Chapter XIV (1)

CONCERNING THE DOCTRINES HELD BY THE DIFFERENT SECTS OF ṢÚFÍS.

I have already stated, in the notice of Abu ´l-Ḥasan Núrí, that the Ṣúfís are divided into twelve sects, of which two are reprobated and ten are approved. Every one of these ten sects has an excellent system and doctrine as regards both purgation (_mujáhadat_) and contemplation (_musháhadat_). Although they differ from each other in their devotional practices and ascetic disciplines, they agree in the fundamentals and derivatives of the religious law and Unification. Abú Yazíd said: “The disagreement of divines is a mercy except as regards the detachment (_tajríd_)[109] of Unification”; and there is a famous tradition to the same effect. The real essence of Ṣúfiism lies amidst the traditions (_akhbár_) of the Shaykhs, and is divided only metaphorically and formally. Therefore I will briefly divide their sayings in explanation of Ṣúfiism and unfold the main principle on which the doctrine of each one of them is based, in order that the student may readily understand this matter.

Footnote 109:

i.e. the detachment of all phenomenal attributes from the Unity of
God.

1.THE MUḤÁSIBÍS.

They are the followers of Abú `Abdalláh Ḥárith b. Asad al-Muḥásibí, who by consent of all his contemporaries was a man of approved spiritual influence and mortified passions (_maqbúl al-nafas ú maqtúl al-nafs_), versed in theology, jurisprudence, and mysticism. He discoursed on detachment from the world and Unification, while his outward and inward dealings (with God) were beyond reproach. The peculiarity of his doctrine is this, that he does not reckon satisfaction (_riḍá_) among the “stations” (_maqámát_), but includes it in the “states” (_aḥwál_). He was the first to hold this view, which was adopted by the people of Khurásán. The people of `Iráq, on the contrary, asserted that satisfaction is one of the “stations”, and that it is the extreme of trust in God (_tawakkul_). The controversy between them has gone on to the present day.[110]

_Discourse on the true nature of Satisfaction and the explanation of
this doctrine._

In the first place I will establish the true nature of satisfaction and set forth its various kinds; then, secondly, I will explain the real meaning of “station” (_maqám_) and “state” (_ḥál_) and the difference between them.

Satisfaction is of two kinds: (_a_) the satisfaction of God with Man, and (_b_) the satisfaction of Man with God. Divine satisfaction really consists in God’s willing that Man should be recompensed (for his good works) and in His bestowing grace (_karámat_) upon him. Human satisfaction really consists in Man’s performing the command of God and submitting to His decree. Accordingly, the satisfaction of God precedes that of Man, for until Man is divinely aided he does not submit to God’s decree and does not perform His command, because Man’s satisfaction is connected with God’s satisfaction and subsists thereby. In short, human satisfaction is equanimity (_istiwá-yi dil_) towards Fate, whether it withholds or bestows, and spiritual steadfastness (_istiqámat_) in regarding events, whether they be the manifestation of Divine Beauty (_jamál_) or of Divine Majesty (_jalál_), so that it is all one to a man whether he is consumed in the fire of wrath or illuminated by the light of mercy, because both wrath and mercy are evidences of God, and whatever proceeds from God is good in His eyes. The Commander of the Faithful, Husayn b. `Alí, was asked about the saying of Abú Dharr Ghifárí: “I love poverty better than riches, and sickness better than health.” Ḥusayn replied: “God have mercy on Abú Dharr! but I say that whoever surveys the excellent choice made by God for him does not desire anything except what God has chosen for him.” When a man sees God’s choice and abandons his own choice, he is delivered from all sorrow. This, however, does not hold good in absence from God (_ghaybat_); it requires presence with God (_ḥuḍúr_), because “satisfaction expels sorrows and cures heedlessness”, and purges the heart of thoughts relating to other than God and frees it from the bonds of tribulation; for it is characteristic of satisfaction to deliver (_rahánídan_).

Footnote 110:

According to Qushayrí (105, 21 ff.) the `Iráqís held the doctrine
which is here ascribed to the Khurásánís, and _vice versâ_.

From the standpoint of ethics, satisfaction is the acquiescence of one who knows that giving and withholding are in God’s knowledge, and firmly believes that God sees him in all circumstances. There are four classes of quietists: (1) those who are satisfied with God’s gift (_`aṭá_), which is gnosis (_ma`rifat_); (2) those who are satisfied with happiness (_nu`má_), which is this world; (3) those who are satisfied with affliction (_balá_), which consists of diverse probations; and (4) those who are satisfied with being chosen (_iṣṭifá_), which is love (_maḥabbat_). He who looks away from the Giver to the gift accepts it with his soul, and when he has so accepted it trouble and grief vanish from his heart. He who looks away from the gift to the Giver loses the gift and treads the path of satisfaction by his own effort. Now effort is painful and grievous, and gnosis is only realized when its true nature is divinely revealed; and inasmuch as gnosis, when sought by effort, is a shackle and a veil, such gnosis is non-cognition (_nakirat_). Again, he who is satisfied with this world, without God, is involved in destruction and perdition, because the whole world is not worth so much that a friend of God should set his heart on it or that any care for it should enter his mind. Happiness is happiness only when it leads to the Giver of happiness; otherwise, it is an affliction. Again, he who is satisfied with the affliction that God sends is satisfied because in the affliction he sees the Author thereof and can endure its pain by contemplating Him who sent it; nay, he does not account it painful, such is his joy in contemplating his Beloved. Finally, those who are satisfied with being chosen by God are His lovers, whose existence is an illusion alike in His anger and His satisfaction; whose hearts dwell in the presence of Purity and in the garden of Intimacy; who have no thought of created things and have escaped from the bonds of “stations” and “states” and have devoted themselves to the love of God. Their satisfaction involves no loss, for satisfaction with God is a manifest kingdom.

SECTION.

It is related in the Traditions that Moses said: “O God, show me an action with which, if I did it, Thou wouldst be satisfied.” God answered: “Thou canst not do that, O Moses!” Then Moses fell prostrate, worshipping God and supplicating Him, and God made a revelation to him, saying: “O son of `Imrán, My satisfaction with thee consists in thy being satisfied with My decree,” i.e. when a man is satisfied with God’s decrees it is a sign that God is satisfied with him.

Bishr Ḥáfí asked Fuḍayl b. `Iyáḍ whether renunciation (_zuhd_) or satisfaction was better. Fuḍayl replied: “Satisfaction, because he who is satisfied does not desire any higher stage,” i.e. there is above renunciation a stage which the renouncer desires, but there is no stage above satisfaction that the satisfied man should wish for it. Hence the shrine is superior to the gate. This story shows the correctness of Muḥásibí’s doctrine, that satisfaction belongs to the class of “states” and Divine gifts, not to the stages that are acquired (by effort). It is possible, however, that the satisfied man should have a desire. The Apostle used to say in his prayers: “O God, I ask of Thee satisfaction after the going forth of Thy ordinance (_al-riḍá ba`d al-qaḍá_),” i.e. “keep me in such a condition that when the ordinance comes to me from Thee, Destiny may find me satisfied with its coming”. Here it is affirmed that satisfaction properly is posterior to the advent of Destiny, because, if it preceded, it would only be a resolution to be satisfied, which is not the same thing as actual satisfaction. Abu ´l-`Abbás b. `Aṭá says: “Satisfaction is this, that the heart should consider the eternal choice of God on behalf of His creature,” i.e. whatever befalls him, he should recognize it as the eternal will of God and His past decree, and should not be distressed, but should accept it cheerfully. Ḥárith Muḥásibí, the author of the doctrine, says: “Satisfaction is the quiescence (_sukún_) of the heart under the events which flow from the Divine decrees.” This is sound doctrine, because the quiescence and tranquillity of the heart are not qualities acquired by Man, but are Divine gifts. And as an argument for the view that satisfaction is a “state”, not a “station”, they cite the story of `Utba al-Ghulám, who one night did not sleep, but kept saying: “If Thou chastise me I love Thee, and if Thou have mercy on me I love Thee,” i.e. “the pain of Thy chastisement and the pleasure of Thy bounty affect the body alone, whereas the agitation of love resides in the heart, which is not injured thereby”. This corroborates the view of Muḥásibí. Satisfaction is the result of love, inasmuch as the lover is satisfied with what is done by the Beloved. Abú `Uthmán Ḥírí says: “During the last forty years God has never put me in any state that I disliked, or transferred me to another state that I resented.” This indicates continual satisfaction and perfect love. The story of the dervish who fell into the Tigris is well known. Seeing that he could not swim, a man on the bank cried out to him: “Shall I tell some one to bring you ashore?” The dervish said, “No.” “Then do you wish to be drowned?” “No.” “What, then, do you wish?” The dervish replied: “That which God wishes. What have I to do with wishing?”

The Ṣúfí Shaykhs have uttered many sayings on satisfaction, which differ in phraseology but agree in the two principles that have been mentioned.

_The distinction between a “State”_ (ḥál) _and a “Station”_ (maqám).

You must know that both these terms are in common use among Ṣúfís, and it is necessary that the student should be acquainted with them. I must discuss this matter here, although it does not belong to the present chapter.

“Station” (_maqám_) denotes anyone’s “standing” in the Way of God, and his fulfilment of the obligations appertaining to that “station” and his keeping it until he comprehends its perfection so far as lies in a man’s power. It is not permissible that he should quit his “station” without fulfilling the obligations thereof. Thus, the first “station” is repentance (_tawbat_), then comes conversion (_inábat_), then renunciation (_zuhd_), then trust in God (_tawakkul_), and so on: it is not permissible that anyone should pretend to conversion without repentance, or to renunciation without conversion, or to trust in God without renunciation.

“State” (_ḥál_), on the other hand, is something that descends from God into a man’s heart, without his being able to repel it when it comes, or to attract it when it goes, by his own effort. Accordingly, while the term “station” denotes the way of the seeker, and his progress in the field of exertion, and his rank before God in proportion to his merit, the term “state” denotes the favour and grace which God bestows upon the heart of His servant, and which are not connected with any mortification on the latter’s part. “Station” belongs to the category of acts, “state” to the category of gifts. Hence the man that has a “station” stands by his own self-mortification, whereas the man that has a “state” is dead to “self” and stands by a “state” which God creates in him.

Here the Shaykhs are at variance. Some hold that a “state” may be permanent, while others reject this view. Ḥárith Muḥásibí maintained that a “state” may be permanent. He argued that love and longing and “contraction” (_qabḍ_) and “expansion” (_basṭ_) are “states”: if they cannot be permanent, then the lover would not be a lover, and until a man’s “state” becomes his attribute (_ṣifat_) the name of that “state” is not properly applied to him. It is for this reason that he holds satisfaction to be one of the “states”, and the same view is indicated by the saying of Abú `Uthmán: “During the last forty years God has never put me in a ‘state’ that I disliked.” Other Shaykhs deny that a “state” can be permanent. Junayd says: “‘States’ are like flashes of lightning: their permanence is merely a suggestion of the lower soul (_nafs_).” Some have said, to the same effect: “‘States’ are like their name,” i.e. they vanish almost as soon as they descend (_taḥillu_) on the heart. Whatever is permanent becomes an attribute, and attributes subsist in an object which must be more perfect than the attributes themselves; and this reduces the doctrine that “states” are permanent to an absurdity. I have set forth the distinction between “state” and “station” in order that you may know what is signified by these terms wherever they occur in the phraseology of the Ṣúfís or in the present work.

In conclusion, you must know that satisfaction is the end of the “stations” and the beginning of the “states”: it is a place of which one side rests on acquisition and effort, and the other side on love and rapture: there is no “station” above it: at this point mortifications (_mujáhadát_) cease. Hence its beginning is in the class of things acquired by effort, its end in the class of things divinely bestowed. Therefore it may be called either a “station” or a “state”.

This is the doctrine of Muḥásibí as regards the theory of Ṣúfiism. In practice, however, he made no difference, except that he used to warn his pupils against expressions and acts which, though sound in principle, might be thought evil. For example, he had a “king-bird” (_sháhmurghí_), which used to utter a loud note. One day Abú Ḥamza of Baghdád, who was Ḥárith’s pupil and an ecstatic man, came to see him. The bird piped, and Abú Ḥamza gave a shriek. Ḥárith rose up and seized a knife, crying, “Thou art an infidel,” and would have killed him if the disciples had not separated them. Then he said to Abú Ḥamza: “Become a Moslem, O miscreant!” The disciples exclaimed: “O Shaykh, we all know him to be one of the elect saints and Unitarians: why does the Shaykh regard him with suspicion?” Ḥárith replied: “I do not suspect him: his opinions are excellent, and I know that he is a profound Unitarian, but why should he do something which resembles the actions of those who believe in incarnation (_ḥulúliyán_) and has the appearance of being derived from their doctrine? If a senseless bird pipes after its fashion, capriciously, why should he behave as though its note were the voice of God? God is indivisible, and the Eternal does not become incarnate, or united with phenomena or commingled with them.” When Abú Ḥamza perceived the Shaykh’s insight, he said: “O Shaykh, although I am right in theory, nevertheless, since my action resembled the actions of heretics, I repent and withdraw.”

May God keep my conduct above suspicion! But this is impossible when one associates with worldly formalists whose enmity is aroused by anyone who does not submit to their hypocrisy and sin.

2. THE QAṢṢÁRÍS.

They are the followers of Abú Ṣáliḥ Ḥamdún b. Aḥmad b. `Umára al-Qaṣṣár, a celebrated divine and eminent Ṣúfí. His doctrine was the manifestation and divulgation of “blame” (_malámat_). He used to say: “God’s knowledge of thee is better than men’s knowledge,” i.e. thy dealings with God in private should be better than thy dealings with men in public, for thy preoccupation with men is the greatest veil between thee and God. I have given some account of al-Qaṣṣár in the chapter on “Blame”. He relates the following story: “One day, while I was walking in the river-bed in the Ḥíra quarter of Níshápúr, I met Núḥ, a brigand famous for his generosity, who was the captain of all the brigands of Níshápúr. I said to him, ‘O Núḥ, what is generosity?’ He replied, ‘My generosity or yours?’ I said, ‘Describe both.’ He replied: ‘I put off the coat (_qabá_) and wear a patched frock and practise the conduct appropriate to that garment, in order that I may become a Ṣúfí and refrain from sin because of the shame that I feel before God; but you put off the patched frock in order that you may not be deceived by men, and that men may not be deceived by thee: accordingly, my generosity is formal observance of the religious law, while your generosity is spiritual observance of the Truth.’” This is a very sound principle.

3. THE ṬAYFÚRÍS.

They are the followers of Abú Yazíd Ṭayfúr b. Ísá b. Surúshán al-Bisṭámí, a great and eminent Ṣúfí. His doctrine is rapture (_ghalabat_) and intoxication (_sukr_). Rapturous longing for God and intoxication of love cannot be acquired by human beings, and it is idle to claim, and absurd to imitate, anything that lies beyond the range of acquisition. Intoxication is not an attribute of the sober, and Man has no power of drawing it to himself. The intoxicated man is enraptured and pays no heed to created things, that he should manifest any quality involving conscious effort (_taklif_). The Ṣúfí Shaykhs are agreed that no one is a proper model for others unless he is steadfast (_mustaqím_) and has escaped from the circle of “states”; but there are some who allow that the way of rapture and intoxication may be trodden with effort, because the Apostle said: “Weep, or else make as though ye wept!” Now, to imitate others for the sake of ostentation is sheer polytheism, but it is different when the object of the imitator is that God may perchance raise him to the rank of those whom he has imitated, in accordance with the saying of the Apostle: “Whoever makes himself like unto a people is one of them.” And one of the Shaykhs said: “Contemplations (_musháhadát_) are the result of mortifications (_mujáhadát_).” My own view is that, although mortifications are always excellent, intoxication and rapture cannot be acquired at all; hence they cannot be induced by mortifications, which in themselves never become a cause of intoxication. I will now set forth the different opinions of the Shaykhs concerning the true nature of intoxication (_sukr_) and sobriety (_ṣaḥw_), in order that difficulties may be removed.

_Discourse on Intoxication and Sobriety._

You must know that “intoxication” and “rapture” are terms used by spiritualists to denote the rapture of love for God, while the term “sobriety” expresses the attainment of that which is desired. Some place the former above the latter, and some hold the latter to be superior. Abú Yazíd and his followers prefer intoxication to sobriety. They say that sobriety involves the fixity and equilibrium of human attributes, which are the greatest veil between God and Man, whereas intoxication involves the destruction of human attributes, like foresight and choice, and the annihilation of a man’s self-control in God, so that only those faculties survive in him that do not belong to the human _genus_; and they are the most complete and perfect. Thus David was in the state of sobriety; an act proceeded from him which God attributed to him and said, “_David killed Goliath_” (Kor. ii, 252): but our Apostle was in the state of intoxication; an act proceeded from him which God attributed to Himself and said, “_Thou didst not throw, when thou threwest, but God threw_” (Kor. viii, 17). How great is the difference between these two men! The attribution of a man’s act to God is better than the attribution of God’s act to a man, for in the latter case the man stands by himself, while in the former case he stands through God.

Junayd and his followers prefer sobriety to intoxication. They say that intoxication is evil, because it involves the disturbance of one’s normal state and loss of sanity and self-control; and inasmuch as the principle of all things is sought either by way of annihilation or subsistence, or of effacement or affirmation, the principle of verification cannot be attained unless the seeker is sane. Blindness will never release anyone from the bondage and corruption of phenomena. The fact that people remain in phenomena and forget God is due to their not seeing things as they really are; for if they saw, they would escape. Seeing is of two kinds: he who looks at anything sees it either with the eye of subsistence (_baqá_) or with the eye of annihilation (_faná_). If with the eye of subsistence, he perceives that the whole universe is imperfect in comparison with his own subsistence, for he does not regard phenomena as self-subsistent; and if he looks with the eye of annihilation, he perceives that all created things are non-existent beside the subsistence of God. In either case he turns away from created things. On this account the Apostle said in his prayer: “O God, show us things as they are,” because whoever thus sees them finds rest. Now, such vision cannot be properly attained except in the state of sobriety, and the intoxicated have no knowledge thereof. For example, Moses was intoxicated; he could not endure the manifestation of one epiphany, but fell in a swoon (Kor. vii, 139): but our Apostle was sober; he beheld the same glory continuously, with ever-increasing consciousness, all the way from Mecca, until he stood at the space of two bow-lengths from the Divine presence (Kor. liii, 9).

My Shaykh, who followed the doctrine of Junayd, used to say that intoxication is the playground of children, but sobriety is the death-field of men. I say, in agreement with my Shaykh, that the perfection of the state of the intoxicated man is sobriety. The lowest stage in sobriety consists in regarding the powerlessness of humanity: therefore, a sobriety that appears to be evil is better than an intoxication that is really evil. It is related that Abú `Uthmán Maghribí, in the earlier part of his life, passed twenty years in retirement, living in deserts where he never heard the sound of a human voice, until his frame was wasted and his eyes became as small as the eye of a sack-needle. After twenty years he was commanded to associate with mankind. He resolved to begin with the people of God who dwelt beside His Temple, since by doing so he would gain a greater blessing. The Shaykhs of Mecca were aware of his coming and went forth to meet him. Finding him so changed that he hardly seemed to be a human creature, they said to him: “O Abú `Uthmán, tell us why you went and what you saw and what you gained and wherefore you have come back.” He replied: “I went because of intoxication, and I saw the evil of intoxication, and I gained despair, and I have come back on account of weakness.” All the Shaykhs said: “O Abú `Uthmán, it is not lawful for anyone after you to explain the meaning of sobriety and intoxication, for you have done justice to the whole matter and have shown forth the evil of intoxication.”

Intoxication, then, is to fancy one’s self annihilated while the attributes really subsist; and this is a veil. Sobriety, on the other hand, is the vision of subsistence while the attributes are annihilated; and this is actual revelation. It is absurd for anyone to suppose that intoxication is nearer to annihilation than sobriety is, for intoxication is a quality that exceeds sobriety, and so long as a man’s attributes tend to increase he is without knowledge; but when he begins to diminish them, seekers (of God) have some hope of him.

It is related that Yaḥyá b. Mu`ádh wrote to Abú Yazíd: “What do you say of one who drinks a single drop of the ocean of love and becomes intoxicated?” Báyazíd wrote in reply: “What do you say of one who, if all the oceans in the world were filled with the wine of love, would drink them all and still cry for more to slake his thirst?” People imagine that Yahyá was speaking of intoxication, and Báyazíd of sobriety, but the opposite is the case. The man of sobriety is he who is unable to drink even one drop, and the man of intoxication is he who drinks all and still desires more. Wine being the instrument of intoxication, but the enemy of sobriety, intoxication demands what is homogeneous with itself, whereas sobriety takes no pleasure in drinking.

There are two kinds of intoxication: (1) with the wine of affection (_mawaddat_) and (2) with the cup of love (_maḥabbat_). The former is “caused” (_ma`lúl_), since it arises from regarding the benefit (_ni`mat_); but the latter has no cause, since it arises from regarding the benefactor (_mun`im_). He who regards the benefit sees through himself and therefore sees himself, but he who regards the benefactor sees through Him and therefore does not see himself, so that, although he is intoxicated, his intoxication is sobriety.

Sobriety also is of two kinds: sobriety in heedlessness (_ghaflat_) and sobriety in love (_maḥabbat_). The former is the greatest of veils, but the latter is the clearest of revelations. The sobriety that is connected with heedlessness is really intoxication, while that which is linked with love, although it be intoxication, is really sobriety. When the principle (_aṣl_) is firmly established, sobriety and intoxication resemble one another, but when the principle is wanting, both are baseless. In short, where true mystics tread, sobriety and intoxication are the effect of difference (_ikhtiláf_), and when the Sultan of Truth displays his beauty, both sobriety and intoxication appear to be intruders (_ṭufaylí_), because the boundaries of both are joined, and the end of the one is the beginning of the other, and beginning and end are terms that imply separation, which has only a relative existence. In union all separations are negated, as the poet says—

“_When the morning-star of wine rises,
The drunken and the sober are as one._”

At Sarakhs there were two spiritual directors, namely, Luqmán and Abu ´l-Faḍl Ḥasan. One day Luqmán came to Abu ´l-Faḍl and found him with a piece (of manuscript) in his hand. He said: “O Abu ´l-Faḍl, what are you seeking in this paper?” Abu ´l-Faḍl replied: “The same thing as you are seeking without a paper.” Luqmán said: “Then why this difference?” Abu ´l-Faḍl answered: “You see a difference when you ask me what I am seeking. Become sober from intoxication and get rid of sobriety, in order that the difference may be removed from you and that you may know what you and I are in search of.”

The Ṭayfúrís and Junaydís are at variance to the extent which has been indicated. As regards ethics, the doctrine of Báyazíd consists in shunning companionship and choosing retirement from the world, and he enjoined all his disciples to do the same. This is a praiseworthy and laudable Path.

4. THE JUNAYDÍS.

They are the followers of Abu ´l-Qásim al-Junayd b. Muḥammad, who in his time was called the Peacock of the Divines (_Ṭá´ús al-`Ulamá_). He is the chief of this sect and the Imám of their Imáms. His doctrine is based on sobriety and is opposed to that of the Ṭayfúrís, as has been explained. It is the best known and most celebrated of all doctrines, and all the Shaykhs have adopted it, notwithstanding that there is much difference in their sayings on the ethics of Ṣúfiism. Want of space forbids me to discuss it further in this book: those who wish to become better acquainted with it must seek information elsewhere.

I have read in the Anecdotes that when Ḥusayn b. Manṣúr (al-Ḥalláj) in his rapture broke off all relations with `Amr b. `Uthmán (al-Makkí) and came to Junayd, Junayd asked him for what purpose he had come to him. Ḥusayn said: “For the purpose of associating with the Shaykh.” Junayd replied: “I do not associate with madmen. Association demands sanity; if that is wanting, the result is such behaviour as yours in regard to Sahl b. `Abdalláh Tustarí and `Amr.” Ḥusayn said: “O Shaykh, sobriety and intoxication are two attributes of Man, and Man is veiled from his Lord until his attributes are annihilated.” “O son of Manṣúr,” said Junayd, “you are in error concerning sobriety and intoxication. The former denotes soundness of one’s spiritual state in relation to God, while the latter denotes excess of longing and extremity of love, and neither of them can be acquired by human effort. O son of Manṣúr, in your words I see much foolishness and nonsense.”

5. THE NÚRÍS.

They are the followers of Abu ´l-Ḥasan Aḥmad b. Muḥammad Núrí, one of the most eminent and illustrious Ṣúfí divines. The principle of his doctrine is to regard Ṣúfiism (_taṣawwuf_) as superior to poverty (_faqr_). In matters of conduct he agrees with Junayd. It is a peculiarity of his “path” that in companionship (_ṣuḥbat_) he prefers his companion’s claim to his own, and holds companionship without preference (_íthár_) to be unlawful. He also holds that companionship is obligatory on dervishes, and that retirement (_`uzlat_) is not praiseworthy, and that everyone is bound to prefer his companion to himself. It is related that he said: “Beware of retirement! for it is in connexion with Satan; and cleave to companionship, for therein is the satisfaction of the Merciful God.”

Now I will explain the true nature of preference, and when I come to the chapter on companionship and retirement I will set forth the mysteries of the subject in order to make it more generally instructive.

_Discourse on Preference_ (íthár).

God said: “_And they prefer them to themselves, although they are indigent_” (Kor. lix, 9). This verse was revealed concerning the poor men among the Companions in particular. The true nature of preference consists in maintaining the rights of the person with whom one associates, and in subordinating one’s own interest to the interest of one’s friend, and in taking trouble upon one’s self for the sake of promoting his happiness, because preference is the rendering of help to others, and the putting into practice of that which God commanded to His Apostle: “_Use indulgence and command what is just and turn away from the ignorant_” (Kor. vii, 198). This will be explained more fully in the chapter on the rules of companionship.

Now, preference is of two kinds: firstly, in companionship, as has been mentioned; and secondly, in love. In preferring the claim of one’s companion there is a sort of trouble and effort, but in preferring the claim of one’s beloved there is nothing but pleasure and delight. It is well known that when Ghulám al-Khalíl persecuted the Ṣúfís, Núrí and Raqqám and Abú Ḥamza were arrested and conveyed to the Caliph’s palace. Ghulám al-Khalíl urged the Caliph to put them to death, saying that they were heretics (_zanádiqa_), and the Caliph immediately gave orders for their execution. When the executioner approached Raqqám, Núrí rose and offered himself in Raqqám’s place with the utmost cheerfulness and submission. All the spectators were astounded. The executioner said: “O young man, the sword is not a thing that people desire to meet so eagerly as you have welcomed it; and your turn has not yet arrived.” Núrí answered: “Yes; my doctrine is founded on preference. Life is the most precious thing in the world: I wish to sacrifice for my brethren’s sake the few moments that remain. In my opinion, one moment of this world is better than a thousand years of the next world, because this is the place of service (_khidmat_) and that is the place of proximity (_qurbat_), and proximity is gained by service.” The tenderness of Núrí and the fineness of his saying astonished the Caliph (who was informed by a courier of what had passed) to such a degree, that he suspended the execution of the three Ṣúfís and charged the chief Cadi, Abu ´l-`Abbás b. `Alí, to inquire into the matter. The Cadi, having taken them to his house and questioned them concerning the ordinances of the Law and the Truth, found them perfect, and felt remorse for his indifference to their fate. Then Núrí said: “O Cadi, though you have asked all these questions, you have not yet asked anything to the point, for God has servants who eat through Him, and drink through Him, and sit through Him, and live through Him, and abide in contemplation of Him: if they were cut off from contemplating Him they would cry out in anguish.” The Cadi was amazed at the subtlety of his speech and the soundness of his state. He wrote to the Caliph: “If the Ṣúfís are heretics, who in the world is a Unitarian?” The Caliph called them to his presence and said: “Ask a boon.” They replied: “The only boon we ask of thee is that thou shouldst forget us, and neither make us thy favourites nor banish us from thy court, for thy favour and displeasure are alike to us.” The Caliph wept and dismissed them with honour.

It is related that Náfi`[111] said: “Ibn `Umar[112] desired to eat a fish. I sought through the town, but did not find one until several days had passed. Having procured it, I gave orders that it should be placed on a cake of bread and presented it to him. I noticed an expression of joy on his face as he received it, but suddenly a beggar came to the door of his house and he ordered the fish to be given to him. The servant said: ‘O master, you have been desiring a fish for several days; let us give the beggar something else.’ Ibn `Umar replied: ‘This fish is unlawful to me, for I have put it out of my mind on account of a Tradition which I heard from the Apostle: _Whenever anyone feels a desire and repels it and prefers another to himself, he shall be forgiven_.’“

Footnote 111:

A well-known traditionist, who died about 120 A.H.

Footnote 112:

`Abdalláh, son of the Caliph `Umar.

I have read in the Anecdotes that ten dervishes lost their way in the desert and were overtaken by thirst. They had only one cup of water, and everyone preferred the claim of the others, so that none of them would drink and they all died except one, who then drank it and found strength to escape. Some person said to him: “Had you not drunk, it would have been better.” He replied: “The Law obliged me to drink; if I had not, I should have killed myself and been punished on that account.” The other said: “Then did your friends kill themselves?” “No,” said the dervish; “they refused to drink in order that their companions might drink, but when I alone survived I was legally obliged to drink.”[113]

Footnote 113:

Here follow two stories illustrating the same topic: the first relates
how `Alí slept in the Prophet’s bed on the night of the latter’s
emigration from Mecca, when the infidels were seeking to slay him; the
second, how on the battle-field of Uḥud the wounded Moslems, though
parched with thirst, preferred to die rather than drink the water
which their comrades asked for.

Among the Israelites there was a devotee who had served God for four hundred years. One day he said: “O Lord, if Thou hadst not created these mountains, wandering for religion’s sake (_siyáḥat_) would have been easier for Thy servants.” The Divine command came to the Apostle of that time to say to the devotee: “What business have you to interfere in My kingdom? Now, since you have interfered, I blot your name from the register of the blest and inscribe it in the register of the damned.” On hearing this, the devotee trembled with joy and bowed to the ground in thanksgiving. The Apostle said: “O fool, it is not necessary to bow down in thanksgiving for damnation.” “My thanksgiving,” the devotee replied: “is not for damnation, but because my name is at least inscribed in one of His registers. But, O Apostle, I have a boon to ask. Say unto God, ‘Since Thou wilt send me to Hell, make me so large that I may take the place of all sinful Unitarians, and let them go to Paradise.’” God commanded the Apostle to tell the devotee that the probation which he had undergone was not for the purpose of humiliating him, but to reveal him to the people, and that on the Day of Resurrection both he and those for whom he had interceded would be in Paradise.

I asked Aḥmad Ḥammádí of Sarakhs what was the beginning of his conversion. He replied: “Once I set out from Sarakhs and took my camels into the desert and stayed there for a considerable time. I was always wishing to be hungry and was giving my portion of food to others, and the words of God—‘_They_ _prefer them to themselves, although they are_ _indigent_’ (Kor. lix, 9)—were ever fresh in my mind; and I had a firm belief in the Ṣúfís. One day a hungry lion came from the desert and killed one of my camels and retired to some rising ground and roared. All the wild beasts in the neighbourhood, hearing him roar, gathered round him. He tore the camel to pieces and went back to the higher ground without having eaten anything. The other beasts—foxes, jackals, wolves, etc.—began to eat, and the lion waited until they had gone away. Then he approached in order to eat a morsel, but seeing a lame fox in the distance he withdrew once more until the new-comer had eaten his fill. After that, he came and ate a morsel. As he departed he spoke to me, who had been watching from afar, and said: ‘O Aḥmad, to prefer others to one’s self in the matter of food is an act only worthy of dogs: a _man_ sacrifices his life and his soul.’ When I saw this evidence I renounced all worldly occupations, and that was the beginning of my conversion.”

Ja`far Khuldí says: “One day, when Abu ´l-Ḥasan Núrí was praying to God in solitude I went to overhear him, for he was very eloquent. He was saying, ‘O Lord, in Thy eternal knowledge and power and will Thou dost punish the people of Hell, whom Thou hast created; and if it be Thy inexorable will to make Hell full of mankind, Thou art able to fill that Hell and all its limbos with me alone and to send them to Paradise.’ I was amazed by his speech, but I dreamed that some one came to me and said: ‘God bids thee tell Abu ´l-Ḥasan that he has been forgiven on account of his compassion for God’s creatures and his reverence for God.’”

He was called Núrí because when he spoke in a dark room the whole room was illuminated by the light (_núr_) of his spirituality. And by the light of the Truth he used to read the inmost thoughts of his disciples, so that Junayd said: “Abu ´l-Ḥasan is the spy on men’s hearts (_jásús al-qulúb_).“

This is his peculiar doctrine. It is a sound principle, and one of great importance in the eyes of those who have insight. Nothing is harder to a man than spiritual sacrifice (_badhl-i rúḥ_) and to refrain from the object of his love, and God hath made this sacrifice the key of all good, as He said: ”_Ye shall never attain to righteousness until ye give in alms of that which ye love_” (Kor. iii, 86). When a man’s spirit is sacrificed, of what value are his wealth and his health and his frock and his food? This is the foundation of Ṣúfiism. Some one came to Ruwaym and asked him for direction. Ruwaym said: “O my son, the whole affair consists in spiritual sacrifice. If you are able for this, it is well; if not, do not occupy yourself with the futilities (_turrahát_) of the Ṣúfís,” i.e. all except this is futile; and God said: “_Do not call dead those who are slain in the way of God. Nay, they are living_” (Kor. ii, 149). Eternal life is gained by spiritual sacrifice and by renunciation of self-interest in fulfilling God’s commandment and by obedience to His friends. But from the standpoint of gnosis (_ma`rifat_) preference and free choice are separation (_tafriqat_), and real preference consists in union with God, for the true basis of self-interest is self-abandonment. So long as the seeker’s progress is connected with acquisition (_kasb_) it is pernicious, but when the attracting influence (_jadhb_) of the Truth manifests its dominion all his actions are confounded, and he loses all power of expression; nor can any name be applied to him or any description be given of him or anything be imputed to him. On this subject Shiblí says in verse—

“_I am lost to myself and unconscious,
And my attributes are annihilated.
To-day I am lost to all things:
Naught remains but a forced expression._”

6. THE SAHLÍS.

They are the followers of Sahl b. `Abdalláh of Tustar, a great and venerable Ṣúfí, who has been already mentioned. His doctrine inculcates endeavour and self-mortification and ascetic training, and he used to bring his disciples to perfection in self-mortification (_mujáhadat_). It is related in a well-known anecdote that he said to one of his disciples: “Strive to say continuously for one day, ‘O Allah! O Allah! O Allah!’ and do the same next day and the day after that,” until he became habituated to saying those words. Then he bade him repeat them at night also, until they became so familiar that he uttered them even during his sleep. Then he said: “Do not repeat them any more, but let all your faculties be engrossed in remembering God.” The disciple did this, until he became absorbed in the thought of God. One day, when he was in his house, a piece of wood fell on his head and broke it. The drops of blood which trickled to the ground bore the legend “Allah! Allah! Allah!”

The “path” of the Sahlís is to educate disciples by acts of self-mortification, and austerities; that of the Ḥamdúnís[114] is to serve and reverence dervishes; and that of the Junaydís is to keep watch over one’s spiritual state (_muráqaba-i báṭin_).

Footnote 114:

The followers of Ḥamdún al-Qaṣṣár, who are generally called Qaṣṣárís.

The object of all austerities and acts of self-mortification is resistance to the lower soul (_nafs_), and until a man knows his lower soul his austerities are of no use to him. Now, therefore, I will explain the knowledge and true nature of the lower soul, and in the next place I will lay down the doctrine concerning self-mortification and its principles.

_Discourse touching the true nature of the Lower Soul_ (nafs) _and the
meaning of Passion_ (hawá).

You must know that _nafs_, etymologically, is the essence and reality of anything, but in popular language it is used to denote many contradictory meanings, e.g. “spirit”, “virility” (_muruwwat_), “body”, and “blood”. The mystics of this sect, however, are agreed that it is the source and principle of evil, but while some assert that it is a substance (_`ayn_) located in the body, as the spirit (_rúḥ_) is, others hold it to be an attribute of the body, as life is. But they all agree that through it base qualities are manifested and that it is the immediate cause of blameworthy actions. Such actions are of two kinds, namely, sins (_ma`áṣí_) and base qualities (_akhláq-i daní_), like pride, envy, avarice, anger, hatred, etc., which are not commendable in law and reason. These qualities can be removed by discipline (_riyáḍat_): e.g., sins are removed by repentance. Sins belong to the class of external attributes, whereas the qualities above mentioned belong to the class of internal attributes. Similarly, discipline is an external act, and repentance is an internal attribute. A base quality that appears _within_ is purged by excellent outward attributes, and one that appears _without_ is purged by laudable inward attributes. Both the lower soul and the spirit are subtle things (_laṭá´if_) existing in the body, just as devils and angels and Paradise and Hell exist in the universe; but the one is the seat of good, while the other is the seat of evil. Hence, resistance to the lower soul is the chief of all acts of devotion and the crown of all acts of self-mortification, and only thereby can Man find the way to God, because submission to the lower soul involves his destruction and resistance to it involves his salvation.[115]

Footnote 115:

Here the author cites Kor. lxxix, 40, 41; ii, 81 (part of the verse);
xii, 53; and the Traditions: “When God wishes well unto His servant He
causes him to see the faults of his soul,” and “God said to David, ‘O
David, hate thy soul, for My love depends on thy hatred of it.’”

Now, every attribute needs an object whereby it subsists, and knowledge of that attribute, namely, the soul, is not attained save by knowledge of the whole body, which knowledge in turn demands an explanation of the qualities of human nature (_insániyyat_) and the mystery thereof, and is incumbent upon all seekers of the Truth, because whoever is ignorant of himself is yet more ignorant of other things; and inasmuch as a man is bound to know God, he must first know himself, in order that by rightly perceiving his own temporality he may recognize the eternity of God, and may learn the everlastingness of God through his own perishableness. The Apostle said: “He who knows himself already knows his Lord,” i.e., if he knows himself as perishable he knows God as everlasting, or if he knows himself as humble he knows God as Almighty, or if he knows himself as a servant he knows God as the Lord. Therefore one who does not know himself is debarred from knowledge of all things.

As regards the knowledge of human nature and the various opinions held on that topic, some Moslems assert that Man is nothing but spirit (_rúḥ_), of which this body is the cuirass and temple and residence, in order to preserve it from being injured by the natural humours (_ṭabáyi`_), and of which the attributes are sensation and intelligence. This view is false, because a body from which the soul (_ján_) has departed is still called “a human being” (_insán_); if the soul is joined with it it is “a live human being”, and if the soul is gone it is “a dead human being”. Moreover, a soul is located in the bodies of animals, yet they are not called “human beings”. If the spirit (_rúḥ_) were the cause of human nature, it would follow that the principle of human nature must exist in every creature possessed of a soul (_ján-dárí_); which is a proof of the falsity of their assertion. Others, again, have stated that the term “human nature” is applicable to the spirit and the body together, and that it no longer applies when one is separated from the other; e.g., when two colours, black and white, are combined on a horse, it is called “piebald” (_ablaq_), whereas the same colours, apart from each other, are called “black” and “white”. This too is false, in accordance with God’s word: “_Did there not come over Man a space of time during which he was not a thing worthy of mention?_” (Kor. lxxvi, 1): in this verse Man’s clay, without soul—for the soul had not yet been joined to his body—is called “Man”. Others aver that “Man” is an atom, centred in the heart, which is the principle of all human attributes. This also is absurd, for if anyone is killed and his heart is taken out of his body he does not lose the name of “human being”; moreover, it is agreed that the heart was not in the human body before the soul. Some pretenders to Ṣúfiism have fallen into error on this subject. They declare that “Man” is not that which eats and drinks and suffers decay, but a Divine mystery, of which this body is the vesture, situated in the interfusion of the natural humours (_imtizáj-i ṭab`_) and in the union (_ittiḥád_) of body and spirit. To this I reply, that by universal consent the name of “human being” belongs to sane men and mad, and to infidels and immoral and ignorant persons, in whom there is no such “mystery” and who suffer decay and eat and drink; and that there is not anything called “Man” in the body, either while it exists or after it has ceased to exist. God Almighty has given the name of “Man” to the sum of the substances which He compounded in us, excluding those things which are not to be found in some human beings, e.g. in the verses “_And We have created Man of the choicest clay_,” etc. (Kor. xxiii, 12-14). Therefore, according to the word of God, who is the most veracious of all who speak the Truth, this particular form, with all its ingredients and with all the changes which it undergoes, is “Man”. In like manner, certain Sunnís have said that Man is a living creature whose form has these characteristics, and that death does not deprive him of this name, and that he is endowed with a definite physiognomy (_ṣúrat-i ma`húd_) and a distinct organ (_álat-i mawsúm_) both externally and internally. By “a definite physiognomy” they mean that he has either good or ill health, and by “a distinct organ” that he is either mad or sane. It is generally allowed that the more sound (_ṣaḥíḥ_) a thing is, the more perfect it is in constitution. You must know, then, that in the opinion of mystics the most perfect composition of Man includes three elements, viz. spirit, soul, and body; and that each of these has an attribute which subsists therein, the attribute of spirit being intelligence, of soul, passion, and of body, sensation. Man is a type of the whole universe. The universe is the name of the two worlds, and in Man there is a vestige of both, for he is composed of phlegm, blood, bile, and melancholy, which four humours correspond to the four elements of this world, viz. water, earth, air, and fire, while his soul (_ján_), his lower soul (_nafs_), and his body correspond to Paradise, Hell, and the place of Resurrection. Paradise is the effect of God’s satisfaction, and Hell is the result of His anger. Similarly, the spirit of the true believer reflects the peace of knowledge, and his lower soul the error which veils him from God. As, at the Resurrection, the believer must be released from Hell before he can reach Paradise and attain to real vision and pure love, so in this world he must escape from his lower soul before he can attain to real discipleship (_irádat_), of which the spirit is the principle, and to real proximity (to God) and gnosis. Hence, whoever knows Him in this world and turns away from all besides and follows the highway of the sacred law, at the Resurrection he will not see Hell and the Bridge (_Ṣiráṭ_). In short, the believer’s spirit calls him to Paradise, of which it is a type in this world, and his lower soul calls him to Hell, of which it is a type in this world. Therefore it behoves those who seek God never to relax their resistance to the lower soul, in order that thereby they may reinforce the spirit and the intelligence, which are the home of the Divine mystery.

SECTION.

As regards what has been said by the Shaykhs concerning the lower soul, Dhu ´l-Nún the Egyptian says: “Vision of the lower soul and its promptings is the worst of veils,” because obedience to it is disobedience to God, which is the origin of all veils. Abú Yazíd Bisṭámí says: “The lower soul is an attribute which never rests save in falsehood,” i.e. it never seeks the Truth. Muḥammad b. `Alí al-Tirmidhí says: “You wish to know God while your lower soul subsists in you; but your lower soul does not know itself, how should it know another?” Junayd says: “To fulfil the desires of your lower soul is the foundation of infidelity,” because the lower soul is not connected with, and is always striving to turn away from, the pure truth of Islam; and he who turns away denies, and he who denies is an alien (_bégána_). Abú Sulaymán Dárání says: “The lower soul is treacherous and hindering (one who seeks to please God); and resistance to it is the best of actions.”

Now I come to my main purpose, which is to set forth the doctrine of Sahl concerning the mortification and discipline of the lower soul, and to explain its true nature.

_Discourse on the Mortification of the Lower Soul._