Chapter XXII: The Balfour Mission to the United States (2)

Page put on his spectacles, took the paper, and read it through. Then, looking over the rim of his glasses in his characteristic way, he leaned toward Admiral Sims and said:

"Admiral, it isn't half strong enough! I think I can write a better despatch than that, myself! At least let me try."

He immediately took a pen and paper and in a few minutes he had written his own version which he gave the Admiral to read. The latter was delighted with it and in a brief time it was on its way to Washington.

From: Ambassador Page.
To: Secretary of State.
Sent: 27 April, 1917.

_Very confidential for Secretary and President_

There is reason for the greatest alarm about the issue of the war
caused by the increasing success of the German submarines. I have
it from official sources that during the week ending 22nd April, 88
ships of 237,000 tons, allied and neutral, were lost. The number of
vessels unsuccessfully attacked indicated a great increase in the
number of submarines in action.

This means practically a million tons lost every month till the
shorter days of autumn come. By that time the sea will be about
clear of shipping. Most of the ships are sunk to the westward and
southward of Ireland. The British have in that area every available
anti-submarine craft, but their force is so insufficient that they
hardly discourage the submarines.

The British transport of troops and supplies is already strained to
the utmost, and the maintenance of the armies in the field is
threatened. There is food enough here to last the civil population
only not more than six weeks or two months.

Whatever help the United States may render at any time in the
future, or in any theatre of the war, our help is now more
seriously needed in this submarine area for the sake of all the
Allies than it can ever be needed again, or anywhere else.

After talking over this critical situation with the Prime Minister
and other members of the Government, I can not refrain from most
strongly recommending the immediate sending over of every destroyer
and all other craft that can be of anti-submarine use. This seems
to me the sharpest crisis of the war, and the most dangerous
situation for the Allies that has arisen or could arise.

If enough submarines can be destroyed in the next two or three
months, the war will be won, and if we can contribute effective
help immediately, it will be won directly by our aid. I cannot
exaggerate the pressing and increasing danger of this situation.
Thirty or more destroyers and other similar craft sent by us
immediately would very likely be decisive.

There is no time to be lost.

(Signed) PAGE.

This cablegram had a certain effect. The reply came from Washington that "eventually" thirty-six destroyers would be sent.

* * * * *

Page's letters of this period are full of the same subject.

_To the President_

London, May 4, 1917.

Dear Mr. President:

The submarines have become a very grave danger. The loss of British
and allied tonnage increases with the longer and brighter days--as
I telegraphed you, 237,000 tons last week; and the worst of it is,
the British are not destroying them. The Admiralty publishes a
weekly report which, though true, is not the whole truth. It is
known in official circles here that the Germans are turning out at
least two a week--some say three; and the British are not
destroying them as fast as new ones are turned out. If merely the
present situation continue, the war will pretty soon become a
contest of endurance under hunger, with an increasing proportion of
starvation. Germany is yet much the worse off, but it will be
easily possible for Great Britain to suffer to the danger point
next winter or earlier unless some decided change be wrought in
this situation.

The greatest help, I hope, can come from us--our destroyers and
similar armed craft--provided we can send enough of them quickly.
The area to be watched is so big that many submarine hunters are
needed. Early in the war the submarines worked near shore. There
are very many more of them now and their range is one hundred
miles, or even two hundred, at sea.

The public is becoming very restive with its half information, and
it is more and more loudly demanding all the facts. There are
already angry threats to change the personnel of the Admiralty;
there is even talk of turning out the Government. "We must have
results, we must have results." I hear confidentially that Jellicoe
has threatened to resign unless the Salonica expedition is brought
back: to feed and equip that force requires too many ships.

And there are other troubles impending. Norway has lost so many of
her ships that she dare not send what are left to sea. Unarmed
they'll all perish. If she arms them, Germany will declare war
against her. There is a plan on foot for the British to charter
these Norwegian ships and to arm them, taking the risk of German
war against Norway. If war comes (as it is expected) England must
then defend Norway the best she can. And _then England may ask for
our big ships to help in these waters_. All this is yet in the
future, but possibly not far in the future.

For the present the only anti-submarine help is the help we may be
able to give to patrol the wide area off Ireland. If we had one
hundred destroyers to send, the job there could, I am told, be
quickly done. A third of that number will help mightily. At the
present rate of destruction more than four million tons will be
sunk before the summer is gone.

Such is this dire submarine danger. The English thought that they
controlled the sea; the Germans, that they were invincible on land.
Each side is losing where it thought itself strongest.

Admiral Sims is of the greatest help imaginable. Of course, I gave
him an office in one of our Embassy buildings, and the Admiralty
has given him an office also with them. He spends much of his time
there, and they have opened all doors and all desks and drawers to
him. He strikes me (and the English so regard him) as a man of
admirable judgment--unexcitable and indefatigable. I hope we'll
soon send a general over, to whom the War Department will act
similarly. Hoover, too, must have a good man here as, I dare say,
he has already made known. These will cover the Navy, the Army,
Food, and Shipping. Perhaps a Censor and an Intelligence (Secret
Service) group ought to come. I mean these for permanent--at least
indefinite--service. Exchange visits by a Congressional Committee
(such as the French and British make) and by high official persons
such as members of your Cabinet (such also as the French and
British make)--you will have got ideas about these from Mr.
Balfour.

W.H.P.

In the latter part of June Admiral Sims went to Queenstown. Admiral Bayly, who directed the operation of the anti-submarine forces there, had gone away for a brief rest, and Admiral Sims had taken over the command of both the British and American forces at that point. This experience gave Admiral Sims a first-hand picture of a really deplorable situation. The crisis was so desperate that he made another appeal to Page.

_From Admiral William S. Sims_

Admiralty House, Queenstown,
June 25, 1917.

My Dear Mr. Page:

I enclose herewith a letter on the submarine situation[61].

I think I have made it plain therein that the Allies are losing the
war; that it will be already lost when the loss of shipping reaches
the point where fully adequate supplies cannot be maintained on the
various battle fronts.

I cannot understand why our Government should hesitate to send the
necessary anti-submarine craft to this side.

There are at least seventeen more destroyers employed on our
Atlantic coast, _where there is no war_, not to mention numerous
other very useful anti-submarine craft, including sea-going tugs,
etc.

Can you not do something to bring our Government to an
understanding of how very serious the situation is? Would it not be
well to send another telegram to Mr. Lansing and the President, and
also send them the enclosed correspondence?

I am sending this by mail because I may be somewhat delayed in
returning to London.

Very sincerely yours,

Wm. S. Sims.

Page immediately acted on this suggestion.

_Most confidential for the Secretary of State and President only_

Sims sends me by special messenger from Queenstown the most
alarming reports of the submarine situation which are confirmed by
the Admiralty here. He says that the war will be won or lost in
this submarine zone within a few months. Time is of the essence of
the problem, and anti-submarine craft which cannot be assembled in
the submarine zone almost immediately may come too late. There is,
therefore, a possibility that this war may become a war between
Germany and the United States alone. Help is far more urgently and
quickly needed in this submarine zone than anywhere else in the
whole war area.

Page.

The United States had now been in the war for three months and only twenty-eight of the sixty destroyers which were available had been sent into the field. Yet this latest message of Page produced no effect, and, when Admiral Sims returned from Queenstown, the two men, almost in despair, consulted as to the step which they should take next. What was the matter? Was it that Washington did not care to get into the naval war with its full strength, or was it that it simply refused to believe the representations of its Admiral and its Ambassador? Admiral Sims and Page went over the whole situation and came to the conclusion that Washington regarded them both as so pro-British that their reports were subject to suspicion. Just as Page had found that the State Department, and its "trade advisers," had believed that the British were using the blockade as a means of destroying American trade for the benefit of Britain, so now he believed that Mr. Daniels and Admiral Benson, the Chief of Naval Operations, evidently thought that Great Britain was attempting to lure American warships into European waters, to undergo the risk of protecting British commerce, while British warships were kept safely in harbour. Page suggested that there was now only one thing left to do, and that was to request the British Government itself to make a statement to President Wilson that would substantiate his own messages.

"Whatever else they think of the British in Washington," he said, "they know one thing--and that is that a British statesman like Mr. Balfour will not lie."

Mr. Balfour by this time had returned from America. The fact that he had established these splendid personal relations with Mr. Wilson, and that he had impressed the American public so deeply with his sincerity and fine purpose, made him especially valuable for this particular appeal. Page and Admiral Sims therefore went to the Foreign Office and laid all the facts before him. Their own statements, Page informed the Foreign Secretary, were evidently regarded as hysterical and biased by an unreasoning friendliness to Great Britain. If Mr. Balfour would say the same things over his own signature, then they would not be disbelieved.

Mr. Balfour gladly consented. He called in Admiral Jellicoe and asked him to draft a despatch, so that all the technical facts would be completely accurate. He also consulted with Sir Edward Carson, the First Lord of the Admiralty. Then Mr. Balfour put the document in its final shape and signed it. It was as follows:

_Mr. Balfour to the President_

June 30, 1917.

The forces at present at the disposal of the British Admiralty are
not adequate to protect shipping from submarine attack in the
danger zone round the British Islands. Consequently shipping is
being sunk at a greater rate than it can be replaced by new tonnage
of British origin.

The time will come when, if the present rate of loss continues, the
available shipping, apart from American contribution, will be
insufficient to bring to this country sufficient foodstuffs and
other essentials, including oil fuel. The situation in regard to
our Allies, France, and Italy, is much the same.

Consequently, it is absolutely necessary to add to our forces as a
first step, pending the adoption or completion of measures which
will, it is hoped, eventually lead to the destruction of enemy
submarines at a rate sufficient to ensure safety of our sea
communications.

The United States is the only allied country in a position to help.
The pressing need is for armed small craft of every kind available
in the area where commerce concentrates near the British and French
coasts. Destroyers, submarines, gunboats, yachts, trawlers, and
tugs would all give invaluable help, and if sent in sufficient
numbers would undoubtedly save a situation which is manifestly
critical. But they are required now and in as great numbers as
possible. There is no time for delay. The present method of
submarine attack is almost entirely by torpedo with the submarine
submerged. The gun defense of merchant ships keeps the submarine
below the surface but does no more; offensively against a submerged
submarine it is useless, and the large majority of the ships
torpedoed never see the attacking submarine until the torpedo has
hit the ship[62].

The present remedy is, therefore, to prevent the submarine from
using its periscope for fear of attack by bomb or ram from small
craft, and this method of defense for the shipping and offense
against the submarine requires small craft in very large numbers.

The introduction of the convoy system, provided there are
sufficient destroyers to form an adequate screen to the convoy,
will, it is hoped, minimize losses when it is working, and the
provision of new offensive measures is progressing; but for the
next few months there is only one safeguard, viz., the immediate
addition to patrols of every small vessel that can possibly be sent
to European waters.

Page, moreover, kept up his own appeal:

_To the President_

July 5th.

_Strictly confidential to the President and the Secretary_

The British Cabinet is engaging in a threatening controversy about
the attitude which they should take toward the submarine peril.
There is a faction in the Admiralty which possesses the
indisputable facts and which takes a very disheartening view of
the situation. This group insists that the Cabinet should make a
confession at least to us of the full extent of the danger and that
it should give more information to the public. The public does not
feel great alarm simply because it has been kept in too great
ignorance. But the political faction is so far the stronger. It
attempts to minimize the facts, and, probably for political
reasons, it refuses to give these discouraging facts wide
publicity. The politicians urge that it is necessary to conceal the
full facts from the Germans. They also see great danger in throwing
the public into a panic.

Mr. Lloyd George is always optimistic and he is too much inclined
to yield his judgment to political motives. In his recent address
in Glasgow he gave the public a comforting impression of the
situation. But the facts do not warrant the impression which he
gave.

This dispute among the political factions is most unfortunate and
it may cause an explosion of public feeling at any time. Changes in
the Cabinet may come in consequence. If the British public knew all
the facts or if the American people knew them, the present British
Government would probably fall. It is therefore not only the
submarine situation which is full of danger. The political
situation is in a dangerous state also.

PAGE.

_To Arthur W. Page_

Wilsford Manor, Salisbury,

July 8, 1917.

DEAR ARTHUR:

Since admirals and generals began to come from home, they and the
war have taken my time so completely, day and night, that I haven't
lately written you many things that I should like to tell you. I'll
try here--a house of a friend of ours where the only other guest
besides your mother and me is Edward Grey. This is the first time
I've seen him since he left office. Let me take certain big
subjects in order and come to smaller things later:

1. The German submarines are succeeding to a degree that the public
knows nothing about. These two things are true: (a) The Germans are
building submarines faster than the English sink them. In this way,
therefore, they are steadily gaining. (b) The submarines are
sinking freight ships faster than freight ships are being built by
the whole world. In this way, too, then, the Germans are
succeeding. Now if this goes on long enough, the Allies' game is
up. For instance, they have lately sunk so many fuel oil ships,
that this country may very soon be in a perilous condition--even
the Grand Fleet may not have enough fuel. Of course the chance is
that oil ships will not continue to fall victims to the U-boats and
we shall get enough through to replenish the stock. But this
illustrates the danger, and it is a very grave danger.

The best remedy so far worked out is the destroyer. The submarines
avoid destroyers and they sink very, very few ships that are
convoyed. If we had destroyers enough to patrol the whole approach
(for, say, 250 miles) to England, the safety of the sea would be
very greatly increased; and if we had enough to patrol and to
convoy every ship going and coming, the damage would be reduced to
a minimum. The Admiral and I are trying our best to get our
Government to send over 500 improvised destroyers--yachts,
ocean-going tugs--any kind of swift craft that can be armed. Five
hundred such little boats might end the war in a few months; for
the Germans are keeping the spirit of their people and of their
army up by their submarine success. If that success were stopped
they'd have no other cry half so effective. If they could see this
in Washington as we see it, they'd do it and do it not halfway but
with a vengeance. If they don't do it, the war may be indefinitely
prolonged and a wholly satisfactory peace may never be made. The
submarine is the most formidable thing the war has produced--by
far--and it gives the German the only earthly chance he has to win.
And he _may_ substantially win by it yet. That's what the British
conceal. In fact, half of them do not see it or believe it. But
nothing is truer, or plainer. One hundred thousand submarine
chasers next year may be worth far less than 500 would be worth
now, for next year see how few ships may be left! The mere arming
of ships is not enough. Nearly all that are sunk are armed. The
submarine now carries a little periscope and a big one, each
painted the colour of the sea. You can't see a little periscope
except in an ocean as smooth as glass. It isn't bigger than a
coffee cup. The submarine thus sinks its victims without ever
emerging or ever being seen. As things now stand, the Germans are
winning the war, and they are winning it on the sea; that's the
queer and the most discouraging fact. My own opinion is that all
the facts ought to be published to all the world. Let the Germans
get all the joy they can out of the confession. No matter, if the
Government and the people of the United States knew all the facts,
we'd have 1,000 improvised destroyers (yachts, tugs, etc., etc.)
armed and over here very quickly. Then the tide would turn.

Then there'd be nothing to fear in the long run. For the military
authorities all agree that the German Army is inferior to the
British and French and will be whipped. That may take a long time
yet; but of the result nobody who knows seems to have any
doubt--unless the French get tired and stop. They have periods of
great war weariness and there is real danger that they may quit and
make a separate peace. General Pershing's presence has made the
situation safe for the moment. But in a little while something else
spectacular and hopeful may be required to keep them in line.

Such is an accurate picture of the war as it is now, and it is a
dangerous situation.

2. The next grave danger is financial. The European Allies have so
bled the English for money that the English would by this time
probably have been on a paper money basis (and of course all the
Allies as well) if we had not come to their financial aid. And
we've got to keep our financial aid going to them to prevent this
disastrous result. That wouldn't at once end the war, if they had
all abandoned specie payments; but it would be a frightfully severe
blow and it might later bring defeat. That is a real danger. And
the Government at Washington, I fear, does not know the full extent
of the danger. They think that the English are disposed to lie down
on them. They don't realize the cost of the war. This Government
has bared all this vast skeleton to me; but I fear that Washington
imagines that part of it is a deliberate scare. It's a very real
danger.

Now, certain detached items:

Sims is the idol of the British Admiralty and he is doing his job
just as well as any man could with the tools and the chance that he
has. He has made the very best of the chance and he has completely
won the confidence and admiration of this side of the world.

Pershing made an admirable impression here, and in France he has
simply set them wild with joy. His coming and his little army have
been worth what a real army will be worth later. It is well he came
to keep the French in line.

The army of doctors and nurses have had a similar effect.

Even the New England saw-mill units have caused a furor of
enthusiasm. They came with absolute Yankee completeness of
organization--with duplicate parts of all their machinery, tents,
cooks, pots, and pans, and everything ship-shape. The only question
they asked was: "Say, where the hell are them trees you want sawed
up?" That's the way to do a job! Yankee stock is made high here by
such things as that.

We're getting a crowd of Yankee lecturers on the United States to
go up and down this Kingdom. There's the greatest imaginable
curiosity to hear about the United States in all kinds of society
from munition workers to universities. I got the British Government
to write Buttrick[63] to come as its guest, and the Rockefeller
Boards rose to the occasion. He'll probably be along presently. If
he hasn't already sailed when you get this, see him and tell him to
make arrangements to have pictures sent over to him to illustrate
his lectures. Who else could come to do this sort of a job?

I am myself busier than I have ever been. The kind of work the
Embassy now has to do is very different from the work of the days
of neutrality. It continues to increase--especially the work that I
have to do myself. But it's all pleasant now. We are trying to help
and no longer to hinder. To save my life I don't see how the
Washington crowd can look at themselves in a mirror and keep their
faces straight. Yesterday they were bent on sending everything into
European neutral states. The foundations of civilization would give
way if neutral trade were interfered with. Now, nothing must go in
except on a ration basis. Yesterday it must be a peace without
victory. Now it must be a complete victory, every man and every
dollar thrown in, else no peace is worth having. I don't complain.
I only rejoice. But I'm glad that kind of a rapid change is not a
part of my record. The German was the same beast yesterday that he
is to-day; and it makes a simple-minded, straight-minded man like
me wonder which attitude was the (or is the) attitude of real
conviction. But this doesn't bother me now as a real problem--only
as a speculation. What we call History will, I presume, in time
work this out. But History is often a kind of lie. But never mind
that. The only duty of mankind now is to win. Other things can
wait.

I walked over to Stonehenge and back (about six miles) with Lord
Grey (Sir Edward, you know) and we, like everybody else, fell to
talking about when the war may end. We know as well as anybody and
no better than anybody else. I have very different moods about
it--no convictions. It seems to me to depend, as things now are,
more on the submarines than on anything else. If we could
effectually discourage them so that the Germans would have to
withdraw them and could no more keep up the spirit of their people
by stories of the imminent starvation of England, I have a feeling
that the hunger and the war weariness of the German people would
lead them to force an end. But, the more they are called on to
suffer the more patriotic do they think themselves and they _may_
go on till they drop dead in their tracks.

What I am really afraid of is that the Germans may, before winter,
offer all that the Western Allies most want--the restoration of
Belgium and France, the return of Alsace-Lorraine, etc., in the
West and the surrender of the Colonies--provided Austria is not
dismembered. That would virtually leave them the chance to work out
their Middle Europe scheme and ultimately there'd probably have to
be another war over that question. That's the real eventuality to
be feared--a German defeat in the West but a German victory in the
Southeast. Everybody in Europe is so war weary that such a plan
_may_ succeed.

On the other hand, what Hoover and Northcliffe fear may come
true--that the Germans are going to keep up the struggle for
years--till their armies are practically obliterated, as Lee's army
was. If the Allies were actually to kill (not merely wound, but
actually kill) 5,000 Germans a day for 300 days a year, it would
take about four years to obliterate the whole German Army. There is
the bare possibility, therefore, of a long struggle yet. But I
can't believe it. My dominant mood these days is an end within a
very few months after the submarines are knocked out. Send over,
therefore, 1,000 improvised destroyers the next two months, and
I'll promise peace by Christmas. Otherwise I can make no promises.
That's all that Lord Grey and I know, and surely we are two wise
men. What, therefore, is the use in writing any more about this?

The chief necessity that grows upon me is that all the facts must
be brought out that show the kinship in blood and ideals of the two
great English-speaking nations. We were actually coming to believe
ourselves that we were part German and Slovene and Pole and
What-not, instead of essentially being Scotch and English. Hence
the unspeakable impudence of your German who spoke of eliminating
the Anglo-Saxon element from American life! The truth should be
forcibly and convincingly told and repeated to the end of the
chapter, and our national life should proceed on its natural
historic lines, with its proper historic outlook and background. We
can do something to bring this about.

Affectionately,

W.H.P.

The labour of getting the American Navy into the war was evidently at first a difficult one, but the determination of Page and Admiral Sims triumphed, and, by August and September, our energies were fully engaged. And the American Navy made a record that will stand everlastingly to its glory. Without its help the German submarines could never have been overcome.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 58: The reference is to the attack made in October, 1916, by the German Submarine U-53, off Nantucket on several British ships. An erroneous newspaper account said that the _Benham_, an American destroyer, had moved in a way that facilitated the operations of the German submarine. This caused great bitterness in England, until Page showed the Admiralty a report from the Navy Department proving that the story was false.]

[Footnote 59: This, of course, is Franklin D. Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy in 1917.]

[Footnote 60: This letter is dated London and was probably begun there. It is evident, however, that the latter part was written at Brighton, where the Ambassador was taking a brief holiday.]

[Footnote 61: This was a long document describing conditions in great detail.]

[Footnote 62: The Navy Department had taken the position that arming merchantmen was the best protection against the submarine. This statement was intended to refute this belief.]

[Footnote 63: Dr. Wallace Buttrick, President of the General Education Board, who was sent at this time to deliver lectures throughout Great Britain on the United States.]