Chapter XVII (3)

Be so good, my dearest Cousin, as to give my love to my dear little Cousins, and believe me always, your most affectionate Cousin,

CHARLOTTE.

[Pageheading: ITALY AND FRANCE]

_Queen Victoria to Viscount Palmerston._

OSBORNE, _24th July 1848._

The Queen has received Lord Palmerston's letter[33] reporting his conversation with M. de Tallenay. She can only repeat her opinion that a negotiation with France in order to agree with her upon a common line of policy to be followed with regard to the Italian question can lead to no good; it will make us the ally of a Government which is not even legally constituted, and which can accordingly not guarantee the fulfilment of any engagement it may enter into, and it will call upon the very power to judge the Italian dispute which it is the interest of Europe to keep out of it. M. de Tallenay seems to have admitted that the French Republic, if called upon to act, will neither allow Austria to keep the Venetian territory nor Sardinia to acquire it, but that she will strive to set up a Venetian Republic. It can really not be an object for us to assist in such a scheme, or even to treat upon it.

Lord Cowley the Queen means to invite to dinner to-day, and she wishes Lord Palmerston to let her know the day on which he is to leave for Frankfort in order that she may prepare her letter for the Archduke accordingly.

[Footnote 33: Lord Palmerston had reported an interview with
de Tallenay, who sought the co-operation of England with France
in Northern Italy; the Austrian force in Italy to be withdrawn
or reduced, the union of Lombardy and Piedmont to be accepted
as a _fait accompli_, and Venetian territory erected into a
separate republic.]

[Pageheading: NORTHERN ITALY]

_Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell._

OSBORNE, _25th July 1848._

The Queen sends Lord John Russell the enclosed Despatch from Lord Normanby, with a draft in answer to it which was sent for her approval, but which she really cannot approve. The Queen must tell Lord John what she has repeatedly told Lord Palmerston, but without apparent effect, that the establishment of an _entente cordiale with the French Republic_, for the purpose of driving the Austrians out of _their dominions_ in Italy, would be a _disgrace_ to this country. That the French would attach the greatest importance to it and gain the greatest advantage by it there can be no doubt of; but how will England appear before the world _at the moment_ when she is struggling to maintain her supremacy in Ireland, and boasts to stand by treaties with regard to her European relations, having declined all this time to interfere in Italy or to address one word of caution to the Sardinian Government on account of its attack on Austria, and having refused to mediate when called upon to do so by Austria, because the terms were not good enough for Sardinia, if she should now ally herself with the arch-enemy of Austria to interfere _against her_ at the moment when she has recovered in some degree her position in the Venetian territory?

The notion of establishing a Venetian State under French guarantee is too absurd. Lord Palmerston in his draft says that we believe that the French plan would be agreed to by Austria. Now this is completely at variance with every account, report, or despatch we have received from Verona, Innspruck, or Vienna; however, Lord Palmerston hints that the King of Sardinia might expect still better terms. The French Republic seems _not_ to be anxious for war, not able to conduct it, and the country appears to be decidedly against it; all M. Bastide says is: "There were two extremes which it would be very difficult for them to admit without opposition, viz. the restoration of Lombardy to the Dominion of Austria on the one side, and the union under one powerful state under Charles Albert of all the principalities into which the north of Italy has hitherto been divided." With this explicit declaration, it would surely be best for the interests of Europe that we should name _this_ to Charles Albert, and call upon him to rest satisfied with his conquest, and to conclude a peace with Austria, leaving her what he cannot take from her, and thus avoid calling in France as an arbiter. Why this has not been done long ago, or should not be done now, the Queen cannot comprehend.

_Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell._

OSBORNE, _27th July 1848._

The Queen has to acknowledge Lord John Russell's two letters with respect to Italy. The alterations in the draft meet many of the Queen's objections, giving to the whole step another appearance. The Queen ... must acknowledge the advantage of our trying to bind [the French] to good conduct; only this must be done in a way not to appear as a league with them against a friendly Power, struggling to preserve to herself a territory granted to her by a Treaty to which we were a party.

As the amended draft secures us against these appearances, and leaves us free for the future, the Queen approves it.

[Pageheading: MINOR GERMAN STATES]

_Queen Victoria to the King of the Belgians._

OSBORNE, _1st August 1848._

MY DEAREST UNCLE,--I had yesterday the happiness of receiving your kind letter of the 29th, for which I return my best thanks.

There are ample means of crushing the Rebellion in Ireland,[34] and I think it now is very likely to go off without any contest.... Lord Hardinge is going over there to serve on the Staff, which is very praiseworthy of him.

I do not think the fate of the Minor Princes in Germany is so completely decided as Charles[35] ... is _so_ anxious to make one believe. There is only a question of taking certain powers and rights away, and not at all of getting rid of them; and I think you will see that the _Ausfuehrung_ of the Unity will be an impossibility, at least in the sense they propose at Frankfort. The Archduke John has spoken very reassuringly both to Ernest and the Duke of Meiningen, and the attachment in many of those smaller principalities is still extremely great, and I am sure they will never consent to being _ausgewischt_. Coburg, for instance, on the occasion of the suppression of a very small riot, showed the greatest attachment and devotion to Ernest; at Gotha the feeling of independence is _very_ great, and at Strelitz, on the occasion of Augusta's confinement with a _son_, the enthusiasm and rejoicing was universal. All this cannot be entirely despised.

We are as happy as possible here, and would be perfectly so, if it was not for the sorrow and misfortunes of so many dear to us, and for the state of the world in general.

I have always forgotten to tell you that we bought a fine marble bust of you quite by accident in London the other day. It is in armour and with moustaches, but quite different to the one the Gardners have at Melbourne; Albert saw it at the window of a shop, and heard it had been bought in a sale of a General Somebody. Now, with Albert's best love, ever your devoted Niece,

VICTORIA R.

We have just heard that there has been an _action_ in Ireland in which some of the insurgents have been killed; _fifty_ Police dispersed _four thousand_ people. Smith O'Brien is, however, not yet taken.

[Footnote 34: _See_ Introductory Note for the year, _ante_, p.
141.]

[Footnote 35: The Frankfort Assembly, in pursuance of the
policy of German consolidation, had placed the central
executive power in the hands of a Reichsverweser, or Vicar
of the Empire. The Archduke John, uncle of the Emperor
of Austria, was elected to this position, and the Queen's
half-brother Charles, Prince of Leiningen, was entrusted with
the Department of Foreign Affairs.]

[Pageheading: AN AMBASSADOR TO FRANCE]

_Queen Victoria to Viscount Palmerston._

OSBORNE, _8th August 1848._

... The Queen has attentively perused the statement of Lord Palmerston in favour of accrediting an Ambassador at Paris. As the proposed arrangement for the present is to be only a _provisional_ one, the Queen thinks that the appointment of a _Minister_ now will leave it quite open to have an Ambassador hereafter, if it should be found necessary or advantageous, whilst it would set that matter at rest for the moment. Withdrawing an Ambassador and substituting a Minister hereafter, would be much more difficult. The French Republic would no doubt like to have an Ambassador here, and perhaps take immediate steps to secure that object if Lord Normanby were accredited Ambassador at Paris, against which we would be secured in having only a Minister there.... Lord Normanby's acquaintance with the public men at Paris is as much an inconvenience as it may be a convenience in some respects; his having been the great admirer and friend of M. Lamartine, for instance, etc., etc. The possibility of mixing freely with persons of various kinds, which Lord Palmerston adduces as an important consideration will, in the Queen's opinion, be more easy for a Minister than for a person of the high rank of Ambassador. All things considered therefore, the Queen will prefer to have temporarily a Minister accredited at Paris.

M. de Tallenay the Queen would receive in London on Tuesday next at six o'clock, when the Queen will be in Town.

_Queen Victoria to Viscount Palmerston._

OSBORNE, _11th August 1848._

The Queen has to acknowledge Lord Palmerston's letter of yesterday. The Queen was quite surprised to hear from Lord Palmerston in his last communication that he had written to Lord Normanby to offer him to stay as Minister at Paris, after his having before stated to the Queen that this would never do and could not be expected from Lord Normanby; Lord Normanby's answer declining this offer therefore does in no way alter the matter, and must have been foreseen by Lord Palmerston. By the delay and Lord Normanby's various conversations with M. Bastide[36] and General Cavaignac it has now become difficult to depart from the precedent of the Belgian and Sardinian Missions without giving offence at Paris. The Queen must, however, insist upon this precedent being fully adhered to. She accordingly sanctions Lord Normanby's appointment as Ambassador Extraordinary, on the _distinct understanding_ that there is to be no Ambassador sent in return to London now, and that a Minister is to be appointed to Paris when the diplomatic intercourse is permanently to be settled. The Queen wishes Lord Palmerston to bear this in mind, and to submit to her the arrangement which he thinks will be best calculated to carry this into effect.

[Footnote 36: Minister of Foreign Affairs.]

[Pageheading: LORD NORMANBY'S APPOINTMENT]

_Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell._

OSBORNE, _11th August 1848._

The Queen has to acknowledge Lord John Russell's letter of to-day. The Queen is highly indignant at Lord Palmerston's behaviour now again with respect to Lord Normanby's appointment; he knew perfectly well that Lord Normanby could not accept the post of Minister, and had written to the Queen before that such an offer could not be made, and has now made it after all, knowing that, by wasting time and getting the matter entangled at Paris, he would carry his point. If the French are so anxious to keep Lord Normanby as to make any sacrifice for that object, it ought to make us cautious, as it can only be on account of the ease with which they can make him serve their purposes. They, of course, like an _entente cordiale_ with us at the expense of Austria;... but this can be no consideration for us....

Threatening the Austrians with war, or making war upon them in case they should not be inclined to surrender their provinces at his bidding [Lord Palmerston] knows to be impossible; therefore the _entente_ with the Republic is of the greatest value to him, enabling him to threaten the Austrians at any time with the French intervention which he can have at command if he agrees to it.[37] The Queen has read the leading articles of the _Times_ of yesterday and to-day on this subject with the greatest satisfaction as they express almost entirely the same views and feelings which she entertains. The Queen hopes that Lord John Russell will read them; indeed, the whole of the Press seem to be unanimous on this subject, and she can hardly understand how there can be two opinions upon it....

[Footnote 37: The success of the Piedmontese in Northern Italy
had not continued through the summer, and the States whose
assistance they had hitherto received began to fall away from
them. The King of Naples, successful within his own dominions,
had withdrawn his troops; the Pope hesitated to attack
Austria; even undivided support from Venetia could no longer
be counted upon. After several reverses, Charles Albert, now
left virtually alone in the contest, was decisively defeated
by Radetzky, at Custozza, and retreated across the Mincio.
With what was left of his troops he entered Milan, which he
was eventually forced to surrender, being unable to maintain
himself there. Italy now turned to France for assistance, but
Cavaignac, virtually Dictator in Paris, would not go further
than combining with England to effect a peaceful mediation.
Austria was not in a frame of mind to relinquish any part of
the provinces she had had so severe a struggle to retain.]

[Pageheading: THE QUEEN AND PALMERSTON]

_Queen Victoria to Viscount Palmerston._

OSBORNE, _20th August 1848._

The Queen has received an _autograph_ letter from the Archduke John (in answer to the private letter she had written to him through Lord Cowley), which has been cut open at the Foreign Office. The Queen wishes Lord Palmerston to take care that this does not happen again. The opening of official letters even, addressed to the Queen, which she has _of late_ observed, is really not becoming, and ought to be discontinued, as it used never to be the case formerly.

_Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell._

OSBORNE, _21st August 1848._

The Queen has received Lord John Russell's letter of yesterday, but cannot say that she has been satisfied by the reasons given by Lord Palmerston. The union of Lombardy and Piedmont cannot be considered as a concession to France for the maintenance of peace, because we know that it is the very thing the French object to. The Queen quite agrees that the principal consideration always to be kept in sight is the preservation of the peace of Europe; but it is precisely on that account that she regrets that the terms proposed by Lord Palmerston (whilst they are not in accordance with the views of France) are almost the only ones which must be most offensive to Austria. Lord Palmerston _will_ have his kingdom of Upper Italy under Charles Albert, to which every other consideration is to be sacrificed, and Lord Normanby's alteration of the terms certainly serve _that_ purpose well; but it is quite independent of the question of mediation, and the only thing in the whole proceeding which is indefensible in principle.

It will be a calamity for ages to come if this principle is to become part of the international law, viz. "that a people can at any time transfer their allegiance from the Sovereign of one State to that of another by universal suffrage (under momentary excitement)," and this is what Lord Normanby--no doubt according to Lord Palmerston's wishes--has taken as the basis of the mediation. For even the _faits accomplis_, which are a convenient basis to justify any act of injustice, are here against Charles Albert.

Lord Palmerston's argument respecting Schleswig,[38] which the Queen quoted in her last letter, had no reference to the Treaty of 1720.

[Footnote 38: The first act of the _Vor-Parlament_, a body
which had existed temporarily at Frankfort, to pave the way
for the National Assembly of a Consolidated Germany, had been
to treat Schleswig, theretofore part of the Danish dominions,
as absorbed in the German Confederation, and Lord Palmerston's
objections to this proceeding had been treated by the Queen
in a letter of 19th August as inconsistent with his attitude
towards Austria.]

[Pageheading: PRUSSIA AND GERMANY]

_Queen Victoria to the King of the Belgians._

OSBORNE, _29th August 1848._

MY DEAREST UNCLE,--Most warmly do I thank you for your very kind and dear letter of the 26th, with so many good wishes for that _dearest_ of days. It is indeed to me one of eternal thankfulness, for a purer, more perfect being than my beloved Albert the Creator could _not_ have sent into this troubled world. I feel that I could _not_ exist without him, and that I should sink under the troubles and annoyances and _degouts_ of my _very_ difficult position, were it not for _his_ assistance, protection, guidance, and comfort. Truly do I thank you for your _great_ share in bringing about our marriage.

Stockmar I do not quite understand, and I cannot believe that he _really wishes to ruin_ all the smaller States, though his principal object is that unity which I fear he will _not_ obtain.

I do not either at all agree in his wish that Prussia should take the lead; his love for Prussia is to me incomprehensible, for it is the country of all others which the _rest_ of Germany dislikes. Stockmar cannot be my good old friend if he has such notions of injustice as I hear attributed to him. But whatever they may be, I do _not_ believe the _Ausfuehrung_ to be possible.

I have great hopes of soon hearing of something decided about the fortunes of the poor French family. You will have seen how nobly and courageously good Joinville and Aumale behaved on the occasion of the burning of that emigrant ship off Liverpool.[39] It will do them great good. I must now conclude. Ever your devoted Niece,

VICTORIA R.

[Footnote 39: One hundred and seventy-eight persons perished
in the burning of the _Ocean Monarch_; the French Princes were
on board a Brazilian steam frigate, which saved one hundred
and fifty-six lives.]

[Pageheading: AUSTRIA DECLINES MEDIATION]

_Queen Victoria to Viscount Palmerston._

OSBORNE, _2nd September 1848._

The Queen has read in the papers the news that Austria and Sardinia have nearly settled their differences, and also "that it was confidently stated that a French and _British_ squadron, with troops on board, _are to make a demonstration in the Adriatic_."

Though the Queen cannot believe this, she thinks it right to inform Lord Palmerston without delay that, should such a thing be thought of, it is a step which the Queen could _not_ give her consent to.

_Queen Victoria to Viscount Palmerston._

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, _4th September 1848._

The Queen since her arrival in Town has heard that the answer from Austria declining our mediation has some days ago been communicated to Lord Palmerston. The Queen is surprised that Lord Palmerston should have left her uninformed of so important an event. The Queen has received Lord Palmerston's letter respecting the proposal to mediate on the part of the central power of Germany,[40] and does not see why that power, which has a responsible Government, is to be precluded from taking part in a negotiation because the Archduke John might be friendly towards Austria--whereas the French republic, which had in public documents espoused the Italian Cause, is to be a party to it.

Neither France nor England are neighbours to or directly interested in Lombardy, whereas Germany is both.[41]

[Footnote 40: See _ante_, p. 188, note 35.]

[Footnote 41: Lord Palmerston's object, in which he ultimately
succeeded, was, by obtaining the French Government's
co-operation in mediating between Austria and Piedmont, to
prevent the aggressive party in France from maturing any
designs on Italy.]

[Pageheading: AUSTRIA AND ITALY]

_Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell._

ON BOARD THE _Victoria and Albert,_ ABERDEEN, _7th September 1848._

The Queen must send the enclosed draft to Lord John Russell, with a copy of her letter to Lord Palmerston upon it. Lord Palmerston has as usual pretended not to have had time to submit the draft to the Queen before he had sent it off. What the Queen has long suspected and often warned against is on the point of happening, viz. Lord Palmerston's using the new _entente cordiale_ for the purpose of wresting from Austria her Italian provinces by French arms. This would be a most iniquitous proceeding. It is another question whether it is good policy for Austria to try to retain Lombardy, but that is for her and not for us to decide. Many people might think that we would be happier without Ireland or Canada. Lord John will not fail to observe how very intemperate the whole tone of Lord Palmerston's language is.

_Queen Victoria to the King of the Belgians._

BALMORAL CASTLE, _13th September 1848._

MY DEAREST UNCLE,--I yesterday received your dear and kind letter of the 9th (it having arrived in London only the day before), which is very quick, and I thank you much for it. The Schleswig affair at Frankfort is _very_ unfortunate, and there seems a lamentable want of _all_ practical sense, foresight, or even _common_ prudence.[42]

The poor Austrians seem now to accept the (to me _very_ doubtful) mediation. It reminds me of the wolf in the lamb's skin. _Nous verrons_, how matters will be arranged....

My letter to Louise will have informed you of our voyage and our arrival here. This house is small but pretty, and though the hills seen from the windows are not _so_ fine, the scenery all around is the finest almost I have seen anywhere. It is very wild and solitary, and yet cheerful and _beautifully wooded_, with the river Dee running between the two sides of the hills. Loch Nagar is the highest hill in the immediate vicinity, and belongs to us.

Then the soil is the driest and best known almost anywhere, and all the hills are as sound and hard as the road. The climate is also dry, and in general not very cold, though we had one or two very cold days. There is a deer forest--many roe deer, and on the opposite hill (which does not belong to us) grouse. There is also black cock and ptarmigan. Albert has, however, no luck this year, and has in vain been after the deer, though they are continually seen, and often quite close by the house. The children are very well, and enjoying themselves much. The boys always wear their Highland dress.

I must now wish you good-bye, and repeat how much delighted we are that everything goes on so well in Belgium. Ever your devoted Niece,

VICTORIA R.

[Footnote 42: The incorporation of Schleswig had been forcibly
resisted, and Sweden determined on armed intervention; but a
temporary armistice was arranged in August. This the National
Assembly attempted to disavow, but a few days after this
letter was written it was ratified.]

[Pageheading: THE QUEEN AND PALMERSTON]

_Memorandum by Queen Victoria._

BALMORAL, _19th September 1848._

I said to Lord John Russell, that I must mention to him a subject, which was a serious one, one which I had delayed mentioning for some time, but which I felt I must speak quite openly to him upon now, namely about Lord Palmerston; that I felt really I could hardly go on with him, that I had no confidence in him, and that it made me seriously anxious and uneasy for the welfare of the country and for the peace of Europe in general, and that I felt very uneasy from one day to another as to what might happen. Lord John replied that he was aware of it; that he had considered the matter already, having heard from his brother (the Duke of Bedford) how strongly I felt about it; that he felt the truth of all that I had said, but that, on the other hand, Lord Palmerston was a very able man, entirely master of his office and affairs, and a very good colleague, never making any difficulties about other questions, but (certainly _unreasonably_) complaining of other people mixing with and interfering in the affairs of his office. I said that ... I fully believed that that Spanish marriage question, which had been the original cause of so many present misfortunes, would never have become so _embrouille_ had it not been for Lord Palmerston. This led Lord John to say, that though he disapproved the length of Lord Palmerston's correspondence, still that we could not have done otherwise than object to the marriage. This is true enough. I repeated that all that had been done in Italy last winter had also done harm, as it was done by _Lord Palmerston_, who was distrusted everywhere abroad, which Lord John regretted. I said that I thought that he often endangered the honour of England by taking a very prejudiced and one-sided view of a question;... that his writings were always as bitter as gall and did great harm, which Lord John entirely assented to, and that I often felt quite ill from anxiety; that I wished Lord Clarendon (who, I had heard, was tired of Ireland) could come over and be Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Lord Palmerston go to Ireland as Lord-Lieutenant. Lord John said nothing would be better, for that he was sure that Lord Palmerston would make an admirable Lord-Lieutenant, but that another thing to be considered was the danger of making Lord Palmerston an enemy by displacing him, that Lord Minto (who was formerly a great friend and admirer of Lord Palmerston's) had told Lady John when she spoke to him on the subject of placing Lord Palmerston in another office, that _he_ (Lord Palmerston) would certainly turn against the Government if displaced. I said that might be, but that sometimes there were great interests at stake which exceeded the danger of offending one man, and that this was here the case; Lord John said it was very true, but that at moments like these one of course was anxious not to do anything which could cause internal trouble. I admitted this, but repeated my anxiety, which Lord John quite understood, though he thought I a little overrated it, and said I was afraid that some day I should have to tell Lord John that I could not put up with Lord Palmerston any longer, which might be very disagreeable and awkward.

It ended by Lord John's promising to bear the subject in mind, and I must say that he took it all just as I could wish.

VICTORIA R.

[Pageheading: AFFAIRS IN THE PUNJAB]

[Pageheading: HOSTILITY OF THE SIKHS]

_Minute by the Governor-General of India._

_30th September 1848._

... The course of events, as they have developed themselves, and long and anxious considerations of this important subject, have finally and immovably confirmed in my mind the conviction which the earlier events of the insurrection at Mooltan long since had founded, that there will be no peace for India, nor any stability of Government in the Punjab, nor any release from anxiety and costly defensive preparations on our frontier, unless the British Government, justly indignant at the unprovoked and treacherous aggression once again committed against them by the Sikhs, shall now effectually provide against future dangers by subverting for ever the Dynasty of the Sings, by converting the Punjab into a British province, and by adopting the only measure which will secure the observance of peace by the Sikhs, namely, depriving them utterly of all the means of making war. I continue as fully convinced as ever that the establishment of a strong, friendly, Hindoo Government in the Punjab would be the best settlement that could be made for the interests of British India, if it could be formed. But I am convinced that such a Government cannot be formed.[43]

[Footnote 43: _See_ Introductory Note for 1849, _post_, p.
208.]

The Chiefs of the Punjab are utterly powerless and worthless. The great body of the nation is adverse to all control, and in no degree submissive to the authority of those who are professedly their rulers.

Even admitting, which I am by no means prepared to do, that the Sirdars are not treacherously or hostilely disposed to the British Government, of what advantage, what defence to us is the fidelity of the Chiefs, if they are confessedly unable to control the army which is as avowedly hostile to us? That which we desire to secure is a peaceful and well-governed neighbour, and a frontier free from alarms, nor demanding a permanent garrison of 50,000 men. If their army are able to disturb and eager to disturb on every occasion the peace we seek to render permanent, of what profit to us is the assumed fidelity of the Chiefs, who cannot repress their soldiers' turbulence, or command their obedience?

I discredit altogether the assurances of the fidelity of the Chiefs on the evidence of the facts before us....

To all these recommendations my colleagues in the Council have yielded their ready assent.

I have to the last sought to avert, or to avoid, the necessity, if it could prudently or fitly be avoided.

The Sikh nation have forced the necessity upon us. Having resolved at once, and fully, to meet it, I shall proceed with all speed to the frontier, and shall endeavour by every exertion, and by all the means in my power, to carry into effect vigorously the measures on which the Government of India has resolved, and which, in my conscience I believe, are imperatively called for by regard to the peace of India, to the security of our Empire there, and to the happiness of the people over whom we rule.

DALHOUSIE.

[Pageheading: PALMERSTON'S ITALIAN POLICY]

_Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell._

OSBORNE, _7th October 1848._

The Queen sends Lord Palmerston's answer to her last letter, of which the Queen has sent a copy to Lord John Russell, and encloses likewise a copy of her present answer. The partiality of Lord Palmerston in this Italian question really _surpasses all conception_, and makes the Queen _very uneasy_ on account of the character and honour of England, and on account of the danger to which the peace of Europe will be exposed. It is now clearly proved by Baron Wessenberg that upon the conclusion of the Armistice with Sardinia, negotiations for peace would have speedily been entered into, had our _mediation_ not been offered to the King, to whom the offer of Lombardy was too tempting not to accept, and now that promise is by fair or unfair means to be made good. The Queen cannot see any principle in this, as the principle upon which Lord Palmerston goes is _Italian Nationality and Independence from a foreign Yoke and Tyranny_. How can the Venetian territory then be secured to Austria? and if this is done, on what ground can Lombardy be wrung from her? It is really not safe to settle such important matters without principle and by personal _passion_ alone. When the _French_ Government say they cannot control public feeling, Lord Palmerston takes this as an unalterable fact, and as a sufficient reason to make the Austrians give up Lombardy; when, however, the _Austrian_ Government say they cannot give up Lombardy on account of the feeling of the Army which had just reconquered it with their blood and under severe privations and sufferings, Lord Palmerston flippantly tells the Austrian Government, "if that were so, the Emperor had better abdicate and make General Radetzky Emperor." When Charles Albert burned the whole of the suburbs of Milan to keep up the delusion that he meant to defend the town, Lord Palmerston said nothing; and now that the Austrian Governor has prohibited revolutionary placards on the walls, and prolonged the period at which arms are to be surrendered, at the end of which persons concealing arms are to be tried by court-martial, he writes to Vienna: "that this savage proclamation, which savours more of the barbarous usages of centuries long gone by than of the spirit of the present times, must strike everybody as a proof of the fear by which the Austrian Commander is inspired," etc., etc., etc.

Venice was to have been made over to Austria by the Armistice, and now that this has not been done, Austria is not even to retake it, in order (as Lord Normanby says) to keep something in hand against which Austria is to make further concessions. Is all this fair? In the meantime, from the account of our Consul at Venice, the French agents are actively employed in intrigues against Austria in that town, and have asked him to assist, which he refused. Lord Palmerston merely approved his conduct, and did not write a line to Paris about it. Now the question at issue is not even to be submitted to a Conference of European powers, but to be settled by the French Republic and Lord Palmerston alone, Lord Normanby being the instrument who has pledged himself over and over again for Italian _independence_ (so called). If Austria makes peace with Sardinia, and gives her Italian provinces separate National Institutions with a liberal constitutional Government, _who can force_ upon her another arrangement?

[Pageheading: GREECE]

_Queen Victoria to Viscount Palmerston._

OSBORNE, _8th October 1848._

The Queen cannot refrain from telling Lord Palmerston what a painful impression the perusal of a draft of his to Lord Normanby referring to the affairs of Greece has made upon her, being so little in accordance with the calm dignity which she likes to see in all the proceedings of the British Government; she was particularly struck by the language in which Lord Palmerston speaks of King Otho, a Sovereign with whom she stands in friendly relations, and the asperity against the Government of the King of the French, who is really sufficiently lowered and suffering for the mistakes he may have committed, and that of all this a copy is to be placed in the hands of the Foreign Minister of the French _Republic_, the Queen can only see with much regret.[44]

[Footnote 44: Lord Palmerston replied that his observations on
the two Kings lay at the very root of his argument, and were
necessary to conciliate the present Government of France.]

_Queen Victoria to the King of the Belgians._

WINDSOR CASTLE, _10th October 1848._

MY DEAREST UNCLE,--Our voyage yesterday was much saddened by a terrible accident at Spithead, which delayed us half an hour, and which still fills us with horror. The sea was running very high, and we were just outside what is called The Spit, when we saw a man in the water, sitting on the keel of a boat, and we stopped, and at that moment Albert discerned _many heads_ above the sea, including a poor woman. The tide was running so strong that we could only stop an instant and let a boat down, but you may imagine our horror. We waited at Gosport to hear if the people had been saved, and we learnt that three had, two of whom by our _Fairy's_ boat, and that four were drowned. Very horrid indeed.

The state of Germany is dreadful, and one does feel quite ashamed about that once really so peaceful and happy people. That there are still good people there I am sure, but they allow themselves to be worked upon in a frightful and shameful way.... In France a crisis seems at hand. _What_ a very bad figure we cut in this mediation! Really it is quite immoral, with Ireland quivering in our grasp, and ready to throw off her allegiance at any moment, for us to force Austria to give up her lawful possessions. What shall we say if Canada, Malta, etc., begin to trouble us? It hurts me terribly. This ought to be the principle in _all actions_, private as well as public: "Was du nicht willst, dass dir geschieht, das thu' auch einem andern nicht." ...

I must now conclude. With every good wish, ever your devoted Niece,

VICTORIA R.

[Pageheading: THE BOERS]

_Earl Grey to Queen Victoria._

COLONIAL OFFICE, _25th October 1848._

Earl Grey presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and begs to inform your Majesty that no official accounts have been received of the engagement on the Cape Frontier between your Majesty's forces under Sir H. Smith and the insurgent Dutch farmers, of which an account is published in the newspapers.[45] Lord Grey has, however, seen a private letter, which mentions, in addition to what is stated in the Government notice in the Cape newspapers, that Sir Harry Smith exposed himself very much, and was slightly wounded; most fortunately, he was merely grazed in the leg; his horse was also struck by a bullet in the nose. A very large proportion of those who were hit by the fire of the rebels were officers, who appear to have been particularly aimed at.

[Footnote 45: In July, Pretorius, the Boer leader, had in
consequence of the British annexation of territory, expelled
the British Resident from Bloemfontein. _See_ Introductory
Note, _ante_, p. 142. Sir Harry Smith decisively defeated the
Boers on the 29th of August.]

_Queen Victoria to Earl Grey._

WINDSOR CASTLE, _26th October 1848._

The Queen has received Lord Grey's letter, and is glad to hear that Sir H. Smith's wound was not of a serious nature. The loss of so many officers, the Queen is certain, proceeds from their wearing a blue coat whilst the men are in scarlet; the Austrians lost a great proportion of officers in Italy from a similar difference of dress.

As to the Medal for Major Edwardes, the Queen did not approve but disapprove the step, and wished the Bath to be given instead, which has been done. The medals for troops in general (given by the East India Company) are a new and doubtful thing, and now it is proposed to reward even a special case of personal distinction by the _Company's_ conferring a mark of honour. Lord Grey will agree with the Queen that it will be better not to establish two fountains of honour in the Realm. If the East India Company wish to mark their approbation, perhaps they might send Major Edwardes a fine sword or something of that kind.

[Pageheading: GOVERNORSHIP OF GIBRALTAR]

_Earl Grey to Queen Victoria._

COLONIAL OFFICE, _26th October 1848._

Earl Grey presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and has just had the honour of receiving your Majesty's letter. Lord Fitzroy Somerset happened to be here when it arrived, and Lord Grey read to him that part of it which relates to the danger occasioned to officers in action from wearing a dress of a different colour from that of the men. Lord Fitzroy observed that although there can be no doubt of the objection to the blue coats worn by officers, in this instance their having suffered so much cannot be attributed to that cause, as it appears that all the officers who were wounded but one, belonged to regiments (the Rifle Battalion or the Cape Mounted Rifles) in which the officers are dressed in the same colour as the men....

Lord Grey begs to submit to your Majesty that the usual time for relieving the present Governor of Gibraltar is now come, and that he thinks it very desirable to appoint a successor to Sir Robert Wilson, who now fills that situation. It appears to Lord Grey that, considering the nature of the appointment and also the great advantage which would result from affording greater encouragement to the officers serving under the Ordnance, it would be very proper to confer this government upon a General Officer belonging to the Royal Artillery or Engineers. There is some difficulty in making a selection from the officers of these Corps, because, from their retiring only by seniority, they seldom attain the rank of General Officer while they are still in possession of sufficient strength and activity for employment. Lord Grey, however, believes from the information he has been able to obtain, that Sir Robert Gardiner might, with advantage, be appointed to this command, which he therefore begs leave to recommend to your Majesty to confer upon him. Lord Grey has had no communication with Sir R. Gardiner, and is entirely ignorant whether he would accept this employment.[46]

[Footnote 46: Sir Robert Gardiner, K.C.B.. was appointed
Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Gibraltar on the 21st of
November, and held that post till 1855.]

[Pageheading: ITALY AND AUSTRIA]

_Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell._

WINDSOR CASTLE, _27th October 1848._

The Queen has not yet acknowledged the receipt of Lord John Russell's communication of the views of the Cabinet on the Italian affairs.[47] She is very glad that the Cabinet should have considered this important question, and that she should have received an assurance "that she will not be advised to have recourse to forcible intervention." The Queen understands this principle to apply to Lombardy as well as to Sicily, and that, of course, "forcible intervention" will not only be avoided as to British means, but likewise as to French means, with British consent and concurrence. Though Lord John Russell does not enter so much into particulars with regard to the opinions of the Members of the Cabinet as the Queen might have wished, she infers from the proposition that Lombardy should be constituted separately under an Archduke, that the idea of making it over to the King of Sardinia is finally abandoned.

[Footnote 47: Lord John had written to the effect that, while
no definite decision had been arrived at with regard to Italy,
it was thought by the Cabinet that every means should be used
to induce Austria to give up Lombardy to an Austrian Prince,
as most conformable to the interests of Austria herself. The
question of Sicily (he added) was more difficult, but if no
agreement could be arrived at by amicable negotiation, the
Cabinet would not be disposed to advise the Queen to have
recourse to forcible intervention.]

_Lord John Russell to Queen Victoria._

PEMBROKE LODGE, _19th November 1848._

Lord John Russell presents his humble duty to your Majesty.

It will probably be necessary to send troops to India, who will then be no longer chargeable to this country. But Lord John Russell thinks it his duty to state that however unwilling he may be to diminish the Military and Naval force, it is still more essential to keep our income within our expenditure.

The whole matter will be under the consideration of the Cabinet next week.

The approaching election of a President in France must decide the question of the future Government of France. Louis Bonaparte may probably play the part of Richard Cromwell.

_Queen Victoria to the King of the Belgians._

WINDSOR CASTLE, _21st November 1848._

MY DEAREST UNCLE,--I write to thank you for your kind letter of the 18th on your god-daughter's _eighth_ birthday! It does seem like an incredible dream that Vicky should already be so old! She is very happy with all her gifts.

In Vienna things are much better. Louis Napoleon's election seems certain, and I own I wish for it as I think it will lead to something else.

You will grieve to hear that our good, dear, old friend Melbourne is dying; there is _no_ hope, and I enclose a pretty letter of Lady Beauvale's,[48] which I think will interest you, and which I beg you to return. One cannot forget how good and kind and amiable he was, and it brings back so many recollections to my mind, though, God knows! I never wish that time back again.

We go to-morrow for four weeks to our dear, peaceful Osborne.

I will now take my leave. Begging you to believe me ever your devoted Niece,

VICTORIA R.

[Footnote 48: See Greville's appreciative description of Lady
Beauvale in his Journal for the 30th of January 1853.]

_Viscount Palmerston to Queen Victoria._

BROCKET HALL, _23rd November 1848._

Viscount Palmerston is here engaged in the melancholy occupation of watching the gradual extinction of the lamp of life of one who was not more distinguished by his brilliant talents, his warm affections, and his first-rate understanding, than by those sentiments of attachment to your Majesty which rendered him the most devoted subject who ever had the honour to serve a Sovereign.

[Pageheading: DEATH OF LORD MELBOURNE]

_Viscount Palmerston to Queen Victoria._

BROCKET HALL, _25th November 1848._

Viscount Palmerston presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and has to state that Viscount Melbourne was released from further suffering at about six o'clock yesterday afternoon. His bodily strength had been rapidly declining during the last few days, and it was only at intervals that he retained any degree of apparent consciousness. The last transition took place quietly and with almost imperceptible gradation.

_Lord John Russell to Queen Victoria._

PEMBROKE LODGE, _26th November 1848._

Lord John Russell presents his humble duty to your Majesty: he sees no political objection to a visit to Osborne on the part of the Duke and Duchess of Nemours. The election of a President in France is so completely absorbing attention that any mark of regard to the Duke of Nemours may well pass unnoticed.

Lord John Russell had the honour of seeing Louis Philippe in this house on Friday. He was in much better spirits, owing to the convalescence of the Queen; but the illness has been a very serious one.

Lord John Russell had understood that the affairs of property belonging to the Orleans family were arranged, and that Louis Philippe would ultimately be possessed of more than a million sterling.

Louis Philippe expressed his opinion in favour of Louis Bonaparte as a candidate for the Presidency. He feels confident that France cannot go to war on account of the state of her finances.

_Queen Victoria to the King of the Belgians._

OSBORNE, _21th November 1848._

MY DEAREST UNCLE,--Thank God! that the news from Berlin are better. It is to be hoped that this may have a good effect elsewhere.

In France there ought really to be a Monarchy before long, _qui que ce soit_.

Our poor old friend Melbourne died on the 24th. I sincerely regret him, for he was truly attached to me, and though not a firm Minister he was a noble, kind-hearted, generous being. Poor Lord Beauvale and Lady Palmerston feel it very much. I wish it might soften the _caro sposo_ of the latter-named person.

VICTORIA R.

[Pageheading: LETTER FROM THE POPE]

_Pope Pius IX. to Queen Victoria._[49]

To the Most Serene and Potent Sovereign Victoria, the Illustrious Queen of England, Pius Papa Nonus.

Most Serene and Most Potent Queen, Greeting! Your Royal Majesty has already learned what a subversion of public affairs has taken place at Rome, and what utterly unheard-of violence was, on the 16th of the late month of November, offered to us in our very Palace of the Quirinal, in consequence of a nefarious conspiracy of abandoned and most turbulent men. Hence, in order to avoid more violent commotions and more serious dangers, as likewise for the purpose of freely performing the functions of our apostolic Ministry, we, not without the deepest and most heartfelt sorrow, have been constrained to depart for a time from our Holy City, and from the whole state of our pontifical dominions; and in the meanwhile we come as far as Gaeta, where, as soon as we had arrived, our first care was to declare to our subjects the sentiments of our mind and will, by a public edict, a copy of which we transmit to your Royal Majesty, together with these our letters. Without doubt, through your own wisdom, you will perfectly understand, Most Serene and Potent Sovereign, that amongst the other most cruel difficulties by which we are pressed, we must be chiefly solicitous concerning those subject to our temporal rule and the rights and possessions of the Roman Church, which, moreover, your august Uncle and the other Princes of Europe protected with so much zeal. But we do not in the least doubt that, in conformity with your exalted magnanimity, your justice, and your known desire to maintain order in public affairs, you will by no means suffer this same to be wanting to us at this most lamentable time. Trusting indeed in this hope, we do not cease, in the humility and affliction of our heart, from earnestly beseeching God, the All Good and All Great, that He may heap upon your Royal Majesty and your whole House all true and solid prosperity, and that He may unite you with us in perfect charity.

Given at Gaeta, the 4th day of December 1848, in the third year of our Pontificate.

PIUS PP. IX.[50]

[Footnote 49: Official translation.]

[Footnote 50: This letter was suitably acknowledged in general
terms. _See_ p. 210.]

[Pageheading: LOUIS NAPOLEON]

_Queen Victoria to the King of the Belgians._

OSBORNE, _13th December 1848._

MY BELOVED UNCLE,--Pray accept my warmest and _best_ wishes for _many, many happy_ returns of your birthday--a day so _dear_ to so many, and which will be hailed with such joy in Belgium. You have indeed reason to look with satisfaction on all around you, though it is a painful thing to think how many have been ruined and made miserable since this day twelvemonths. Let us hope that another year may bring many things round again.

The weather is beautiful, and I wish much we could fly over to pay our respects to you on your dear birthday.

The papers are just come, and I see there is no doubt of Louis Napoleon's election, which I am very glad of, as it is a sign of better times. But that one _should have to wish for him_ is really wonderful.

Now good-bye, dearest Uncle. Ever your devoted Niece,

VICTORIA R.

_Queen Victoria to the King of the Belgians._

OSBORNE, _19th December 1848._

MY DEAREST, KINDEST UNCLE,--Your dear letter, full of interesting topics, which I received yesterday, gave me great pleasure, and I thank you much for it. The success of Louis Napoleon[51] is an extraordinary event, but valuable as a universal condemnation of the Republic since February.

It will, however, perhaps be more difficult to get rid of him again than one at _first_ may imagine. Nemours thinks it better that none of themselves should be _called_ into action for some time to come. I fear that _he feels_ now that they _ought_ to have _foreseen_ the dangers in February, and _ought not_ to have yielded; when I said to him that the Pope had declared that he would _never_ quit Rome, and _did so do_ the _very next day_, he said: "Ah! mon Dieu, on se laisse entrainer dans ces moments." Louise said to me that _her Father_ had so _often declared he would never quit Paris alive_, so that when she heard of his flight she always believed it was untrue and he must be dead....

[Footnote 51: He was elected President on the 10th of
December, by an immense majority.]

[Pageheading: THE QUEEN AND PALMERSTON]

_Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell._

WINDSOR CASTLE, _22nd December 1848._

The Queen has been waiting to receive an answer from Lord John Russell upon her last letter, and has therefore delayed sending the enclosed letter from Lord Palmerston.[52] But lest any further delay might cause future inconvenience, she sends it now without having received Lord John's answer. The Queen is sure Lord John will feel that neither Lord Palmerston nor Lord Normanby have shown a proper regard for the Queen's wishes and opinion in this matter. Lord Normanby's Despatch shows that the step to be taken with reference to an Ambassador to be sent here is avowedly for the purpose of controlling the future action of the Queen's Government, and to _oblige her_ to keep a _permanent_ Ambassador at Paris in the person of Lord Normanby. It is not very delicate in Lord Normanby to convey such a message, nor in Lord Palmerston to urge it so eagerly. M. de Beaumont's departure from this country without taking leave of the Queen was neither very becoming.

The Queen has already, on Lord Palmerston's account, received two public affronts: the one by her Minister in Spain having been sent out of that country,[53] the other now, by the new Emperor of Austria not announcing to her by special mission his accession to the Throne, which he did to all other Sovereigns, avowedly, as it appears, to mark the indignation of Austria at the inimical proceedings of the British Foreign Secretary. The Queen does not think that, in the face of such slurs, the dignity of England will be vindicated by a race between her representative and that of Spain, who is to present his credentials first to the new President of the French Republic, which Lord Palmerston considers of such importance as to render an _immediate_ decision indispensable.

Should Lord John think that we cannot do less now for Louis Napoleon than has been done in the case of General Cavaignac, the Queen will not object to renewing Lord Normanby's credentials as Ambassador-Extraordinary on a special mission.