Chapter III: Part 3

The Chen Yuen had on board her the famous Captain McGiffin, who wrote a great deal about his adventures in the fight. He was an American, who was usually described as commander of the ship and as having fought the battle. He was photographed against the hits in a desperately wounded condition, but afterwards it was surmised that he was not blind to dramatic effect. His narratives can hardly be accepted as historical evidence, save in a general way.

The next ship of interest at the battle of Yalu was the Elswick cruiser, Chih Yuen. She is described in most accounts of the Yalu as having very gallantly charged the entire Japanese fleet, attempting to ram; a tremendous fire was poured into her till she went down, and there was an end of her. According to Japanese officers, what really happened was that at an early stage in the action her steering-gear got disabled; she was simply wandering about unable to do anything. She was simply a cloud of white smoke drifting along. The Takachiho, one of the Japanese cruisers, had a 10-in. gun. She waited until the Chih Yuen was within something like 400 yards, when they could not miss, then let drive with this 10-in. They did not attempt to pick out any particular part of the Chih Yuen; they simply fired “into the brown.” They hit her somewhere rather high up near the funnel; there was a tremendous cloud of white smoke, which became red, and when that cloud went the ship was gone. There is no idea that any magazine was hit, or that there was any ammunition on deck to account for it, and the favourite theory of the Japanese officers is that this particular hit upset her stability in some way and did the finishing touch, and thus caused her to capsize.

SINKING OF THE KING YUEN (p. 139).]

Opposite is a sketch by a Japanese officer of the sinking of the King Yuen, which was a small Chinese ironclad. There is a great deal of mystery in all the histories as to how that ship really did go down. The Japanese account of it is that “she was on fire, and apparently the fire could not be put out; she began to roll very much indeed—first very heavily over one way and then very heavily over the other way; she continued rolling like that, and one time she rolled and did not come back.”

She had a sister ship, the Lai Yuen. This ship was set on fire at an early stage of the action, and the Chinese apparently did not trouble to put the fire out. The consequence was it got a large hold and burnt every scrap of woodwork in the ship. But the extraordinary thing is that her people managed to go on fighting. Of her deck nothing was left but twisted beams. The ship was nearly white-hot, and a number of men got roasted to death in her; but she was still in fighting condition when the battle ended. Probably only Chinamen could have fought in such conditions.

The Ching Yuen was set on fire, but not badly hit in any way.

There were two other Chinese ships lost, the Tchao Yung and the Yang Wei. These were set on fire at a very early stage, and most of the accounts that we hear of the danger of fire in action are based upon these two particular ships. It appears that their captains were economical men, who liked to make a little money; so when the ships were painted they did not scrape off the old paint, and as the ships were about twelve years old the paint got very thick. Moreover, as they found kerosine cheaper than linseed oil, they mixed the paint always with kerosine. The ships, therefore, were of a somewhat inflammable nature. When they got hit, the men trying to put the fire out got hit also, and the ships were then simply left to blaze away. That is the true cause of most of the fire scares that happened just after Yalu.

The Chinese shell were very defective indeed. They had very few shell with any charges; nearly all they had to fire with were solid shot or cement shell, the very worst possible thing for firing at cruisers with; and this fact that they had no good shell must, perhaps, account for the survival of the Japanese fleet. For although just after Yalu the Japanese said that their shooting was 15 per cent. and the Chinese 10 per cent., they have since stated that the Chinese hits were something like 25 per cent. and their own about 12 per cent., and they say that in the early stages of the battle the Chinese never missed a single shot with their big guns—they hit every ship that they fired at; and they describe them as being some of the best gunners in the world—that these No. 1 Chinese gunners were born shots; but gradually, as the battle went on, the Japanese 3-pounders and machine guns playing on the Chinese ships took off the heads of those men, and they were replaced by other men who were not such good shots, and this went on until, towards the end of the battle, practically no hitting at all was done by the Chinese. But in the early part of the fight their shooting was very good indeed.

The Japanese in their fleet had three enormous guns, each of 66 tons, which would penetrate something like double the thickness of any armour opposed to them. Only one of those guns seems to have been in a condition to fire. In the excitement of the battle the Japanese got something wrong with the gear, and had to manipulate them by hand; and the consequence was that two of those guns fired about once each, and the third once an hour. It is unfortunate that these guns did not secure at least one fair and square hit—the data of it would have been extremely valuable.

After the battle of Yalu the Chinese ships were patched up. The Tche Yuen, which had already taken part in the battle of Asan, took part in Yalu, but was then knocked about and ran away. Although she had been so badly hit in the battle of Asan, when she was doing the strategical movement at the rear, she only took eight days to patch up, and she was then able to go out to sea again. After Yalu she was very quickly got ready once more.

The first conclusion one is forced to is that penetration does not seem to have done anything in this battle. Where a gun was matched against some very inferior armour, it went through and smashed it up, but wherever the armour that it ought to penetrate was anything like equal to the gun, the result was failure.

The second point is the astonishing amount of hitting that all these ships seem to have been able to stand. There are many cases of quite little ships that in theory one single shell would finish, but it has taken five or six shells to disable them at all, and in a week or two they have been fit to go out fighting again. The Saikio-maru, and the way she was hammered and still managed to go on fighting and remain in a fairly good condition, is a particular case in point. Although the upper works may be knocked about and splintered, and so on, it does not seem much good splintering the upper works and making a mess of the ship unless there is a gun near it, and somebody to be disabled. Now, this conclusion is dead against the “moral effect” theory. It is almost a gospel that if the upper works are shelled enough the crew somewhere else will get demoralised. I do not believe it; they will not in a modern war be aware of it. I think this point should be laid to heart and thought over by those who have 6-in. guns to attack ships with. To do harm, they must fire those guns with all the intelligence they can bring to bear.

On the other hand, it is well to remember, as in the case of the King Yuen and Chih Yuen, that hits in the upper works caused the loss of these ships by affecting stability, so far as can be gathered in the absence of the hulls now at the bottom of the Yellow Sea.

ON BOARD THE TING YUEN AFTER THE SURRENDER AT WEI-HAI-WEI.]

A third point is, that the danger from fire in action is grossly exaggerated. As to the Japanese, they one and all say that they had no trouble with fire at Yalu. They have not entirely done away with woodwork in their ships. Following the fashion set by the Germans, they have done away with a fair amount, but their ships are by no means without wood, like German ships and others which have not been in action—though even Germans are now reverting to a certain amount of wood. The Japanese say that they had buckets of water standing round; the men ran to the buckets of water, and the fire was under. The Chinese had exactly the same system, and they had no trouble till about the end of the action, when they got demoralised, and then the fire began to get headway. Hose pipes seem to have always been untrustworthy, too liable to be holed by splinters. Wet sand proved excellent. It may be noted that hits on the sea near the ships deluged all the exposed parts of ships at Yalu with water. The loss of life was returned as follows:—

Japanese—90 killed, 204 wounded.
Chinese—36 killed, 88 wounded, 700 drowned (approximate).

Details (official) of the losses are:—

JAPANESE.

+-------------+--------------+--------------+
| | Killed. | Wounded. |
| +---------+----+---------+----+
| |Officers.|Men.|Officers.|Men.|
+-------------+---------+----+---------+----+
|Matsushima | 2 | 33 | 5 | 71 |
|Chiyoda | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
|Itsukushima | 0 | 13 | 1 | 17 |
|Hashidate | 2 | 1 | 0 | 9 |
|Hi-yei | 3 | 16 | 3 | 34 |
|Fusoo | 0 | 2 | 2 | 10 |
|Yoshino | 0 | 1 | 2 | 9 |
|Takachiho | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 |
|Akitsusu | 1 | 4 | 0 | 10 |
|Naniwa | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
|Akagi | 2 | 9 | 2 | 15 |
|Saikio | 0 | 0 | 1 | 10 |
| +---------+----+---------+----+
| Total | 10 | 80 | 16 |188 |
+-------------+---------+----+---------+----+

Total killed and wounded, 294. Wounded who died subsequently were:
Matsushima, 1 officer and 21 men;
Itsukushima, 1 man;
Hi-yei, 4 men;
Fusoo, 1 officer and 2 men;
Yoshino, 1 officer; and
Saikio, 1 man.

CHINESE.

+----------+-------+--------+--------+------+
| |Killed.|Wounded.|Drowned.|Total.|
+----------+-------+--------+--------+------+
|Ting Yuen | 14 | 25 | | 39 |
|Lai Yuen | 10 | 20 | | 30 |
|Chen Yuen | 7 | 15 | | 22 |
|Ching Yuen| 2 | 14 | | 16 |
|Tche Yuen | 3 | 0 | | 3 |
|Ping Yuen | 0 | 12 | | 12 |
|Kuang Chi | 0 | 2 | | 2 |
|Chih Yuen | ? | ? | 200 | 200 |
|King Yuen | ? | ? | 200 | 200 |
|Tchao Yong| ? | ? | | ? |
|Yang Wei | ? | ? | | ? |
+----------+-------+--------+--------+------+

During the battle both the Tche Yuen and Kuang Chi ran away. The first reached Port Arthur, and her captain was beheaded; the other ran ashore at Talienwan, and remained there till she was found on the 23rd by the Naniwa and Akitsushima, which destroyed her. The Yang Wei was finished by a spar torpedo on the 18th.

The remaining Chinese ships reached Port Arthur without adventure, and “victory” was celebrated by the draping of all guns, save those of the Tche Yuen, in red. They refitted very slowly.[25]

[25] Some of the dead were not removed for a fortnight.

The Japanese, on the other hand, kept the sea, repairing ships—except the Matsushima—in secluded bays. The least damaged cruisers watched Port Arthur and Wei-hai-wei.

On October 20th the Chinese were all repaired, and went to Wei-hai-wei, whence Admiral Ting meanwhile cruised aimlessly; but no action took place, and on November 7th he returned to Wei-hai-wei. Here the Chen Yuen ran ashore while entering harbour, and did not get off for three weeks. She was not repaired till the middle of January, a great hole in her bottom having to be mended. This was done with cement.

Meanwhile the Japanese, ignoring Ting, concentrated efforts on Port Arthur, the Lao Tung Peninsula being invaded while the Japanese fleet lay blockading the enemy in Wei-hai-wei. On the 20th he returned to Port Arthur, leaving a few cruisers to watch Ting, and the rest of the fleet took part in the fighting there.

The fleet was in four divisions:—

I.
Matsushima. Itsukushima.
Hashidate. Chiyoda

II.
Fuso. Hi-Yei.
Takao. Yayeyama.

III.
Yoshino. Naniwa.
Akitsushima. Takachiho.

IV.
Two divisions of 5 torpedo boats each,
and some gunboats inshore.

[This fleet moved parallel with the army on shore, and occasionally shelled the Chinese.]

On the 21st the fleet steamed past the harbour entrance, about seven miles out. They then detached the Chiyoda, which went to Pigeon Bay, and shelled Port Arthur at extreme range till 4 p.m.

At that time the Chinese fired at the fleet without result, till a heavy squall came on, in the midst of which the torpedo boats rushed the harbour. Excellently manœuvred, they got in untouched, and shelled the disorganised Chinese in the town. Outside, the Japanese soldiers were carrying fort after fort, the defence being poor, as the Chinese grew panic-stricken.

“THE MASSACRE AT PORT ARTHUR.”

Then followed the Port Arthur massacre, horrible stories of which flooded the world for the next few days. It has been strenuously denied that any massacre took place, but this is not correct. Few, if any, civilians were killed; there were next to none in the place, the supposed dead civilians being Chinese soldiers, who had discarded the overcoats, which were the only uniform they had, in order to continue the fight on guerilla lines. But very little quarter was given.

A Japanese disavowal and explanation will be found below:—

To the Editor of the _Japan Mail_.

SIR,—In September last, for the purpose of studying the
practical application of International Law, I joined the fleet,
and embarked in a man-of-war of the Imperial Japanese
Navy. I am now staying in Port Arthur, after witnessing
several battles. Being a subscriber to your paper, I saw in
the issue of the 21st January some singular statements by Mr.
Creelman, to which you refer. It being impossible for an
eye-witness like me to pass over such a matter in silence, I
enclose an explanation of this affair, in the hope that you will
kindly have it translated at your office, and published through
the columns of your valuable paper. What I write is an
accurate and faithful description of the things that actually
happened, and I vouch for their truth in the sight of Heaven.
Convinced that the contents of my letter are of value to the
public at large, I venture to trouble you, especially since my
facts may furnish material to strengthen the position you take
in the matter. Harassed by official business of various kinds,
I cannot find leisure to write at greater length, and must
crave your kind indulgence.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,
TAKAHASHI SAKUYE,
_Hogakushi_,
Professor at the Naval University, and Ex-legal Adviser to
the Commander-in-Chief of the Regular Imperial Fleet.

ENCLOSURE.

On the occasion of the battle of Port Arthur I was on board
the Itsukushima, and accurately observed the fight as
carried on both on shore and at sea. I saw how the Imperial
troops fought, and how the squadron co-operated with the
army off the coast of Port Arthur, and I watched the
movements of the enemy with the utmost vigilance. Similarly,
I carefully looked out for any incident that might furnish
material for the study of my special subject, and I do
not therefore hesitate to say that I am among those best
informed as to what actually took place on that occasion.
Equally, I do not hesitate to declare that I saw nothing
blameworthy about the assault on Port Arthur.

I have seen to-day in a copy of the _Japan Mail_ that
reached me, that Mr. Creelman, the war correspondent of
the _New York World_, wrote to that paper to the following
effect: “Torpedo boats were going through the waves, sinking
junks loaded with men, women, and children endeavouring
to escape. Ten junks, laden with terror-stricken people,
were thus sunk, and the water was filled with drowning
inhabitants.” While regretting, for the sake of Mr.
Creelman, whose honour as a gentleman may be impaired by
such absurd fabrications, I fear that the public might be
led astray by what he has written, and therefore I feel
constrained to refute the false statements made by him.

In the first place, the assertions of Mr. Creelman are
entirely imaginary; for his allegation that he saw from the
shore, on the day of the assault upon Port Arthur, that is,
on November 21, 1894, Japanese men-of-war and torpedo boats
in motion, cannot be founded on actual fact. It is true
that on the 21st men-of-war and torpedo boats were off the
coast of Port Arthur, but for two days, from the evening of
the 21st, they were away from the coast, owing to stress
of weather. Now, Port Arthur was not entirely taken on the
21st. Severe struggles were still in progress on that day.
Hence it was practically impossible at such a juncture to
see the warships and torpedo boats in motion off the coast
of Port Arthur, and the fictitiousness of any statement to
the contrary will be admitted by any one actually at the
scene of the battle. On that same day certain staff officers
of the Army, desiring to communicate some intelligence
to the fleet, could only effect their object by braving
extraordinary dangers and hardships, and by passing through
the lines of the enemy. How, then, could Mr. Creelman have
seen the movements of the fleet and the torpedo flotilla
except in pure imagination!

Secondly, while the fleet and flotilla were lying off the
coast of Port Arthur and in the vicinity, from 5 a.m. to 6
p.m. on the 21st, not a single Chinese junk was captured.
Only two junks escaped that day, at a little past 5 p.m.
But the commander of the fleet had specially ordered that
any small vessel of the kind should be let alone, attention
being paid to the larger only. No other junk escaped. It is
true that there were five or six junks on the shore, close
by the foot of Lao-Tie-Shan, but they were all beached.
Thus the statement that junks, loaded with men, women, and
children, were sunk is not only absolutely groundless, but
the very allegation that such a number of junks attempted to
escape is a fabrication.

Thirdly, it is a fact that at a little past 4 p.m. two
steamers emerged from Port Arthur. It was subsequently
known by the confession of Chinese prisoners that a number
of Chinese officers were on these vessels. It is also a
fact that torpedo boats pursued these steamers. It would
have been a neglect of duty on the part of the fleet to
disregard the escape of such vessels. When the torpedo boats
gave chase to the steamers, they signalled, “Heave-to, or
take the consequence.” The steamers not obeying, two blank
cartridges were fired after them, but they still kept on
their course. Moreover, they returned the fire of their
pursuers, and the latter therefore began to chase them with
more vigour. Thereat one of the steamers turned back into
the harbour, and the other changing its course, ran ashore,
and all the persons on board fled. Was not this procedure on
the part of the Japanese officers perfectly proper, and in
strict accordance with the canons of western nations?

The foregoing explanations are sufficient to prove the
falsehood of Mr. Creelman’s statements. I regret that he
should be so lost to the sense of honour as to fabricate
such injurious stories. In order that the public may not be
deceived, I beg you to give publicity to these facts.

Your obedient servant,
TAKAHASHI SAKUYE,
_Hogakushi_.

Port Arthur,
_February 11, 1895_.

This disposes of the most gruesome fictions about the massacre, but it does not deal with what took place on shore.

The true story, as I had it from a Japanese army officer who was there, is as follows:—

The battle was over, and the Japanese were marching into the town, a few Chinese retreating before them. Isolated fighting continued; but the place was, to all intents and purposes, captured.

As the victorious Japanese pressed forward, a young officer suddenly came across the remains of his brother, who had been captured, wounded, a day or two before. The body showed that death had been inflicted with atrocious Chinese tortures.

Maddened at this dreadful sight, the young officer practically ran amok. Crying “No quarter,” he began to kill. His men, understanding the cause, started on the same career of vengeance; and it spread like wildfire through the army, that the town was full of the corpses of tortured Japanese prisoners, and two or three regiments got out of hand. For some time “Vengeance” was the battle-cry, and terrible things happened that night.

Before we blame the Japanese, we should remember that our own hands are not quite clean in this matter; human nature has its limitations, and there are many men still living who can recall what they did when, in the Indian Mutiny, they found rebels red-handed among the tortured and outraged bodies of British ladies and children. Armchair ethics may condemn; but the armchair critics sit at home doing the condemnation. It is less easy to be philosophical in the hour of battle. The philosopher must have been through it, and abstained from slaughter, for his strictures to be worth anything. Personally, I think few things come more under the head of “excusable” than the Port Arthur massacre, so long as human nature remains human.

Port Arthur was converted into a Japanese base, and for a few weeks events languished, while preparations were made for the attack on Wei-hai-wei.

VII WEI-HAI-WEI

On January 18, 1895, the Japanese fleet bombarded Teng-ckow-foo, facing Port Arthur on the Chinese mainland. It is about eight miles west of Wei-hai-wei.

On the 19th the bombardment was continued; on the 20th the army was landed to the east of Wei-hai-wei.

Wei-hai-wei was moderately fortified, chiefly with 8-in. Krupp guns. There were a few larger ones, and a sprinkling of modern pieces. Mostly, however, the guns were old. On Leu-Kun tau[26] were some more forts, a gunnery school, and a coaling station. The Chinese fleet lay behind this island, the Japanese watching both entrances, which were protected by booms.

[26] _Tau_ means island.

On the 30th the Japanese fleet and army opened fire on the defences. In this affair the Chao-pei-tsui defences were silenced by the Naniwa, Akitsushima, and Katsuragi, the division being under command of Captain (now Admiral) Togo. The magazine was exploded, and the forts taken possession of by the Japanese soldiers. Before retreating, however, the Chinese destroyed all save a few old guns.

The rest of the fleet bombarded Leu-Kun tau without much result on either side. The Chinese warships took part in the defence. A photograph of this battle, taken from a captured fort, is given.

The net result, however, of the operations of the 30th to 31st was that the Japanese took practically everything except the island. On the night of the 31st, Admiral Ito decided on a torpedo-boat attack. Both entrances had some boom defence, with gaps here and there. The Japanese attempted to attack by the east with sixteen boats.

Division I. six boats.
” II. six ”
” III. four ”

The Japanese soldiers in the forts took them for Chinese, so they retired.

A heavy gale came on next day, and the whole Japanese fleet ran to shelter at Teng-chow, returning on February 2nd, when another ineffectual bombardment at 2500 metres took place. An equally ineffective torpedo attack was tried in the night. It failed, as the Chinese sighted the boats, and they wisely did not try to force their way in.

Next day, and the next again, the bombardment was violently renewed, but on both sides it led to nothing save expenditure of ammunition. Landings on Leu-Kun tau led to nothing, and the only incident of real moment was the rushing out of twelve Chinese torpedo boats on the 4th.

Several were sunk as they came out; the rest ran ashore, and were captured or destroyed. So far as can be gathered, Ting had found his boats a nuisance, and was in terror of the Japanese boats being allowed in in mistake for Chinese ones. He also appears to have imagined that a daylight attack might produce something in his favour; but the balance of evidence seems to point to the fact that the boats were a nuisance to him.

Whatever was intended, the Chinese boats made no attack on the Japanese cruisers; escape was their only objective. Only two succeeded in getting away.

On the night of the 4th the third torpedo attack was made. The boats went in in three divisions of four each, though only the second and third divisions went in—the first being employed to create a diversion at the western entrance.

The eastern boats crept in slowly, in a cold so intense that an officer and two men were frozen to death. Two boats (8 and 21), their steersmen frost-bitten, grounded as they tried to enter.

By four o’clock a boat had got quite near the Chinese, and fired two torpedoes without result; a second boat was no luckier with three. Not till then did the Chinese open fire, and this boat ran ashore immediately afterwards.

Two more boats collided in the confusion, another had her boilers burst, yet another was badly hit. Only one boat came out unscathed. As mentioned further on in “Personal Characteristics,” the real truth of the attack has never been known, and never will be, save vaguely.[27]

[27] See this chapter for the reason why.

Its result, however, is well known, the battleship Ting Yuen was hit in the stern and sank in the mud, where she lay with her upper works above water and guns still firing.

Throughout the 5th the bombardment continued unabated, and though no harm was done, the ceaseless worry told heavily on the Chinese.

On the night of the 5th a fourth attack was made by the first division. It met with little resistance, torpedoed the Lai Yuen and a despatch vessel, the Wei Yuen, and also hit the Ching Yuen in the bow without sinking her. The boats met with no defence worth mentioning; the Chinese look-outs, worn out with the ceaseless bombardments, were mostly asleep.

On the 6th a landing was effected on Leu-Kun tau, and on the 7th the usual bombardment continued. The Matsushima, Naniwa, and Yoshino were hit, but the Chinese lost a magazine, blown up.

On the 9th the Ching Yuen sank, her end being accelerated by a water-line hit from a shore gun. The Itsukushima was hit on the water-line this day by a shell from the 12-in. guns of the Chen Yuen, but the shell failed to burst. On the 10th and 11th the bombardment still continued. Only one fort now remained to the Chinese, but their ships still afloat were comparatively little hurt. The moral effect of the continuous firing finally broke them down, and on the 12th, in the midst of the firing, a gunboat flying a white flag came out.

The Japanese ceased fire, and the gunboat came to the Matsushima. Two officers from the Chinese fleet came on board, and delivered a letter from Admiral Ting to Admiral Ito, suggesting terms of surrender. It is worthy of note that, so one of the Malsushima’s officers told me, these two Chinamen, on being taken to the wardroom to await Admiral Ito’s reply, promptly and instantly fell asleep, and were only awakened later with the greatest difficulty. They were absolutely worn out. It is stated, also, that the whole of the beleaguered crews did the same thing directly firing ceased; want of sleep was, indeed, the immediate cause of Admiral Ting’s surrender, though, of course, his position was absolutely hopeless.

Ting surrendered on condition that the lives of his men were spared, but he and his principal officers committed suicide. The whole of the defenders were executed by the Chinese at the first available opportunity.

Japanese naval losses during this affair were officially given as:—

2 officers and 27 men killed.
4 ” ” 32 ” wounded.

On shore the army lost much more heavily, as during the fighting the entire force occupying one captured fort were destroyed by the Chen Yuen, which steamed up close to them and opened fire.

JAPANESE FLEET BOMBARDING WEI-HAI-WEI DURING THE WAR.]

Chinese losses were never stated, but they are believed to have been much less than was expected. The entire crews of the Lai Yuen and Wei Yuen were lost, and most of those in the Ching Yuen.

Wei-hai-wei was won chiefly through sheer human inability to stand the strain of the everlasting bombardment and torpedo menace. Guns accomplished practically nothing directly towards it, and even the torpedo _per se_ was not decisive. The principal factor was Admiral Ito’s persistent and unremitting attack.

With Wei-hai-wei the war was practically over. The only remaining incident of note was an attack on Formosa, in which, if all accounts are true, the Japanese did not shine very greatly, or else there are problems in war which in peace cannot be conceived. It is stated that the Japanese began to bombard at 8 a.m. The Chinese had loaded all guns; they left a few men to fire them, and then retired. Reply ceased about 8.30, but the Japanese did not, it is said, discover it till about 2 p.m. An explanation, of course, is that they did not trust the silence of the forts—which is reasonable enough. That they did not notice it is the accusation of their critics.

VIII AFTER THE WAR WITH CHINA

Save for a few torpedo boats lost, the war left the Japanese fleet unimpaired; the ships damaged at Yalu were in trim again when peace was declared. On the other hand, beyond the Chin Yen, Japan gained little in the ships she took. The Tche Yuen is of very small fighting value, the Ping Yuen of none, and none of the gunboats are of any utility. Of the captured torpedo boats, one was superior to any Japanese boat; the rest, from long neglect, were in a bad way.

Towards the end of the war the Esmeralda (now Idzumi), already described, passed from the Chilian to the Japanese Navy, and at its close the Tatsuta, detained _en route_, proceeded on her way.

Just before war broke out—in May, 1894—the Akaski, a sister to the Suma, had been laid down at Yokosuka; the two battleships Fuji and Yashima, of an improved Royal Sovereign type, were progressing in England, the former at the Thames Ironworks, the latter at Elswick.

The Suma was launched at Yokosuka on March 9, 1895. Unlike the Akitsushima and other ships which had preceded her, she is of entirely Japanese design and workmanship, and nothing more Western than an odd “stand-by man” or two assisted in her construction. Practically, she is the first Japanese-built ship. Particulars of her are:—

Displacement 2700 tons.
Material of hull Steel.
Length 305 ft.
Beam 41 ft.
Draught 16⅓ ft.
Armament Two 6-in. Q.F. 45 cals.
Six 4.7-in. Q.F. 45 cals.
Twelve 3-pdr. Q.F.
Four Nordenfelts.
Two torpedo tubes.
Horse-power (forced) 8500.
Boilers Cylindrical.
Number of boilers Eight.
Screws Two.
Type of engines Vertical triple expansion.
Where made Yokosuka.
Trial speed (forced draught) 20 knots.
Coal (normal) 200 tons.
” (maximum capacity) 600 tons.
Nominal radius at that 11,000 miles.

Protection is afforded by a steel deck 2 ins. on the slopes and 1 in. on the flat.

The Akashi, launched two years later, is a sister, without fighting-tops and more built-up amidships.

The Yashima was launched at Elswick on February 28, 1896; the Fuji at the Thames Ironworks on March 31st in the same year. Mr. G. C. Mackrow, of the Thames Ironworks, was the designer.

The following are particulars:—

Displacement 12450 tons.
Material Steel.
Length between perpendiculars 374 ft.
” over all 400 ft.
Beam 73½ ft.
Draught 30 ft.
Armament Four 12-in. 40 cals.
Ten 6-in. Q.F. 40 cals.
Twenty 3-pdr. Q.F.
Four 2½ pdr. Q.F.
One torpedo tube in bow.
Four broadside tubes (submerged).
Horse-power (natural draught)
on trials (10,000) Fuji, 10200.
Yashima, 9750.
Speed (natural draught) Fuji, 16.8 knots.
Yashima, 17.7 knots.
Horse-power (forced draught)
(14,000) Fuji, 14,100.
Yashima, 14,075.
Speed (forced draught) (contract
18 knots) Fuji, 18.5 knots.
Yashima, 19.2 knots.
Boilers Cylindrical
(with Humphrys’ ferrules).
Engines (by Humphrys and
Tennant) Triple expansion.
Screws Two.
Weight of armour 3000 tons.
Material of armour Harvey steel.
Normal coal 700 tons.
Bunker capacity 1100 tons.
Complement 600.

These ships are, as has been before noted, improved Royal Sovereigns. As designed, they would have differed from these ships only in that, being some 1500 tons smaller, they are able to carry less weight in the way of coal, etc. Their big guns, 12 in. against 13.5 in., are lighter, but against this must be put the fact that they carry heavy shields to them. Further, the introduction of Harvey steel in the place of compound armour greatly increased the value of their armour without adding to its weight. Regarded in the light of present-day developments, they are defective in protection to the secondary armament nearly as much as the Royal Sovereigns were before reconstruction. A comparison of the two ships, Fuji and Royal Sovereign, is of interest.

ROYAL
FUJI. SOVEREIGN.
Guns 4 A (12-in.). 4 A (13.5-in.).
10 D (6-in. Q.F.). 10 D (6-in. Q.F.).
Steel armour deck on slopes 2½ ins. 3 ins.
Belt (water-line) 18-16 ins. 18-8 ins.
Length of belt 226 ft. 250 ft.
Lower deck 4 ins. 4 ins.
Barbettes 14 ins. 17 ins.
Barbette guns Inclined thick No protection.
shields.
Bulkheads 14 ins. 16 ins.
Casemates (main deck),
thickness in front 6 ins. 6 ins.
Casemate backs 2 ins. 2 ins.
Coal carried normally 700. 900.
Capacity 1100. 1450.

The difference in armour value, caused by the introduction of Harvey process in time to allow of its adoption on the Fuji, is very marked. Since then, of course, Harvey has given place to Harvey nickel, and this in its turn to Krupp process armour, of which 9 ins. would nearly equal 17 ins. of Royal Sovereign armour. But their fine 12-in. guns, as powerful still as any afloat, keep the Fuji class still in the ranks of good fighting ships.

In appearance the two ships are almost identical, the only difference being in the arrangement of the ventilators.

Between them, however, an important difference exists; the Yashima has her dead wood cut away aft, while the Fugi has not. Consequently, the Yashima is much the handier vessel, but, in part from the fact that she was the first ship to have the dead wood aft cut away, in part from inherent weaknesses thereby engendered, the Fuji is regarded as the better ship of the two. The Yashima, being docked without proper precautions suitable to the case, exhibited some dropping aft, in consequence of the effect of the unsupported weight. This led to such sterns being countermanded for subsequent Japanese battleships, though in cruisers it is always applied. The turning circle of the Yoshima, it may be mentioned, is extremely small.

Finally, it may be noted that these two ships were the first to be fitted with the Elswick submerged torpedo tube. They have the earliest pattern, and it will not deliver torpedoes very successfully when the ship is at high speed.

THE “AFTER-THE-WAR PROGRAMME.”

After the war Japan decided to have a really first-class modern fleet of four battleships, six cruisers, and a proportionate number of smaller craft.

HATSUSE.]

The four big battleships are practically sisters, though differing in appearance and detail. The main differences are as follows:—

FUNNELS.

Shikishima 3
Hatsuse 3
Asahi 2
Mikasa 2

Little differences in rig have been purposely introduced; thus the Hatsuse is shorter-masted than the Shikishima, and the Asahi and Mikasa have their funnels differently placed, those of the latter being more amidships.

Also, instead of casemates, the Mikasa has her 6-in. battery protected by a continuous armoured wall. Essentially, however, the ships are sisters.

They were produced as follows:—

Shikishima, by Thames Ironworks, launched 1898.
Asahi, ” Clydebank, ” 1899.
Hatsuse, ” Elswick, ” 1899.
Mikasa, ” Vickers-Maxim, ” 1900.

Although she differs considerably from the Shikishima in appearance, the Asahi is practically a sister ship, the sole points of difference being (1) funnels; (2) distribution of the 2½-pounders; (3) absence of a bow torpedo boat; and (4) mounting of the big guns. There are, of course, certain minor structural differences—such, for instance, as the fact that the Asahi has a slightly larger wardroom, and that this wardroom is a trifle further aft—but, generally speaking, for fighting purposes they are identical, save for the points of difference noted above. There are unseen differences of detail also, such as the thickness of the armour deck, but none of these affect the fighting value. There is a difference, too, in the coal carried, but coal capacity does not show to the eye.

The details of the Asahi, with those of the Shikishima and the British Formidable, are as follows:—

------------------------+-------------+-------------+--------------+
| Asahi. | Shikishima.| Formidable. |
------------------------+-------------+-------------+--------------+
Displacement | 15,200 | 14,850 | 15,000 |
Material of hull | steel | steel | steel |
Length | 400 ft. | 400 ft. | 400 ft. |
Beam | 75⅙ ft. | 75½ ft. | 75 ft. |
Draught | 27½ ft. | 27¼ ft. | 26¾ ft. |
Guns--12-in. Four 12-in. Mark IX. for all |
6-in. | 14 | 14 | 12 |
3-in. | 20 | 20 | 16 |
------------------------+-------------+-------------+--------------+
| Six 3-pdrs. | Six 3-pdrs. |Twelve 3-pdrs.|
Smaller | Six 2½-pdrs.| Six 2½-pdrs.| Eight Maxims |
| Eight Maxims| Eight Maxims| |
------------------------+-------------+-------------+--------------+
Torpedo tubes, submerged| 4 | 4 | 4 |
” above water | 0 | 1 | 0 |
Armour belt | 9 ins. | 9 ins. | 9 ins. |
” at ends | 4½ ins. | 4½ ins. | 3 ins. |
” deck | 4 ins. | 5 ins. | 3 ins. |
Lower deck | 6 ins. | 6 ins. | 9 ins. |
Casemates | 6 ins. | 6 ins. | 6 ins. |
Barbettes | 14 ins. | 14 ins.| 12 ins. |
Bulkheads | 14 ins. | 14 ins.| 12 ins. |
Armour material | Harvey nickel, all three |
I.H.P., forced | 15,000 | 14,500 | 15,000 |
Boilers | Belleville, all three |
Speed (contract) | 18 | 18.5 | 18 |
Coal (normal) | (?) 1,400 | 700 | 900 |
Screws | Two in all three |
------------------------+------------------------------------------+

There is some doubt about the Asahi’s coal, 1400 tons may be the maximum and 700 the normal. Japanese ships do not need to carry much coal, being designed to operate in waters where friendly coal stations are numerous. True, ships thus kept short are likely to be out of action because they are coaling, about once a week; but, on the other hand, as they get two extra 6-in. quickfirers and four 12-pounders for this sacrifice, they are rather envied by our naval officers. After all, the primary duty of a battleship is to hit the enemy hard, and an extra 6-in. in the broadside is no mean advantage. There are other incidental advantages too—a single 6-in. shell would put all the eight 12-pounders out of action on the upper deck of the Formidable, while, thanks to the casemates acting as screens, the Asahi could only lose four of her 3-in. by a single shell. In the placing of her 3-in. guns she is altogether better off than the Formidable, the sole point in which the British ship is superior being the four guns carried on the main deck forward. The Formidable can fight all these on the broadsides; it is doubtful if the Asahi could, because of the blast from the big guns firing above them. But _per contra_ she has her other 3-in. quickfirers much better placed; they are more distributed.

The positions of these are: four on the main deck forward; four on the main deck aft; four on the upper deck amidships; two on top of the forward upper deck casemates; two beside the fore conning-tower; and four beside the after conning-tower—a total of twenty. Those of the Shikishima are placed in exactly the same fashion. Those of the Formidable are: four on main deck forward (extreme bow); four on main deck aft; and eight on upper deck amidships; a total of sixteen. Three units instead of six; or, to put it another way, work for only three shells instead of six shells.

The Asahi is an improvement on the Shikishima in the matter of the 2½-pounders—a very small detail. In the Shikishima these are grouped on top of the amidship upper-deck casemates; in the Asahi only two are over these casemates, the other four being distributed, a couple on each bridge. Two theories are at work here, and it will need a war to say which is the better. In the Shikishima it is easy to concentrate three 2½-pounders on a single torpedo boat or portion of a big enemy, while, as a price for this, they are at the mercy of a single shell. Those of the Asahi are not thus at the mercy of one shell, but it will be far less easy to concentrate them.

The next point of difference between the Shikishima and the Asahi is that the former carries a bow above-water torpedo tube, with 6-in. Harvey nickel protection to it. This tube, similarly protected, is in the Fuji, Yashima, Asama, Tokiwa, and Yakumo. After some experiments and practice the Japanese authorities decided that this tube was of no use practically, and decreed its abolition. That of the Shikishima had, however, already been built in, so this ship has it. In the Asahi the design was modified, and the bow tube dropped out. It is absent also in the Hatsuse, a sister, and in the Iwate and Idzumo.

Under certain circumstances such a tube might be of great use in action—for instance, approaching an enemy who presented his broadside while the ship possessing the tube wished to make a feint to close. But to use it it would be necessary to slow down or reverse engines—both things that might be awkward to do in an action. Still, the real objection does not lie there, so much as in the trouble with sea that a bow tube causes. Bow guns, even high up, are always liable to get “washed out,” a bow torpedo tube is still more likely to be so. In addition to this, it raises an unnecessary large bow wave.

In comparison with the Formidable, the Asahi and Shikishima have—beside the 6-in. and 3-in. guns—other points of distinct difference. They have (1) complete instead of partial belts; (2) 6-in. instead of 9-in. armour protecting the lower deck; (3) much higher barbettes; and (4) quite differently shaped hoods to the big guns.

Of these differences the armour one is of no immediate moment at present. The Asahi, in the matter of armour, is practically a Majestic with 3-in. stripped off the lower deck amidships and disposed on the ends plus some extra armour paid for in the weight of coal carried. Now, the 6-in. lower deck armour of the Asahi is proof against any 6-in. projectile at any range, and though a steel-pointed 9.2-in. common shell has been through 6-in. Harvey nickel at Whale Island, this is probably an isolated proving-ground case, and nothing but an armour-piercing shell of large calibre is ever likely to get through such armour in actual warfare. Also it is at least doubtful whether such a shell would do more harm than a solid shot, and against a 12-in. solid shot 9-in. armour is no more protection than 6-in. In either case the shot will go through and dance about inside, and it is this “dancing about” that makes shot dangerous, and all armour save the very best a snare and a delusion so far as solid projectiles are concerned. However, medium armour is imperatively needed to keep off shells, for it is good-bye to any ship inside of which a big common shell is comfortably planted. The Admiral class, for instance, would do no more fighting once a big common shell got them amidships.

As for the complete belt, the Formidable, of course, has something on the bow, and this may be considered proof against 6-in. shell in action, save at short range. It is, at any rate, proof against the deadly little shell from 12-pounders and the like. As for any 6-in. shot—well, very few 6-in. shot are carried in any ship, and holes made by them are easily plugged.

The real gain of the Asahi is the extra gun-power, but since it is held essential that British ships shall have a large coal supply, it is useless to decry the Formidable over the two missing 6-in. guns. The defect of the Formidable, and one that might have been remedied, is the position of the 12-pounders. These could and should have been either more distributed, or else placed right up above everything and clear of everything, much as the French place their 4-in. quickfirers. Such a gun is extremely unlikely to be actually hit, whereas if it is crowded about with bulwarks, boats, and so on, a shell coming anywhere near is bound to burst with devastating effect.

In appearance it is difficult to tell the Asahi from our Canopus class, save for colour. A critical eye could detect the much higher barbettes of the Japanese vessel and their different shape, but that is about all, for the extra casemate would hardly be visible at any appreciable distance. Like the Canopus class, the Asahi has the huge after funnel, and the resemblance is increased by the tautness of her masts. The sign manual of a British man-of-war is the rake forward of the top masts, in the smartest Channel Fleet ships this is most noticeable; but the Asahi also is taut.

The Asahi has a slight sheer forward, like all our new ships, in consequence of which, though both pairs of guns are at the same height above the water, the after barbette looks a good deal higher than the fore one. The shields are peculiar. The plan gives a general idea of their appearance—sloping fronts but straight sides. The British pattern slopes all round, and is generally more squat—and of the two is more favourably regarded afloat. If by any off chance a big shot hit the side of the Asahi shield it would get through, from the inclined sides of the British pattern it would rebound at any range. However, a shot is very unlikely to hit the sides of the shield, and probably the mere shock of a big projectile would effectually displace everything and put the turret out of action. Wherever a big projectile hits it must do some harm, whether it gets through or not, and the old American idea of battering in preference to penetration is not so unsound as many folk are now disposed to regard it. Especially must this be so with certain foreign-built ships; the least little thing wrong and the colossal blow will find it out.

The guns and mountings of the Asahi are from Elswick. They embody some slight improvements upon those of the Shikishima, but are on exactly the same general principle. The 12-in. can easily do a round a minute, and should be able to do a round every two minutes in action. The rate of the 12.5-in. Canet gun at Yalu was one round per sixty minutes, but there were special circumstances involved. Still, there is no doubt that big guns have made enormous strides towards quick-fire in the last year or two, and two of the Asahi or Formidable 12-in. are equal to three of those in the Majestic probably.

The Asahi is fitted with the Barr and Stroud transmitters, each casemate having an indicator—in English and Japanese—to give the range automatically from the conning-tower. The official British view is against these transmitters, on the grounds that action will derange them; but there is no getting away from the fact that, even so, till deranged they will be exceedingly useful. Our methods of passing the range are cumbersome, and, in addition, by the time it is passed it has probably altered. Moreover, gunnery is not so much a matter of good shooting as knowing the range; the wrong range given accounts for most misses—at any rate, in the British Navy.

All the hoists in the Asahi are electrical, with auxiliary hand-power in case of need.

All the ships have twenty-five Belleville boilers each, fitted with economisers.

Full-speed trial results were:—

Shikishima 6 hours 16,370 = 18.78 knots.
Asahi 6 ” 16,360 = 18.3 ”
Hatsuse 6 ” 16,117 = 19.11 ” (maximum).
Mikasa 6 ” 16,400 = 18.6 ”

ARMOURED CRUISERS

The armoured cruisers are of two classes. The first comprises the British (Elswick) built Asama, Tokiwa, Idzumo, Iwate; the second the Stettin-built Yakumo, and the St. Nazaire-built Azuma.

These last were the original Japanese design; Elswick put the extra guns at its own discretion, and rearranged the positions as the plans indicate.

Particulars are:—

ASAMA TYPE. AZUMA TYPE.
Displacement 9750. 9436.
Length 408 ft. 446 ft.
Beam 67 ft. 59 ft.
Draught (mean) 24¼ ft. 24½ ft.
Guns Four 8-in. Four 8-in.
Fourteen 6-in. Twelve 6-in.
Twelve 3-in. Twelve 3-in.
Seven 2½-pdrs. Twelve 1-pdrs., etc.
Torpedo tubes (submerged) Four. Four.
” ” (above water) One.[28] One.

[28] Not in Iwate and Idzumo.

All six have four of the 6-in. guns unprotected, the other 6-in. and the 8-in. guns are in casemates and turrets (for the 8-in.).

All have 7-in. belts reduced to 3½ ins. forward, with 5-in. armour on the lower deck side. Their decks reinforce the belts.

The Iwate, Idzumo, Azuma, and Yakumo have Belleville boilers, the other two cylindrical. The type ship had very high horse-power; in the later vessels this was reduced, and the saving effected spent in substituting Krupp process armour for Harvey nickel on the sides.

Trial (full-speed) results were:—

Designed Indicated Trial
speed. horse-power. result.

Asama 22 knots 19,000 = 22 knots.
Tokiwa ” (?) = 22.7 ”
Idzumo 20.75 knots 15,739 = 22.04 ”
Iwate ” (?) = 21.8 ”
Yakumo 20 knots 15,500 = 20.7 ”
Azuma 21 knots 18,000 = 21 ”

The first two have a pair of funnels only.

The ships are very good ones, equal in many ways to second-class battleships, but not calculated to stand battleship fire, I fancy.

The Kasuga and Nisshin were launched for Argentina in 1902 and 1903 respectively, by Messrs. Ansalds, of Genoa, Italy. They were purchased by Japan immediately before the war with Russia.

Details are—

Displacement 7700 tons.
Length 357 ft.
Beam 61½ ft.
Draught (mean) 23 ft.
Guns (in Kasuga) One 10-in. 45 cals.
Two 8-in. 45 cals.
” (in Nisshin) Four 8-in. 45 cals.
The secondary armament
is in both Fourteen 6-in. 45 cals.
Ten 12-pdrs.
2 Maxims.
Two field-guns.
Torpedo tubes Four (above water).
Designed horse-power 13,500.
Speed 20 knots.
Coal (normal) 650 tons.
” (maximum) 1100 tons.
Boilers Cylindrical.

NISSHIN.]

These ships belong to the well-known Garibaldi class. The belt is 6-in. Terni armour reduced to 4½ ins. at the ends, and reinforced by a deck 1½ in. on the slopes.

Above the main belt is a 6-in. redoubt, with 4¾ in. ends, above again a 6-in. battery containing ten 6-in. guns.

The primary guns are protected by 5½-in. armour.

The remaining 6-in. guns are carried without protection on the upper deck. Six 12-pounders are carried between them, the remainder under the poop and forecastle.

The torpedo tubes are in special casements.

The ships originally had a single military mast, but just before completion the fighting-tops were removed.

They are the heaviest-armed armoured cruisers of their size in the world. Compared to the Russian Bayan, of about the same displacement, this superiority is manifest.

NISSHIN. KASUGA. BAYAN.
Four 8-in. One 10-in. Two 8-in.
Fourteen 6-in. Two 8-in. Eight 6-in.
Ten 12-pdrs. Fourteen 6-in. Twenty 12-pdrs.
Ten 12-pdrs.

(_Nisshin has two 8-in. in forward turret where Kasuga has a single 10-in. The fighting-tops were removed on completion._)]

KASUGA.]