Chapter XLVIII: Appendix: EF (3)

[88] Telegram from General Gordon to Sir E. Baring dated Feb. 27, 1884, says: “You have to say whether the partial evacuation of the Soudan fulfils your objects,—if it does not, then you must act by Indian Moslem troops from Wady Halfa; and do so at once by sending detachments of troops to Wady Halfa.”—_Egypt, No. 12_ (1884), _Enclosure 1_, in _No. 229_. And again, on Feb. 29, “Should you wish to intervene, send 200 British troops to Wady Halfa and adjutants to inspect Dongola, and then open up Suakin-Berber road by Indian Moslem troops. This will cause an immediate collapse of the revolt. Whether you think it worth while to do this or not you are, of course, the best judge. I can only tell you the _modus operandi_ of an expeditious intervention. If you decide against this you may probably have to decide between Zubair and the Mahdi. Zubair with £100,000.”—_Egypt, No. 12_ (1884), _Enclosure 5, No. 229_.—ED.

[89] “Nineteenth Century,” August, 1877.—ED.

[90] A telegram from Mudir of Dongola says that “on the 24th July, the Emir Abou Kanga and his army, who had come from Kordofan, were slaughtered, and that before the messenger quitted Kartoum another fight occurred, in which the son of Sheikh Sid and his followers were killed on the 30th August, and the siege raised. This is confirmed by a letter sent to me by Cassim-el-Mousse Bey, stating that he and his soldiers were at Halfeyeh, and that the Shaggyeh tribe and people had come in and tendered their submission.—_Egypt, No. 35, 1884, No. 133._—ED.

[91] An oke equals 3½ lbs. troy.—ED.

[92] The position of the garrisons in Darfour, the Bahr-el-Gazelle and Equatorial provinces renders it impossible that you should take any action which would facilitate their retreat without extending your operations far beyond the sphere which Her Majesty’s Government is prepared to sanction.

As regards the Sennaar garrison, Her Majesty’s Government is not prepared to sanction the dispatch of an expedition of British troops up the Blue Nile in order to insure its retreat.

From the last telegrams received from General Gordon, there is reason to hope that he has already taken steps to withdraw the Egyptian portion of the Sennaar garrison.

You will use your best endeavours to insure the safe retreat of the Egyptian troops which constitute the Kartoum garrison, and of such of the civil employés of Kartoum, together with their families, as may wish to return to Egypt.

As regards the future government of the Soudan, and especially of Kartoum, Her Majesty’s Government would be glad to see a Government at Khartoum which, so far as all matters connected with the internal administration of the country are concerned, would be wholly independent of Egypt.—_Lord Wolseley’s Instructions, Egypt, No. 35, 1884, No. 157._—ED.

[93] “I am strongly against any permanent retention of the Soudan, but I think we ought to leave it with decency, and give the respectable people a man to lead them, around whom they can rally, and we ought to support that man by money and by opening road to Berber. Pray do not consider me in any way to advocate retention of Soudan; I am quite averse to it, but you must see that you could not recall me nor could I possibly obey until the Cairo employés get out from all the places. I have named men to different places, thus involving them with Mahdi; how could I look the world in the face if I abandoned them and fled? As a gentleman, could you advise this course? It may have been a mistake to send me up, but having been done I have no option but to see evacuation through, for even if I was mean enough to escape I have no power to do so. You can easily understand this; would you do so? If you were the people of Khartoum, you would, like they would, make terms with Mahdi by making me backsheesh Mahdi.”—_Gen. Gordon to Sir E. Baring, Kartoum, March 3, 1884; Egypt, No. 12, 1884; No. 231._ This telegram, forwarded by Sir E. Baring to Lord Granville, was received by H. M. Ministers on March 11, 1884. On April 3 Mr. Gladstone stated in the House of Commons that “General Gordon was under no orders and under no restraint to stay at Kartoum.”—ED.

[94] Abdel Kader was then Minister of War. In March 1882, he was appointed to succeed Raouf Pasha as Governor-General of the Soudan, and on the 11th of May he reached Kartoum and assumed his duties. He carried on an active campaign against the Mahdi until March 26th, 1883, when Al-ed-Din Pasha was publicly proclaimed at Kartoum, Governor-General of the Soudan, in his place. In January 1884 Abdel Kader was selected by the Egyptian Government as their envoy to Kartoum. He at first accepted the position and then declined it. Upon this the Egyptian Government requested Her Majesty’s Government to select a well-qualified British officer to go to Kartoum instead of Abdel Kader. General Gordon was the officer selected. Thus, in suggesting Abdel Kader as his successor, General Gordon was suggesting the very man whom he had succeeded.—ED.

[95] The instructions conveyed to Lord Wolseley by Her Majesty’s Government were to the effect that the _primary object of the expedition was to bring away General Gordon and Colonel Stewart from Kartoum_. He was moreover enjoined not to advance further southwards than was absolutely necessary in order to attain _the primary object of the expedition_.—ED.

[96] It must be borne in mind that when Gordon wrote this he expected the expedition to reach Kartoum before the middle of November and not towards the end of January. The strength of the rebels had materially increased during December and January.—ED.

[97] General Sir Lintorn Simmons, G.C.B.—ED.

[98] “I have ascertained within the last few weeks that the principal agent in the surrender of the city was not Ferratch Pasha, as originally stated, but a certain civilian exile from Egypt who had acted at one time under Arabi as Secretary of the Ministry of Marine. I know the history of this man well, and can vouch for its accuracy, as I often heard it at Cairo when I was there. Four years or so ago Awaan was an honest and zealous employé in the Cadastral Survey under Sir Auckland Colvin—a service which of all others under the Control was the most inefficient, and is now acknowledged to have been so. Awaan, provoked at the waste and mismanagement, one day had the temerity to draw up a memorandum of what he knew and to send it to his chief. The answer was his dismissal. He then appealed to the native press—for there was some liberty in those days—and his grievance made him a hero; and when Arabi came to power he gave him this place as secretary, which he held at Alexandria down to the bombardment. I never heard of his taking any prominent part in the politics of that eventful time, but on Sir Auckland Colvin’s landing he was among the first persons arrested. Lord Charles Beresford tried him by one of his courts-martial and found him guilty of exciting to rebellion, or some such charge. He was handed over to the Circassian tender mercies, and, after seventy-four days in irons in the terrible Borgho prison, he was exiled to Kartoum. He was clearly a political prisoner if ever there was one; and when Lord Dufferin promised us the amnesty at the compromise of Arabi’s trial, I wrote to him recommending Awaan’s case to his special attention, and I have his answer, with a memorandum, curiously enough, by the very Sir Charles Wilson who was afterwards to reap such bitter disappointment at his hands. But Lord Dufferin declined to interfere, and Awaan was left at Kartoum to his revenge. On January 26 it was he who, with the English again at his gates, negotiated its surrender to its Arab deliverer.”—_Mr. Wilfred Blunt in a letter to the ‘Times’ of May 4, 1884._—ED.

[99] “One of the most painful parts of this business is the constant and continual reports one hears of the intended treachery of this or that influential man. I have, though greatly tired, kept my faith in all men, and have resisted any of those measures which never benefit and which throw widespread alarm throughout the town. Men who belonged to the beleaguered Shaggyeh and who had been shut up with them escaped here without arms, saying that the Shaggyeh had gone over to the enemy, while others would come from them beseeching for aid. I am glad to say that without exception the people of the town and the troops have behaved themselves in a most kind and proper way. This binds me not to leave them until I can do so under Government which would give them some hope of peace.”—_General Gordon’s telegram to Sir E. Baring, received at Cairo end of March, 1884. Egypt, No. 12, No. 287._—ED.

[100] To strike with a slipper during a dispute is with Moslems the greatest insult one man can offer another.—ED.

[101] On Feb. 11th, 1884, General Gordon telegraphed from Berber to Sir Evelyn Baring: “I would not, if I were supreme, try again any Egyptian forces at Suakin, but would engage 3000 Turkish troops in British pay. That would settle the affair. It would be sufficient for the Padishah’s troops to appear to cause a collapse of all fanatical feeling.”—ED.

[102] “Several telegrams have been sent from press asking about what I said respecting slaves. The question asked me was this: Did I insist on the liberation of slaves in 1889 as per Treaty 1877? I answered that the Treaty would not be enforced in 1889 by me, which, considering the determination of Her Majesty’s Government respecting Soudan, was a self-evident fact. The question is one of slave-holding, not of slave-hunting, and, in my opinion, that Treaty of 1877 will never be carried out in Cairo as to slave-holding.”—_General Gordon’s telegram to Sir E. Baring, received at Cairo Feb. 21, 1884, Egypt 12, No. 132._—ED.

“Let it be known to you all that I have been appointed, in concert between the Khedive’s Government and the Government of Great Britain, Governor-General of the whole Soudan; and the Soudan has now become an independent State, to govern itself without the intervention of the Egyptian Government in any way whatever.”—_General Gordon’s Proclamation to All the Notables and Inhabitants in the Soudan, Feb. 13, 1884._—ED.

[103] General Gordon is here probably quoting the views of Herbin, the French Consul.—ED.

[104] Though, as shown in a previous note, General Gordon was right in assuming no expedition would have been sent had he not been in Kartoum with Stewart, he is also right in saying, “The expedition comes up to deliver the garrisons,” for the avowed policy declared in the instructions of Her Majesty’s Government to Lord Wolseley was that steps were to be taken to insure the safe retreat of the Egyptian troops and civil employés.—ED.

[105] Court of Enquiry.—ED.

[106] This forecast is in a fair way of being fulfilled.—ED.

[107] It seems pretty clear that this is Olivier Pain.

[108] Not received from the Government with these Journals.

[109] “European Consuls came to me to-day with the question whether Kartoum was menaced. I replied that it was not so, directly, but that the road to Berber was threatened. They asked me if I could help them to go to Berber. I replied ‘Yes.’ There is no doubt that when these Europeans leave, it will be a most significant sign to the people in this town and in the provinces that no assistance is likely to come to Kartoum. Under these circumstances, what do you recommend me to say in order to neutralise the ill-effects of their departure?—_General Gordon to Sir Evelyn Baring, Kartoum, March 9, 1884_, 11.30 P.M. _Egypt, No. 12 (1884), Inclosure in No. 242_.

“You know exactly the position of the different garrisons so far as I can explain it, and that there is no probability of the people rallying round me, or of paying any attention to my Proclamation.

“If you mean to make the proposed diversion to Berber (of British troops), and to accept my proposal as to Zebehr, to instal him in the Soudan and evacuate, then it is worth while to hold on to Kartoum.

“If, on the other hand, you determine on neither of these steps, then I can see no use in holding on to Kartoum, for it is impossible for me to help the other garrisons, and I shall only be sacrificing the whole of the troops and _employés_ here.

“In this latter case, your instructions to me had better be that I should evacuate Kartoum, and, with all the employés and troops, remove the seat of government to Berber. You would understand that such a step would mean the sacrificing of all outlying places except Berber and Dongola.

“You must give a prompt reply to this, as even the retreat to Berber may not be in my power in a few days; and, even if carried out at once, the retreat will be of extreme difficulty.

“I should have to leave large stores, and nine steamers which cannot go down. Eventually, some question would arise at Berber and Dongola, and I may utterly fail in getting the Cairo employés to Berber.

“If I attempt it, I could be responsible only for the attempt to do so.

“Once the Mahdi is in Kartoum, operations against him will be very arduous, and will not serve Sennaar and Kassala.”

“_Kartoum, March 9, 1884_, 11.40 P.M.

“If the immediate evacuation of Kartoum is determined upon, irrespective of outlying towns, I would propose to send down all the Cairo employés and white troops with Colonel Stewart to Berber, where he would await your orders. I would also ask Her Majesty’s Government to accept the resignation of my commission, and I would take all steamers and stores up to the Equatorial and Bahr Gazelle Provinces, and consider those provinces as under the King of the Belgians.

“You would be able to retire all Cairo employés and white troops with Stewart from Berber to Dongola, and thence to Wady Halfa.

“If you, therefore, determine on the immediate evacuation of Kartoum, this is my idea. If you object, tell me.

“It is the only solution that I can see if the immediate evacuation of Kartoum, irrespective of the outlying towns, is determined upon.”—_Ibid._—ED.

[110] “I have received your telegram of the 9th inst., informing me that you have received a letter from General Gordon from which it appears that that officer contemplates proceeding to Bahr Gazelle and the Equatorial Provinces. I have to state that Her Majesty’s Government are of opinion that General Gordon should not at present go beyond Kartoum.—_Earl Granville to Sir E. Baring, Feb. 11th, 1884. Egypt, No. 12 No. 4._—ED.

[111] Romulus Gessi, who was formerly employed as interpreter at the headquarters of the army before Sebastopol, and who did such excellent work against the slave-hunters in the Soudan as General Gordon’s lieutenant in 1878. Gessi was subsequently appointed Governor of the Bahr Gazelle, but was obliged to retire owing to the intrigues of Raouf Pasha. He died at the hospital at Suez in 1881.—ED.

[112] General Gordon’s chief complaint against the Intelligence Department was that they spent no money in bribing natives to try and get messages through to Kartoum; had they done so, many, he held, would have volunteered, and some must have succeeded.—ED.

[113] General Gordon to Sir E. Baring, March 1st.—“_Re_ policy. I maintain firmly policy of eventual evacuation, but I tell you plainly it is impossible to get Cairo employés out of Kartoum unless the Government helps in the way I told you.”—_Inclosure 1 in No. 229, No. 12 in Blue Book No. 12._

Sir Evelyn Baring replies in a telegram dated March 2nd, 1884:—“I have received your eleven telegrams of the last four days on matters of general policy. I am most anxious to help and support you in every way, but find it very difficult to understand exactly what you want. I think your best plan will be to reconsider the whole question carefully and then state to me in one telegram what it is you recommend, &c.”

[114] Earl Granville to Mr. Egerton, April, 23rd, 1884:—“Gordon should be at once informed by several messengers ... that we do not propose to supply him with Turkish or other force for the purpose of undertaking military expeditions, such being beyond the scope of the commission he holds, and at variance with the pacific policy which was the purpose of his mission to the Soudan; that, if with this knowledge, he continues at Kartoum, he should state to us the cause and intention with which he so continues.”—_Egypt, No. 12 (1884), No. 36._—ED.

[115] Supposed remarks of British soldiers crossing the desert upon camels.

[116] Saddles.—ED.

[117] Allusion to images produced on the retina by an excited or exhausted brain.—ED.

[118] See Appendix, “The Insurrection of the False Prophet.”

[119] Goba is on the right bank of the Blue Nile, to the north of Tuti Island, and within two miles of Kartoum.—ED.

[120] See p. 141.

[121] Appendix P.

[122] It would be interesting if some Member of Parliament would ask Her Majesty’s Government for information on this subject.—ED.

[123] Appendix P.

[124] _I.e._, the priest.—ED.

[125] Appendix Q.

[126] Many of General Gordon’s “instincts” have been no less remarkable than many of his escapes. In a telegram to Sir Evelyn Baring, dated March 1st, he said, “I will do my best to carry out my instructions, but feel convinced I shall be caught in Kartoum.”—ED.

[127] It is worth while to note how readily Her Majesty’s Government, who had declined all General Gordon’s suggestions while he lived, accepted this posthumous piece of advice.—ED.

[128] In his ‘Wild Tribes of the Soudan,’ Mr. F. L. James gives an account of how he and his party were treated by Ala-ed-Deen and the Bey at Senheit. This Bey was no other than Ferratch Pasha, who is said to have opened the gates of Kartoum. “We had engaged camels at Senheit,” says Mr. James, “for some weeks’ shooting in the vicinity. On our return, a steamer was leaving Massowah for Suez, which we could only catch by taking the same camels on to the coast. Our Shaggyeh drivers objected, saying the road to the sea was out of their country, and their camels were tired—perfectly valid excuses. We offered them half as much again as the proper fare, but they still demurred, fearing that the Governor of Massowa would take their camels, make them carry for the Government, and probably never pay them. On obtaining a letter for the Bey at Senheit (Ferratch), asking (as we fondly imagined) Ala-ed-Deen, who was at that time Governor of Massowah, to let them go free, they consented to accompany us. On our arrival we presented the letter, which, we found, merely stated that the garrison of Senheit was in want of salt, and that he had better load up the camels with some, and return them to him.”—ED.

[129] Appendix Q.

[130] The Mahdi declared that the Archangel Gabriel had twice appeared to him and commanded him to unsheath the sword of faith in order to reform the bad Moslem and to found a Mussulman Empire which would be followed by universal peace.—ED.

[131] The action of Her Majesty’s Government had now raised the question in General Gordon’s mind as to whether he was justified in punishing any of the inhabitants of Kartoum who were _hedging_ with the Mahdi. He was almost disposed to let them _hedge_ if it gave them a better chance of their lives.—ED.

[132] Appendix R.

[133] Hansall.—ED.

[134] These distinctions are in satirical allusion to some mistake made at the Foreign Office.—ED.

[135] Appendix S.

[136] There is a good-natured, and half playful ring about these orders, but the fact must not be overlooked that they are distinct commands. General Gordon, while Governor-General of the Soudan, had the right to issue orders to anyone in the Soudan, and no one was more cognizant of this right than he.—ED.

[137] The arrests of the Mudir, Cadi, Sheikh el Islam, &c., who were supposed to be in communication with the Mahdi.—ED.

[138] _I.e._, Chief of Expeditionary Force.—ED.

[139] Appendix Q.

[140] Appendix Q.

[141] Appendix R.

[142] Eight pages of the diary were cut out.—ED.

[143] General Gordon has just stated that a letter received from the Greek Consul, dated 17th of August, contained more news than one he received, dated 31st of August, from an officer in Her Majesty’s service. He then goes on to say he sees now (_i.e._, after reading the Greek Consul’s letter) why he was kept in the dark.—ED.

[144] Sir Gerald Graham’s despatch.—ED.

[145] “King John issued an edict that if any of his subjects were found smoking they should lose hand and foot. General Gordon in his notes on Abyssinia in 1879, said: ‘I write in haste, but I will sum up my impression of Abyssinia. The king is rapidly growing mad. He cuts off the noses of those who take snuff, and the lips of those who smoke. The king is hated more than Theodore was. Cruel to a degree, he does not, however, take life. He cuts off the feet and hands of people who offend him. He puts out their eyes by pouring hot tallow into their ears. No one can travel without the king’s order if he is a foreigner. You can buy nothing without his order; no one will shelter you without his order—in fact no more complete despotism could exist.’

* * * * *

“The cruelties the king and his people committed were atrocious. Forty Soudan soldiers were mutilated altogether, and sent to Bogos with the message that, if His Highness the Khedive wanted eunuchs he could have these.”—_Hill’s Colonel Gordon in Central Africa_, pp. 421-423.—ED.

[146] Mr. F. L. James in his ‘Wild Tribes of the Soudan,’ gives an excellent and interesting account of this mission station, p. 210, _seq._

[147] Twaddle.—ED.

[148] Ismail, the Ex-Khedive, who knew King John well, said to General Gordon, “Never go near him, it is perfectly useless.”— ED.

[149] Of course General Gordon’s contention throughout is that giving Kassala, Katarif, Galabat and Bogos, to the King of Abyssinia, is in fact precisely the same thing as abandoning those places.—ED.

[150] Here a page has been cut out by General Gordon himself.—ED.

[151] Appendix U, _a_.

[152] Appendix U, _c_.

[153] U, _b_.

[154] U, _d_.

[155] The Austrian Consul.—ED.

[156] When a Christian becomes a Mahommedan he has to take a Mahommedan name.—ED.

[157] General Gordon is here evidently thinking of Gessi’s glorious campaign against Suleiman.—ED.

[158] The Black Watch started from Cairo for Wady Halfa on September 23rd. The Mounted Infantry reached Deel on September 24th, and 150 men under Daubeny got as far as Tangoor on the 26th. The first steam pinnace arrived at Sarras, which is about twenty miles above the second cataract, on September 26th. Lord Wolseley did not reach Wady Halfa until October 5th.—ED.

[159] The paper referred to is the French extract just given.—ED.

[160] _Sir E. Baring to Earl Granville (received March 5th)._

“General Gordon has on several occasions pressed for 200 British troops to be sent to Wady Halfa. I agree with the military authorities in thinking that it would not be desirable to comply with this request.”

* * * * *

_Sir Evelyn Baring to Earl Granville (received March 4th)._

“General Gordon and Colonel Stewart strongly urge the desirability, from the point of view of the success of their present mission, of opening up the Berber-Suakin route.... I cannot agree with the proposal mentioned in Colonel Stewart’s telegram, that a force of British or Indian cavalry should be sent through for Suakin to Berber.”—_Egypt No. 12 (1884). No. 205._—ED.

[161] Gordon’s intention and desire was to have taken the steamers to the Bahr Gazelle, and to have protected that country against the Mahdi.—ED.

[162] The fact that the Fellaheen were dragged in chains from their huts, and kept in chains in the streets of Cairo, is well known.—ED.

[163] General Gordon intends H.M. Government to understand by this statement, that, in the position of a Major-General in H.M. service, he would give all his services to the retreating expedition, were he ordered to do so, though such an order would be most unwelcome; but that he would do nothing of the kind until some one replaced him as Governor-General. He is really applying to himself the remarks he made a few pages back: “In military affairs it is different: one is ordered to go here and there, and one obeys (even if one thinks it unwise, having represented it), but in diplomacy there is no such call.”—ED.

[164] Up to the present we have neither given the Soudan to the Turks nor have we established Zubair as Governor-General, but we have had “_a deal of worry and danger_,” and the campaign has been “_entirely unprofitable and devoid of prestige_.”—ED.

[165] We are at present not only in strict blockade on the land side of Suakin, but absolutely besieged.—ED.

[166] Barges.—ED.

[167] Appendix T.

[168]

_Sir Evelyn Baring to Earl Granville._

Cairo, February 28th, 1884.

“I have the honour to report to your Lordship that, although I did not specially consult General Gordon on the subject of sending British troops to Assouan, he telegraphs to me that if 100 British troops were sent to Assouan or Wady Halfa, they would run no more risk than Nile tourists, and would have the best effect.... I certainly would not risk sending so small a body as 100 men.”—_Egypt No. 12, No. 170._—ED.

[169] The foregoing portion of the Journal is written on tissue copying-paper.—ED.

[170] This part of the Journal is written on telegraph forms.—ED.

[171] Captured at Berber by the Arabs.—ED.

[172] General Gordon asks in an undated telegram, written after the fall of Berber: “Is it right that I should have been sent to Kartoum with only seven followers, after the destruction of Hicks’ army, and no attention paid to me till communications were cut?”—ED.

[173] Formerly General Gordon’s under secretary and secretary. He was of old and good family, and greatly respected by General Gordon, who said in 1879: “A few men like Berzati Bey would regenerate Egypt, but they are rare.”—ED.

[174] Two of these horses returned to-day; as I expect the riders threw themselves off and let their horses loose, and that, too, at a distance so great that the Arabs did not see them!!!

[175] I am going to make them pay for twenty-two of the Remingtons, for it appears doubtful if they were captured, inasmuch as to-day they asked me to send the steamer down to look for them. I expect the men simply threw them down and bolted upon the appearance of the Arabs.

[176] See map on opposite page.—ED.

[177] It was about this date that the recall of Lord Wolseley was generally rumoured at home and abroad. On the 10th of October this rumoured recall was officially contradicted. The ‘Times,’ however, said: “We have every confidence in the veracity and good information of our correspondent, but so incredible did his statement seem at first sight that we have made further inquiries, in order to be quite sure there was no mistake in its transmission.”—ED.

[178] It is interesting to note how often General Gordon breaks away abruptly from a subject which is irritating him, and deals with one which has a touch of humour in it. He never does this when he is discussing or explaining any particular point; it is only when he is thoroughly annoyed with his subject that he suddenly leaves it.—ED.

[179] General Gordon was in the habit of passing a great part of the day and of the night on the roof of his palace.—ED.

[180] Appendix V.

[181] Massowah is only 466 miles from Kartoum, and less than half that distance from Kassala.—ED.

[182] _i.e._ In mutiny or a stampede to the Mahdi. “The belly governs the whole world.”—ED.

[183] Here again General Gordon is really angry, and breaks off with a humorous touch about his black soldiers, so that he may, as it were, hold himself in.—ED.

[184] Appendix X.

[185] List of Greeks who went in the steamer _Abbas_, 10 Sept. ‘84.

Demitrios Kapnoulas. Demosthen Kapilos.
George Kepetzakos. Demitrios Georgopoulos.
Herial Bolanaki. George Kontis.
Alexandre Genacari. Xenophon Apostolidis.
Nasum Abagui. George Tantzos.
Nessim Morinos. Jean Stergiou.
Demitrios Perdicakis. Nicolas Kouvaras.
Michel Nomikos. Jean Dermitrzakis.
Stauros Papadakis. Michel Chatzi Christodoulou.
Jean Prospion.

[186] Appendix X.

[187] See Mahdi’s remarks upon this in Appendix U.

[188] It is impossible to read this without a feeling of admiration for the thorough way in which General Gordon examined into the minutest details of everything himself. Every precaution human foresight could conceive he took to ensure the safety of the _Abbas_ and her crew; having done this, her _fate_ was in higher hands than his.—ED.

[189] Compare General Gordon’s account with the account given by the Mudir of Dongola:—“A certain Faki Walad Ahmet, who appears trustworthy, has arrived here, stating that he has heard that after General Gordon’s return to Kartoum a steamer, with forty men on board, partly Europeans and partly Egyptians, besides five negroes and three servants, arrived at Salamat, where she ran aground, but did not founder. The population, aware of the fate of Berber, and being much alarmed, several persons from the steamer went ashore in order to reassure the natives, declaring that they had not come to make war, but to purchase camels in order to cross the desert to Merawi. The Sheikhs Soliman and Abu Noman, and the uncle of Faki Osman, agreed to see to their conveyance, and provided a guide, who was to conduct the party. Those on board were so pleased with this attention that they presented one of the Sheikhs with a gold sword, the uncle with a silver sword, and the guide with a rich dress, whereupon the Sheikhs requested them to leave the steamer and accept their hospitality until preparations had been completed for crossing the desert. The invitation was accepted, and the party entered a house, where they were all massacred. The Sheikhs afterwards returned to the steamer and killed most of them on board. Of forty persons only fourteen were spared, and these were taken prisoners.” The Sub-Mudir, not knowing if there were any Europeans among the survivors, had sent messengers for further intelligence.—ED.

[190] _i.e._, details of the fighting strength of the _Abbas_.—ED.

[191] Who came in.

[192] _i.e._, collected them from the different offices and officials in Kartoum. They have not been given over by the Government.— ED.

NOTE.—On the opposite page is an extract from Lord Lytton’s speech, cut from one of the papers: “Ask General Gordon, if he ever comes safely home to us, what he and his still unrescued garrison have learned to think of the high sense of national honour, the chivalrous courage, the unflinching good faith of Mr. Gladstone and his Radical Cabinet.” (Three cheers were given for Gordon.)—ED.

[193] Appendix Y.

[194] That is to say, the men were depressed by the apparent remoteness of their chance of escape.—ED.

[195] Egypt, ‘84, No. 22.

[196] On the page opposite the one which contains this paragraph General Gordon has pasted cuttings from the paper to which he alludes. One of these cuttings says, “An official telegram received here from Wady Halfa states that, owing to the unprecedented lowness of the Nile, no confidence is felt in the practicability of hauling boats over the cataracts till the end of September.” General Gordon’s comment written against this is, “It was not a low Nile—it was an average Nile, only you were _too late_.”— ED.

[197] _See_ ‘Ismailia,’ vol. i., p. 31.—ED.

[198] General Gordon has already fully explained wherein the responsibility of Her Majesty’s Government towards the Soudan lies.—ED.

[199] Colonel Harrison, C.B., C.M.G., R.E.—ED.

[200] At this point General Gordon refers to the newspaper cuttings he has made and pasted in on the opposite page. The first reference is a comment on a telegram in the _Standard_, dated Suakin, August 30th, which runs as follows: “The _Jaffariyeh_ overtook _not far_ to the _south_ of Suakin the three dhows _recently captured_ by the rebels. The latter on being overtaken ran the boats aground, and escaped inland. The crew of the _Jaffariyeh_ subsequently burned the dhows.” The italics are General Gordon’s. (_b_) refers to a further telegram headed “Rebellion in Arabia,” and dated Constantinople, Sunday night: “Fighting still going on in the Hedjaz between the Ottoman troops and the Arab tribes which have revolted against the authority of the Sultan’s Government. Matters must be considered somewhat serious by the Porte, for the Government have decided to despatch to the seat of disturbance further reinforcements of Imperial troops to the extent of some two thousand, &c.” In an account in a London paper of the departure of Lords Northbrook and Wolseley, General Gordon has marked certain penny-a-line passages, and in all cases where “Gordon Relief Expedition” occurs, he has drawn his pen through this and all expressions indicating that the Expeditionary Force comes to his relief.—ED.

[201] Suakin was at this time besieged on the land side.—ED.

[202] The lines extended from the Blue to the White Nile, _i.e._ from Bourré to the Mogrim Fort.—ED.

[203] General Gordon had great admiration and affection for the Black Regulars.—ED.

[204] _Baring to Lord Granville, March 6th, 1884._

“With reference to General Graham’s message communicated to Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for War relative to the opening out of the Berber-Suakin route, I wish to say that I do not recommend any English troops being sent to Berber.”—_Egypt, No. 12, 1884, No. 214._

[205] _i.e._ to be removed from my position as Governor-General.—ED.

[206] “In fact, things are not serious, although they may become so if delay occurs in sending Zebehr (Zubair). My weakness is that of being foreign and Christian and peaceful; and it is only by sending Zebehr that prejudice can be removed.”—_General Gordon to Sir E. Baring, Kartoum, March 4th, 1884. Egypt, No. 12. Enclosure 5, in No. 202._

[207] See accounts of slave hunting in the Bahr Gazelle, App. U, _b_.

[208] _I.e._ driving the cows down with the view to their exploding the mines.—ED.

[209] The steamers General Gordon sent to Metemma to assist the relieving force.—ED.

[210]

_Sir E. Baring to Lord Granville._

“Cairo, March 13th, 1884.

“I have instructed him (General Gordon) to hold on at Kartoum, until I can communicate further with Her Majesty’s Government, and have told him that he should on no account proceed to the Bahr Gazelle and Equatorial Provinces.”—_Egypt_, 1884, Nos. 12-242.—ED.

[211] The English Government has, in the most liberal manner, stated it will meet any bills that General Gordon may have drawn upon it on his private account, and of which General Gordon has given a list. The Egyptian Government has acted in a similar manner with regard to moneys spent by General Gordon at Kartoum.—ED.

[212] _i.e._ the Viziers.—ED.

[213] Whenever General Gordon deals with this subject, he shows how thoroughly angry he is, and his anger increases as he proceeds. Hence the frequent reiterations of his resolve not to leave.—ED.

[214] Briefly summarised, what General Gordon says is: “If the expeditionary force has come for me alone, I will not return with it: it may go back, while I will remain here as Governor-General, and make the best use I can of the war material which belongs to me while I hold that position. If I am removed from that position by a Firman from the Khedive, I will still remain here, in a private capacity, and devote my life and energy to those people who have devoted their lives to me.”—ED.

[215] Not received from the Government.

[216] Appendix Y.

[217] The Firman of Towfik respecting the troops withdrawing, which Gordon received 24th January, 1884, and which he did not promulgate.—ED.

[218] It is important there should be no misconstruction placed on these words. Had General Gordon thought their death would benefit the Soudan, he would never have said when he urged their going down, “If you go, you do me a great service, _i.e._ do the Soudan a great service.” When he said, “I dare not, with my views, say their death is an evil,” he merely meant, “I dare not say that two brave, just, upright men are not happier in the future life than in the present one.”—ED.

[219] General Gordon means, in my opinion, “Fairly just in his political views.” Herbin was the Editor of the _Bosphore Égyptien_.—ED.

[220] This refers to a telegram sent by Colonel Coetlogon to Colonel Fraser Floyer, at Wady Halfa, at the above date, which runs: “No fresh news. Anxiously awaiting reinforcements.” Underneath this General Gordon has written: “If Coetlogon had only been then informed that there was no intention to send reinforcements (further than nine persons) for (nearly) a year!”—ED.

[221] Major Kitchener did not know it himself

[222] A soldier previously mentioned, who was thought to have deserted.—ED.

[223] This recovery of biscuit enabled General Gordon to hold Kartoum until the gates were treacherously opened to the enemy.—ED.

[224] _Vide_ General Graham’s despatch in _re_ Black Watch.—ED.

[225] Fort Mogrim.—ED.

[226] I expect that this story of _Ismailia_ being again struck twice is a fib!

[227] _i.e._ 1,200 yards.—ED.

[228] Goba is rather more than a mile from the Palace of Kartoum.—ED.

[229] _i.e._ to escape the guns of the North Fort.—ED.

[230] _i.e._ mounted Arabs.—ED.

[231] _i.e._ it would have been possible had the force started earlier.—ED.

[232] _i.e._ a bedstead.—ED.

[233] Not because General Gordon held Zubair in esteem, but as a record of how often he had asked for his presence, and of how closely his absence was connected with the welfare of the Soudan.—ED.

[234] “The Committee are unanimous in the feeling that countenance in any shape for such an individual (_i.e._ Zubair) would be a degradation to England and a scandal to Europe.”—_Mr. Sturge to Earl Granville, British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, March 10th, 1884._—ED.

[235] _i.e._ Zubair would have been able to obtain it for me.—ED.

[236] “You will bear in mind the main end to be pursued is the evacuation of the Soudan.

“In undertaking this difficult task which now lies before you, you may feel assured that no effort will be wanting on the part of the Cairo authorities, whether English or Egyptian, to afford you all the co-operation and support in their power.”—_Sir E. Baring to Major-General Gordon, Inclosure in Egypt No 6._—ED.

[237] General Gordon has here drawn his pen through some dozen lines of his journal.—ED.

[238] Patriotism does not consist in obedience to an existing Government, but in love of one’s country, and in devotion to its public interest and welfare.—ED.

[239] _i.e._ Her Majesty’s Government declined to send troops to the Soudan, yet ordered Egypt to evacuate it, and would not permit Turkish troops to assist her.—ED.

[240] Showing how thoroughly they trusted General Gordon.—ED.

[241] See Appendix upon the insurrection of the False Prophet.—ED.

[242] These have not been handed over by the Government.—ED.

[243] If they deserted.—ED.

[244] Here succeed some dozen lines through which General Gordon has drawn his pen. Underneath is written “Abuse of Baring & Co.”—ED.

[245] Sir E. Baring, in writing to General Gordon on the instructions of H. M. Government conveyed to him, says: “You will bear in mind the main end to be pursued is the _evacuation of the Soudan_.”—_Enclosure, in Egypt No. 6._ Sir E. Baring does not say, “the evacuation of Kartoum and the abandonment of all the other garrisons in the Soudan.”—ED.

[246] That is to say, the expeditionary force was 185 miles further from Kartoum than General Gordon expected it to be.—ED.

[247] General Gordon marks on back of this telegram, which is one of three, “Telegraph of which Colonel Stewart has the key.”

[248] Appendix Y.

[249] The one alluded to in former paragraph.

[250] See last page.

[251] This account of Major Kitchener is in a letter from General Baker. General Gordon has cut out the portion of the original letter, and has pasted it in the body of his journal.—ED.

[252] _i.e._ coming up on a camel.—ED.

[253] There is some significance in this. The Mahdi in all probability knew General Gordon had recommended Turkish troops being dispatched to the Soudan, and felt he could not hold the country against them, if they came.—ED.

[254] They were two of the sixteen General Gordon imprisoned for conspiring with the Mahdi.—ED.

[255] _i.e._ the way in which this battery was directed towards that part of the Palace which the Arabs knew General Gordon inhabited.—ED.

[256] That is to say, either those who are being robbed and cheated will in their own interest be forced to give up the town to the enemy, or the robbers and cheats will be bought over by the Mahdi.—ED.

[257] “It is rather amusing to see the _personality_ of this Arab battery:” p. 42.—ED.

[258] General Gordon here declines to fight the Khedive’s ministerial battles.—ED.

[259] _i.e._ General Gordon.—ED.

[260] Title of the Book, ‘The Dissipation of Gloom from all (Mohammedan) Peoples.’

[261] The Moslems say that the Koran was sent down, every word of it, by the Angel Gabriel to Mahomed.

[262] This verse is considered to be the _completion_ of God’s final Revelation through Mahomed.

[263] The Hadiths—the authorised traditional sayings of Mahomed and those brought down by Gabriel.

[264] In Arabic writing quotation marks are not used, but, at the end of the quotation, they append the words, “End of his words.”

[265] Saadat—“Felicity”—is used as title of honour, and cannot, of course, be properly used for one who is a Kāfir and under Divine wrath.

[266] “Peace be on him” (on whom be peace), the usual formula of salutation to a true believer if alive, and used of prophets when their names are mentioned.

[267] Prince of the Faith—literally, axis or pole.

[268] The argument here rests upon the duty of avoiding force in dealing with brother Moslems, and of using persuasion only.

[269] The argument here is that true believers are sometimes killed, though in the right, as the Israelites were by Nebuchadnezzar.

[270] “Yellow-haired Greeks”—the ancient phrase here applied as “Children of the Yellow (race),” the yellow-haired Russians being meant.

[271] The intention of the writer seems to be to convey reproach of the Government authorities in Cairo, who were responsible for the fate of the army and his own desperate condition. But he seems unwilling to utter a word inconsistent with Moslem resignation or the loyalty of a soldier, though the detachment to which he belonged had been exposed to destruction.

[272] The latest accounts from the Soudan state that Ibn en Najoomi has quarrelled with Mahomed el Khair on account of his peculations.

[273] Query—Does this refer to a veil such as dervishes wear, which was sent to a renegade by the Mahdi?

[274] Reference is here made to the earthquake mentioned in a former letter, as being prepared by Gordon.

[275] Evidently a wrong enclosure had been put in by General Gordon.

[276] Slatin’s new name.

[277] This document came down with the fourth Journal. It was compiled in the Intelligence Branch, Quartermaster-General’s Department of the War Office.

[278] Powerful nomad tribes inhabiting the country west of the White Nile, and south east of Kordofan and Darfur.

[279] A body corresponding to the Divines in Christendom, who are appealed to by the Sultan respecting the right application of precepts of the Moslem faith, and their decision is known as a _fetua_.

[280] This opinion hardly agrees with that of a military correspondent of the _Times_, who, writing from Kartoum, on the 24th July, 1883, states that to preserve tranquillity at ordinary times, 9,000 troops, exclusive of the garrison of Kartoum, would be necessary, even supposing the provinces of Kordofan and Darfur to be abandoned, as has been recommended by several high authorities. He suggests that the 9,000 troops should be distributed as follows—viz., 4,000 between Kartoum and Jebel Ain, on both sides of the White Nile, 1,000 at Fashoda to keep the Denka tribes and Shilluks in order, and 4,000 on the Blue Nile, between Kartoum and Karkoj.

[281] South of Kordofan. This district is principally inhabited by negro tribes, with a king of their own, nominally subject to Kordofan.

[282] About 150 miles north-west of Kaka on the White Nile.

[283] A tribe above Korti, on the left bank of the Nile.

[284] An Italian of great force of character. He joined Colonel Gordon’s Staff in the summer of 1874, and subsequently became Governor of the Bahr-el-Ghazāl province.

[285] A district on the Abyssinian frontier near the sources of the Atbara.

[286] Sometimes called Suk-abu-Sin.

[287] Above Sennaar on the Blue Nile.

[288] A negro tribe, numbering nearly a million souls, inhabiting the banks of the White Nile for 200 miles northwards from the mouth of the Ghazal river.

[289] A powerful Arab tribe, living in the country between the Atbara and Kartoum.

[290] Capital of Kordofan.

[291] A large town in the south of Darfur.

[292] A district south of Kordofan.

[293] A district called by the Abysrians Bogos, on the road between Kassala and Massowah.

[294] A pretty town, with a good supply of water, and surrounded by excellent gardens.

[295] One ardeb = 5⅗ bushels.

[296] A kind of maize.

[297] The information concerning the events of the rebellion up to the arrival of Lieut.-Colonel Stewart at Kartoum, is derived almost entirely from native sources, and it is consequently impossible to put much reliance on the statements as to the extent of the losses in the various engagements. It is even difficult to ascertain the correct dates of the principal events. Some accounts state that the assaults on El Obeyed took place on the 4th, 5th and 6th September.

[298] South of the country of the Baggara Arabs, and west of Bahr el-Ghazel.

[299] Bara is due north of Obeyed.

[300] The Fakirs are learned pious men. The Dervishes are their satellites.

[301] The junction between the 1st Battalion and Abdel Kader’s force was to have taken place on the 15th January, but, for some reason or other, it did not take place till Abdel Kader’s arrival at Kawa on the 1st February.

[302] An Arab tribe inhabiting the country between Sennaar and Fazokl.

[303] Sometimes written El Gerazeh or Qurassa. A village on the right bank of the White Nile.

[304] Deputy Governor.

[305] Major.

[306] Lieutenant-Colonel.

[307] Sometimes written Goz Abou Goumeh.

[308] On the left bank of the Nile near Old Dongola.

[309] One ardeb = 5⅗ bushels.

[310] Number not stated.

[311] Late Bombay Staff Corps.

[312] Late 11th Foot.

[313] Late 70th Foot.

[314] Late Captain of Baker’s Horse in South Africa.

[315] Late Guards, and subsequently 15th Foot.

[316] Late Duke of Cambridge’s Own Middlesex Regiment.

[317] Late the Buffs, East Kent Regiment.

[318] Two of the battalions were those of the 2nd Regiment, which had been ordered by Abdel Kader Pasha to operate against the rebels at Abu-Djuma, but they had done absolutely nothing. It is not known to what regiments the other battalions belonged, and whether they had all been sent up from Kartoum, or if part of the 1st Regiment had been withdrawn from Sennaar. Owing to the hostility of the Hassanieh Arabs it had been necessary to reinforce the garrison of Duem by a battalion, and 2000 troops remained in reserve at the camp of Omdurman.

[319] The column had then marched about five miles, and was close to the village of Marabiyeh.

[320] The troops both marched and fought, formed up in square, with camels and baggage in the centre, and a few mounted Bashi Bazouks and men on dromedaries in front to feel the way. In this formation the army could hardly accomplish eight miles a day, six being the usual march, and it could, consequently, only strike a blow when and where the enemy pleased.

[321] The Nordenfeldts were placed at the angles of the square, and the guns in the faces. Owing to obstacles thrown in the way by Suleiman Pasha, who was nominally in chief command, General Hicks had great difficulty in getting any of them to open fire.

[322] At the battle of Marabiyeh, as the engagement of the 29th April is called, the Egyptians were formed in four ranks, but the front rank was never made to lie down, and the fourth or rear rank, not being able to reach over three men’s shoulders, fired their rifles up into the air.

[323] Of the English officers, Colonels Colborne and de Coetlogan had marched with the army from Kawa, Colonel Farquhar, Captains Massey and Evans, and Dr. Rosenberg had accompanied General Hicks on his reconnaissance up the river.

The others were not present at the battle of Marabiyeh. Major Martin and Captain Walker had been invalided home, and Major Warner was with Hussein Pasha on the Blue Nile.

[324] Sixteen miles below Dueim.

[325] Bara is nearer the Nile than El Obeyed, and in a fertile country, from which General Hicks hoped to be able to procure some supplies.

[326] The distance between Duem and Kartoum is about 110 miles.

[327] The other English officers with the Expeditionary Force are Colonel Farquhar, Chief of the Staff; Majors Warner, Massey, and Evans; Captains Heath and Walker, and Surgeon-Major Rosenburg. In addition to these, there are several Austrians and Germans. Colonel de Coetlogon remains at Kartoum, and Colonel Colborne and Major Martin have been invalided home.

[328] On the road from Suakin to Berber, situated in a valley about three miles in breadth, enclosed by mountains. Many of the inhabitants of Suakin live there during the hot season.

[329] The lofty mountains of Erkowit lie 20 to 30 miles south-east of Sinkat. Erkowit is another summer retreat for the people of Suakin.

[330] Tokar is a small town in the centre of a great grain-producing district. It is a penal settlement for Suakin, from which it is about 45 miles distant.

[331] Commander Lynedoch Needham Moncrieff entered the Royal Navy in 1863, and in February 1865, while Sub-Lieutenant of the _Peloros_, was engaged in the destruction of piratical junks in Tungroa Bay. He became Lieutenant in July 1865, and retired with the rank of Commander in 1873. Proceeding to the Cape of Good Hope on the outbreak of the Zulu war, Commander Moncrieff served with the 2nd battalion of the Native Contingent from May 1879 till the close of the campaign, during which he was engaged in the battle of Ulundi, where he was slightly wounded, afterwards having Commissariat charge at Fort Cambridge. His services were officially commended at the close of the campaign. In January 1880, the deceased officer was nominated Consul at Cayenne, and, having passed the examination, was, on the 4th of March, 1880, appointed Consul for French Guiana, to reside at Cayenne, but did not proceed thither, being shortly afterwards sent as acting Consul to Jeddah. He was appointed Consul at Suakin on the 1st of April, 1882, the post being worth 750_l_. per annum, besides an annual allowance of 250_l._ for office expenses. Commander Moncrieff received the silver medal of the Royal Humane Society for saving life at sea in 1864.

[332] On the left bank of the White Nile, opposite Kartoum.

[333] After leaving Duem, the formation, with the camels in the centre of the square, appears to have been adopted.

[334] An important town in Kordofan, north of El Obeyed.

[335] From information received, the army appears to have arrived at Sangi Hamferid about the 1st October, and not on the date before mentioned—7th October.

[336] Duem to Melbeis—total 251 miles. These distances are only approximate.

[337] The existence of these two despatches was not known to Sir E. Baring till they appeared in the ‘Egyptian Gazette’ of the 27th November. Chérif Pasha had previously informed him that nothing had been heard of General Hicks since the 27th September, the date on which he started from Duem. Chérif Pasha subsequently admitted that he was mistaken in making that statement.

[338] The undermentioned European officers are believed to have perished, viz.—Lieut.-General Hicks, Colonel Farquhar, Majors Warner, Massey, Evans, Alfred Freiherr von Seckendorff, Captains Arthur Herlth, and Alexander Matyuga, Lieut. Morris Brody, late Sergeant-Major R.H.A., Surgeon-General Georges Bey, and Surgeon-Major Rosenberg. And with them, Al-ed-Deen Pasha, Governor-General of the Soudan, and many Egyptian officers of high rank. Mr. O’Donovan and Mr. Vizetelly, newspaper correspondents who accompanied the expedition, have not since been heard of.

[339] The Paris _Temps_ of 23rd November, 1883, states that the Mahdi’s forces are organised and commanded by a Frenchman named Soulié, who has lived for many years in Egypt. He went there after having served in the French Army; and, after the bombardment of Alexandria, went to Kartoum, whence he proceeded to join the False Prophet, soon making his way into the latter’s graces, and obtaining his confidence.

[340] Galabat, Kalabat and Metemma are the same place.

[341] This territory is called Bogos by the Abyssinians, and Senheit by the Egyptians. Its capital is Keren.

[342] Evidently Colonel Stewart’s journal.

[343] Colonel Stewart’s Journal.

[344] Suggests that, in place of the railway from Wady Halfa, the Cataracts be passed as suggested by General Gordon.

[345] The word Mahdi signifies _guide_.

[346] Lupton Bey’s assumed name.