Chapter XIX: Washington in the Summer of 1916 (2)

I find at this date (a month before the Presidential election), the greatest tangle and uncertainty of political opinion that I have ever observed in our country. The President, in spite of his unparalleled leadership and authority in domestic policy, is by no means certain of election. He has the open hostility of the Germans--all very well, if he had got the fruits of a real hostility to them; but they have, in many ways, directed his foreign policy. He has lost the silent confidence of many men upon whose conscience this great question weighs heavily. If he be defeated he will owe his defeat to the loss of confidence in his leadership on this great subject. His opponent has put forth no clear-cut opinion. He plays a silent game on the German "issue." Yet he will command the support of many patriotic men merely as a lack of confidence in the President.

Nor do I see any end of the results of this fundamental error. In the economic and political readjustment of the world we shall be "out of the game," in any event--unless we are yet forced into the war by Hughes's election or by the renewal of the indiscriminate use of submarines by the Germans.

There is a great lesson in this lamentable failure of the President really to lead the Nation. The United States stands for democracy and free opinion as it stands for nothing else and as no other nation stands for it. Now when democracy and free opinion are at stake as they have not before been, we take a "neutral" stand--we throw away our very birthright. We may talk of "humanity" all we like: we have missed the largest chance that ever came to help the large cause that brought us into being as a Nation....

And the people, sitting on the comfortable seats of neutrality upon which the President has pushed them back, are grateful for Peace, not having taken the trouble to think out what Peace has cost us and cost the world--except so many as have felt the uncomfortable stirrings of the national conscience.

There is not a man in our State Department or in our Government who has ever met any prominent statesmen in any European Government--except the third Assistant Secretary of State, who has no authority in forming policies; there is not a man who knows the atmosphere of Europe. Yet when I proposed that one of the under Secretaries should go to England on a visit of a few weeks for observation, the objection arose that such a visit would not be "neutral."

III

The extraordinary feature of this experience was that Page had been officially summoned home, presumably to discuss the European situation, and that neither the President nor the State Department apparently had the slightest interest in his visit.

"The President," Page wrote to Mr. Laughlin, "dominates the whole show in a most extraordinary way. The men about him (and he sees them only on 'business') are very nearly all very, very small fry, or worse--the narrowest twopenny lot I've ever come across. He has no real companions. Nobody talks to him freely and frankly. I've never known quite such a condition in American life." Perhaps the President had no desire to discuss inconvenient matters with his Ambassador to Great Britain, but Page was certainly determined to have an interview with the President. "I'm not going back to London," he wrote Mr. Laughlin, "till the President has said something to me or at least till I have said something to him. I am now going down to Garden City and New York till the President send for me; or, if he do not send for me, I'm going to his house and sit on his front steps till he come out!" Page had brought from England one of the medals which the Germans had struck in honour of the _Lusitania_ sinking, and one reason why he particularly wished to see the President alone was to show him this memento.

Another reason was that in early September Page had received important news from London concerning the move which Germany was making for peace and the attitude of Great Britain in this matter. The several plans which Germany had had under consideration had now taken the form of a definite determination to ask for an armistice before winter set in. A letter from Mr. Laughlin, Chargé d'affaires in Page's absence, tells the story.

_From Irwin Laughlin_

Embassy of the United States of America.
London, August 30, 1916.

DEAR MR. PAGE:

For some little time past I have heard persistent rumours, which
indeed are more than rumours, since they have come from important
sources, of an approaching movement by Germany toward an early
armistice. They have been so circumstantial and so closely
connected--in prospect--with the President, that I have examined
them with particular attention and I shall try to give you the
results, and my conclusions, with the recommendation that you take
the matter up directly with the President and the Secretary of
State. I have been a little at a loss to decide how to communicate
what I have learned to the Government in Washington, for the
present conditions make it impossible to set down what I want to
say in an official despatch, but the fortunate accident of your
being in the United States gives me the safe opportunity I want,
and so I send my information to you, and by the pouch, as time is
of less importance than secrecy.

There seems to be no doubt that Germany is casting about for an
opportunity to effect an armistice, if possible before the winter
closes in. She hopes it may result in peace--a peace more or less
favourable to her, of course--but even if such a result should fail
of accomplishment she would have gained a breathing space; have
secured an opportunity to improve her strategic position in a
military sense, perhaps by shortening her line in Flanders: have
stiffened the resistance of her people; and probably have
influenced a certain body of neutral opinion not only in her favour
but against her antagonists.

I shall not try to mention the various sources from which the
threads that compose this fabric have been drawn, but I finally
fastened on X of the Admiralty as a man with whom I could talk
profitably and confidentially, and he told me positively that his
information showed that Germany was looking in the direction I have
indicated, and that she would soon approach the President on the
subject--even if she had not already taken the first steps toward
preparing her advance to him.

I asked X if he thought it well for me to broach the subject to
Lord Grey and he suggested that I first consult Y, which I did. The
latter seemed very wary at the outset, but he warmed up at last and
in the course of the conversation told me he had reliable
information that when Bethmann-Hollweg went to Munich just before
the beginning of the allied offensive in the west in June he told
the King of Bavaria that he was confident the Allies would be
obliged to begin overtures for peace next October; adding that if
they didn't Germany would have to do so. The King, it appears,
asked him how Germany could approach the Allies if it proved to be
advisable and he replied: "Through our good friend Wilson."

I asked Y if the King of Spain's good offices would not be enlisted
jointly with those of the President in attempting to arrange an
armistice, but he thought not, and said that the King of Spain was
very well aware that the Allies would not consider anything short
of definite peace proposals from Germany and that His Majesty knew
the moment for them had not arrived. I then finally asked him point
blank if he thought the Germans would approach the President for an
armistice, and, if so, when. He said he was inclined to think they
might do so perhaps about October. On my asking him if he was
disposed to let me communicate his opinion privately to the
Government in Washington he replied after some hesitation that he
had no objection, but he quickly added that I must make it clear at
the same time that the British Government would not listen to any
such proposals.

These conversations took place during the course of last week, and
on Sunday--the 27th--I invited the Spanish Ambassador to luncheon
at Tangley when I was able to get him to confirm what Y had said of
his Sovereign's attitude and opinions.

I may mention for what it is worth that on Hoover's last trip to
Germany he was told by Bullock, of the Philadelphia _Ledger_, that
Zimmermann of the Berlin Foreign Office had told him that the
Germans had intended in June to take steps for an armistice which
were prevented by the preparations for the allied offensive in the
west.

Y was very emphatic in what he said of the attitude of his
government and the British people toward continuing the war to an
absolutely conclusive end, and I was much impressed. He said among
other things that the execution of Captain Fryatt had had a
markedly perceptible effect in hardening British public opinion
against Germany and fixing the determination to fight to a
relentless finish. This corresponds exactly with my own
observations.

I leave this letter entirely in your hands. You will know what use
to make of it. It is meant as an official communication in
everything but the usual form from which I have departed for
reasons I need not explain further.

I look forward eagerly to your return,

Very sincerely yours,

IRWIN LAUGHLIN.

Page waited five weeks before he succeeded in obtaining his interview with Mr. Wilson.

_To the President_

The New Willard, Washington, D.C.

Thursday, September 21, 1916.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

While I am waiting for a convenient time to come when you will see
me for a conference and report, I send you notes on conversations
with Lord Grey and Lord Bryce[47]. They are, in effect, though of
course not in form, messages to you.

The situation between our government and Great Britain seems to me
most alarming; and (let me add) easily removable, if I can get the
ear of anybody in authority. But I find here only an atmosphere of
suspicion--unwarranted by facts and easily dissipated by straight
and simple friendly methods. I am sure of this.

I have, besides, a most important and confidential message for you
from the British Government which they prefer should be orally
delivered.

And I have written out a statement of my own study of the situation
and of certain proposals which, I think, if they commend themselves
to you, will go far to remove this dangerous tension. I hope to go
over them with you at your convenience.

Yours faithfully,

WALTER H. PAGE.

The situation was alarming for more reasons than the determination of Germany to force the peace issue. The State Department was especially irritated at this time over the blockade. Among the "trade advisers" there was a conviction, which all Page's explanations had not destroyed, that Great Britain was using the blockade as a means of destroying American commerce and securing America's customers for herself. Great Britain's regulations on the blacklist and "bunker coal" had intensified this feeling. In both these latter questions Page regarded the British actions as tactless and unjust; he had had many sharp discussions at the Foreign Office concerning them, but had not made much headway in his efforts to obtain their abandonment. The purpose of the "blacklist" was to strike at neutral firms with German affiliations which were trading with Germany. The Trading with the Enemy Act provided that such firms could not trade with Great Britain; that British vessels must refuse to accept their cargoes, and that any neutral ship which accepted such cargoes would be denied bunker coal at British ports. Under this law the Ministry of Blockade issued a "blacklist" of more than 1,000 proscribed exporting houses in the United States. So great was the indignation against this boycott in the United States that Congress, in early September, had passed a retaliatory act; this gave the President the authority at any time to place an embargo upon the exports to the United States of countries which discriminated against American firms and also to deny clearance to ships which refused to accept American cargoes. The two countries indeed seemed to be hastening toward a crisis.

Page's urgent letter to Mr. Wilson brought a telegram from Mr. Tumulty inviting the Ambassador to spend the next evening and night with the President at Shadow Lawn, the seaside house on the New Jersey coast in which Mr. Wilson was spending the summer. Mr. Wilson received his old friend with great courtesy and listened quietly and with apparent interest to all that he had to say. The written statement to which Page refers in his letter told the story of Anglo-American relations from the time of the Panama tolls repeal up to the time of Page's visit to Shadow Lawn. Quotations have already been made from it in preceding chapters, and the ideas which it contains have abundantly appeared in letters already printed. The document was an eloquent plea for American coöperation with the Allies--for the dismissal of Bernstorff, for the adoption of a manly attitude toward Germany, and for the vindication of a high type of Americanism.

Page showed the President the _Lusitania_ medal, but that did not especially impress him. "The President said to me," wrote Page in reference to this visit, "that when the war began he and all the men he met were in hearty sympathy with the Allies; but that now the sentiment toward England had greatly changed. He saw no one who was not vexed and irritated by the arbitrary English course. That is, I fear, true--that he sees no one but has a complaint. So does the Secretary of State, and the Trade Bureau and all the rest in Washington. But in Boston, in New York, and in the South and in Auburn, N.Y., I saw no one whose sympathy with the Allies had undergone any fundamental change. I saw men who felt vexed at such an act as the blacklist, but that was merely vexation, not a fundamental change of feeling. Of course, there came to see me men who had 'cases.' Now these are the only kind of men, I fear, whom the Government at Washington sees--these and the members of Congress whom the Germans have scared or have 'put up' to scare the Government--who are 'twisting the lion's tail,' in a word."

"The President said," wrote Page immediately after coming from Shadow Lawn, "Tell those gentlemen for me'--and then followed a homily to the effect that a damage done to any American citizen is a damage to him, etc. He described the war as a result of many causes, some of long origin. He spoke of England's having the earth and of Germany wanting it. Of course, he said, the German system is directly opposed to everything American. But I do not gather that he thought that this carried any very great moral reprehensibility.

"He said that he wouldn't do anything with the retaliatory act till after election lest it might seem that he was playing politics. But he hinted that if there were continued provocation afterward (in case he were elected) he would. He added that one of the worst provocations was the long English delay in answering our Notes. Was this delay due to fear or shame? He evidently felt that such a delay showed contempt. He spoke of the Bryan treaty[48]. But on no question had the British 'locked horns' with us--on no question had they come to a clear issue so that the matter might be referred to the Commission."

Page delivered his oral message about the German determination to obtain an armistice. This was to the effect that Great Britain would not grant it. Page intimated that Britain would be offended if the President proposed it.

"If an armistice, no," answered Mr. Wilson. "That's a military matter and is none of my business. But if they propose an armistice looking toward peace--yes, I shall be glad."

The experience was an exceedingly trying one for both men. The discussion showed how far apart were the President and his Ambassador on practically every issue connected with the crisis. Naturally the President's reference to the causes of the war--that there were many causes, some of them of long persistence, and that Great Britain's domination of the "earth" was one of them--conflicted with the judgment of a man who attributed the origin of the struggle to German aggression. The President's statement that American sympathy for the Allies had now changed to irritation, and the tolerant attitude toward Germany which Mr. Wilson displayed, affected Page with the profoundest discouragement. The President's intimation that he would advance Germany's request for an armistice, if it looked toward peace--this in reply to Page's message that Great Britain would not receive such a proposal in a kindly spirit--seemed to lay the basis of further misunderstandings. The interview was a disheartening one for Page. Many people whom the Ambassador met in the course of this visit still retain memories of his fervour in what had now become with him a sacred cause. With many friends and officials he discussed the European situation almost like a man inspired. The present writer recalls two long conversations with Page at this time: the recollection of his brilliant verbal portraiture, his description of the determination of Englishmen, his admiration for the heroic sacrifice of Englishwomen, remain as about the most vivid memories of a life-time. And now the Ambassador had brought this same eloquence to the President's ear at Shadow Lawn. It was in this interview that Page had hoped to show Mr. Wilson the real merits of the situation, and persuade him to adopt the course to which the national honour and safety pointed; he talked long and eloquently, painting the whole European tragedy with that intensity and readiness of utterance and that moral conviction which had so moved all others with whom he had come into contact during this memorable visit to the United States; but Mr. Wilson was utterly cold, utterly unresponsive, interested only in ending the war. The talk lasted for a whole morning; its nature may be assumed from the many letters already printed; but Page's voice, when it attempted to fire the conscience of the President, proved as ineffective as his pen. However, there was nothing rasping or contentious about the interview. The two men discussed everything with the utmost calmness and without the slightest indications of ill-nature. Both men had in mind their long association, both inevitably recalled the hopes with which they had begun their official relationship three years before, at that time neither having the faintest intimation of the tremendous problems that were to draw them asunder. Mr. Wilson at this meeting did not impress his Ambassador as a perverse character, but as an extremely pathetic one. Page came away with no vexation or anger, but with a real feeling for a much suffering and a much perplexed statesman. The fact that the President's life was so solitary, and that he seemed to be so completely out of touch with men and with the living thoughts of the world, appealed strongly to Page's sympathies. "I think he is the loneliest man I have ever known," Page remarked to his son Frank after coming away from this visit.

Page felt this at the time, for, as he rose to say good-bye to the President, he put his hand upon his shoulder. At this Mr. Wilson's eyes filled with tears and he gave Page an affectionate good-bye. The two men never met again.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 38: This is quoted from a hitherto unpublished despatch of Bernstorff's to Berlin which is found among Page's papers.]

[Footnote 39: The _China_ case was a kind of _Trent_ case reversed. In 1861 the American ship _San Jacinto_ stopped the British vessel _Trent_ and took off Mason and Slidell, Confederate commissioners to Great Britain. Similarly a British ship, in 1916, stopped an American ship, the _China_, and removed several German subjects. As the British quickly saw the analogy, and made suitable amends, the old excitement over the _Trent_ was not duplicated in the recent war.]

[Footnote 40: See Chapter XIII, page 434.]

[Footnote 41: Mr. Forbes had been Governor-General of the Philippines from 1909 to 1913. His work had been extraordinarily successful.]

[Footnote 42: Secretary of Agriculture.]

[Footnote 43: In charge of government road building, a distant relative of the Ambassador.]

[Footnote 44: Major General William Crozier, U.S.A., Chief of Ordnance.]

[Footnote 45: See Chapter XIX, pages 160-164.]

[Footnote 46: It was General Sheridan.]

[Footnote 47: See Chapter XIX, pages 160 and 164.]

[Footnote 48: The treaty between the United States and Great Britain, adopted through the urgency of Mr. Bryan, providing for the arbitration of disputes between the two countries.]