigued after their march, were hurried in forming their line, and not completely marshalled; nor the consul, because, in his new camp, no collection was yet made of wood or forage, to bring which from the adjacent country a great number of his men had gone forth from the camp. Still fortune, whose power prevails over all human schemes, brought about a battle. Nearer to the enemy’s camp was a river, not very large, from which both parties supplied themselves with water; and that this might be done with safety, guards were stationed on each bank. On the Roman side were two cohorts, a Marrucinian and a Pelignian, with two troops of Samnite horse, commanded by a lieutenant-general, Marcus Sergius Silus; and in the front of the camp there was posted another guard, under Caius Cluvius, lieutenant-general, composed of three cohorts, a Firmian, a Vestinian, and a Cremonian; besides two troops of horse, a Placentine and an Æsernian. While there was quiet at the river, neither party making an attack; about the ninth hour, a horse, breaking loose from those who had the care of him, ran off towards the farther bank, and three Roman soldiers followed him through the water, which was about as high as their knees. At the same time two Thracians endeavoured to bring the horse from the middle of the channel to their own bank; but one of these having been slain, and the horse having been recovered, they retired to their post. On the enemy’s bank there was a body of eight hundred Thracians, of whom a few, at first enraged at their countryman being killed before their eyes, crossed the river in pursuit of his slayers; in a little time some more, and at last all of them, and engaged with the guard which defended the bank on the Roman side. Some authors say, that by the command of Paullus, the horse was driven without a bridle to the enemy’s side, and men sent to bring him back, in order that the enemy might first provoke the conflict. For when favourable auspices were not obtained by the first twenty victims, at length the haruspices declared, “that the entrails of the twenty-first portended victory to the Romans, provided they acted only upon the defensive, without striking the first blow.” However, whether by the design of the leader or by accident, the battle was certainly brought about from this commencement, and, in a short time, was so augmented by party after party on both sides flying to carry succour to their comrades, that the commanders were compelled to come down to a general decision of the contest; for Æmilius, on hearing the tumult, came forth from his tent, and when it seemed neither easy nor safe to recall or stop the impetuosity of those who were rushing to arms, he thought it best to avail himself of the ardour of the soldiers, and to turn an accident into an opportunity. He therefore led out his forces from the camp, and riding among their ranks exhorted them to enter upon the contest they had so greatly desired with corresponding ardour. At the same time Nasica, having been sent forward to reconnoitre what was the position of affairs amongst those who were engaged in the commencing conflict, announced that Perseus was approaching with his army in battle-array. First marched the Thracians, men of fierce countenance and tall of stature, and protected on their left side by bucklers which shone with remarkable brightness. A black cloak covered both shoulders, and on their right they brandished from time to time a sword of enormous weight. Next to the Thracians stood the hired auxiliaries, their armour and costume differing according to their respective nations; and among these were some Pæonians. Next came a band of the Macedonians themselves, which they called the phalanx of the Leucaspides. A few selected for their strength and valour were more conspicuous, shining in gilded armour and scarlet cloaks: this was the middle of the army. These were succeeded by those whom they called Chalcaspides, from their brazen and glittering bucklers. This phalanx was placed next to the other on the right wing. Besides these two phalanxes, which constituted the chief strength of the Macedonian army, the targeteers, who were also Macedonians, and carried pikes like those of the phalanx, but in other respects more lightly armed, were distributed on the wings advanced, and projecting beyond the rest of the line. The plain was illuminated with the brightness of their arms, the neighbouring hills echoed with their shouts, as they mutually cheered each other on. Such was the swiftness and boldness of all these forces as they came out to the fight, that those who were first slain fell at two hundred and fifty paces from the Roman camp. Meanwhile Æmilius advanced, and when he saw not only the other Macedonians, but those who constituted the phalanx, some with their bucklers, and some with their targets removed from their shoulders, and with their pikes inclined in one direction receiving the attack of the Romans, admiring the firmness of the serried ranks, and the bristling rampart of outstretched pikes, he was smitten at once with astonishment and terror, as if he had never seen so fearful a spectacle, and was afterwards in the habit of frequently referring to it, and making this statement respecting himself. Carefully concealing however at the time the agitation of his troubled mind, he with serene countenance and careless aspect, and with his head and body undefended, drew up his line. The Pelignians were now fighting against the targeteers, who were ranged opposite to them, and when, after long and laborious efforts, they were unable to break through that compact array, Salius, who was commanding the Pelignians, seized a standard and threw it among the enemy. On this a prodigious conflict was excited, whilst on the one side the Pelignians strove with all their might to recover the standard, the Macedonians on the other to retain possession of it. The former strove either to cut through the long spears of the Macedonians, or to repel them with the bosses of their bucklers, or in some instances to turn them aside even with their naked hands, while the latter drove them firmly grasped with both hands with such force against the enemy, who rushed on with rash and heedless fury, that, penetrating shields and bucklers, they overthrew the men transfixed in like manner. The first ranks of the Pelignians having been thus defeated, those who stood behind them were also cut down, and the rest retreated towards the mountain which the inhabitants call Mount Olocrus, though not yet in open flight. On this the grief of Æmilius burst forth, so that he even rent his robe with mortification, for in other places as well he saw that his men were hanging back and approaching with timidity that hedge of steel, as it were, with which the Macedonian line bristled in every part. But that skilful general observed that this conjunction of the foe was not every where close, but that here and there it opened with little interstices, either on account of the unevenness of the ground, or on account of the very length of its front, which was immensely extended, while those who attempted to occupy higher ground were necessarily, though unwillingly, separated from those who occupied lower positions, or those who were slower from those who were faster, and those who advanced from those who held back, and lastly, those who pressed upon the enemy from those who were repulsed. In order, therefore, entirely to break the ranks of the enemy, and to distribute the irresistible attack of the entire phalanx into a number of separate conflicts, he commanded his men, that wherever they should see the line of the enemy present openings, they should individually rush to those spots, and insinuating themselves like a wedge into such spaces, however narrow their extent, they should fight with impetuosity. This order having been issued and spread through the whole army, he led on in person one of the legions to the battle.

41. The troops were impressed by the high dignity of his office, the personal renown of the man, and, above all, by his age: for, though more than sixty years old, he discharged the duties of youth, taking on himself the principal share both of the labour and danger. His legion filled up the space between the targeteers and the phalanxes, and thus disunited the enemy’s line. Behind him were the targeteers, and his front faced the shielded phalanx of Chalcaspides. Lucius Albinus, a man of consular rank, was ordered to lead on the second legion against the phalanx of the Leucaspides, which formed the centre of the enemy’s line. On the right wing, where the fight began, at the river, he brought forward the elephants, with the cohorts of allied cavalry; and from this quarter the retreat of the Macedonians first began. For as new contrivances generally make an important figure in the words of men, but on being put in practice ofttimes prove vain and ineffectual, so on that occasion the elephants in the line of battle were a mere name, without the least use. Their attack was followed by the Latin allies, who forced the enemy’s left wing to give way. In the centre, the second legion charged and dispersed the phalanx; nor was there any more evident cause of the victory, than there being many distinct fights, which first disordered that body, when it wavered, and at last quite broke it. Its force, while it is compact and bristling with extended spears, is irresistible; but if, by attacking them separately, you force them to turn about their spears, which, on account of their length and weight, are unwieldy, they are mingled in a confused mass; and, if any disorder arises on the flank or rear, they fall into irretrievable disorder. Thus, now, they were obliged to oppose the Romans in small parties, and with their own line broken into numerous divisions; and the Romans, when any opening was made, worked themselves into their ranks. But had they advanced with their entire line, straight against the phalanx when in its regular order, just as happened to the Pelignians, who, in the beginning of the battle, incautiously engaged the targeteers; they would have impaled themselves on the spears, and would have been unable to withstand such a firm body.

42. But though a massacre was made of the infantry on all sides, except those who threw away their arms and fled, the cavalry quitted the field with scarcely any loss. The king himself was the first in flight. With the sacred squadrons of horse he took the road to Pella, and was quickly followed by Cotys and the Odrysian cavalry. The other wings of the Macedonians, likewise, went off with full ranks: because, as the line of infantry stood in the way, the slaughter of them detained the conquerors, and made them careless of pursuing the cavalry. For a long time, the men of the phalanx were cut off, in front, on the flanks, and on the rear; at last, such as could avoid the enemy’s hands, fled unarmed towards the sea; some even ran into the water, and, stretching out their hands to those on board the fleet, humbly begged their lives. And when they saw boats coming from all the ships, supposing that they were coming to take them in rather than to slay them, advanced farther into the water, so that some of them even swam. But, when they were cut to pieces as enemies by the boats, such as were able regained the land by swimming back, where they met with a more dreadful death; for the elephants, which their riders had driven down to the shore, trod them under foot, and crushed them in pieces. It was generally acknowledged, that the Macedonians never lost so great a number of men in any battle with the Romans; for their killed amounted to twenty thousand; six thousand, who made their escape from the field to Pydna, fell alive into the hands of the Romans, and five thousand were taken straggling through the country. Of the victorious army there fell not more than one hundred, the greater part of whom were Pelignians; but a much greater number were wounded. If the battle had been begun earlier, so that the conquerors might have had daylight enough for a pursuit, all their troops must have been utterly destroyed. As it happened, the approach of night both screened the fugitives, and made the Romans unwilling to follow them through an unknown country.

43. Perseus fled as far as the Pierian wood, with a military appearance, being attended by a numerous body of horse, together with his royal retinue; but when he came into the thicket, where there were numerous paths in different directions, and when darkness came on, he turned out of the main path with a very few, in whom he placed the greatest confidence. The horsemen, abandoned by their leader, dispersed, in different directions, to their respective homes; some of whom made their way to Pella, quicker than Perseus himself, because they went by the straight and open road. The king was hindered by his fears and the many difficulties of the way, till near midnight. Perseus was met at the palace by Euctus, governor of Pella, and the royal pages; but of all his friends who had escaped from the battle by various chances, and had reached Pella, not one would come near him, though they were repeatedly sent for. Only three persons accompanied him in his flight; Evander a Cretan, Neo a Bœotian, and Archidamus an Ætolian. With these he continued his retreat, at the fourth watch; for he began to fear, lest those who had refused to obey his summons, might, presently, attempt something more audacious. He had an escort of about five hundred Cretans. He took the road to Amphipolis; leaving Pella in the night, and hastening to get over the river Axius before daylight, as he thought that it, from the difficulty of passing it, would put an end to the further pursuit of the Romans.

44. The consul, when he returned victorious to his camp, to mar his entire joy, was much distressed by concern for his younger son. This was Publius Scipio, who afterwards acquired the title of Africanus by the destruction of Carthage. He was, by birth, the son of the consul Paullus, and by adoption, the grandson of the elder Africanus. He was then only in the seventeenth year of his age, which circumstance heightened his father’s anxiety; for, pursuing the enemy with eagerness, he had been carried away by the crowd to a distant part. But when he returned late in the evening, the consul, having received his son in safety, felt unmixed joy for the very important victory. When the news of the battle reached Amphipolis, the matrons ran together to the temple of Diana, whom they style Tauropolos, to implore her aid. Diodorus, who was governor of the city, fearing lest the Thracians, of whom there were two thousand in garrison, might, during the confusion, plunder the city, contrived to receive in the middle of the forum a letter through a person whom he had deceitfully suborned to personate a courier. The contents of it were, that “the Romans had put in their fleet at Emathia, and were ravaging the territory round; and that the governors of Emathia besought him to send a reinforcement to oppose the ravagers.” After reading this, he desired the Thracians to march to the relief of the coast of Emathia, telling them, as an encouragement, that the Romans being dispersed through the country, they might easily kill many of them, and gain a large booty. At the same time he threw discredit on the report of the defeat, alleging that, if it were true, many would have come thither direct from the retreat. Having, on this pretence, sent the Thracians out of the town, he no sooner saw them pass the river Strynion, than he shut the gates.

45. On the third day after the battle, Perseus arrived at Amphipolis, and sent thence to Paullus suppliant ambassadors, with the wand of peace. In the mean time, Hippias Medon, and Pantauchus, the principal friends of the king, went themselves to the consul, and surrendered to the Romans the city of Berœa, to which they had fled after the battle; and several other cities, struck with fear, prepared to do the same. The consul despatched to Rome, with letters and the news of his victory, his son Quintus Fabius, Lucius Lentulus, and Quintus Metellus. He gave to his infantry the spoils of the enemy who were slain, and to his cavalry the plunder of the circumjacent country, provided, however, that they did not stay out of the camp longer than two nights. He himself then removed nearer the sea towards Pydna. Berœa, Thessalonica, and Pella, and indeed almost every city in Macedonia, successively surrendered within two days. The inhabitants of Pydna, which was the nearest, had not yet sent any ambassadors; the confused multitude, made up of many different nations, with the numbers who had been driven into one place in their flight from the battle, embarrassed the counsels and unanimity of the inhabitants; the gates, too, were not only shut, but closed up with walls. Milo and Pantauchus were sent to confer, under the wall, with Solon, who commanded in the place. By his means the crowd of military people were sent away, and the town was surrendered and given up to the soldiers to be plundered. Perseus, after making a single effort to procure the assistance of the Basaltians, to whom he had sent ambassadors in vain, came forth into a general assembly, bringing with him his son Philip, in order to encourage the Amphipolitans themselves, and to raise the spirits of those horse and foot soldiers who had either constantly accompanied him, or had happened to fly to the same place. But, though he made several attempts to speak, he was always stopped by his tears; so that, finding himself unable to proceed, he told Evander, the Cretan, what he wished to have laid before the people, and came down from the tribunal. Although the multitude, on observing the aspect of the king, and his pitiable weeping, had themselves sighed and wept with him, yet they refused to listen to the discourse of Evander; and some, from the middle of the assembly, had the assurance to interrupt him, exclaiming, “Depart to some other place, that the few of us who are left alive may not be destroyed on your account.” Their daring opposition stopped Evander’s mouth. The king retired to his palace; and, causing his treasures to be put on board some barks which lay in the Strymon, went down himself to the river. The Thracians would not venture to trust themselves on board, but went off to their own homes, as did the rest of the soldiers. The Cretans only followed in hope of the money: but, as any distribution of it among them would probably raise more discontent than gratitude, fifty talents[97] were laid for them on the bank, to be scrambled for. After this scramble they went on board, yet in such hurry and disorder, that they sunk one of the barks, which was swamped by numbers in the mouth of the river. They arrived that day at Galepsus, and the next at Samothrace, to which they were bound. Thither it is said that as many as two thousand talents[98] were conveyed.

46. Paullus sent officers to hold the government of the several cities which had surrendered; lest, at a time when peace was but newly restored, the conquered might suffer any ill treatment. He detained with himself the ambassadors of Perseus; and, being uninformed of the flight of the king, detached Publius Nasica, with a small party of horse and foot, to Amphipolis, both that he might lay waste the country of Sintice, and be ready to obstruct every effort of the king. In the mean time, Melibœa was taken and sacked by Cneius Octavius. At Æginium, to which Cneius Anicius, a lieutenant-general, had been despatched, two hundred men were lost by a sally made from the town; the Æginians not being aware that the war was at an end. The consul, quitting Pydna, arrived with his whole army, on the second day, at Pella; and, pitching his camp at the distance of a mile from it, remained in that station for several days, reconnoitring on all sides the situation of the city; and he perceived that it was chosen to be the capital of the kingdom, not without good reason. It stands on a hill which faces the south-west, and is surrounded by morasses, formed by stagnant waters from the adjacent lakes, so deep as to be impassable either in winter or summer. In the part of the morass nearest to the city the citadel rises up like an island, being built on a mound of earth formed with immense labour, so as to be capable of supporting the wall, and secure against any injury from the water of the surrounding marsh. At a distance it seems to join the city rampart, but is divided from it by a river, and united by a bridge; so that if externally invaded it has no access from any part, and if the king chooses to confine any person within it, there is no way for an escape except by that bridge, which can be guarded with great ease. This was the depository of the royal treasure; but, at that time, there was nothing found there but the three hundred talents which had been sent to king Gentius, and afterwards brought back. While they were stationed at Pella, audience was given to a great number of embassies, which came with congratulations, especially out of Thessaly. Then, receiving intelligence that Perseus had passed over to Samothrace, the consul departed from Pella, and after four days’ march, arrived at Amphipolis. Here the whole multitude poured out of the town to meet him; a plain demonstration that the people considered themselves not as _bereft of a good and just king, but as delivered from a haughty tyrant. Paullus having entered the city while engaged in religious services, and performing a solemn sacrifice, the altar was suddenly kindled by lightning, while all considered the event to signify that the offerings of the consul were most acceptable to the gods, since they were consecrated by fire from heaven. The consul, after a short delay at Amphipolis, proceeded at once in pursuit of Perseus, and also that he might carry his victorious arms round to all the nations which had been under his sway, made for the province of Odomantice, a region beyond the river Strymon, and encamped at Siræ_.