Chapter XXII: The Balfour Mission to the United States (1)

I

Page now took up a subject which had been near his heart for a long time. He believed that one of the most serious causes of Anglo-American misunderstanding was the fact that the leading statesmen of the two countries had never had any personal contact with one another. At one time, as this correspondence shows, the Ambassador had even hoped that President Wilson himself might cross the ocean and make the British people an official visit. The proposal, however, was made before the European war broke out, the occasion which Page had in mind being the dedication of Sulgrave Manor, the old English home of the Washington family, as a perpetual memorial to the racial bonds and common ideals uniting the two countries. The President found it impossible to act upon this suggestion and the outbreak of war made the likelihood of such a visit still more remote. Page had made one unsuccessful attempt to bring the American State Department and the British Foreign Office into personal contact. At the moment when American irritation had been most keen over the blockade and the blacklist, Page had persuaded the Foreign Office to invite to England Mr. Frank L. Polk, at that time Counsellor of the Department; the Ambassador believed that a few conversations between such an intelligent gentleman as Mr. Polk and the British statesmen would smooth out all the points which were then making things so difficult. Unfortunately the pressure of work at Washington prevented Mr. Polk from accepting Sir Edward Grey's invitation.

But now a greater necessity for close personal association had arisen. The United States had entered the war, and this declaration had practically made this country an ally of Great Britain and France. The British Government wished to send a distinguished commission to the United States, for two reasons: first, to show its appreciation of the stand which America had taken, and secondly, to discuss plans for coöperation in the common task. Great Britain frankly admitted that it had made many mistakes in the preceding three years--mistakes naval, military, political, and economic; it would welcome an opportunity to display these errors to Washington, which might naturally hope to profit from them. As soon as his country was in the war, Page took up this suggestion with the Foreign Office. There was of course one man who was preëminently fitted, by experience, position, and personal qualities, to head such a commission; on this point there was no discussion. Mr. Balfour was now in his seventieth year; his activities in British politics dated back to the times of Disraeli; his position in Great Britain had become as near that of an "elder statesman" as is tolerable under the Anglo-Saxon system. By this time Page had established the friendliest possible relations with this distinguished man. Mr. Balfour had become Foreign Secretary in December, 1916, in succession to Lord Grey. Greatly as Page regretted the resignation of Grey, he was much gratified that Mr. Balfour had been selected to succeed him. Mr. Balfour's record for twenty-five years had been one of consistent friendliness toward the United States. When President Cleveland's Venezuelan message, in 1896, had precipitated a crisis in the relations of the two countries, it was Mr. Balfour's influence which was especially potent in causing Great Britain to modify its attitude and to accept the American demand for arbitration. That action not only amicably settled the Venezuelan question; it marked the beginning of a better feeling between the English-speaking countries and laid the basis for that policy of benevolent neutrality which Great Britain had maintained toward the United States in the Spanish War. The excellent spirit which Mr. Balfour had shown at this crisis he had manifested on many occasions since. In the criticisms of the United States during the _Lusitania_ troubles Mr. Balfour had never taken part. The era of "neutrality" had not ruffled the confidence which he had always felt in the United States. During all this time the most conspicuous dinner tables of London had rung with criticisms of American policy; the fact was well known, however, that Mr. Balfour had never sympathized with these reproaches; even when he was not in office, no unfriendly word concerning the United States had ever escaped his lips. His feeling toward this country was well shown in a letter which he wrote Page, in reply to one congratulating him on his seventieth birthday. "I have now lived a long life," said Mr. Balfour, "and most of my energies have been expended in political work, but if I have been fortunate enough to contribute, even in the smallest degree, to drawing closer the bonds that unite our two countries, I shall have done something compared with which all else that I may have attempted counts in my eyes as nothing."

Page's letters and notes contain many references to Mr. Balfour's kindly spirit. On the day following the dismissal of Bernstorff the American Ambassador lunched with the Foreign Secretary at No. 4 Carlton Gardens.

"Mr. Balfour," Page reported to Washington, "gave expression to the hearty admiration which he entertained for the President's handling of a difficult task. He said that never for a moment had he doubted the President's wisdom in the course he was pursuing. He had the profoundest admiration for the manner in which he had promptly broken with Germany after receiving Germany's latest note. Nor had he ever entertained the slightest question of the American people's ready loyalty to their Government or to their high ideals. One of his intellectual pleasures, he added, had long been contemplation of the United States as it is and, even more, as its influence in the world will broaden. 'The world,' said Mr. Balfour, 'will more and more turn on the Great Republic as on a pivot.'"

Occasionally Mr. Balfour's discussion of the United States would take a more pensive turn. A memorandum which Page wrote a few weeks after the above touches another point:

March 27, 1917.

I had a most interesting conversation with Mr. Balfour this
afternoon. "It's sad to me," said he, "that we are so unpopular, so
much more unpopular than the French, in your country. Why is it?
The old school books?"

I doubted the school-book influence.

"Certainly their influence is not the main cause. It is the
organized Irish. Then it's the effect of the very fact that the
Irish question is not settled. You've had that problem at your very
door for 300 years. What's the matter that you don't solve it?"

"Yes, yes,"--he saw it. But the plaintive tone of such a man asking
such a question was significant and interesting and--sad.

Then I told him the curious fact that a British Government made up
of twenty individuals, every one of whom is most friendly to the
United States, will, when they act together as a Government, do the
most offensive things. I mentioned the blacklist; I mentioned
certain complaints that I then held in my hand--of Americans here
who are told by the British Government that they must turn over to
the British Government's agent in New York their American
securities which they hold in America!

There's a sort of imperious, arrogant, Tory action that comes
natural to the English Government, even when not natural to the
individual Englishman.

* * * * *

On April 5th, the day before the United States formally declared war, Page notified Washington that the British Government wished Mr. Balfour to go to the United States as the head of a Commission to confer with our Government. "Mr. Balfour is chosen for this mission," Page reported, "not only because he is Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, but because he is personally the most distinguished member of the Government." Page tells the story in more detail in a letter to Mr. Polk, at that time Counsellor of the State Department.

_To Frank L. Polk_

London, May 3, 1917.

DEAR MR. POLK:

... Mr. Balfour accurately represents British character, British
opinion, and the British attitude. Nobody who knows him and knows
British character and the British attitude ever doubted that. I
know his whole tribe, his home-life, his family connections, his
friends; and, of course, since he became Foreign Secretary, I've
come to know him intimately. When the question first came up here
of his going, of course I welcomed it enthusiastically. About that
time during a two-hour conversation he asked me why the British
were so unpopular in the United States. Among other reasons I told
him that our official people on both sides steadfastly refused to
visit one another and to become acquainted. Neither he nor Lord
Grey, nor Mr. Asquith, nor Mr. Lloyd George, had ever been to the
United States, nor any other important British statesman in recent
times, and not a single member of the Administration was personally
known to a single member of the British Government. "I'll go," said
he, "if you are perfectly sure my going will be agreeable to the
President." He himself recalled the fact, during one of our several
conversations just before he left, that you had not come when he
and Lord Grey had invited you. If you had come, by the way, this
era of a better understanding would have begun then, and half our
old troubles would then have been removed. Keeping away from one
another is the best of all methods of keeping all old
misunderstandings alive and of making new ones.

I have no doubt that Mr. Balfour's visit will cause visits of many
first-class British statesmen during the war or soon afterward.
That's all we need to bring about a perfect understanding.

You may remember how I tried to get an official report about the
behaviour of the _Benham_[58], and how, in the absence of that,
Lord Beresford made a disagreeable speech about our Navy in the
House of Lords, and how, when months later you sent me
Roosevelt's[59] letter, Lord Beresford expressed regret to me and
said that he would explain in another speech. I hadn't seen the old
fellow for a long time till a fortnight ago. He greeted me
cheerily, and I said, "I don't think I ought to shake hands with
you till you retract what you said about our navy." He insisted on
my dining with him. He invited Admiral Sims also, and those two
sailors had a jolly evening of it. Sims's coming has straightened
out all that naval misunderstanding and more. He is of immense help
to them and to us. But I'm going to make old Beresford's life a
burden till he gets up in the Lords and takes that speech
back--publicly. He's really all right; but it's just as well to
keep the records right. The proceedings of the House of Lords are
handsomely bound and go into every gentleman's library. I have seen
two centuries of them in many a house.

We can now begin a distinctly New Era in the world's history and in
its management if we rise to the occasion: there's not a shadow of
doubt about that. And the United States can play a part bigger than
we have yet dreamed of if we prove big enough to lead the British
and the French instead of listening to Irish and Germans. Neither
England nor France is a democracy--far from it. We can make them
both democracies and develop their whole people instead of about 10
per cent. of their people. We have simply to conduct our affairs by
a large national policy and not by the complaints of our really
non-American people. See how a declaration of war has cleared the
atmosphere!

We're happy yet, on rations. There are no potatoes. We have
meatless days. Good wheat meantime is sunk every day. The
submarine must be knocked out. Else the earth will be ruled by the
German bayonet and natural living will be _verboten_. We'll all
have to goose-step as the Crown Prince orders or--be shot. I see
they now propose that the United States shall pay the big war
indemnity in raw materials to the value of hundreds of billions of
dollars! Not just yet, I guess!

As we get reports of what you are doing, it's most cheerful. I
assure you, God has yet made nothing or nobody equal to the
American people; and I don't think He ever will or can.

Sincerely yours,
WALTER H. PAGE.

One of the curious developments of this Balfour Mission was a request from President Wilson that Great Britain should take some decisive step for the permanent settlement of the Irish question. "The President," this message ran, "wishes that, when you next meet the Prime Minister, you would explain to him that only one circumstance now appears to stand in the way of perfect coöperation with Great Britain. All Americans who are not immediately connected with Germany by blood ties find their one difficulty in the failure of Great Britain so far to establish a satisfactory form of self-government in Ireland. In the recent debates in Congress on the War Resolution, this sentiment was especially manifest. It came out in the speeches of those enemies of the Declaration who were not Irish themselves nor representatives of sections in which Irish voters possessed great influence--notably members from the Southern States.

"If the American people were once convinced that there was a likelihood that the Irish question would soon be settled, great enthusiasm and satisfaction would result and it would also strengthen the coöperation which we are now about to organize between the United States and Great Britain. Say this in unofficial terms to Mr. Lloyd George, but impress upon him its very great significance. If the British Government should act successfully on this matter, our American citizens of Irish descent and to a great extent the German sympathizers who have made common cause with the Irish, would join hands in the great common cause."

_To the President_
London, May 4, 1917.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

... It is a remarkable commentary on the insularity of the British
and on our studied isolation that till Mr. Balfour went over not a
member of this Government had ever met a member of our
Administration! Quite half our misunderstandings were due to this.
If I had the making of the laws of the two governments, I'd have a
statutory requirement that at least one visit a year by high
official persons should be made either way. We should never have
had a blacklist, etc., if that had been done. When I tried the
quite humble task of getting Polk to come and the excuse was made
that he couldn't be spared from his desk--Mr. President, I fear we
haven't half enough responsible official persons in our Government.
I should say that no man even of Polk's rank ought to have a desk:
just as well give him a mill-stone. Even I try not to have a desk:
else I'd never get anything of importance done; for I find that
talks and conferences in my office and in the government offices
and wherever else I can find out things take all my waking hours.
The Foreign Office here has about five high position men to every
one in the State Department. God sparing me, I'm going one of
these days to prepare a paper for our Foreign Affairs Committee on
the Waste of Having too Few High Grade Men in the Department of
State; a Plea for Five Assistant Secretaries for Every One Now
Existing and for Provision for International Visits by Them.

Here's an ancient and mouldy precedent that needs shattering--for
the coming of our country into its proper station and influence in
the world.

I am sure that Mr. Balfour's visit has turned out as well as I
hoped, and my hopes were high. He is one of the most interesting
men that I've ever had the honour to know intimately--he and Lord
Grey. Mr. Balfour is a Tory, of course; and in general I don't like
Tories, yet liberal he surely is--a sort of high-toned Scotch
democrat. I have studied him with increasing charm and interest.
Not infrequently when I am in his office just before luncheon he
says, "Come, walk over and we'll have lunch with the family." He's
a bachelor. One sister lives with him. Another (Lady Rayleigh, the
wife of the great chemist and Chancellor of Cambridge University)
frequently visits him. Either of those ladies could rule this
Empire. Then there are nieces and cousins always about--people of
rare cultivation, every one of 'em. One of those girls confirmed
the story that "Uncle Arthur" one day concluded that the niblick
was something more than a humble necessity of a bad golfer--that it
had positive virtues of its own and had suffered centuries of
neglect. He, therefore, proceeded to play with the niblick only,
till he proved his case and showed that it is a club entitled to
the highest respect.

A fierce old Liberal fighter in Parliamentary warfare, who entered
politics about the time Mr. Balfour did, told me this story the
other day. "I've watched Balfour for about forty years as a cat
watches a rat. I hate his party. I hated him till I learned better,
for I hated that whole Salisbury crowd. They wanted to Cecil
everything. But I'll tell you, Sir, apropos of his visit to your
country, that in all those years he has never spoken of the United
States except with high respect and often with deep affection. I
should have caught him, if he had."

I went with him to a college in London one afternoon where he
delivered a lecture on Dryden, to prove that poetry can carry a
certain cargo of argument but that argument can't raise the
smallest flight of poetry. Dry as it sounds, it was as good a
literary performance as I recall I ever heard.

At his "family" luncheon, I've found Lord Milner or Lord Lansdowne,
or some literary man who had come in to find out from Lady Rayleigh
how to conduct the Empire or to write a great book; and the modest
old chemical Lord sits silent most of the time and now and then
breaks loose to confound them all with a pat joke. This is a
vigorous family, these Balfours. There's one of them (a cousin of
some sort, I think, of the Foreign Secretary) who is a Lord of much
of Scotland, about as tall as Ben Nevis is high--a giant of a man.
One of his sons was killed early in the war and one was
missing--whether dead or not he did not know. Mrs. Page expressed
her hope one day to the old man that he had had news from his
missing son. "No, no," said he simply, "and me lady is awearying."

We've been lucky, Mr. President, in these days of immortal horrors
and of difficulties between two governments that did not know one
another--uncommonly lucky, in the large chances that politics gives
for grave errors, to have had two such men in the Foreign Office
here as Lord Grey and Mr. Balfour. There are men who were
mentioned for this post that would have driven us mad--or to war
with them. I'm afraid I've almost outgrown my living hero worship.
There isn't worshipful material enough lying around in the world to
keep a vigorous reverence in practice. But these two gentlemen by
birth and culture have at least sometimes seemed of heroic size to
me. It has meant much to know them well. I shall always be grateful
to them, for in their quiet, forceful way they helped me much to
establish right relations with these people--which, pray God, I
hope to retain through whatever new trials we may yet encounter.
For it will fall to us yet to loose and to free the British, and a
Briton set free is an American. That's all you can do for a man or
for a nation of men.

These Foreign Secretaries are not only men of much greater
cultivation than their Prime Ministers but of greater moral force.
But I've come to like Lloyd George very much. He'd never deliver a
lecture on Dryden, and he doesn't even play a good game of golf;
but he has what both Lord Grey and Mr. Balfour lack--a touch of
genius--whatever that is--not the kind that takes infinite pains,
but the kind that acts as an electric light flashed in the dark. He
said to me the other day that experts have nearly been the death of
him. "The Government has experts, experts, experts, everywhere. In
any department where things are not going well, I have found boards
and committees and boards of experts. But in one department at
least I've found a substitute for them. I let twenty experts go and
I put in one Man, and things began to move at once. Do you know any
real Men? When you hear of any, won't you let me know?"

A little while ago he dined with me, and, after dinner, I took him
to a corner of the drawing room and delivered your message to him
about Ireland. "God knows, I'm trying," he replied. "Tell the
President that. And tell him to talk to Balfour." Presently he
broke out--"Madmen, madmen--I never saw any such task," and he
pointed across the room to Sir Edward Carson, his First Lord of the
Admiralty--"Madmen." "But the President's right. We've got to
settle it and we've got to settle it now." Carson and Jellicoe came
across the room and sat down with us. "I've been telling the
Ambassador, Carson, that we've got to settle the Irish question
now--in spite of you.

"I'll tell you something else we've got to settle now," said
Carson. "Else it'll settle us. That's the submarines. The press and
public are working up a calculated and concerted attack on Jellicoe
and me, and, if they get us, they'll get you. It's an attack on the
Government made on the Admiralty. Prime Minister," said this Ulster
pirate whose civil war didn't come off only because the big war was
begun--"Prime Minister, it may be a fierce attack. Get ready for
it." Well, it has been developing ever since. But I can't for the
life of me guess at the possible results of an English
Parliamentary attack on a government. It's like a baseball man
watching a game of cricket. He can't see when the player is out or
why, or what caused it. Of course, the submarine may torpedo Lloyd
George and his Government. It looks very like it may overturn the
Admiralty, as Gallipoli did. If this public finds out the whole
truth, it will demand somebody's head. But I'm only a baseball man;
cricket is beyond me.

But Lloyd George will outlive the war as an active force, whatever
happen to him in the meantime. He's too heavily charged with
electricity to stop activity. The war has ended a good many careers
that seemed to have long promise. It is ending more every day. But
there is only one Lloyd George, and, whatever else he lack, he
doesn't lack life.

I heard all the speeches in both Houses on the resolution of
appreciation of our coming into the war--Bonar Law's, Asquith's
(one of the best), Dillon's, a Labour man's, and, in the Lords,
Curzon's, Crewe's, the Archbishop's (who delivered in the course of
his remarks a benediction on me) and Bryce's (almost the best of
all). It wasn't "oratory," but it was well said and well meant.
They know how badly they need help and they do mean to be as good
to us as their benignant insularity will permit. They are changing.
I can't describe the great difference that the war has made in
them. They'll almost become docile in a little more time.

And we came in in the nick of time for them--in very truth. If we
hadn't, their exchange would have gone down soon and they know it.
I shall never forget the afternoon I spent with Mr. Balfour and Mr.
Bonar Law on that subject. They saw blue ruin without our financial
help. And now, if we can save them from submarines, those that know
will know how vital our help was. Again, the submarine is the great
and grave and perhaps the only danger now. If that can be scotched,
I believe the whole Teutonic military structure would soon tumble.
If not, the Germans may go on as long as they can feed their army,
allowing their people to starve.

Of course, you know, we're on rations now--yet we suffer no
inconvenience on that score. But these queer people (they are the
most amusing and confusing and contradictory of all God's
creatures, these English, whose possibilities are infinite and
whose actualities, in many ways, are pitiful)--these queer people
are fiercely pursuing food-economy by discussing in the newspapers
whether a hen consumes more food than she produces, and whether
what dogs eat contains enough human food to justify the shooting of
every one in the Kingdom. That's the way we are coming down to
humble fare. But nothing can quite starve a people who all live
near the sea which yields fish enough near shore to feed them
wastefully.

All along this South shore, where I am to-day[60], I see the Stars
and Stripes; and everywhere there is a demand for the words and
music of the Battle Hymn of the Republic and the Star Spangled
Banner.

This our-new-Ally business is bringing me a lot of amusing
troubles. Theatres offer me boxes, universities offer me degrees,
hospitals solicit visits from me, clubs offer me dinners--I'll have
to get a new private secretary or two well-trained to say "No"
politely, else I shall not have my work done. But all that will
presently wear away as everything wears away (quickly, too) in the
grim face of this bloody monster of war which is consuming men as a
prairie fire consumes blades of grass. There's a family that lives
around the corner from this hotel. One son is in the trenches,
another is in a madhouse from shell-shock, a third coming home
wounded the other day was barely rescued when a torpedo sunk a
hospital ship and may lose his reason. I suppose I saw one hundred
men this afternoon on a single mile of beach who had lost both
legs. Through the wall from my house in London is a hospital. A
young Texan has been there, whose legs are gone at the thighs and
one arm at the elbow. God pity us for not having organized the
world better than this! We'll do it, yet, Mr. President--_you'll_
do it; and thank God for you. If we do not organize Europe and
make another such catastrophe impossible, life will not be worth
being born into except to the few whose days happen to fall between
recurring devastations of the world.

Yours sincerely,

WALTER H. PAGE.

"I hope that the English people," Colonel House wrote to Page about this time, "realize how successful Mr. Balfour's visit to America really was. There is no man they could have sent who could have done it better. He and the President got along marvellously well. The three of us dined and spent the evening together and it was delightful to see how sympathetic their minds were."

A letter from Mr. Polk also discloses the impression which Mr. Balfour made upon Washington:

_From Frank L. Polk_

Washington, May 25, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. PAGE:

I just want to get off a line to catch the pouch.

You probably know what a wonderful success the British Mission has
been, but I do not think you can realize what a deep impression
they have made on all of us. Mr. Balfour really won the affection
of us all, and I do not know when I was more sorry to have a man
leave than I was to have him go last night. He expressed himself as
having been very much impressed with his reception and the way he
was treated. He was most fair in all discussions, and I think has a
better understanding of our point of view. I had the good fortune
of being present at the financial and the diplomatic conferences,
and I think we all felt that we were dealing with a sympathetic
friend.

He and the President got on tremendously. The best evidence of that
was the fact that the President went up to Congress and sat in the
gallery while Mr. Balfour addressed the House. This is without
precedent.

The difficult problem of course was the blacklist and bunkering
agreement, but I think we are by that. The important thing now is
for the British to make all the concessions possible in connection
with the release of goods in Rotterdam and the release of goods in
Prize Court, though the cases have not been begun. Of course I mean
cases of merely suspicion rather than where there is evidence of
wrongdoing.

The sending of the destroyers and troops abroad is going to do a
great deal toward impressing our people with the fact that we
really are in the war. I do not think it is thoroughly borne home
on the majority yet what a serious road we have chosen.

With warm regards,

Yours faithfully,

FRANK L. POLK.

Mr. Polk's reference to the blacklist recalls an episode which in itself illustrates the changed character of the relations that had now been established between the American and the British governments. Mr. Balfour discussed shipping problems for the most part with Mr. Polk, under whose jurisdiction these matters fell. As one of these conferences was approaching its end Mr. Balfour slightly coughed, uttered an "er," and gave other indications that he was about to touch upon a ticklish question.

"Before I go," he said, "there--er--is one subject I would--er--like to say something about."

Mr. Polk at once grasped what was coming.

"I know what you have in mind," said Mr. Polk in his characteristically quick way. "You want us to apply your blacklist to neutrals."

In other words, the British hoped that the United States, now that it was in the war, would adopt against South America and other offenders those same discriminations which this country had so fiercely objected to, when it was itself a neutral.

The British statesman gave Mr. Polk one of his most winning smiles and nodded.

"Mr. Balfour," said Mr. Polk, "it took Great Britain three years to reach a point where it was prepared to violate all the laws of blockade. You will find that it will take us only two months to become as great criminals as you are!"

Mr. Balfour is usually not explosive in his manifestations of mirth, but his laughter, in reply to this statement, was almost uproarious. And the State Department was as good as its word. It immediately forgot all the elaborate "notes" and "protests" which it had been addressing to Great Britain. It became more inexorable than Great Britain had ever been in keeping foodstuffs out of neutral countries that were contiguous to Germany. Up to the time the United States entered the war, Germany, in spite of the watchful British fleet, had been obtaining large supplies from the United States through Holland, Denmark, and the Scandinavian peninsula. But the United States now immediately closed these leaks. In the main this country adopted a policy of "rationing"; that is, it would furnish the little nations adjoining Germany precisely the amount of food which they needed for their own consumption. This policy was one of the chief influences in undermining the German people and forcing their surrender. The American Government extended likewise the blacklist to South America and other countries, and, in doing so, it bettered the instruction of Great Britain herself.

Though the whole story of the blockade thus seems finally to have ended in a joke, the whole proceeding has its serious side. The United States had been posing for three years as the champion of neutral rights; the point of view of Washington had been that there was a great principle at stake. If such a principle were involved, it was certainly present in just the same degree after the United States became belligerent as in the days when we were neutrals. The lofty ideals by which the Administration had professed to be guided should have still controlled its actions; the mere fact that we, as a belligerent, could obtain certain advantages would hardly have justified a great and high-minded nation in abandoning its principles. Yet abandon them we did from the day that we declared war. We became just as remorseless in disregarding the rights of small states as Great Britain--according to our numerous blockade notes--had been. Possibly, therefore, Mr. Balfour's mirth was not merely sympathetic or humorous; it perhaps echoed his discovery that our position for three years had really been nothing but a sham; that the State Department had been forcing points in which it did not really believe, or in which it did not believe when American interests were involved. At any rate, this ending of our long argument with Great Britain was a splendid justification for Page; his contention had always been that the preservation of civilization was more important than the technicalities of the international lawyers. And now the Wilson Administration, by throwing into the waste basket all the finespun theories with which it had been embarrassing the Allied cause since August 4, 1914, accepted--and accepted joyously--his point of view.

II

One of the first things which Mr. Balfour did, on his arrival in Washington, was personally to explain to President Wilson about the so-called "secret treaties." The "secret treaty" that especially preyed upon Mr. Wilson's mind, and which led to a famous episode at the Versailles Conference, was that which had been made with Italy in 1915, as consideration for Italy's participation in the war. Mr. Balfour, in telling the President of these territorial arrangements with Italy, naturally did not criticise his ally, but it was evident that he regarded the matter as something about which the United States should be informed.

"This is the sort of thing you have to do when you are engaged in a war," he explained, and then he gave Mr. Wilson the details.

Probably the most important information which Mr. Balfour and the French and Italian Commissions brought to Washington was the desperate situation of the Allied cause. On that point not one of the visiting statesmen or military and naval advisers made the slightest attempt at concealment. Mr. Balfour emphasized the seriousness of the crisis in one of his earliest talks with Mr. McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury. The British statesman was especially interested in the financial situation and he therefore took up this matter at an early date with the Treasury Department.

"Mr. Balfour," said Mr. McAdoo, "before we make any plans of financial assistance it is absolutely necessary that we know precisely where we stand. The all-important thing is the question as to how long the war is likely to last. If it is only to last a few months, it is evident that we need to make very different arrangements than if it is to last several years. Just what must we make provision for? Let us assume that the United States goes in with all its men and resources--that we dedicate all our money, our manufacturing plants, our army, our navy, everything we have got, to bringing the war to an end. How long will it take?"

Mr. Balfour replied that it would be necessary to consult his naval and military advisers before he answered that question. He said that he would return in a day or two and make an explicit statement. He did so and his answer was this: Under these circumstances--that the United States should make war to the full limit of its power, in men and resources--the war could not be ended until the summer or the autumn of 1919. Mr. McAdoo put the same question in the same form to the French and Italian Missions and obtained precisely the same answer.

Page's papers show that Mr. Balfour, in the early stages of American participation, regarded the financial situation as the thing which chiefly threatened the success of the Allied cause. So much greater emphasis has been laid upon the submarine warfare that this may at first seem rather a misreading of Great Britain's peril. Yet the fact is that the high rate of exchange and the depredatory U-boat represented almost identically the same danger. The prospect that so darkened the horizon in the spring of 1917 was the possible isolation of Great Britain. England's weakness, as always, consisted in the fact that she was an island, that she could not feed herself with her own resources and that she had only about six weeks' supply of food ahead of her at any one time. If Germany could cut the lines of communication and so prevent essential supplies from reaching British ports, the population of Great Britain could be starved into surrender in a very brief time, France would be overwhelmed, and the triumph of the Prussian cause would be complete. That the success of the German submarine campaign would accomplish this result was a fact that the popular mind readily grasped. What it did not so clearly see, however, was that the financial collapse of Great Britain would cut these lines of communication quite as effectually as the submarine itself. The British were practically dependent for their existence upon the food brought from the United States, just as the Allied armies were largely dependent upon the steel which came from the great industrial plants of this country. If Great Britain could not find the money with which to purchase these supplies, it is quite apparent that they could not be shipped. The collapse of British credit therefore would have produced the isolation of the British Isles and led to a British surrender, just as effectively as would the success of the German submarine campaign.

As soon as Bernstorff was sent home, therefore, and the participation of this country in the war became extremely probable, Mr. Balfour took up the financial question with Page.

_To the President_
March 5, 1917.

The inquiries which I have made here about financial conditions
disclose an international situation which is most alarming to the
financial and industrial outlook of the United States. England has
not only to pay her own war bills, but is obliged to finance her
Allies as well. Up to the present time she has done these tasks out
of her own capital. But she cannot continue her present extensive
purchases in the United States without shipping gold as payment for
them, and there are two reasons why she cannot make large
shipments of gold. In the first place, both England and France must
keep the larger part of the gold they have to maintain issues of
their paper at par; and, in the second place, the German U-boat has
made the shipping of gold a dangerous procedure even if they had it
to ship. There is therefore a pressing danger that the
Franco-American and Anglo-American exchange will be greatly
disturbed; the inevitable consequence will be that orders by all
the Allied Governments will be reduced to the lowest possible
amount and that trans-Atlantic trade will practically come to an
end. The result of such a stoppage will be a panic in the United
States. The world will therefore be divided into two hemispheres,
one of them, our own, will have the gold and the commodities; the
other, Great Britain and Europe, will need these commodities, but
it will have no money with which to pay for them. Moreover, it will
have practically no commodities of its own to exchange for them.
The financial and commercial result will be almost as bad for the
United States as for Europe. We shall soon reach this condition
unless we take quick action to prevent it. Great Britain and France
must have a credit in the United States which will be large enough
to prevent the collapse of world trade and the whole financial
structure of Europe.

If the United States declare war against Germany, the greatest help
we could give Great Britain and its Allies would be such a credit.
If we should adopt this policy, an excellent plan would be for our
Government to make a large investment in a Franco-British loan.
Another plan would be to guarantee such a loan. A great advantage
would be that all the money would be kept in the United States. We
could keep on with our trade and increase it, till the war ends,
and after the war Europe would purchase food and an enormous supply
of materials with which to reëquip her peace industries. We should
thus reap the profit of an uninterrupted and perhaps an enlarging
trade over a number of years and we should hold their securities in
payment.

On the other hand, if we keep nearly all the gold and Europe cannot
pay for reëstablishing its economic life, there may be a world-wide
panic for an indefinite period.

Of course we cannot extend such a credit unless we go to war with
Germany. But is there no way in which our Government might
immediately and indirectly help the establishment in the United
States of a large Franco-British credit without violating armed
neutrality? I do not know enough about our own reserve bank law to
form an opinion. But these banks would avert such a danger if they
were able to establish such a credit. Danger for us is more real
and imminent, I think, than the public on either side the Atlantic
understands. If it be not averted before its manifestations become
apparent, it will then be too late to save the day.

The pressure of this approaching crisis, I am certain, has gone
beyond the ability of the Morgan financial agency for the British
and French governments. The financial necessities of the Allies are
too great and urgent for any private agency to handle, for every
such agency has to encounter business rivalries and sectional
antagonisms.

It is not improbable that the only way of maintaining our present
preëminent trade position and averting a panic is by declaring war
on Germany. The submarine has added the last item to the danger of
a financial world crash. There is now an uncertainty about our
being drawn into the war; no more considerable credits can be
privately placed in the United States. In the meantime a collapse
may come.

PAGE.

Urgent as this message was, it really understated the desperate condition of British and Allied finances. That the warring powers were extremely pressed for money has long been known; but Page's papers reveal for the first time the fact that they were facing the prospect of bankruptcy itself. "The whole Allied combination on this side the ocean are very much nearer the end of their financial resources," he wrote in July, "than anybody has guessed or imagined. We only can save them.... The submarines are steadily winning the war. Pershing and his army have bucked up the French for the moment. But for his coming there was more or less danger of a revolution in Paris and of serious defection in the army. Everybody here fears that the French will fail before another winter of the trenches. Yet--the Germans must be still worse off."

The matter that was chiefly pressing at the time of the Balfour visit was the fact that the British balances in the New York banks were in a serious condition. It should always be remembered, however, that Great Britain was financing not only herself, but her Allies, and that the difficult condition in which she now found herself was caused by the not too considerate demands of the nations with which she was allied in the war. Thus by April 6, 1917, Great Britain had overdrawn her account with J.P. Morgan to the extent of $400,000,000 and had no cash available with which to meet this overdraft. This obligation had been incurred in the purchase of supplies, both for Great Britain and the allied governments; and securities, largely British owned stocks and bonds, had been deposited to protect the bankers. The money was now coming due; if the obligations were not met, the credit of Great Britain in this country would reach the vanishing point. Though at first there was a slight misunderstanding about this matter, the American Government finally paid this over-draft out of the proceeds of the first Liberty Loan. This act saved the credit of the allied countries; it was, of course, only the beginning of the financial support that America brought to the allied cause; the advances that were afterward furnished from the American Treasury made possible the purchases of food and supplies in enormous quantities. The first danger that threatened, the isolation and starvation of Great Britain, was therefore overcome. It was the joint product of Page's work in London and that of the Balfour Commission in the United States.

III

Until these financial arrangements had been made there was no certainty that the supplies which were so essential to victory would ever leave the United States; this obstruction at the source had now been removed. But the greater difficulty still remained. The German submarines were lying off the waters south and west of Ireland ready to sink the supply ships as soon as they entered the prohibited zone. Mr. Balfour and his associates were working also on this problem in Washington; and, at the same time, Page and Admiral Sims and the British Admiralty were bending all their energies in London to obtain immediate coöperation.

A remark which Mr. Balfour afterward made to Admiral Sims shows the frightful nature of the problem which was confronting Great Britain at that time.

"That was a terrible week we spent at sea in that voyage to the United States," Mr. Balfour said. "We knew that the German submarine campaign was succeeding. Their submarines were destroying our shipping and we had no means of preventing it. I could not help thinking that we were facing the defeat of Great Britain."

Page's papers show that as early as February 25th he understood in a general way the disheartening proportions of the German success. "It is a momentous crisis," he wrote at that time. "The submarines are destroying shipping at an appalling rate." Yet it was not until Admiral Sims arrived in London, on April 9th, that the Ambassador learned all the details. In sending the Admiral to England the Navy Department had acted on an earnest recommendation from Page. The fact that the American Navy was inadequately represented in the British capital had long been a matter of embarrassment to him. The ability and personal qualifications of our attachés had been unquestioned; but none of them during the war had been men of high rank, and this in itself proved to be a constant impediment to their success. While America was represented by Commanders, Japan, Italy, and France had all sent Admirals to London. Page's repeated requests for an American Admiral had so far met with no response, but the probability that this country would become involved in the war now gave new point to his representations. In the latter part of March, Page renewed his request in still more urgent form, and this time the President and the Navy Department responded favourably. The result was that, on April 9th, three days after the American declaration of war, Admiral Sims and his flag-lieutenant, Commander Babcock, presented themselves at the American Embassy. There was little in the appearance of these men to suggest a violent naval demonstration against Germany. Both wore civilian dress, their instructions having commanded them not to bring uniforms; both were travelling under assumed names, and both had no more definite orders than to investigate the naval situation and cable the results to Washington. In spite of these attempts at secrecy, the British had learned that Admiral Sims was on the way; they rejoiced not only in this fact, but in the fact that Sims had been chosen, for there was no American naval officer whose professional reputation stood so high in the British Navy or who was so personally acceptable to British officialdom and the British public. The Admiralty therefore met Admiral Sims at Liverpool, brought him to London in a special train, and, a few hours after his arrival, gave him the innermost secrets on the submarine situation--secrets which were so dangerous that not all the members of the British Cabinet had been let into them.

Page welcomed Admiral Sims with a cordiality which that experienced sea veteran still gratefully remembers. He at once turned over to him two rooms in the Embassy. "You can have everything we've got," the Ambassador said. "If necessary to give you room, we'll turn the whole Embassy force out into the street." The two men had not previously met, but in an instant they became close friends. A common sympathy and a common enthusiasm were greatly needed at that crisis. As soon as Admiral Sims had finished his interview with Admiral Jellicoe, he immediately sought out the Ambassador and laid all the facts before him. Germany was winning the war. Great Britain had only six weeks' food supply on hand, and the submarines were sinking the ships at a rate which, unless the depredations should be checked, meant an early and unconditional surrender of the British Empire. Only the help of the United States could prevent this calamity.

Page, of course, was aghast: the facts and figures Admiral Sims gave him disclosed a situation which was even more desperate than he had imagined. He advised the Admiral to cable the whole story immediately to Washington. Admiral Sims at first had some difficulty in obtaining the Admiralty's consent to doing this, and the reason was the one with which Page had long been familiar--the fear, altogether too justified, that the news would "leak" out of Washington. Of course there was no suspicion in British naval circles of the good faith of the Washington officials, but important facts had been sent so many times under the seal of the strictest secrecy and had then found their way into the newspapers that there was a deep distrust of American discretion. Certainly no greater damage could have been done the allied cause at that time than to have the Germans learn how successfully their submarine campaign was progressing. The question was referred to the Imperial War Council and its consent obtained. The report, however, was sent to the Navy Department in the British naval code, and decoded in the British Embassy in Washington.

Admiral Sims's message gave all the facts about the submarine situation, and concluded with the recommendation that the United States should assemble all floating craft that could be used in the anti-submarine warfare, destroyers, tugs, yachts, light cruisers, and similar vessels, and send them immediately to Queenstown, where they would do valuable service in convoying merchant vessels and destroying the U-boats. At that time the American Navy had between fifty and sixty destroyers that were patrolling the American coast; these could have been despatched, almost immediately, to the scene of operations; but, in response to this request, the Department sent six to Queentown.

The next few months were very unhappy ones for Admiral Sims. He was the representative in London of one of the world's greatest naval powers, participating in the greatest war that had ever enlisted its energies, yet his constant appeals for warships elicited the most inadequate response, his well-reasoned recommendations for meeting the crisis were frequently unanswered and at other times were met with counter-proposals so childish that they seemed almost to have originated in the brains of newspaper amateurs, and his urgent pictures of a civilization rapidly going to wreck were apparently looked upon with suspicion as the utterances of a man who had been completely led astray by British guile. To give a fair idea of Washington's neglect during this period it is only necessary to point out that, for four months, Admiral Sims occupied the two rooms in the Embassy directly above Page's, with Commander Babcock as his only aid. Sims's repeated requests to Secretary Daniels for an additional staff went unheeded. Had it not been for the Admiral's constant daily association with Page and the comfort and encouragement which the Ambassador gave him, this experience would have been almost unbearable. In the latter part of April, the Admiral's appeals to Washington having apparently fallen on deaf ears, he asked Page to second his efforts. The Admiral and Commander Babcock wrote another message, and drove in a motor car to Brighton, where Page was taking a little rest. The Admiral did not know just how strong a statement the Ambassador would care to sponsor, and so he did not make this representation as emphatic as the judgment of both men would have preferred.

The Admiral handed Page the paper, saying that he had prepared it with the hope that the Ambassador would sign it and send it directly to President Wilson.

"It is quite apparent," Admiral Sims said, "that the Department doesn't believe what I have been saying. Or they don't believe what the British are saying. They think that England is exaggerating the peril for reasons of its own. They think I am hopelessly pro-British and that I am being used. But if you'll take it up directly with the President, then they may be convinced."