Chapter VI: Part 6

This last torpedo has an effective range of over 3000 yards. It is not, however, carried on shipboard.

The Whiteheads are identical with those in the British service. So, too, are the above-water tubes. The submerged ones are of Elswick pattern—Mark I., which was not satisfactory at high speeds in the Fuji, Yashima, and Shikishima; Mark II., which delivers fairly well at all speeds in the later ships. All ships that carry submerged tubes—that is, all first-class battleships or cruisers—have four fitted: two forward on the broadside and two bearing 45° abaft the beam, just abaft the after barbette.

Above-water tubes are condemned, and several of those in existence were under orders of removal when the Russian war broke out.

Above-water bow tubes were condemned on account of the seas that they took in. As such as exist in armoured vessels are protected by 6-in. armour, they did not improve seaworthiness, the weight in the extreme bow being inconvenient.

4. ARMOUR.

An armour-plate factory has been established at Kobé, but it is not yet in a position to turn out much except gun shields.

A characteristic of the Japanese has been their readiness to adopt new processes.

Thus the Fuji and Yashima were designed for compound armour, but the Harvey process coming in while the ships were building, it was at once adopted in preference to compound. So, too, in later ships the improved Harvey, “Harvey-Nickel,” was at once used, and in the Iwate and Idzumo belts were shortened a little and speed reduced, so that the Krupp process might be employed for the water-line plates.

In the Mikasa great expense was undertaken solely in order to apply Krupp cemented to curved surfaces instead of the non-cemented and less tough Krupp plates usually so employed. There is some doubt whether this experiment was successful; if Krupp cemented plates are “fiddled with” their special virtue departs. It is also stated, however, that the Mikasa’s plates were made on a special process somewhat analogous to the Krupp, but differing from it in certain details, and less liable to injury in bending.

5. ENGINES AND BOILERS.

The engines of Japanese warships are, save in the case of a few small vessels, of British manufacture, and the same as those of British ships.

In boilers, the Belleville type was adopted with the Shikishima, and several older vessels have been re-boilered with it. Almost the first warship to be fitted with this type was the Chiyoda.

With some remarkable exceptions, Japanese naval engineers have not succeeded very conspicuously in securing the very economical coal results which have been obtained with Bellevilles in the British Fleet. A remarkable instance to the contrary was the Idzumo; the Mikasa also did well. The Asahi, when first commissioned, did badly, but, when the art of coal spreading on scientific lines was mastered, suddenly became very economical.

No trouble of any sort has been experienced, and the Japanese have shown themselves singularly adapted to the management of water-tube boilers.

When the Yaeyama was re-boilered, Niclausse generators were fitted to her, but with indifferent success. Consequently, in order to continue experiments on the lines of the British Navy, this type was fitted to the Niitaka and Tsushima, and ordered for one of the new battleships. Apparently the experiment is to be continued to other types, following the example of the British Navy, though the majority of the engineers are averse to such a procedure, both on account of the success obtained with the Belleville and because of the extreme difficulty involved when many types exist, and many of the men sent to a ship are used to some other type of boiler than the one that they are called on to work.

A water-tube boiler of Japanese design exists—a species of cross between the Belleville and Yarrow, with a little Niclausse thrown in. It does not appear to promise well, and though designed to possess the virtues of each type, seems more likely to embody their weaker points than their strong ones. Such, at least, appears to be the general verdict.

There is also another water-tube boiler of Japanese origin, something like the Thornycroft, which is in the hands of the Temperley Transported Company; but I have not heard of any practical tests of it as yet, its invention being quite recent.

In any case, neither is likely to oust existing types, as most of the valuable points in a boiler are already patented all over the world. The inventors of new types are, therefore, hampered much like inventors of new systems of wireless telegraphy are—some one has been before them. In addition, a water-tube boiler requires some years of practical service before it can be classed as out of the experimental stage. The great advantage possessed by the Belleville, which “in theory” is one of the worst of boilers, lies in the numerous features introduced by years of practical experience. In rough-sea work theory and practice rarely go together; the thing that is ideal on paper is apt at sea to fail unexpectedly. The water-tube boilers fitted in Japanese ships are as follows:—

BELLEVILLE. NILAUSSE.

Chiyoda (old type). Niitaka.
Itsukushima. Yaeyama.
Matsushima (old type). Tsushima.
Shikishima (old type). Kashima.
Asahi. Katori.
Hatsuse.
Mikasa.
Yakumo.
Azuma.
Iwate.
Idzumo.
Takasago.

The Japanese boiler under experiment is the Miyabara, the invention of the Engineer-in-Chief of the Japanese Navy. It is to be fitted to the Otawa, and probably some other ships. It is also in the Hashidate. The inventor recently produced a paper showing its all-round advantages over every other type of water-tube boiler; but this, of course, may be taken _cum grano salis_. However, there is little doubt but that, should it be in any way successful, natural national vanity will lead to its general adoption in preference to European types, just as the 2½-pounder gun has been.

XXIII OTHER NAVIES AS SEEN BY THE JAPANESE

The following expressions of opinion are not necessarily entirely representative, but they certainly coincide with the views of a great many of the more travelled officers, and as such will have, no doubt, some considerable interest.

BRITISH.

“British officers are too fond of golf and other games—they do not study enough. They are very stiff at first, but nice when you know them. They are always very clean, spick and span, and well shaved. On board a British warship it is always very impressive—it is the most impressive navy in the world. And it is more ready than many people think.”

FRENCH.

“The French is a funny navy, and it is hard to say what is good and what is bad in it, for the thing that looks good may be bad, and the thing that looks bad, good. They have some very clever engineers.”

GERMAN.

“The German officers all seem ‘strong.’ To many they seem always overbearing. They hope to be the greatest navy in the world; and plenty of them think that they already are.”

RUSSIAN.[41]

“The Russians are brave—very brave. But not many are good, and they are savages. They can be very polite when it suits them; when not—ah! Russian sailors are miserable people who lie in the snow, who have very little money, which they spend in buying cheap fish. They are very dirty. That is all we know of Russian sailors, who are quite like strange people to us. But we have no fear as to the result of a war with the Polar Bear.”

[41] Expressed before the Russo-Japanese War.

UNITED STATES, AMERICA.

“The Americans have a wonderful navy with wonderful ships. Everything American is more wonderful than anything else in the world, so that we do not know what to believe.”

THEMSELVES.

Of themselves Japanese officers speak little. But it is not difficult to infer from their talk that they do not in any way feel dissatisfied with themselves. Ship for ship, they are firmly convinced that they are the finest navy in the world; and it cannot be said that up to the moment of writing (June, 1904) they have done anything to cause them to retract this opinion. No body of men could have displayed better qualities than they have from all accounts. It may be added that, in my opinion, every Japanese is also of conviction that Japan is going to be the greatest naval power in the world in the future. With that feeling they entered on the present war. It is a very useful feeling to have.

XXIV THE WAR WITH RUSSIA

The war with Russia was the direct outcome of the action of that Power in ousting Japan from Port Arthur. There is little question but that the real object of the Chino-Japanese War was Japan’s determination to be the paramount power in the Far East. The action of Russia, France, and Germany in neutralising all that victory gave her completely checkmated Japan, and from that day onward she made little secret of her preparations for a war, the prize of which would be the control of China, and the foundation of a Far Eastern Empire whose ultimate proportions none can foresee.

The political situation between Japan and Russia needs no comment in a purely naval record of events: Japan made ready with a steady determination, where Russia ignored the obvious.

Not till a month or two before the war did Russia recognise that it was inevitable; she then sought refuge in diplomatic delays, which Japan severed by the sudden rupture of negotiations at a moment favourable to herself. Much has been written of Japan’s “treachery” and Russia’s “duplicity,” but neither accusation is just.

Following are the Japanese versions of the various incidents of the war, as officially reported:—

They were prefaced by the Chemulpo incident, in which the Asama, Naniwa, Takachiho, Suma, Chiyoda, and Niitaka annihilated the Russian cruiser Variag and the gunboat Korietz.

As a naval incident, this action has little interest or significance, the Russian ships being abnormally overmatched; indeed, there is nothing in the affair worthy of comment save the admirable strategy displayed by the Japanese in thus ensuring absolute victory without taking any risks. A very high appreciation of the real meaning of sea-power is evidenced here.

The rest of the naval war concentrated around Port Arthur. The Japanese task was in no way an easy one, for Russia made no errors after the first stupendous one by which she lost her two best battleships.

ADMIRAL TOGO.]

FIRST ATTACK ON PORT ARTHUR

Admiral Togo’s official report of the attack on Port Arthur is dated February 10, 1904, at sea, and is as follows:—

After the combined fleet left Sasebo on the 6th,
everything went off as planned.

At midnight, on the 8th, the advance squadron attacked
the enemy’s advance squadron, the latter being mostly
outside the bay.

The Poltava, Askold, and two others were apparently
struck by torpedoes.

At noon, on the 9th, the fleet advanced to the offing
of Port Arthur Bay, and attacked the enemy for forty
minutes, I believe doing considerable damage.

I believe the enemy were greatly demoralised. They
stopped fighting at one o’clock, and appeared to
retreat to the harbour.

The Japanese fleet suffered but very slight damage, and
its fighting strength has not decreased.

Our casualties were four killed and fifty-four wounded.
The imperial princes on board suffered no harm.

The conduct of the officers was cool, and not unlike
their conduct at manœuvres.

This morning, owing to the heavy south wind, detailed
reports from the vessels have not been received, so I
merely report the above facts.

TOGO.

The ships actually torpedoed were the Tsarevitch, Retvizan, and Pallada, none of which were sunk.

The Japanese fleet consisted of all the modern vessels.

The relative small loss inflicted upon the Russians is explained as follows:—

(1) Several of the Japanese boats followed some
scouting Russian boats in error.
(2) The torpedo is an uncertain weapon at the best.

The Japanese boats got in by imitating Russian signals.

In the battle of the 9th very little harm was done on either side. The Novik and several other Russian ships were struck, but the damages were in no case serious. On the Japanese side the Fuji and Iwate received some hits, but these, though extensive, were not of a really serious nature.

SECOND ATTACK

The official report is as follows:—

On the 13th a division of torpedo-boat destroyers
started for Port Arthur during a heavy snowstorm. The
boats lost sight of each other and became separated.
Only the Hayatori and Asagiri reached Port Arthur. The
Asagiri sighted the entrance to the harbour at three
o’clock on the morning of the 14th, and was received
with a heavy fire by the batteries and scouting torpedo
boats. She entered the harbour and discharged a torpedo
at a warship from whose funnel smoke was ascending. The
Asagiri then emerged safely, returning the fire of the
enemy’s torpedo-boats.

The same morning, at five o’clock, the Hayatori
approached Port Arthur and discerned two Russian ships,
which opened fire on her. The destroyer discharged a
torpedo, which was seen to explode. The Hayatori also
escaped scathless.

It is impossible to state the definite material
results, owing to the darkness, but the moral effect
was certainly considerable.

TOGO.

It has not yet been definitely ascertained whether any Russian ship was sunk; if so, it was only a minor vessel. This attack may be written off as a wasted effort.

ATTACK ON VLADIVOSTOK

The next incident of note was the attack on Vladivostok, which, again, was barren of results, as the Russians did not attempt to reply.

The official report of the attack on Vladivostok, from Admiral Kamimura, commanding the second squadron, is as follows:—

As prearranged, the squadron reached the eastern
entrance of Vladivostok on the morning of March 6,
after passing through the frozen sea. The enemy’s ships
were not seen in the outside harbour, and the Japanese
vessels approached the batteries on the north-east
coast from a point beyond the range of the batteries of
the Balzan Promontory and the Bosphorous Strait.

After bombarding the inner harbour for forty minutes
from ten minutes to two, the Japanese squadron
retired. It is believed that the bombardment effected
considerable damage. Soldiers were seen on land, but
the Russian batteries did not reply to the Japanese
fire.

Black smoke was observed in the eastern entrance about
five in the afternoon, and was thought to be from the
enemy’s ships, but the smoke gradually disappeared. On
the morning of the 7th inst. the Japanese squadron
reconnoitred America Bay and Strelok Bay, but nothing
unusual was seen. The warships again approached the
eastern entrance of Vladivostok at noon, but the
enemy’s ships were not visible, and the batteries did
not fire.

The squadron then turned towards Possiet Bay, but
seeing nothing of the enemy, retired.

The next operations were more exciting, being officially reported as follows:—

An attack on Port Arthur took place on March 10th, as
previously planned.

Our destroyers were formed into two separate flotillas.
Both of them reached the outside of the harbour at
midnight on the 9th and reconnoitred, but no enemy
was seen. At dawn the second flotilla laid special
mechanical mines in many places, and succeeded in the
task, notwithstanding the intermittent fires from the
enemy’s forts.

At half-past four a.m. the first flotilla encountered
six Russian destroyers at the south of Liaotishan,
and a hot action took place for twenty minutes. In
its course three of our destroyers—Asashio, Kasumi,
and Akatsuki—fought very closely against the enemy’s
destroyers, almost touching each other, and delivered a
hot fire.

The enemy’s destroyers were severely injured, either
being damaged in engines or suffering from the outbreak
of fire, and fled away in great confusion. Our ships also
sustained some damage. Casualties on our side are seven
petty officers killed and nine men wounded.

The Akatsuki’s auxiliary steampipe was destroyed,
but all the destroyers of the first flotilla have no
difficulty for further fighting or navigation.

The second flotilla, when it was leaving the outside
of the harbour at 7 a.m., found two Russian destroyers
just coming back into the harbour, and attacked them,
intercepting their return course. One of the two
escaped, but the other—namely, the Steregutchy—was
destroyed and captured by our destroyer Sazanami, which
tried to tow it back. However, the leakage was great
and the sea very rough, and the towing-rope was broken.
Therefore, after the prisoners, four in all, were taken
up, the captured ship was left, and she sank at ten
minutes past ten a.m.

The damage in the second flotilla is insignificant.
Casualties: Two men killed and one officer and three
men wounded.

Although the Novik and Bayan came out from the harbour
towards the second flotilla, they soon retired into the
harbour upon seeing that our cruisers were approaching.

As to the movements of our main squadron and the
cruiser squadron, they arrived off Port Arthur at eight
a.m. The cruiser squadron at once proceeded towards the
front of the mouth of the harbour and supported our
destroyer flotilla, as above stated.

The main squadron also approached Liaotishan, from ten
a.m. until twenty minutes to two p.m., and made an
indirect bombardment against the harbour. The enemy’s
forts intermittently returned the fire, but no damage
was inflicted upon our ships. A detached squadron of
cruisers went to Dalny, and destroyed the enemy’s
buildings on the San Shan Islands.

The Takasago and Chihaya scouted the western coast of
the entrance of Port Arthur, but no enemy was seen.

A Russian destroyer, which had been sunk in Pigeon Bay
in the last battle, is found to be the Vnushitelni, of
which now the upper parts of the masts and funnels are
seen on the surface. All our ships discontinued the
battle at two p.m., and retired.

Subsequently an attempt was made to block Port Arthur harbour with sunken ships. It was also hoped to destroy the Retvizan by exploding ships near her, but the attack was completely foiled by the defence.

There was a second bottling expedition of March 27th, which again failed. It led to the death of a valuable officer, Commander Hirose. The official report ran as follows:—

The united squadron again left for Port Arthur on
Saturday.

On Sunday morning at half-past three it commenced
blockading the harbour entrance. The four steamers to
be sunk, escorted by a flotilla of destroyers, advanced
to the entrance, facing the enemy’s searchlights.

At about two miles from the entrance they were
discovered by the enemy, and exposed to fire from the
fortress on either shore, and also from the enemy’s
ships on guard.

Braving these dangers, the four steamers ran into the
waterway at the mouth of the harbour. The Chiyo-maru
anchored at about half a chain from the shore, to the
west of Golden Hill, and blew up. The Fukui-maru,
passing to the left of Chiyo-maru, advanced a short
distance, and was about to anchor, when she was struck
by a torpedo from the enemy’s destroyers, and sank. The
Yahiko-maru went to the left of the Fukui-maru, and
blew up herself.

The Yoneyama-maru reached the harbour entrance, and
colliding against the stern of an enemy’s destroyer,
managed to reach the middle passage by passing between
the Chiyo-maru and Fukui-maru. Just at that moment
an enemy’s torpedo struck and sunk her. The momentum
brought her forward to the left shore, and with her
bows towards the left side sank sideways.

To have accomplished the work so far under such great
disadvantages and dangers must be considered a success
and command admiration. It is regrettable, however,
that, owing to some space being still left between the
Yahiko-maru and Yoneyama-maru, a complete blocking has
not been effected.

Those who were engaged in this work are those who had
been engaged in the same work before. It was by their
special request that only the petty officers and crews
were supplanted by new men.

The casualties were as follows:—Commander Hirose and
three petty officers killed; Lieut. Shimada mortally
wounded; Lieut. Masuki, Engineer Kura, and six petty
officers and men slightly wounded. All the rest of the
crews were safely picked up by our destroyers.

Commander Hirose and Boatswain Sugino, who were killed,
displayed admirable courage. Sugino was just going
down to light the magazine on the Fukui-maru, when the
ship was struck by the enemy’s torpedo, killing him.
Commander Hirose, after causing his men to take to the
boats, and not finding Sugino, searched through the
ship three times. Finding his ship gradually going
down, he was compelled to leave her and enter the boat.
As the boat was rowing away under the enemy’s fire, a
shell struck him on the head, and the greater part of
his body was blown away, the only remaining part of
this brave officer’s body being a piece of flesh in the
boat.

Commander Hirose was always a model officer, and he
leaves a meritorious example and memory which will be
everlasting.

For the protection of the steamers and the rescue of
their crews, all our flotilla of destroyers did their
utmost, in the face of the enemy’s severe cannonade.
Above all, the destroyers Kotaka and Tsubame penetrated
to within a mile of the harbour entrance, where they
encountered and engaged an enemy’s destroyer, to which
they did considerable damage. The Russian destroyer
seemed to have had her boiler hit, and sent up a volume
of steam, and retreated.

As the officers and men were leaving the harbour after
their work was done, they observed one of the enemy’s
ships below Golden Hill. She seemed completely disabled.

In spite of the enemy’s very hot fire, to which our
flotilla was exposed until dawn, no damage whatever was
sustained.

The crews on board the Chiyo-maru and Yahi-maru were
taken on board the destroyer Tsubame. The crew of the
Yoneyama-maru escaped in three boats, and were rescued
by the destroyers Misasagi and Karigane. The crew of
the Fukui-maru was taken on board the Kasumi.

The following torpedo boats and destroyers took part in
the engagement:—

Destroyers.—Shirakumo, Kasumi, Asashio, Akatsuki,
Akebono, Oboro, Inazumi, Ikadzuchi, Usugumo, Sazanami,
and Shimonome.

Torpedo boats.—Karigane, Kotaka, Misasagi, Tsubame,
Managure, and Hato.

TOGO.

The concluding operation of the first stage of the war was reported as follows by Admiral Togo:—

On the 11th our combined fleet commenced, as previously
planned, the eighth attack upon Port Arthur. The fourth
and the fifth destroyer flotillas, the fourteenth
torpedo flotilla, and the Koryo-maru reached the mouth
of Port Arthur at midnight of the 12th, and effected the
laying of mines at several points outside the port,
defying the enemy’s searchlight.

The second destroyer flotilla discovered, at dawn of
the 13th, one Russian destroyer trying to enter the
harbour, and, after ten minutes’ attack, sank her.

Another Russian destroyer was discovered coming from
the direction of Liau-tie-shan. We attacked her, but
she managed to flee into the harbour.

There were no casualties on our side, except two seamen
in the Ikazuchi slightly wounded. There was no time
to rescue the enemy’s drowning crew, as the Bayan
approached.

The third fleet reached outside of Port Arthur at
8 a.m., when the Bayan came out and opened fire.
Immediately the Novik, Askold, Diana, Petropavlovsk,
Pobieda, and Poltava came out and made offensive attack
upon us.

Our third fleet, tardily answering and gradually
retiring, enticed the enemy fifteen miles south-east of
the port, when our first fleet, being informed through
wireless telegraphy from the third fleet, suddenly
appeared before the enemy and attacked them.

While the enemy was trying to regain the port, a
battleship of the Petropavlovsk type struck mines laid
by us in the previous evening, and sank at 10.32 a.m.

Another ship was observed to have lost freedom of
movement, but the confusion of enemy’s ships prevented
us from identifying her. They finally managed to regain
the port.

Our third fleet suffered no damage.
The enemy’s damage was, besides the above-mentioned,
probably slight also.

Our first fleet did not reach firing distance. Our
fleets retired at 1 p.m., prepared for another attack

On the 14th our fleet resailed towards Port Arthur. The
second, the fourth, and the fifth destroyer flotillas
and the ninth torpedo flotilla joined at 3 a.m., and
the third fleet at 7 a.m. No enemy’s ship was seen
outside the port.

Our first fleet arrived there at 9 a.m., and,
discovering three mines laid by the enemy, destroyed
them all.

The Kasuga and the Nisshin were despatched to the west
of Liau-tie-shan. They made an indirect bombardment for
two hours, this being their first action. The new forts
at Liau-tie-shan were finally silenced.

Our forces retired at 1.30 p.m.

TOGO.

The Russian ship destroyed was Admiral Makaroff’s flagship, the Petropavlovsk; the second ship injured was the battleship Pobieda. In the action in which she engaged the third squadron, the Bayan also was damaged, and the effective Russian fleet for the moment reduced to the Peresviet, Sevastopol, Askold, Diana, Novik, and some five destroyers.

Another attempt to block the harbour followed, no less than ten ships being employed. In Japan this attempt was accepted as completely successful; but there are few grounds for believing that it was more than temporarily so.

Too little is yet known of the real facts of the war for many conclusions of value to be drawn; indeed, only one thing is as yet fully clear, and that is the importance of battleships. Russia’s failure lay here. Lacking a battleship superiority, she was unable to support her cruisers, and these consequently unable to support the destroyers. As a result, despite the extraordinary activity of the Russian cruiser Bayan, the naval war followed the exact course that any one cognizant of naval affairs could have predicted on February 10, 1904. Only the battleship can confer command of the sea.

Later events to the end of May included the loss of the battleship Hatsuse, by contact with a Russian mine, and the sinking of the cruiser Yoshino, after collision with the Kasuga in a fog.

APPENDICES

THE SINKING OF THE KOW-SHING

OFFICIAL REPORT OF CAPTAIN TOGO OF THE NANIWA

“At 9.15 a.m., coming close to the Kow-shing, I signalled J. W. (to stop immediately) and twice fired blank shot. The next signal was L. P. (to anchor), which she obeyed. I was at that time very anxious to catch the flying Chinese warship, and I turned a little while in that direction. At that time the Kow-shing signalled D. N. W. R. (may I proceed), which I answered by the signal J. W.

“At 10.40, I sent Lieutenant Hitomi and others as prize officers to her. On seeing all the papers and other things, they found that she was carrying contraband persons. So I ordered her to follow me, which her captain consented to do. When I hoisted the signal L. R. (slip or weigh anchor immediately), she asked me by signal to send a boat for communication. I thought that the captain wished to tell me that he was prevented by the Chinese soldiers from obeying my order. So I ordered Lieutenant Hitomi to go again to her, giving him instructions to bring the Europeans on board the Naniwa, if the Chinese generals were resisting the carrying out of my order. When the lieutenant came alongside, the captain came to the gangway and said that the Chinese generals asked to be allowed to return to Taku, as they did not know that war had broken out. The lieutenant informed me that, when he went there, the Chinese soldiers were in a condition of the greatest confusion and excitement, so that the captain intentionally came down to the gangway and would not let him go on deck. Four hours had been consumed in these fruitless negotiations, and there was no longer room for hesitation, so I signalled M. L. (quit the ship immediately). To this the captain again answered by the signal demanding a boat. At that time I thought it would be rather foolish to send our officers, as the Chinese were in such an excited state. Accordingly I signalled H. J. (boat cannot come). It seemed to me that she was awaiting the arrival of the Chinese fleet; moreover, it was very dangerous to hesitate any longer, so I again hoisted the signal M. L., and at the same time a red flag on the foremast. At 1.10 p.m. I ordered one torpedo and shells to be discharged. The latter hit the engine-room.

“At 1.15 the Kow-shing began to sink from her stern.

“At 1.37 I sent two cutters to rescue the captain, the officers and the rest.

“At 1.46 she sank.

“The spot where she sank is two miles south of the island of Sho-pai-oul.”

CAPTAIN GALSWORTHY’S REPORT.

The British steamer Kow-shing, owned by the Indo-China Co., left Shang-hai on July 17th, bound to Taku, under charter to carry Chinese troops from that port to Asan, on the coast of Korea. Arriving at Taku on the 20th, arrangements were made to ship the troops, and on the 23rd 1100 came on board, including two generals, a number of other officers of various ranks, and a German ex-army officer named Hanneken, who came as an ordinary passenger. At 9.50 p.m. on the 23rd the ship proceeded on her voyage to Asan. All went well until the morning of the 25th, when off Shopeiul Island, we passed a man-of-war flying the Japanese naval ensign, with a white flag above it. This vessel proved to be the Chinese warship Tei-yuen. Shortly afterwards we sighted three Japanese men-of-war, the Naniwa, Yoshino, and another (probably the Akitsushiu). The Naniwa at once steamed towards us, flying a signal ordering us to stop. She also fired two blank charges, and signalled us to anchor, which we did at once. The Naniwa then steamed away, apparently to communicate with the other ships. I at once enquired by signal if I might proceed, to which the Naniwa replied, “Heave-to or take the consequences.” A boat then came from the Naniwa and an officer came on board. He was received at the gangway, and he asked to see the ship’s papers. They were shown him, and his attention particularly called to the fact that she was a British ship. Numerous other questions were asked and answered, the most important one being, “Would the Kow-shing follow the Naniwa?” Being utterly helpless against a man-of-war, I replied that there would be no alternative but to do so, under protest, if ordered. The officer then left the ship, and proceeded to the Naniwa. Shortly after, being still at anchor, I was ordered by signal to cut, slip, or weigh immediately. The Chinese generals learning the meaning of the signals, and finding preparations were being made to follow the Naniwa, objected most emphatically. They were told how useless it would be to resist, as one shot would sink them in a short time. The generals then said they would rather die than obey Japanese orders, and, as they had 1100 men against about 400 on the Naniwa, they would fight sooner than surrender. They were told that if they decided to fight, the foreign officers would leave the ship. The generals then gave orders to the troops on deck to kill us if we obeyed the orders of the Japanese or attempted to leave the ship. With gestures they threatened to cut off our heads, to stab or shoot us; and a lot of men were selected to watch us and carry out the order. A signal was then made requesting the Naniwa to send a boat, in order to communicate the state of affairs. A boat was at once sent, but a crowd of armed Chinese took possession of the gangway, until I prevailed on the generals to send them away. Eventually the officers came alongside, and a message for the commander of the Naniwa was sent, stating that the Chinese refused to allow the Kow-shing to be taken, and insisting upon returning to Taku. It was again pointed out that she was a British ship, and that she had left port before war had been declared. The boat then returned to the Naniwa, and on her arrival a signal was hoisted ordering the Europeans to leave the ship at once. A reply was given that they were not allowed to leave the ship, and asking for a boat to be sent. Notice was sent to the engineers to be handy on deck in case the Japanese fired. The Naniwa shortly afterwards replied that a boat could not be sent. The Naniwa then hoisted a red flag at the fore, which was apparently a signal for discharging a torpedo, as one was fired at the Kow-shing, but missed her. A broadside of five guns was then fired. At the time I was on the bridge, my officers having left it, and seeing that the soldiers set to watch me had left their station at the foot of the ladder, I rushed to the wheelhouse, and, after obtaining a lifebelt (the last one remaining), I jumped over the ship’s side. In doing so I heard a terrific explosion, and upon returning to the surface of the sea I found the atmosphere was thick with smoke and fine coal-powder. I at once struck out for the shore, distant about 1¼ miles. There were many Chinese in the water, but I only saw one European, Mr. von Hanneken. As the air cleared, a bullet struck the water close to my ear, and was followed by a shower of bullets. Knowing that shot from the Naniwa could not strike near me, owing to being sheltered by the hull of the Kow-shing, I turned on my back, and saw the Chinese soldiers firing at me from the deck and the ’tween deck ports. As far as possible I protected the back of my head with the lifebelt, and swam as low in the water as I could. Shortly after the Kow-shing went down, stern first. After being in the water some time, I was picked up by the Naniwa’s cutter, in a very exhausted condition. The same boat had already rescued one of the quartermasters, who had been wounded in the neck by a rifle bullet. On arriving at the Naniwa we found that the chief officer was the only other person saved by the Japanese, leaving five Europeans connected with the ship, and the passenger, missing. We anchored off Shopeiul about 9 a.m. The firing commenced about 1 p.m., and we were taken aboard the Naniwa about 2.30 p.m. During the evening the Naniwa steamed away, arriving the next morning at the rendezvous of the Japanese Fleet in Korea. We were then transferred to the Yayeyama, together with a Danish electrician, named Muhlenstedt, and about sixty Chinese, who were taken prisoners from the Chinese steamer Tso-kiang, the same clay. The Yayeyama then proceeded to Sasebo, arriving on the morning of the 28th. From Sasebo I and Mr. Tamplin, the chief officer, came here in a small tender at noon on Sunday last, having in the mean time been interviewed by Mr. Suyematsu Kencho, President of the Imperial Board of Legislature, who came down from Tokyo for that purpose. The quartermaster remained behind owing to his wound not having properly healed up, whilst Mr. Muhlenstedt is being further detained. During our detention we received every care and attention necessary for our comfort. After arriving here we proceeded to H.M.’s Consulate, and made an affidavit of the entire circumstances. The Naniwa, I may mention, had been damaged on the port quarter from a shot fired from the Tche-yuen in the morning. I can positively say I did not see the Japanese fire on the Chinese in the water. The Chinese killed many of their own people.

LOSS OF THE KOW-SHING

Finding and Order of a Naval Court, held at H.B.M. Consulate, Nagasaki, on August 7, 1894.

The S.S. Kow-shing was an iron vessel, schooner rigged, of 1355 tons registered tonnage, official number 87000, built at Barrow-in-Furness, and belonging to the port of London. It appears from evidence given before this court that she sailed from Taku on or about the 23rd day of July, 1894, bound for Gasan, in Korea, with no cargo but 1100 Chinese troops on board, that everything went well until the morning of the 25th July, when about 9 a.m. the Naniwa-kan, a Japanese man-of-war, signalled to her to stop and to anchor, with the island of Sho-pei-oul bearing about N. by E., distant 1¼ miles. That after communicating with the Kow-shing twice by boat, and ordering the officers to quit the vessel, which they were prevented doing by the Chinese troops, the Naniwa-kan, about 1 p.m., discharged a torpedo at the Kow-shing, and this not striking her the Naniwa-kan fired a broadside of five heavy guns at her and continued firing both heavy and machine guns from deck and tops until she sank, about an hour later. That when firing commenced a number of the crew and Chinese troops jumped overboard, amongst them the master, Thomas Ryder Galsworthy, the first mate, Lewis Henry Tamplin, and a quartermaster, Lucas Evangelista (a Manilla man), who are the only members of the crew at present known to be saved. The court, having regard to the circumstances above stated, find as follows:—

1. That the ship was sufficiently seaworthy and
found well in all necessary respects.

2. That the conduct of the officers and crew before
and up to the time of the sinking of the vessel was
satisfactory and free from blame.

3. That the cause of the sinking was due to her
having been repeatedly struck by heavy cannon shots
from the Naniwa-kan, a Japanese man-of-war.

4. That no efforts on the part of the master or crew
would have availed to avert the catastrophe.

5. That the court attaches no blame whatever to
the master, Thomas Ryder Galsworthy, or any of the
officers or crew.

6. The expenses of the Court are merely approved.

Dated at Nagasaki, the 7th day of August, 1894.

JOHN J. QUIN,
H.B.M. Consul, president.

THE ARMISTICE

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan having in view of the untoward event which temporarily interrupted the depending negotiations for peace commanded his plenipotentiaries to consent to a temporary armistice,

The undersigned Count Ito Hirobumi, Junii, grand cross of the imperial order of Paullownia, minister president of state, and Viscount Mutsu Munemitsu, Junii, first class of the imperial order of the Sacred Treasure, minister of state for foreign affairs, the plenipotentiaries of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan; and Li Hung-Chang, plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of China, senior tutor to the Heir Apparent, senior grand secretary of state, minister superintendent of trade for the northern ports of China, viceroy of the province of Chihli and earl of the first rank, have concluded the following treaty of armistice:—

Art. 1. The Imperial governments of Japan and China agree to enforce an armistice between their respective military and naval forces in the provinces of Fêng-tien, Chihli and Shan-tung subject to the provisions contained in the following articles:—

Art. 2. The forces affected by this armistice shall have the right to maintain the positions respectively occupied by them at the time hostilities are actually suspended, but they shall not under any circumstances during the existence of this armistice advance beyond such positions.

Art. 3. The two governments engage during the existence of this treaty not to extend, perfect or advance their attacking works or to reinforce or in anywise to strengthen either for offensive or defensive operations their confronting military line. But this engagement shall not prevent either government from making any new distribution or arrangement of troops not intended to augment or strengthen the armies now actually in the field and engaged in active military operations.

Art. 4. The movement of troops and the transportation of military supplies and all other contraband of war by sea shall be subject to the ordinary rules of war and shall consequently be liable to hostile capture.

Art. 5. This armistice shall be enforced by the imperial governments of Japan and China for the period of 21 days from the date of the signature of this treaty.

In those localities occupied by the troops of the two governments to which there is no telegraphic communication the quickest possible means shall be employed in issuing the orders for the armistice, and the respective commanders of the two countries shall upon the receipt of such orders announce the fact to each other and take steps to enforce the armistice.

Art. 6. This armistice shall terminate, without notice on either side, at mid-day on the 20th day of the 4th month of the 28th year of Meiji corresponding to the 26th day of the 3rd month of the 21st year of Kwang-Hsu. If in the mean time the depending negotiations for peace are broken off, this armistice shall in that case terminate at the same time such negotiations cease.

In witness whereof the plenipotentiaries of Japan and China have hereunto set their hands and affixed their seals.

Done at Shimonosiki, Japan, this 30th day of the 3rd month of the 28th year of Meiji corresponding to the 5th day of the 3rd month of the 21st year of Kwang-Hsu.

COUNT ITO HIROBUMI (L. S.),
_Junii; grand cross of the imperial order
of Paullownia; minister president of
state; plenipotentiary of His Majesty the
Emperor of Japan_.

VISCOUNT MUTSU MUNEMITSU (L. S.),
_Junii; first class of the imperial order
of the Sacred Treasure; minister of state
for foreign affairs; plenipotentiary of
His Majesty the Emperor of Japan_.

LI HUNG-CHANG (L. S.),
_plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor
of China; senior tutor to the Heir_

_Apparent; senior grand secretary of state;
minister superintendent of trade for the
northern ports of China; viceroy of the
province of Chihli and earl of the first rank_.

THE TREATY OF PEACE

(_Official translation._)

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan and His Majesty the Emperor of China, desiring to restore the blessings of peace to their countries and subjects and to remove all cause for future complications, have named as their plenipotentiaries for the purpose of concluding a treaty of peace, that is to say:

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, Count Ito Hirobumi, Junii, grand cross of the imperial order of the Paullownia, minister president of state, and Viscount Mutsu Munemitsu, Junii, first class of the imperial order of the Sacred Treasure, minister of state for foreign affairs;

and His Majesty the Emperor of China, Li Hung-chang, senior tutor to the heir apparent, senior grand secretary of state, minister superintendent of trade for the northern ports of China, viceroy of the province of Chihli and earl of the first rank, and Li Ching-Fong, ex-minister of the diplomatic service, of the second official rank;

who, after having exchanged their full powers, which were found to be in good and proper form, have agreed to the following articles:

Art. 1. China recognises definitively the full and complete independence and autonomy of Korea, and in consequence the payment of tribute and the performance of ceremonies and formalities by Korea to China in derogation of such independence and autonomy shall wholly cease for the future.

Art. 2. China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and sovereignty the following territories together with all fortifications, arsenals and public property therein:

(_a_) The southern portion of the province of Fêng-Tien within the following boundaries:

The line of demarcation begins at the mouth of the River Yalu and ascends that stream to the mouth of the River Anping; from thence the line runs to Funghwang; from thence to Haiching, from thence to Yingkow, forming a line which describes the southern portion of the territory. The places above named are included in the ceded territory. When the line reaches the River Liao at Yingkow it follows the course of that stream to its mouth, where it terminates. The mid-channel of the River Liao shall be taken as the line of demarcation.

The cession also includes all islands appertaining or belonging to the province of Fêng-Tien situated in the eastern portion of the bay of Liaotung and in the northern part of the Yellow Sea.

(_b_) The Island of Formosa, together with all islands appertaining or belonging to the said Island of Formosa.

(_c_) The Pescadores Group, that is to say, all islands lying between the 119th and 120th degrees of longitude east of Greenwich and the 23rd and 24th degrees of north latitude.

Art. 3. The alignments of the frontiers described in the preceding article shall be subject to verification and demarcation on the spot, by a joint commission of delimitation consisting of two or more Japanese and two or more Chinese delegates to be appointed immediately after the exchange of the ratifications of this act. In case the boundaries laid down in this act are found to be defective at any point, either on account of topography or in consideration of good administration, it shall also be the duty of the delimitation commission to rectify the same.

The delimitation commission will enter upon its duties as soon as possible, and will bring its labours to a conclusion within the period of one year after appointment.

The alignments laid down in this act shall, however, be maintained until the rectifications of the delimitation commission, if any are made, shall have received the approval of the governments of Japan and China.

Art. 4. China agrees to pay to Japan as a war indemnity the sum of 200,000,000 Kuping Taels. The said sum to be paid in eight instalments. The first instalment of 50,000,000 taels to be paid within six months, and the second instalment of 50,000,000 taels to be paid within twelve months, after the exchange of the ratifications of this act. The remaining sum to be paid in six equal annual instalments, as follows: The first of such equal annual instalments to be paid within two years; the second within three years; the third within four years; the fourth within five years; the fifth within six years, and the sixth within seven years, after the exchange of the ratification of this act. Interest at the rate of 5 per centum per annum shall begin to run on all unpaid portions of the said indemnity from the date the first instalment falls due.

China shall, however, have the right to pay by anticipation at any time any or all of the said instalments. In case the whole amount of the indemnity is paid within three years after the exchange of the ratification of the present act, all interest shall be waived and the interest for two years and a half or for any less period if then already paid shall be included as a part of the principal amount of the indemnity.

Art. 5. The inhabitants of the territories ceded to Japan, who wish to take up their residence outside the ceded districts, shall be at liberty to sell their real property and retire. For this purpose a period of two years from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of the present act shall be granted. At the expiration of that period those of the inhabitants who shall not have left such territories shall, at the option of Japan, be deemed to be Japanese subjects.

Each of the two governments shall, immediately upon the exchange of the ratifications of the present act, send one or more commissioners to Formosa to effect a final transfer of that province; and within the space of two months after the exchange of the ratifications of this act such transfer shall be completed.

Art. 6. All treaties between Japan and China having come to an end in consequence of the war, China engages, immediately upon the exchange of the ratifications of this act, to appoint plenipotentiaries to conclude, with the Japanese plenipotentiaries, a treaty of commerce and navigation and a convention to regulate frontier intercourse and trade. The treaties, conventions and regulations now subsisting between China and European powers shall serve as a basis for the said treaty and convention between Japan and China. From the date of the exchange of the ratifications of this act until the said treaty and convention are brought into actual operation, the Japanese government; its officials; commerce; navigation; frontier intercourse and trade; industries; ships and subjects, shall, in every respect, be accorded by China the most favoured nation treatment.

China makes in addition the following concession, to take effect six months after the date of the present act:

1st.—The following cities, towns and ports, in addition to those already opened, shall be opened to the trade, residence, industries and manufactures of Japanese subjects, under the same conditions and with the same privileges and facilities as exist at the present in cities, towns, and ports of China:

1.—Shashih in the Province of Hupeh.
2.—Chungking in the Province of Szechüan.
3.—Soochow in the Province of Kianghsu.
4.—Hangchow in the Province of Chekiang.

The Japanese government shall have the right to station consuls at any or all of the above-named places.

2nd.—Steam navigation for vessels under the Japanese flag for the conveyance of passengers and cargo shall be extended to the following places:

1.—On the Upper Yangtsze River, from Ichang
to Chungking.

2.—On the Woosung River and the Canal, from
Shang-hai to Soochow and Hangchow.

The rules and regulations which now govern the navigation of the inland waters of China by foreign vessels shall, so far as applicable, be enforced in respect of the above-named routes, until new rules and regulations are conjointly agreed to.

3rd.—Japanese subjects purchasing goods or produce in the interior of China shall have the right temporarily to rent or hire warehouses for the storage of the articles so purchased or transported, without the payment of any taxes or exactions whatever.

4th.—Japanese subjects shall be free to engage in all kinds of manufacturing industries in all the open cities, towns and ports of China, and shall be at liberty to import into China all kinds of machinery, paying only the stipulated import duties thereon.

All articles manufactured by Japanese subjects in
China, shall, in respect of inland transit and internal
taxes, duties, charges and exactions of all kinds, and
also in respect of warehousing and storing facilities
in the interior of China, stand upon the same footing
and enjoy the same privileges and exemptions as
merchandise imported by Japanese subjects into China.

In the event of additional rules and regulations
being necessary in connection with these concessions,
they shall be embodied in the treaty of commerce and
navigation provided for by this article.

Art. 7. Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding article, the evacuation of China by the armies of Japan shall be completely effected within three months after the exchange of the ratifications of the present act.

Art. 8. As a guarantee of the faithful performance of the stipulations of this act, China consents to the temporary occupation of the military forces of Japan of Wei-hai-wei in the Province of Shan-tung.

Upon the payment of the first two instalments of the war indemnity, herein stipulated, this place shall be evacuated by the Japanese forces, provided the Chinese government consents to pledge, under suitable and sufficient arrangements, the customs revenue of China as security for the payment of the principal and interest of the remaining instalments of the said indemnity. In the event no such arrangements are concluded, such evacuation shall only take place upon the payment of the final instalment of the said indemnity.

It is, however, expressly understood that no such evacuation shall take place until after the exchange of the ratifications of the treaty of commerce and navigation.

Art. 9. Immediately upon the exchange of the ratifications of this act all prisoners of war then held shall be restored, and China undertakes not to ill-treat or punish prisoners of war so restored to her by Japan. China also engages to at once release all Japanese subjects accused of being military spies or charged with any other military offences. China further engages not to punish in any manner, nor to allow to be punished, those Chinese subjects who have in any manner been compromised in their relations with the Japanese army during the war.

Art. 10. All offensive military operations shall cease upon the exchange of the ratifications of this act.

Art. 11. The present act shall be ratified by Their Majesties the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of China, and ratifications shall be exchanged at Chefoo, on the 8th day of the 5th month of the 28th year of Meiji, corresponding to 14th day of the 4th month of the 21st year of Kuang-Hsü (May 8th, 1895).

In witness whereof, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the same and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

Done at Shimonoseki, in duplicate, this 17th day of the 4th month of the 28th year of Meiji, corresponding to the 23rd day of the 3rd month of 21st year of Kuang-Hsü.

COUNT ITO HIROBUMI [L.L.],
_Junii; grand cross of the imperial order of the
Paullownia; minister president of state; plenipotentiary
of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan._

VISCOUNT MUTSU MUNEMITSU [L.L.],
_Junii; first class of the imperial order of the Sacred
Treasure; minister of state for foreign affairs;
plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan._

LI HUNG-CHANG [L.L.],
_plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of China,
senior tutor to the heir apparent; senior grand
secretary of state; minister superintendent of trade for
the northern ports of China; viceroy of the province
of Chihli and earl of the first rank._

LI CHING-FONG,
_plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of China,
ex-minister of the diplomatic service of the
second official rank._

CORRESPONDENCE IN CONNECTION WITH THE WEI-HAI-WEI SURRENDER.