Chapter XIV (4)

They are the followers of Abú `Abdalláh Muḥammad b. Khafíf of Shíráz, an eminent mystic in his time and the author of celebrated treatises on various branches of Ṣúfiism. He was a man of great spiritual influence, and was not led by his lusts. I have heard that he contracted four hundred marriages. This was due to the fact that he was of royal descent, and that after his conversion the people of Shíráz paid great court to him, and the daughters of kings and nobles desired to marry him for the sake of the blessing which would accrue to them. He used to comply with their wishes, and then divorce them before consummation of the marriage. But in the course of his life forty wives, who were strangers to him (_bégána_), two or three at a time, used to serve him as bed-makers (_khádimán-i firásh_), and one of them—she was the daughter of a vizier—lived with him for forty years. I have heard from Abu ´l-Ḥasan `Alí b. Bakrán of Shíráz that one day several of his wives were gathered together, and each one was telling some story about him. They all agreed _sese nunquam eum vidisse libidini obsequentem_. Hitherto each of them had believed that she was peculiarly treated in this respect, and when they learned that the Shaykh’s behaviour was the same towards them all, they were astonished and doubted whether such was truly the case. Accordingly, they sent two of their number to question the vizier’s daughter, who was his favourite, as to his dealings with her. She replied: “When the Shaykh wedded me and I was informed that he would visit me that night, I prepared a fine repast and adorned myself assiduously. As soon as he came and the food was brought in, he called me to him and looked for a while first at me and then at the food. Then he took my hand and drew it into his sleeve. From his breast to his navel there were fifteen knots (_`aqd_) growing out of his belly. He said, ‘Ask me what these are’; so I asked him and he replied, ‘They are knots made by the tribulation and anguish of my abstinence in renouncing a face like this and viands like these.’ He said no more, but departed; and that is all my intimacy with him.”

The form of his doctrine in Ṣúfiism is “absence” (_ghaybat_) and “presence” (_ḥuḍúr_). I will explain it as far as possible.

_Discourse on Absence_ (ghaybat) _and Presence_ (ḥuḍúr).

These terms, although apparently opposed to each other, express the same meaning from different points of view. “Presence” is “presence of the heart”, as a proof of intuitive faith (_yaqín_), so that what is hidden from it has the same force as what is visible to it. “Absence” is “absence of the heart from all things except God” to such an extent that it becomes absent from itself and absent even from its absence, so that it no longer regards itself; and the sign of this state is withdrawal from all formal authority (_ḥukm-i rusúm_), as when a prophet is divinely preserved from what is unlawful. Accordingly, absence from one’s self is presence with God, and _vice versâ_. God is the lord of the human heart: when a divine rapture (_jadhbat_) overpowers the heart of the seeker, the absence of his heart becomes equivalent to its presence (with God); partnership (_shirkat_) and division (_qismat_) disappear, and relationship to “self” comes to an end, as one of the Shaykhs has said in verse—

“_Thou art the Lord of my heart,
Without any partner: how, then, can it be divided?_”

Inasmuch as God is sole lord of the heart, He has absolute power to keep it absent or present as He will, and, in regard to the essence of the case, this is the whole argument for the doctrine of His favourites; but when a distinction is made, the Shaykhs hold various opinions on the subject, some preferring “presence” to “absence”, while others declare that “absence” is superior to “presence”. There is the same controversy as that concerning sobriety and intoxication, which I have explained above; but these terms indicate that the human attributes are still subsistent, whereas “absence” and “presence” indicate that the human attributes are annihilated: therefore the latter terms are in reality more sublime. “Absence” is preferred to “presence” by Ibn `Aṭá, Ḥusayn b. Manṣúr (al-Ḥalláj), Abú Bakr Shiblí, Bundár b. al-Ḥusayn, Abú Ḥamza of Baghdád, Sumnún Muḥibb, and a number of the Shaykhs of `Iráq. They say: “Thou thyself art the greatest of all veils between thee and God: when thou hast become absent from thyself, the evils implicit in thy being are annihilated in thee, and thy state undergoes a fundamental change: the ‘stations’ of novices become a veil to thee, and the ‘states’ of those who seek God become a source of mischief to thee; thine eye is closed to thyself and to all that is other than God, and thy human attributes are consumed by the flame of proximity to God (_qurbat_). This is the same state of ‘absence’ in which God drew thee forth from the loins of Adam, and caused thee to hear His exalted word, and distinguished thee by the honorary robe of Unification and the garment of contemplation; so long as thou wert absent from thyself, thou wert present with God face to face, but when thou becamest present with thine own attributes, thou becamest absent from thy proximity to God. Therefore thy ‘presence’ is thy perdition. This is the meaning of God’s word, ‘_And now are ye come unto us alone, as We created you at first_’” (Kor. vi, 94). On the other hand, Ḥárith Muḥásibí, Junayd, Sahl b. `Abdalláh, Abú Ja`far Ḥaddád,[129] Ḥamdún Qaṣṣár, Abú Muḥammad Jurayrí, Ḥuṣrí, Muḥammad b. Khafíf, who is the author of the doctrine, and others hold that “presence” is superior to “absence”. They argue that inasmuch as all excellences are bound up with “presence”, and as “absence” from one’s self is a way leading to “presence” with God, the way becomes an imperfection after you have arrived at the goal. “Presence” is the fruit of “absence”, but what light is to be found in “absence” without “presence”? A man must needs renounce heedlessness in order that, by means of this “absence”, he may attain to “presence”; and when he has attained his object, the means by which he attained it has no longer any worth.

“_The ‘absent’ one is not he who is absent from his country,
But he who is absent from all desire.
The ‘present’ one is not he who hath no desire,
But he who hath no heart (no thought of worldly things),
So that his desire is ever fixed on God._”

Footnote 129:

_Nafaḥát_, No. 201.

It is a well-known story that one of the disciples of Dhu ´l-Nún set out to visit Abú Yazíd. When he came to Abú Yazíd’s cell and knocked at the door Abú Yazíd said: “Who art thou, and whom dost thou wish to see?” He answered: “Abú Yazíd.” Abú Yazíd said: “Who is Abú Yazíd, and where is he, and what thing is he? I have been seeking Abú Yazíd for a long while, but I have not found him.” When the disciple returned to Dhu ´l-Nún and told him what had passed, Dhu ´l-Nún said: “My brother Abú Yazíd is lost with those who are lost in God.” A certain man came to Junayd and said: “Be present with me for a moment that I may speak to thee.” Junayd answered: “O young man, you demand of me something that I have long been seeking. For many years I have been wishing to become present with myself a moment, but I cannot; how, then, can I become present with you just now?” Therefore, “absence” involves the sorrow of being veiled, while “presence” involves the joy of revelation, and the former state can never be equal to the latter. Shaykh Abú Sa`íd says on this subject—

_Taqashsha`a ghaymu ´l-hajri `an qamari ´l-ḥubbi
Wa-asfara núru ´l-ṣubḥi `an ẕulmati ´l-ghaybi._

“The clouds of separation have been cleared away from the moon of love, And the light of morning has shone forth from the darkness of the Unseen.”

The distinction made by the Shaykhs between these two terms is mystical, and on the surface merely verbal, for they seem to be approximately the same. To be present with God is to be absent from one’s self—what is the difference?—and one who is not absent from himself is not present with God. Thus, forasmuch as the impatience of Job in his affliction did not proceed from himself, but on the contrary he was then absent from himself, God did not distinguish his impatience from patience, and when he cried, “_Evil hath befallen me_” (Kor. xxi, 83), God said, “_Verily, he was patient_.” This is evidently a judgment founded on the essential nature of the case (_ḥukm ba-`ayn_). It is related that Junayd said: “For a time I was such that the inhabitants of heaven and earth wept over my bewilderment (_ḥayrat_); then, again, I became such that I wept over their absence (_ghaybat_); and now my state is such that I have no knowledge either of them or of myself.” This is an excellent indication of “presence”.

I have briefly explained the meaning of “presence” and “absence” in order that you may be acquainted with the doctrine of the Khafífís, and may also know in what sense these terms are used by the Ṣúfís.

10. SAYYÁRÍS.

They are the followers of Abu ´l-`Abbás Sayyárí, the Imám of Merv. He was learned in all the sciences and associated with Abú Bakr Wásiṭí. At the present day he has numerous followers in Nasá and Merv. His school of Ṣúfiism is the only one that has kept its original doctrine unchanged, and the cause of this fact is that Nasá and Merv have never been without some person who acknowledged his authority and took care that his followers should maintain the doctrine of their founder. The Sayyárís of Nasá carried on a discussion with those of Merv by means of letters, and I have seen part of this correspondence at Merv; it is very fine. Their expositions are based on “union” (_jam`_) and “separation” (_tafriqa_). These words are common to all scientists and are employed by specialists in every branch of learning as a means of rendering their explanations intelligible, but they bear different meanings in each case. Thus, in arithmetic _jam`_ denotes the addition and _tafriqa_ the subtraction of numbers; in grammar _jam`_ is the agreement of words in derivation, while _tafriqa_ is the difference in meaning; in law _jam`_ is analogy (_qiyás_) and _tafriqa_ the characteristics of an authoritative text (_ṣifát-i nuṣṣ_), or _jam`_ is the text and _tafriqa_ the analogy; in divinity _jam`_ denotes the essential and _tafriqa_ the formal attributes of God.[130] But the Ṣúfís do not use these terms in any of the significations which I have mentioned. Now, therefore, I will explain the meaning attached to them by the Ṣúfís and the various opinions of the Shaykhs on this subject.

Footnote 130:

For the distinction between _ṣifát-i dhát_ and _ṣifát-i fi`l_ see
Dozy, _Supplément_, ii, 810.

_Discourse on Union_ (jam`) _and Separation_ (tafriqa).

God united all mankind in His call, as He says, “_And God calls to the abode of peace_”; then He separated them in respect of Divine guidance, and said, “_and guides whom He willeth into the right way_” (Kor. x, 26). He called them all, and banished some in accordance with the manifestation of His will; He united them all and gave a command, and then separated them, rejecting some and leaving them without succour, but accepting others and granting to them Divine aid; then once more he united a certain number and separated them, giving to some immunity from sin and to others a propensity towards evil. Accordingly the real mystery of union is the knowledge and will of God, while separation is the manifestation of that which He commands and forbids: e.g., He commanded Abraham to behead Ishmael, but willed that he should not do so; and He commanded Iblís to worship Adam, but willed the contrary; and He commanded Adam not to eat the corn, but willed that he should eat it; and so forth. Union is that which He unites by His attributes, and separation is that which He separates by His acts. All this involves cessation of human volition and affirmation of the Divine will so as to exclude all personal initiative. As regards what has been said on the subject of union and separation, all the Sunnís, except the Mu`tazilites, are in agreement with the Ṣúfí Shaykhs, but at this point they begin to diverge, some applying the terms in question to the Divine Unity (_tawḥíd_), some to the Divine attributes, and some to the Divine acts. Those who refer to the Divine Unity say that there are two degrees of union, one in the attributes of God and the other in the attributes of Man. The former is the mystery of Unification (_tawḥíd_), in which human actions have no part whatever; the latter denotes acknowledgment of the Divine Unity with sincere conviction and unfailing resolution. This is the opinion of Abú `Alí Rúdbárí. Those, again, who refer these terms to the Divine attributes say that union is an attribute of God, and separation an act of God in which Man does not co-operate, because God has no rival in Godhead. Therefore union can be referred only to His substance and attributes, for union is equality in the fundamental matter (_al-taswiyat fi ´l-aṣl_), and no two things are equal in respect of eternity except His substance and His attributes, which, when they are separated by expository analysis (_`ibárat ú tafṣíl_), are not united. This means that God has eternal attributes, which are peculiar to Him and subsist through Him; and that He and His attributes are not two, for His Unity does not admit difference and number. On this ground, union is impossible except in the sense indicated above.

Separation in predicament (_al-tafriqat fi ´l-ḥukm_) refers to the actions of God, all of which are separate in this respect. The predicament of one is being (_wujúd_); of another, not-being (_`adam_), but a not-being that is capable of being; of another, annihilation (_faná_), and of another subsistence (_baqá_). There are some, again, who refer these terms to knowledge (_`ilm_) and say that union is knowledge of the Divine Unity and separation knowledge of the Divine ordinances: hence theology is union and jurisprudence is separation. One of the Shaykhs has said, to the same effect: “Union is that on which theologians (_ahl al-`ilm_) are agreed, and separation is that on which they differ.” Again, all the Ṣúfí mystics, whenever they use the term “separation” in the course of their expositions and indications, attach to it the meaning of “human actions” (_makásib_), e.g. self-mortification, and by “union” they signify “divine gifts” (_mawáhib_), e.g. contemplation. Whatever is gained by means of mortification is “separation”, and whatever is solely the result of Divine favour and guidance is “union”. It is Man’s glory that, while his actions exist and mortification is possible, he should escape by God’s goodness from the imperfection of his own actions, and should find them to be absorbed in the bounties of God, so that he depends entirely on God and commits all his attributes to His charge and refers all his actions to Him and none to himself, as Gabriel told the Apostle that God said: “My servant continually seeks access to Me by means of works of supererogation until I love him; and when I love him, I am his ear and his eye and his hand and his heart and his tongue: through Me he hears and sees and speaks and grasps,” i.e., in remembering Me he is enraptured by the remembrance (_dhikr_) of Me, and his own “acquisition” (_kasb_) is annihilated so as to have no part in his remembrance, and My remembrance overpowers his remembrance, and the relationship of humanity (_ádamiyyat_) is entirely removed from his remembrance: then My remembrance is his remembrance, and in his rapture he becomes even as Abú Yazíd in the hour when he said: “Glory to me! how great is my majesty!” These words were the outward sign of his speech, but the speaker was God. Similarly, the Apostle said: “God speaks by the tongue of `Umar.” The fact is that when the Divine omnipotence manifests its dominion over humanity, it transports a man out of his own being, so that his speech becomes the speech of God. But it is impossible that God should be mingled (_imtizáj_) with created beings or made one (_ittiḥád_) with His works or become incarnate (_ḥáll_) in things: God is exalted far above that, and far above that which the heretics ascribe to Him.

It may happen, then, that God’s love holds absolute sway over the heart of His servant, and that his reason and natural faculties are too weak to sustain its rapture and intensity, and that he loses all control of his power to act (_kasb_). This state is called “union”.[131] Herewith are connected all extraordinary miracles (_i`jáz_) and acts of miraculous grace (_karámát_). All ordinary actions are “separation”, and all acts which violate custom are “union”. God bestows these miracles on His prophets and saints, and refers His actions to them and theirs to Himself, as He hath said: “_Verily, they who swear fealty unto thee, swear fealty unto God_” (Kor. xlviii, 10), and again: “_Whosoever obeys the Apostle has obeyed God_” (Kor. iv, 82). Accordingly, His saints are united (_mujtami`_) by their inward feelings (_asrár_) and separated (_muftariq_) by their outward behaviour, so that their love of God is strengthened by the internal union, and the right fulfilment of their duty as servants of God is assured by their external separation. A certain great Shaykh says—

“_I have realized that which is within me, and my tongue hath conversed with Thee in secret, And we are united in one respect, but we are separated in another. Although awe has hidden Thee from the glances of mine eye, Ecstasy has made Thee near to my inmost parts._”[132]

The state of being inwardly united he calls “union”, and the secret conversation of the tongue he calls “separation”; then he indicates that both union and separation are in himself, and attributes the basis (_qá`ida_) of them to himself. This is very subtle.

Footnote 131:

Here the author illustrates the meaning of “union” and “separation” by
the action of Muḥammad when he threw gravel in the eyes of the
unbelievers at Badr, and by that of David when he slew Goliath. See p.
185 _supra_.

Footnote 132:

The last words are corrupt and unmetrical in all the texts. I have
found the true reading, من الأَحْشآءِ دانى, in a MS. of the _Kitáb
al-Luma`_ by Abú Naṣr al-Sarráj, which has recently come into the
possession of Mr. A. G. Ellis.

SECTION.

Here I must notice a matter of controversy between us and those who maintain that the manifestation of union is the denial of separation, because the two terms contradict each other, and that when anyone passes under the absolute sway of Divine guidance he ceases to act and to mortify himself. This is sheer nullification (_ta`ṭíl_), for a man must never cease to practise devotion and mortify himself as long as he has the possibility and power of doing so. Moreover, union is not apart from separation, as light is apart from the sun, and accident from substance, and attribute from object: therefore, neither is self-mortification apart from Divine guidance, nor the Truth from the Law, nor discovery from search. But mortification may precede or follow Divine guidance. In the former case a man’s tribulation is increased, because he is in “absence” (_ghaybat_), while in the latter case he has no trouble or pain, because he is in “presence” (_haḍrat_). Those to whom negation is the source (_mashrab_) of actions, and to whom it seems to be the substance (_`ayn_) of action, commit a grave error. A man, however, may attain such a degree that he regards all his qualities as faulty and defective, for when he sees that his praiseworthy qualities are vicious and imperfect, his blameworthy qualities will necessarily appear more vicious. I adduce these considerations because some ignorant persons, who have fallen into an error that is closely akin to infidelity, assert that no result whatever depends upon our exertion, and that inasmuch as our actions and devotions are faulty and our mortifications are imperfect a thing left undone is better than a thing done. To this argument I reply: “You are agreed in supposing that everything done by us has an energy (_fi`l_), and you declare that our energies are a centre of defect and a source of evil and corruption: consequently you must also suppose that things left undone by us have an energy; and since in both cases there is an energy involving defect, how can you regard that which we leave undone as better than that which we do?” This notion evidently is a noxious delusion. Here we have an excellent criterion to distinguish the believer from the infidel. Both agree that their energies are inherently defective, but the believer, in accordance with God’s command, deems a thing done to be better than a thing left undone, while the infidel, in accordance with his denial of the Creator (_t`aṭíl_), deems a thing left undone to be better than a thing done.

Union, then, involves this—that, although the imperfection of separation is recognized, its authority (_ḥukm_) should not be let go; and separation involves this—that, although one is veiled from the sight of union, he nevertheless thinks that separation is union. Muzayyin the Elder[133] says in this sense: “Union is the state of privilege (_khuṣúṣiyyat_) and separation is the state of a servant (_`ubúdiyyat_), these states being indissolubly combined with each other,” because it is a work of the privileged state to fulfil the duties of servantship; therefore, although the tediousness and painfulness of self-mortification and personal effort may be removed from one who performs all that is required of him in this respect, it is impossible that the substance (_`ayn_) of self-mortification and religious obligation should be removed from anyone, even though he be in the essence of union, unless he has an evident excuse that is generally acknowledged by the authority of the religious law. Now I will explain this matter in order that you may better understand it.

Footnote 133:

_Nafaḥát_, No. 188.

Union is of two kinds: (1) sound union (_jam`-i salámat_), and (2) broken union (_jam`-i taksír_). Sound union is that which God produces in a man when he is in the state of rapture and ecstasy, and when God causes him to receive and fulfil His commandments and to mortify himself. This was the state of Sahl b. `Abdalláh and Abú Ḥafṣ Ḥaddád and Abu ´l-`Abbás Sayyárí, the author of the doctrine. Abú Yazíd of Bisṭám, Abú Bakr Shiblí, Abu ´l-Ḥasan Ḥuṣrí, and a number of great Shaykhs were continually in a state of rapture until the hour of prayer arrived; then they returned to consciousness, and after performing their prayers became enraptured again. While thou art in the state of separation, thou art thou, and thou fulfillest the command of God; but when God transports thee He has the best right to see that thou performest His command, for two reasons: firstly, in order that the token of servantship may not be removed from thee, and secondly, in order that He may keep His promise that He will never let the law of Muḥammad be abrogated. “Broken union” (_jam`-i taksír_) is this: that a man’s judgment becomes distraught and bewildered, so that it is like the judgment of a lunatic: then he is either excused from performing his religious obligations or rewarded (_mashkúr_) for performing them; and the state of him who is rewarded is sounder than the state of him who is excused.

You must know, in short, that union does not involve any peculiar “station” (_maqám_) or any peculiar “state” (_ḥál_), for union is the concentration of one’s thoughts (_jam`-i himmat_) upon the object of one’s desire. According to some the revelation of this matter takes place in the “stations” (_maqámát_), according to others in the “states” (_aḥwál_), and in either case the desire of the “united” person (_ṣáḥib jam`_) is attained by negating his desire. This holds good in everything, e.g., Jacob concentrated his thoughts on Joseph, so that he had no thought but of him; and Majnún concentrated his thoughts on Laylá, so that he saw only her in the whole world, and all created things assumed the form of Laylá in his eyes. One day, when Abú Yazíd was in his cell, some one came and asked: “Is Abú Yazíd here?” He answered: “Is anyone here except God?” And a certain Shaykh relates that a dervish came to Mecca and remained in contemplation of the Ka`ba for a whole year, during which time he neither ate nor drank, nor slept, nor cleansed himself, because of the concentration of his thoughts upon the Ka`ba, which thereby became the food of his body and the drink of his soul. The principle in all these cases is the same, viz. that God divided the one substance of His love and bestows a particle thereof, as a peculiar gift, upon every one of His friends in proportion to their enravishment with Him; then He lets down upon that particle the shrouds of humanity and nature and temperament and spirit, in order that by its powerful working it may transmute to its own quality all the particles that are attached to it, until the lover’s clay is wholly converted into love, and all his actions and looks become so many indispensable conditions of love. This state is named “union” alike by those who regard the inward meaning and those who regard the outward expression. Ḥusayn b. Manṣúr (al-Ḥalláj) says in this sense:

“_Thy will be done, O my Lord and Master!
Thy will be done, O my purpose and meaning!
O essence of my being, O goal of my desire,
O my speech and my hints and my gestures!
O all of my all, O my hearing and my sight,
O my whole and my element and my particles!_”

Therefore, to one whose qualities are only borrowed from God, it is a disgrace to affirm his own existence, and an act of dualism (_zunnár_) to pay any heed to the phenomenal universe; and all created objects are despicable to his soaring thought. Some have been led by their dialectical subtlety and their admiration of phraseology to speak of “the union of union” (_jam` al-jam`_). This is a good expression as phrases go, but if you consider the meaning, it is better not to predicate union of union, because the term “union” cannot properly be applied except to separation. Before union can be united it must first have been separated, whereas the fact is that union does not change its state. The expression, therefore, is liable to be misunderstood, because one who is “united” does not look forth from himself to what is above or to what is below him. Do not you perceive that when the two worlds were displayed to the Apostle on the night of the Ascension he paid no heed to anything? He was in “union”, and one who is “united” does not behold “separation”. Hence God said: “_His gaze swerved not, nor did it stray_” (Kor. liii, 17). In my early days I composed a book on this subject and entitled it _Kitáb al-bayán li-ahl al-`iyán_,[134] and I have also discussed the matter at length in the _Baḥr al-qulúb_[135] in the chapter on “Union”. I will not now burden my readers by adding to what I have said here.

Footnote 134:

“The Book of Exposition for Persons of Intuition.”

Footnote 135:

“The Sea of Hearts.”

This sketch of the doctrine of the Sayyárís concludes my account of those Ṣúfí sects which are approved and follow the path of true theosophy. I now turn to the opinions of those heretics who have connected themselves with the Ṣúfís and have adopted Ṣúfiistic phraseology as a means of promulgating their heresy. My aim is to expose their errors in order that novices may not be deceived by their pretensions and may guard themselves from mischief.

11. THE ḤULÚLÍS.

Of those two reprobate sects which profess to belong to Ṣúfiism and make the Ṣúfís partners in their error, one follows Abú Ḥulmán of Damascus.[136] The stories which his adherents relate of him do not agree with what is written about him in the books of the Shaykhs, for, while the Ṣúfís regard him as one of themselves, these sectaries impute to him the doctrines of incarnation (_ḥulúl_) and commixture (_imtizáj_) and transmigration of spirits (_naskh-i arwáḥ_). I have seen this statement in the book of Muqaddasí,[137] who attacks him; and the same notion of him has been formed by theologians, but God knows best what is the truth. The other sect refer their doctrine to Fáris,[138] who pretends to have derived it from Ḥusayn b. Manṣúr (al-Ḥalláj), but he is the only one of Ḥusayn’s followers who holds such tenets. I saw Abú Ja`far Ṣaydalání[139] with four thousand men, dispersed throughout `Iráq, who were Ḥallájís; and they all cursed Fáris on account of this doctrine. Moreover, in the compositions of al-Ḥalláj himself there is nothing but profound theosophy.

Footnote 136:

See note, p. 131.

Footnote 137:

The _nisba_ Muqaddasí or Maqdisí belongs to a number of Moslem
writers. I do not know which of them is intended here.

Footnote 138:

See _Nafaḥát_, No. 178.

Footnote 139:

This person, whom the author has already mentioned at the beginning of