Chapter XIV (2)

God has said: “_Those who strive to the utmost_ (jáhadú) _for Our sake, We will guide them into Our ways_” (Kor. xxix, 69). And the Prophet said: “The (_mujáhid_) is he who struggles with all his might against himself (_jáhada nafsahu_) for God’s sake.” And he also said: “We have returned from the lesser war (_al-jihád al-aṣghar_) to the greater war (_al-jihád al-akbar_)”. On being asked, “What is the greater war?” he replied, “It is the struggle against one’s self” (_mujáhadat al-nafs_). Thus the Apostle adjudged the mortification of the lower soul to be superior to the Holy War against unbelievers, because the former is more painful. You must know, then, that the way of mortification is plain and manifest, for it is approved by men of all religions and sects, and is observed and practised by the Ṣúfís in particular; and the term “mortification” (_mujáhadat_) is current among Ṣúfís of every class, and the Shaykhs have uttered many sayings on this topic. Sahl b. `Abdalláh Tustarí carries the principle to an extreme point. It is related that he used to break his fast only once in fifteen days, and he ate but little food in the course of his long life. While all mystics have affirmed the need of mortification, and have declared it to be an indirect means (_asbáb_) of attaining contemplation (_musháhadat_), Sahl asserted that mortification is the direct cause (_`illat_) of the latter, and he attributed to search (_ṭalab_) a powerful effect on attainment (_yáft_), so that he even regarded the present life, spent in search, as superior to the future life of fruition. “If,” he said, “you serve God in this world, you will attain proximity to Him in the next world: without that service there would not be this proximity: it follows that self-mortification, practised with the aid of God, is the direct cause of union with God.” Others, on the contrary, hold that there is no direct cause of union with God, and whoever attains to God does so by Divine grace (_faḍl_), which is independent of human actions. Therefore, they argue, the object of mortification is to correct the vices of the lower soul, not to attain real proximity, and inasmuch as mortification is referred to Man, while contemplation is referred to God, it is impossible that one should be caused by the other. Sahl, however, cites in favour of his view the words of God: “_Those who strive to the utmost for Our sake, We will guide them into Our ways_” (Kor. xxix, 69), i.e. whoever mortifies himself will attain to contemplation. Furthermore, he contends that inasmuch as the books revealed to the Prophets, and the Sacred Law, and all the religious ordinances imposed on mankind involve mortification, they must all be false and vain if mortification were not the cause of contemplation. Again, both in this world and the next, everything is connected with principles and causes. If it is maintained that principles have no causes, there is an end of all law and order: neither can religious obligations be justified nor will food be the cause of repletion and clothes the cause of warmth. Accordingly, to regard actions as being caused is Unification (_tawḥíd_), and to rebut this is Nullification (_ta`ṭíl_). He who asserts it is proving the existence of contemplation, and he who denies it is denying the existence of contemplation. Does not training (_riyáḍat_) alter the animal qualities of a wild horse and substitute human qualities in their stead, so that he will pick up a whip from the ground and give it to his master, or will roll a ball with his foot? In the same way, a boy without sense and of foreign race is taught by training to speak Arabic, and take a new language in exchange for his mother tongue; and a savage beast is trained to go away when leave is given to it, and to come back when it is called, preferring captivity to freedom.[116] Therefore, Sahl and his followers argue, mortification is just as necessary for the attainment of union with God as diction and composition are necessary for the elucidation of ideas; and as one is led to knowledge of the Creator by assurance that the universe was created in time, so one is led to union with God by knowledge and mortification of the lower soul.

Footnote 116:

Here follows an account of the mortification which the Prophet imposed
on himself.

I will now state the arguments of the opposing party. They maintain that the verse of the Koran (xxix, 69) cited by Sahl is a _hysteron proteron_, and that the meaning of it is, “Those whom We guide into Our ways strive to the utmost for Our sake.” And the Apostle said: “Not one of you shall be saved by his works.” “O Apostle,” they cried, “not even thou?” “Not even I,” he said, “unless God encompass me with His mercy.” Now, mortification is a man’s act, and his act cannot possibly become the cause of his salvation, which depends on the Divine Will, as God hath said: “_Whomsoever God wishes to lead aright, He will open his breast to receive_ _Islam, but whomsoever He wishes to lead astray, He will make his breast strait and narrow_” (Kor. vi, 125). By affirming His will, He denies the (effect of the) religious ordinances which have been laid upon mankind. If mortification were the cause of union Iblís would not have been damned, or if neglect of mortification were the cause of damnation Adam would never have been blessed. The result hangs on predestined grace (_`ináyat_), not on abundance of mortification. It is not the case that he who most exerts himself is the most secure, but that he who has most grace is nearest to God. A monk worshipping in his cell may be far from God, and a sinner in the tavern may be near to Him. The noblest thing in the world is the faith of a child who is not subject to the religious law (_mukallaf_) and in this respect belongs to the same category as madmen: if, then, mortification is not the cause of the noblest of all gifts, no cause is necessary for anything that is inferior.

I, `Alí b. `Uthmán al-Jullábí, say that the difference between the two parties in this controversy lies in expression (_`ibárat_). One says, “He who seeks shall find,” and the other says, “He who finds shall seek.” Seeking is the cause of finding, but it is no less true that finding is the cause of seeking. The one party practises mortification for the purpose of attaining contemplation, and the other party practises contemplation for the purpose of attaining mortification. The fact is that mortification stands in the same relation to contemplation as Divine blessing (_tawfíq_), which is a gift from God, to obedience (_ṭá`at_): as it is absurd to seek obedience without Divine blessing, so it is absurd to seek Divine blessing without obedience, and as there can be no mortification without contemplation, so there can be no contemplation without mortification. Man is guided to mortification by a flash of the Divine Beauty, and inasmuch as that flash is the cause of the existence of mortification, Divine guidance (_hidáyat_) precedes mortification.

Now, as regards the argument of Sahl and his followers that failure to affirm mortification involves the denial of all the religious ordinances which have come down in the books revealed to the Prophets, this statement requires correction. Religious obligations (_taklíf_) depend on Divine guidance (_hidáyat_), and acts of mortification only serve to affirm the proofs of God, not to effect real union with Him. God has said: “_And though We had sent down the angels unto them and the dead had spoken unto them and We had gathered before them all things together, they would not have believed unless God had so willed_” (Kor. vi, 111), for the cause of belief is Our will, not evidences or mortification. Accordingly, the revelations of the Prophets and the ordinances of religion are a means (_asbáb_) of attaining to union, but are not the cause (_`illat_) of union. So far as religious obligations are concerned, Abú Bakr was in the same position as Abú Jahl, but Abú Bakr, having justice and grace, attained, whereas Abú Jahl, having justice without grace, failed. Therefore the cause of attainment is attainment itself, not the act of seeking attainment, for if the seeker were one with the object sought the seeker would be one, and in that case he would not be a seeker, because he who has attained is at rest, which the seeker cannot be.

Again, in reference to their argument that the qualities of a horse are altered by mortification, you must know that mortification is only a means of bringing out qualities that are already latent in the horse but do not appear until he has been trained. Mortification will never turn a donkey into a horse or a horse into a donkey, because this involves a change of identity; and since mortification has not the power of transforming identity it cannot possibly be affirmed in the presence of God.

Over that spiritual director, namely, Sahl, there used to pass a mortification of which he was independent and which, while he was in the reality thereof, he was unable to express in words. He was not like some who have made it their religion to talk about mortification without practising it. How absurd that what ought to consist wholly in action should become nothing but words! In short, the Ṣúfís are unanimous in recognizing the existence of mortification and discipline, but hold that it is wrong to pay regard to them. Those who deny mortification do not mean to deny its reality, but only to deny that any regard should be paid to it or that anyone should be pleased with his own actions in the place of holiness, inasmuch as mortification is the act of Man, while contemplation is a state in which one is kept by God, and a man’s actions do not begin to have value until God keeps him thus. The mortification of those whom God loves is the work of God in them without choice on their part: it overwhelms and melts them away; but the mortification of ignorant men is the work of themselves in themselves by their own choice: it perturbs and distresses them, and distress is due to evil. Therefore, do not speak of thine own actions while thou canst avoid it, and never in any circumstances follow thy lower soul, for it is thy phenomenal being that veils thee from God. If thou wert veiled by one act alone, thou mightest be unveiled by another, but since thy whole being is a veil thou wilt not become worthy of subsistence (_baqá_) until thou art wholly annihilated. It is related in a well—known anecdote that Ḥusayn b. Manṣúr (al-Ḥalláj) came to Kúfa and lodged in the house of Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusayn al-`Alawí. Ibráhím Khawwáṣ also came to Kúfa, and, having heard of al-Ḥalláj, went to see him. Al-Ḥalláj said: “O Ibráhím, during these forty years of your connexion with Ṣúfiism, what have you gained from it?” Ibráhím answered: “I have made the doctrine of trust in God (_tawakkul_) peculiarly my own.” Al-Ḥalláj said: “You have wasted your life in cultivating your spiritual nature: what has become of annihilation in Unification (_al-faná fi ´l-tawḥíd_)?” i.e. “trust in God is a term denoting your conduct towards God and your spiritual excellence in regard to relying on Him: if a man spends his whole life in remedying his spiritual nature, he will need another life for remedying his material nature, and his life will be lost before he has found a trace or vestige of God”. And a story is told of Shaykh Abú `Alí Siyáh of Merv, that he said: “I saw my lower soul in a form resembling my own, and some one had seized it by its hair and gave it into my hands. I bound it to a tree and was about to destroy it, when it cried out, ‘O Abú `Alí, do not trouble yourself. I am God’s army (_lashkar-i khudáyam_): you cannot reduce me to naught.’” And it is related concerning Muḥammad b. `Ulyán of Nasá, an eminent companion of Junayd, that he said: “In my novitiate, when I had become aware of the corruptions of the lower soul and acquainted with its places of ambush, I always felt a violent hatred of it in my heart. One day something like a young fox came forth from my throat, and God caused me to know that it was my lower soul. I cast it under my feet, and at every kick that I gave it, it grew bigger. I said: ‘Other things are destroyed by pain and blows: why dost thou increase?’ It replied: ‘Because I was created perverse: that which is pain to other things is pleasure to me, and their pleasure is my pain.’” Shaykh Abu ´l-`Abbás Shaqání, who was the Imám of his time, said: “One day I came into my house and found a yellow dog lying there, asleep. Thinking it had come in from the street, I was about to turn it out. It crept under my skirt and vanished.” Shaykh Abu ´l-Qásim Gurgání, who to-day is the Quṭb—may God prolong his life!—relates, speaking of his novitiate, that he saw his lower soul in the form of a snake. A dervish said: “I saw my lower soul in the shape of a mouse. ‘Who art thou?’ I asked. It answered: ‘I am the destruction of the heedless, for I urge them to evil, and the salvation of those who love God, for if I were not with them in my corruption they would be puffed up with pride in their purity.’”

All these stories prove that the lower soul is a real substance (_`ayní_), not a mere attribute, and that it has attributes which we clearly perceive. The Apostle said: “Thy worst enemy is thy lower soul, which is between thy two sides.” When you have obtained knowledge of it you recognize that it can be mastered by discipline, but that its essence and substance do not perish. If it is rightly known and under control, the seeker need not care though it continues to exist in him. Hence the purpose of mortifying the lower soul is to destroy its attributes, not to annihilate its reality. Now I will discuss the true nature of passion and the renunciation of lusts.

_Discourse on the true nature of Passion_ (hawá).

You must know that, according to the opinion of some, passion is a term applied to the attributes of the lower soul, but, according to others, a term denoting the natural volition (_irádat-i ṭab`_) whereby the lower soul is controlled and directed, just as the spirit is controlled by the intelligence. Every spirit that is devoid of the faculty of intelligence is imperfect, and similarly every lower soul that is devoid of the faculty of passion is imperfect. Man is continually being called by intelligence and passion into contrary ways. If he obeys the call of intelligence he attains to faith, but if he obeys the call of passion he arrives at error and infidelity. Therefore passion is a veil and a false guide, and man is commanded to resist it. Passion is of two kinds: (1) desire of pleasure and lust, and (2) desire of worldly honour and authority. He who follows pleasure and lust haunts taverns, and mankind are safe from his mischief, but he who desires honour and authority lives in cells (_ṣawámi`_) and monasteries, and not only has lost the right way himself but also leads others into error. One whose every act depends on passion, and who finds satisfaction in following it, is far from God although he be with you in a mosque, but one who has renounced and abandoned it is near to God although he be in a church. Ibráhím Khawwáṣ relates this anecdote: “Once I heard that in Rúm there was a monk who had been seventy years in a monastery. I said to myself: ‘Wonderful! Forty years is the term of monastic vows: what is the state of this man that he has remained there for seventy years?’ I went to see him. When I approached, he opened a window and said to me: ‘O Ibráhím, I know why you have come. I have not stayed here for seventy years because of monastic vows, but I have a dog foul with passion, and I have taken my abode in this monastery for the purpose of guarding the dog (_sagbání_), and preventing it from doing harm to others.’ On hearing him say this I exclaimed: ‘O Lord, Thou art able to bestow righteousness on a man even though he be involved in sheer error.’ He said to me: ‘O Ibráhím, how long will you seek men? Go and seek yourself, and when you have found yourself keep watch over yourself, for this passion clothes itself every day in three hundred and sixty diverse garments of godhead and leads men astray.’“

In short, the devil cannot enter a man’s heart until he desires to commit a sin: but when a certain quantity of passion appears, the devil takes it and decks it out and displays it to the man’s heart; and this is called diabolic suggestion (_waswás_). It begins from passion, and in reference to this fact God said to Iblís when he threatened to seduce all mankind: ”_Verily, thou hast no power over My servants_” (Kor. xv, 42), for the devil in reality is a man’s lower soul and passion. Hence the Apostle said: “There is no one whom his devil (i.e. his passion) has not subdued except `Umar, for he has subdued his devil.” Passion is mingled as an ingredient in the clay of Adam; whoever renounces it becomes a prince and whoever follows it becomes a captive. Junayd was asked: “What is union with God?” He replied: “To renounce passion,” for of all the acts of devotion by which God’s favour is sought none has greater value than resistance to passion, because it is easier for a man to destroy a mountain with his nails than to resist passion. I have read in the Anecdotes that Dhu ´l-Nún the Egyptian said: “I saw a man flying through the air, and asked him how he had attained to this degree. He answered: ‘I set my feet on passion (_hawá_) in order that I might ascend into the air (_hawá_).’” It is related that Muḥammad b. Faḍl al-Balkhí said: “I marvel at one who goes with his passion into God’s House and visits Him: why does not he trample on his passion that he may attain to Him?”

The most manifest attribute of the lower soul is lust (_shahwat_). Lust is a thing that is dispersed in different parts of the human body, and is served by the senses. Man is bound to guard all his members from it, and he shall be questioned concerning the acts of each. The lust of the eye is sight, that of the ear is hearing, that of the nose is smell, that of the tongue is speech, that of the palate is taste, that of the body (_jasad_) is touch, and that of the mind is thought (_andíshídan_). It behoves the seeker of God to spend his whole life, day and night, in ridding himself of these incitements to passion which show themselves through the senses, and to pray God to make him such that this desire will be removed from his inward nature, since whoever is afflicted with lust is veiled from all spiritual things. If anyone should repel it by his own exertions, his task would be long and painful. The right way is resignation (_taslím_). It is related that Abú `Alí Siyáh of Merv said: “I had gone to the bath and in accordance with the custom of the Prophet I was using a razor (_pubis tondendæ causâ_). I said to myself: ‘O Abú `Alí, amputate this member which is the source of all lusts and keeps thee afflicted with so much evil.’ A voice in my heart whispered: ‘O Abú `Alí, wilt thou interfere in My kingdom? Are not all thy limbs equally at My disposal? If thou do this, I swear by My glory that I will put a hundredfold lust and passion in every hair in that place.’”

Although a man has no power over what is vicious in his constitution, he can get an attribute changed by Divine aid and by resigning himself to God’s will and by divesting himself of his own power and strength. In reality, when he resigns himself, God protects him; and through God’s protection he comes nearer to annihilating the evil than he does through self-mortification, since flies are more easily driven away with an umbrella (_mikanna_) than with a fly-whisk (_midhabba_). Unless Divine protection is predestined to a man, he cannot abstain from anything by his own exertion, and unless God exerts Himself towards a man, that man’s exertion is of no use. All acts of exertion fall under two heads: their object is either to avert the predestination of God or to acquire something in spite of predestination; and both these objects are impossible. It is related that when Shiblí was ill, the physician advised him to be abstinent. “From what shall I abstain?” said he, “from that which God bestows upon me, or from that which He does not bestow? It is impossible to abstain from the former, and the latter is not in my hands.” I will discuss this question carefully on another occasion.

7. THE ḤAKÍMÍS.

They are the followers of Abú `Abdalláh Muḥammad b. `Alí al-Ḥakím al-Tirmidhí, who was one of the religious leaders of his time and the author of many works on every branch of exoteric and esoteric science. His doctrine was based on saintship (_wiláyat_), and he used to explain the true nature of saintship and the degrees of the saints and the observance of the proper arrangement of their ranks.

As the first step towards understanding his doctrine, you must know that God has saints (_awliyá_), whom He has chosen out of mankind, and whose thoughts He has withdrawn from worldly ties and delivered from sensual temptations; and He has stationed each of them in a particular degree, and has opened unto them the door of these mysteries. Much might be said on this topic, but I must briefly set forth several points of capital importance.

_Discourse on the Affirmation of Saintship_ (wiláyat).

You must know that the principle and foundation of Ṣúfiism and knowledge of God rests on saintship, the reality of which is unanimously affirmed by all the Shaykhs, though every one has expressed himself in different language. The peculiarity of Muḥammad b. `Alí (al-Ḥakím) lies in the fact that he applied this term to the theory of Ṣúfiism.

_Waláyat_ means, etymologically, “power to dispose” (_taṣarruf_), and _wiláyat_ means “possession of command” (_imárat_). _Waláyat_ also means “lordship” (_rubúbiyyat_); hence God hath said: “_In this case the lordship_ (al-waláyat) _belongs to God who is the_ _Truth_” (Kor. xviii, 42), because the unbelievers seek His protection and turn unto Him and renounce their idols. And _wiláyat_ also means “love” (_maḥabbat_). _Walí_ may be the form _fa`íl_ with the meaning of _maf`úl_, as God hath said: “_And He takes charge of_ (yatawallá) _the righteous_” (Kor. vii, 195), for God does not leave His servant to his own actions and attributes, but keeps him under His protection. And _walí_ may be the form _fa`íl_, equivalent to _fá`il_, with an intensive force, because a man takes care (_tawallí kunad_) to obey God and constantly to fulfil the obligations that he owes to Him. Thus _walí_ in the active meaning is “one who desires” (_muríd_), while in the passive meaning it denotes “one who is the object of God’s desire” (_murád_). All these meanings, whether they signify the relation of God to Man or that of Man to God, are allowable, for God may be the protector of His friends, inasmuch as He promised His protection to the Companions of the Apostle, and declared that the unbelievers had no protector (_mawlá_).[117] And, moreover, He may distinguish them in an exclusive way by His friendship, as He hath said, “_He loves them and they love Him_” (Kor. v, 59), so that they turn away from the favour of mankind: He is their friend (_walí_) and they are His friends (_awliyá_). And He may confer on one a “friendship” (_wiláyat_) that enables him to persevere in obedience to Him, and keeps him free from sin, and on another a “friendship” that empowers him to loose and bind, and makes his prayers answered and his aspirations effectual, as the Apostle said: “There is many a one with dirty hair, dust-stained, clad in two old garments, whom men never heed; but if he were to swear by God, God would verify his oath.” It is well known that in the Caliphate of `Umar b. al-Khaṭṭáb, the Nile, in accordance with its usual habit, ceased to flow; for in the time of Paganism they used annually to adorn a maiden and throw her into the river to make it flow again. `Umar therefore wrote on a piece of paper: “O river, if thou hast stopped of thy own will, thou doest wrong, and if by command of God, `Umar bids thee flow.“ When this paper was thrown in, the Nile resumed its course.

Footnote 117:

Kor. xlvii, 12.

My purpose in discussing saintship and affirming its reality is to show you that the name of saint (_walí_) is properly applied to those in whom the above-mentioned qualities are actually present (_ḥál_) and not merely reputed (_qál_). Certain Shaykhs formerly composed books on this subject, but they became rare and soon disappeared. Now I will commend to you the explanation given by that venerable spiritual director who is the author of the doctrine—for my own belief in it is greater—in order that much instruction may be gained, not only by yourself, but also by every seeker of Ṣúfiism who may have the good fortune to read this book.

SECTION.

You must know that the word _walí_ is current among the vulgar, and is to be found in the Koran and the Apostolic Traditions: e.g., God hath said, ”_Verily, on the friends_ (awliyá) _of God no fear shall come, and they shall not grieve_“ (Kor. x, 63); and again, ”_God is the friend_ (walí) _of those who believe_” (Kor. ii, 258). And the Apostle said: “Among the servants of God there are some whom the prophets and martyrs deem happy.” He was asked: “Who are they? Describe them to us that perchance we may love them.” He replied: “Those who love one another, through God’s mercy, without wealth and without seeking a livelihood: their faces are luminous, and they sit on thrones of light; they are not afraid when men are afraid, nor do they grieve when men grieve.” Then he recited: “_Verily, on the friends of God no fear shall come, and they shall not grieve_” (Kor. x, 63). Furthermore, the Apostle said that God said: “He who hurts a saint (_walí_) has allowed himself to make war on Me.”

These passages show that God has saints (_awliyá_) whom He has specially distinguished by His friendship and whom He has chosen to be the governors of His kingdom and has marked out to manifest His actions and has peculiarly favoured with diverse kinds of miracles (_karámát_) and has purged of natural corruptions and has delivered from subjection to their lower soul and passion, so that all their thoughts are of Him and their intimacy is with Him alone. Such have been in past ages, and are now, and shall be hereafter until the Day of Resurrection, because God has exalted this (Moslem) community above all others and has promised to preserve the religion of Muḥammad. Inasmuch as the traditional and intellectual proofs of this religion are to be found among the divines (_`ulamá_), it follows that the visible proof is to be found among the Saints and elect of God. Here we have two parties opposed to us, namely, the Mu`tazilites and the rank and file of the Anthropomorphists (_Ḥashwiyya_). The Mu`tazilites deny that one Moslem is specially privileged more than another; but if a saint is not specially privileged, neither is a prophet specially privileged; and this is infidelity. The vulgar Anthropomorphists allow that special privileges may be conferred, but assert that such privileged persons no longer exist, although they did exist in the past. It is all the same, however, whether they deny the past or the future, since one side of denial is no better than another.

God, then, has caused the prophetic evidence (_burhán-i nabawí_) to remain down to the present day, and has made the Saints the means whereby it is manifested, in order that the signs of the Truth and the proof of Muḥammad’s veracity may continue to be clearly seen. He has made the Saints the governors of the universe; they have become entirely devoted to His business, and have ceased to follow their sensual affections. Through the blessing of their advent the rain falls from heaven, and through the purity of their lives the plants spring up from the earth, and through their spiritual influence the Moslems gain victories over the unbelievers. Among them there are four thousand who are concealed and do not know one another and are not aware of the excellence of their state, but in all circumstances are hidden from themselves and from mankind. Traditions have come down to this effect, and the sayings of the Saints proclaim the truth thereof, and I myself—God be praised!—have had ocular experience (_khabar-i `iyán_) of this matter. But of those who have power to loose and to bind and are the officers of the Divine court there are three hundred, called _Akhyár_, and forty, called _Abdál_, and seven, called _Abrár_, and four, called _Awtád_, and three, called _Nuqabá_, and one, called _Quṭb_ or _Ghawth_. All these know one another and cannot act save by mutual consent.

Here the vulgar may object to my assertion that they know one another to be saints, on the ground that, if such is the case, they must be secure as to their fate in the next world. I reply that it is absurd to suppose that knowledge of saintship involves security. A believer may have knowledge of his faith and yet not be secure: why should not the same hold good of a saint who has knowledge of his saintship? Nevertheless, it is possible that God should miraculously cause the saint to know his security in regard to the future life, while maintaining him in a state of spiritual soundness and preserving him from disobedience. The Shaykhs differ on this question for the reason which I have explained. Those belonging to the four thousand who are concealed do not admit that the saint can know himself to be such, whereas those of the other class take the contrary view. Each opinion is supported by many lawyers and scholastics. Abú Isḥáq Isfará´iní[118] and some of the ancients hold that a saint is ignorant of his saintship, while Abú Bakr b. Fúrak[119] and others of the past generation hold that he is conscious of it. I ask the former party, what loss or evil does a saint suffer by knowing himself? If they allege that he is conceited when he knows himself to be a saint, I answer that Divine protection is a necessary condition of saintship, and one who is protected from evil cannot fall into self-conceit. It is a very common notion (_sukhan-i sakht `ámiyána_) that a saint, to whom extraordinary miracles (_karámát_) are continually vouchsafed, does not know himself to be a saint or these miracles to be miracles. Both parties have adherents among the common people, but opinion is of no account.

Footnote 118:

See Ibn Khallikán, No. 4.

Footnote 119:

See Ibn Khallikán, No. 621; Brockelmann, i, 166.

The Mu`tazilites, however, deny special privileges and miracles, which constitute the essence of saintship. They affirm that all Moslems are friends (_awliyá_) of God when they are obedient to Him, and that anyone who fulfils the ordinances of the Faith and denies the attributes and vision of God and allows believers to be eternally damned in Hell and acknowledges only such obligations as are imposed by Reason, without regard to Revelation, is a “friend” (_walí_). All Moslems agree that such a person is a “friend”, but a friend of the Devil. The Mu`tazilites also maintain that, if saintship involved miracles, all believers must have miracles vouchsafed to them, because they all share in faith (_ímán_), and if they share in what is fundamental they must likewise share in what is derivative. They say, further, that miracles may be vouchsafed both to believers and to infidels, e.g. when anyone is hungry or fatigued on a journey some person may appear in order to give him food or mount him on an animal for riding. If it were possible, they add, for anyone to traverse a great distance in one night, the Apostle must have been that man; yet, when he set out for Mecca, God said, “_And they_ (the animals) _carry your burdens to a land which ye would not have reached save with sore trouble to yourselves_” (Kor. xvi, 7). I reply: “Your arguments are worthless, for God said, ‘_Glory to Him who transported His servant by night from the sacred mosque to the farther mosque_’” (Kor. xvii, 1). Miracles are special, not general; but it would have been a general instance if all the Companions had been miraculously conveyed to Mecca, and this would have destroyed all the principles of faith in the unseen. Faith is a general term, applicable to the righteous and the wicked alike, whereas saintship is special. The journey of the Companions to Mecca falls under the former category, but inasmuch as the case of the Apostle was a special one, God conveyed him in one night from Mecca to Jerusalem, and thence to a space of two bow-lengths from the Divine presence; and he returned ere the night was far spent. Again, to deny special privileges is manifestly unreasonable. As in a palace there are chamberlains, janitors, grooms, and viziers, who, although they are equally the king’s servants, are not equal in rank, so all believers are equal in respect of their faith, but some are obedient, some wise, some pious, and some ignorant.

SECTION.

The Shaykhs, every one, have given hints as to the true meaning of saintship. Now I will bring together as many of these selected definitions as possible.

Abú `Alí Júzajání says: “The saint is annihilated in his own state and subsistent in the contemplation of the Truth: he cannot tell anything concerning himself, nor can he rest with anyone except God,” because a man has knowledge only of his own state, and when all his states are annihilated he cannot tell anything about himself; and he cannot rest with anyone else, to whom he might tell his state, because to communicate one’s hidden state to another is to reveal the secret of the Beloved, which cannot be revealed except to the Beloved himself. Moreover, in contemplation it is impossible to regard aught except God: how, then, can he be at rest with mankind? Junayd said: “The saint hath no fear, because fear is the expectation either of some future calamity or of the eventual loss of some object of desire, whereas the saint is the son of his time (_ibn waqtihi_): he has no future that he should fear anything; and as he hath no fear so he hath no hope, since hope is the expectation either of gaining an object of desire or of being relieved from a misfortune, and this belongs to the future; nor does he grieve, because grief arises from the rigour of time, and how should he feel grief who is in the radiance of satisfaction (_riḍá_) and the garden of concord (_muwáfaqat_)?” The vulgar imagine this saying to imply that, inasmuch as the saint feels neither fear nor hope nor grief, he has security (_amn_) in their place; but he has not security, for security arises from not seeing that which is hidden, and from turning one’s back on “time”; and this (absence of security) is characteristic of those who pay no regard to their humanity (_bashariyyat_) and are not content with attributes. Fear and hope and security and grief all refer to the interests of the lower soul, and when that is annihilated satisfaction (_riḍá_) becomes an attribute of Man, and when satisfaction has been attained his states become steadfast (_mustaqím_) in vision of the Author of states (_muḥawwil_), and his back is turned on all states. Then saintship is revealed to his heart and its meaning is made clear to his inmost thoughts. Abú `Uthmán Maghribí says: “The saint is sometimes celebrated (_mashhúr_), but he is not seduced (_maftún_),” and another says: “The saint is sometimes hidden (_mastúr_), but he is not celebrated.” Seduction consists in falsehood: inasmuch as the saint must be veracious, and miracles cannot possibly be performed by a liar, it follows that the saint is incapable of being seduced. These two sayings refer to the controversy whether the saint knows himself to be such: if he knows, he is celebrated, and if he does not know, he is seduced; but the explanation of this is tedious. It is related that Ibráhím b. Adham asked a certain man whether he desired to be one of God’s saints, and on his replying “Yes”, said: “Do not covet anything in this world or the next, and devote thyself entirely to God, and turn to God with all thy heart.” To covet this world is to turn away from God for the sake of that which is transitory, and to covet the next world is to turn away from God for the sake of that which is everlasting: that which is transitory perishes and its renunciation becomes naught, but that which is everlasting cannot perish, hence its renunciation also is imperishable. Abú Yazíd was asked: “Who is a saint?” He answered: “That one who is patient under the command and prohibition of God,” because the more a man loves God the more does his heart revere what He commands and the farther is his body from what He forbids. It is related that Abú Yazíd said: “Once I was told that a saint of God was in such and such a town. I set out to visit him. When I arrived at his mosque he came forth from his chamber and spat on the floor of the mosque. I turned back without saluting him, and said to myself: ‘A saint must keep the religious law in order that God may keep him in his spiritual state. Had this man been a saint his respect for the mosque would have prevented him from spitting on its floor, or God would have preserved him from marring the grace vouchsafed to him.’ The same night I dreamed that the Apostle said to me, ‘O Abú Yazíd, the blessing of that which thou hast done is come to thee.’ Next day I attained to this degree which ye behold.” And I have heard that a man who came to visit Shaykh Abú Sa`íd entered the mosque with his left foot foremost. The Shaykh gave orders that he should be dismissed, saying: “He who does not know how to enter the house of the Friend is not suitable for us.” Some heretics who have adopted this perilous doctrine assert that service of God (_khidmat_) is necessary only while one is becoming a saint, but that after one has become a saint service is abolished. This is clearly wrong. There is no “station” on the way to the Truth where any obligation of service is abolished. I will explain this matter fully in its proper place.

_Discourse on the Affirmation of Miracles_ (karámát).

You must know that miracles may be vouchsafed to a saint so long as he does not infringe the obligations of the religious law. Both parties of the orthodox Moslems agree on this point, nor is it intellectually impossible, because such miracles are a species of that which is predestined by God, and their manifestation does not contradict any principle of the religious law, nor, on the other hand, is it repugnant to the mind to conceive them as a genus. A miracle is a token of a saint’s veracity, and it cannot be manifested to an impostor except as a sign that his pretensions are false. It is an extraordinary act (_fi`lí náqiḍ-i `ádat_), performed while he is still subject to the obligations of religion; and whoever is able, through knowledge given him by God, to distinguish by the method of deduction what is true from what is false, he too is a saint. Some Sunnís maintain that miracles are established, but not to the degree of an evidentiary miracle (_mu`jizat_[120]): they do not admit, for example, that prayers may be answered and fulfilled, and so forth, contrary to custom. I ask in reply: “What do you consider wrong in the performance by a true saint, while he is subject to religious obligations, of an act which violates custom?” If they say that it is not a species of that which is predestined by God, this statement is erroneous; and if they say that it is a species of that which is predestined, but that its performance by a true saint involves the annulment of prophecy and the denial of special privileges to the prophets, this assertion also is inadmissible, since the saint is specially distinguished by miracles (_karámát_) and the prophet by evidentiary miracles (_mu`jizát_); and inasmuch as the saint is a saint and the prophet is a prophet, there is no likeness between them to justify such precaution. The pre-eminence of the prophets depends on their exalted rank and on their being preserved from the defilement of sin, not on miracles or evidentiary miracles or acts which violate custom. All the prophets are equal so far as they all have the power of working such miracles (_i`jáz_), but some are superior to others in degree. Since, then, notwithstanding this equality in regard to their actions, some prophets are superior to others, why should not miracles (_karámát_) which violate custom be vouchsafed also to the saints, although the prophets are superior to them? And since, in the case of the prophets, an act which violates custom does not cause one of them to be more exalted or more specially privileged than another, so, in the case of the saints, a similar act does not cause a saint to be more specially privileged than a prophet, i.e. the saints do not become like in kind (_hamsán_) to the prophets. This proof will clear away, for reasonable men, any difficulties that this matter may have presented to them. “But suppose,” it may be said, “that a saint whose miracles violate custom should claim to be a prophet.” I reply that this is impossible, because saintship involves veracity, and he who tells a falsehood is no saint. Moreover, a saint who pretends to prophesy casts an imputation on (the genuineness of) evidentiary miracles, which is infidelity. Miracles (_karámát_) are vouchsafed only to a pious believer, and falsehood is impiety. That being so, the miracles of the saint confirm the evidence of the prophet. There is no difficulty in reconciling the two classes of miracles. The apostle establishes his prophecy by establishing the reality of evidentiary miracles, while the saint, by the miracles which he performs, establishes both the prophecy of the apostle and his own saintship. Therefore the veracious saint says the same thing as the veracious prophet. The miracles of the former are identical with the evidentiary miracles of the latter. A believer, seeing the miracles of a saint, has more faith in the veracity of the prophet, not more doubt, because there is no contradiction between the claims made by them. Similarly, in law, when a number of heirs are agreed in their claim, if one of them establishes his claim the claim of the others is established; but not so if their claims are contradictory. Hence, when a prophet adduces evidentiary miracles as evidence that his prophecy is genuine, and when his claim is confirmed by a saint, it is impossible that any difficulty should arise.

Footnote 120:

The name _mu`jizat_ is given to a miracle performed by a prophet,
while one performed by a saint is called _karámat_.

_Discourse on the difference between Evidentiary Miracles_ (mu`jizát)
_and Miracles_ (karámát).

Inasmuch as it has been shown that neither class of miracles can be wrought by an impostor, we must now distinguish more clearly between them. _Mu`jizát_ involve publicity and _karámát_ secrecy, because the result of the former is to affect others, while the latter are peculiar to the person by whom they are performed. Again, the doer of _mu`jizát_ is quite sure that he has wrought an extraordinary miracle, whereas the doer of _karámát_ cannot be sure whether he has really wrought a miracle or whether he is insensibly deceived (_istidráj_). He who performs _mu`jizát_ has authority over the law, and in arranging it he denies or affirms, according as God commands him, that he is insensibly deceived.[121] On the other hand, he who performs _karámát_ has no choice but to resign himself (to God’s will) and to accept the ordinances that are laid upon him, because the _karámát_ of a saint are never in any way incompatible with the law laid down by a prophet. It may be said: “If evidentiary miracles are the proof of a prophet’s veracity, and if nevertheless you assert that miracles of the same kind may be performed by one who is not a prophet, then they become ordinary events (_mu`tád_): therefore your proof of the reality of _mu`jizát_ annuls your argument establishing the reality of _karámát_.” I reply: “This is not the case. The _karámat_ of a saint is identical with, and displays the same evidence as, the _mu`jizat_ of a prophet: the quality of _i`jáz_ (inimitability) exhibited in the one instance does not impair the same quality in the other instance.” When the infidels put Khubayb on the gallows at Mecca, the Apostle, who was then seated in the mosque at Medína, saw him and told the Companions what was being done to him. God also lifted the veil from the eyes of Khubayb, so that he saw the Apostle and cried, “Peace be with thee!” and God caused the Apostle to hear his salutation, and caused Khubayb to hear the Apostle’s answer. Now, the fact that the Apostle at Medína saw Khubayb at Mecca was an evidentiary miracle, and the fact that Khubayb at Mecca saw the Apostle at Medína was likewise an extraordinary act. Accordingly there is no difference between absence in time and absence in space; for Khubayb’s miracle (_karámat_) was wrought when he was absent from the Apostle in space, and the miracles of later days were wrought by those who were absent from the Apostle in time. This is a clear distinction and a manifest proof that _karámát_ cannot possibly be in contradiction with _i`jáz_ (miracles performed by a prophet). _Karámát_ are not established unless they bear testimony to the truth of one who has performed a _mu`jizat_, and they are not vouchsafed except to a pious believer who bears such testimony. _Karámát_ of Moslems are an extraordinary miracle (_mu`jizat_) of the Apostle, for as his law is permanent so must his proof (_ḥujjat_) also be permanent. The saints are witnesses to the truth of the Apostle’s mission, and it is impossible that a miracle (_karámat_) should be wrought by an unbeliever (_bégána_).

Footnote 121:

B. omits the words “that he is insensibly deceived”.

On this topic a story is related of Ibráhím Khawwáṣ, which is very apposite here. Ibráhím said: “I went down into the desert in my usual state of detachment from worldly things (_tajríd_). After I had gone some distance a man appeared and begged me to let him be my companion. I looked at him and was conscious of a feeling of repugnance. He said to me: ‘O Ibráhím, do not be vexed. I am a Christian, and one of the Ṣábians among them. I have come from the confines of Rúm in the hope of being thy companion.’ When I knew that he was an unbeliever, I regained my equanimity, and felt it more easy to take him as my companion and to fulfil my obligations towards him. I said: ‘O monk, I fear that thou wilt suffer from want of meat and drink, for I have nothing with me.’ ‘O Ibráhím,’ said he, ‘is thy fame in the world so great, and art thou still concerned about meat and drink?’ I marvelled at his boldness and accepted him as my companion in order to test his claim. After journeying seven days and nights we were overtaken by thirst. He stopped and cried: ‘O Ibráhím, they trumpet thy praise throughout the world. Now let me see what privileges of intimacy (_gustákhíhá_) thou hast in this court (i.e. to what extent thou art a favourite with God), for I can endure no more.’ I laid my head on the earth and cried: ‘O Lord, do not shame me before this unbeliever, who thinks well of me!’ When I raised my head I saw a dish on which were placed two loaves of bread and two cups of water. We ate and drank and went on our way. After seven days had passed I resolved to test him ere he should again put me to the proof. ‘O monk,’ I said, ‘now it is thy turn. Let me see the fruits of thy mortification.’ He laid his head on the earth and muttered something. Immediately a dish appeared containing four loaves and four cups of water. I was amazed and grieved, and I despaired of my state. ‘This has appeared,’ I said, ‘for the sake of an unbeliever: how can I eat or drink thereof?’ He bade me taste, but I refused, saying, ‘Thou art not worthy of this, and it is not in harmony with thy spiritual condition. If I regard it as a miracle (_karámat_), miracles are not vouchsafed to unbelievers; and if I regard it as a contribution (_ma`únat_) from thee, I must suspect thee of being an impostor.’ He said: ‘Taste, O Ibráhím! I give thee joy of two things: firstly, of my conversion to Islam (here he uttered the profession of faith), and secondly, of the great honour in which thou art held by God.’ ‘How so?’ I asked. He answered: ‘I have no miraculous powers, but my shame on account of thee made me lay my head on the earth and beg God to give me two loaves and two cups of water if the religion of Muḥammad is true, and two more loaves and cups if Ibráhím Khawwáṣ is one of God’s saints.’” Then Ibráhím ate and drank, and the man who had been a monk rose to eminence in Islam.

Now, this violation of custom, although attached to the _karámat_ of a saint, is identical with the evidentiary miracles which are wrought by prophets, but it is rare that in a prophet’s absence an evidence should be vouchsafed to another person, or that in the presence of a saint some portion of his miraculous powers should be transferred to another person. In fact, the end of saintship is only the beginning of prophecy. That monk was one of the hidden (saints), like Pharaoh’s magicians. Ibráhím confirmed the Prophet’s power to violate custom, and his companion also was endeavouring both to confirm prophecy and to glorify saintship; a purpose which God in His eternal providence fulfilled. This is a clear difference between _karámat_ and _i`jáz_. The manifestation of miracles to the saints is a second miracle, for they ought to be kept secret, not intentionally divulged. My Shaykh used to say that if a saint reveals his saintship and claims to be a saint, the soundness of his spiritual state is not impaired thereby, but if he takes pains to obtain publicity he is led astray by self-conceit.

_Discourse on the performance of miracles belonging to the evidentiary
class by those who pretend to godship._