Chapter IX: Minor Missions--India and China (1)

General Gordon arrived in London at the end of January 1880--having lingered on his home journey in order to visit Rome--resolved as far as he possibly could to take that period of rest which he had thoroughly earned, and which he so much needed. But during these last few years of his life he was to discover that the world would not leave him undisturbed in the tranquillity he desired and sought. Everyone wished to see him usefully and prominently employed for his country's good, and offers, suitable and not suitable to his character and genius, were either made to him direct, or put forward in the public Press as suggestions for the utilization of his experience and energy in the treatment of various burning questions. His numerous friends also wished to do him honour, and he found himself threatened with being drawn into the vortex of London Society, for which he had little inclination, and, at that time, not even the strength and health.

After this incident he left London on 29th February for Switzerland, where he took up his residence at Lausanne, visiting _en route_ at Brussels, Mr, afterwards Lord, Vivian, then Minister at the Belgian Court, who had been Consul-General in Egypt during the financial crisis episode. It is pleasant to find that that passage had, in this case, left no ill-feeling behind it on either side, and that Gordon promised to think over the advice Mrs Vivian gave him to get married while he was staying at the Legation. His reply must not be taken as of any serious import, and was meant to turn the subject. About the same time he wrote in a private letter, "Wives! wives! what a trial you are to your husbands! From my experience married men have more or less a cowed look."

It was on this occasion that Gordon was first brought into contact with the King of the Belgians, and had his attention drawn to the prospect of suppressing the slave trade from the side of the Congo, somewhat analogous to his own project of crushing it from Zanzibar. The following unpublished letter gives an amusing account of the circumstances under which he first met King Leopold:--

"HOTEL DE BELLE-VUE, BRUXELLES,
"_Tuesday, 2nd March 1880_.

"I arrived here yesterday at 6 P.M., and found my baggage had not
come on when I got to the hotel (having given orders about my
boxes which were to arrive to-day at 9 A.M.). I found I was
_detected_, and a huge card of His Majesty awaited me, inviting
to dinner at 6.30 P.M. It was then 6.20 P.M. I wrote my excuses,
telling the truth. Then I waited. It is now 9.30 A.M., and no
baggage. King has just sent to say he will receive me at 11 A.M.
I am obliged to say I cannot come if my baggage does not arrive.

"I picked up a small book here, the 'Souvenirs of Congress of
Vienna,' in 1814 and 1815. It is a sad account of the festivities
of that time. It shows how great people fought for invitations to
the various parties, and how like a bomb fell the news of
Napoleon's descent from Elba, and relates the end of some of the
great men. The English great man, Castlereagh, cut his throat
near Chislehurst; Alexander died mad, etc., etc. They are all in
their 6 feet by 2 feet 6 inches.... Horrors, it is now 10.20
A.M., and no baggage! King sent to say he will see me at 11 A.M.;
remember, too, I have to dress, shave, etc., etc. 10.30 A.M.--No
baggage!!! It is getting painful. His Majesty will be furious.
10.48 A.M.--No baggage! Indirectly Mackinnon (late Sir William)
is the sinner, for he evidently told the King I was coming.
Napoleon said, 'The smallest trifles produce the greatest
results.' 12.30 P.M.--Got enclosed note from palace, and went to
see the King--a very tall man with black beard. He was very
civil, and I stayed with him for one and a half hours. He is
quite at sea with his expedition (Congo), and I have to try and
get him out of it. I have to go there to-morrow at 11.30 A.M. My
baggage has come."

During his stay at Lausanne his health improved, and he lost the numbed feeling in his arms which had strengthened the impression that he suffered from _angina pectoris_. This apprehension, although retained until a very short period before his final departure from England in 1884, was ultimately discovered to be baseless. With restored health returned the old feeling of restlessness. After five weeks he found it impossible to remain any longer in Lausanne. Again he exclaims in his letters: "Inaction is terrible to me!" and on 9th April he left that place for London.

Yet, notwithstanding his desire to return to work, or rather his feeling that he could not live in a state of inactivity, he refused the first definite suggestion that was made to him of employment. While he was still at Lausanne, the Governor of Cape Colony sent the following telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies:--"My Ministers wish that the post of Commandant of the Colonial Forces should be offered to Chinese Gordon." The reply to this telegram read as follows:--"The command of the Colonial Forces would probably be accepted by Chinese Gordon in the event of your Ministers desiring that the offer of it should be made to him." The Cape authorities requested that this offer might be made, and the War Office accordingly telegraphed to him as follows: "Cape Government offer command of Colonial Forces; supposed salary, £1500; your services required early." Everyone seems to have taken it as a matter of course that he would accept; but Gordon's reply was in the negative: "Thanks for telegram just received; I do not feel inclined to accept an appointment." His reasons for not accepting what seemed a desirable post are not known. They were probably due to considerations of health, although the doubt may have presented itself to his mind whether he was qualified by character to work in harmony with the Governor and Cabinet of any colony. He knew very well that all his good work had been done in an independent and unfettered capacity, and at the Cape he must have felt that, as nominal head of the forces, he would have been fettered by red tape and local jealousies, and rendered incapable of doing any good in an anomalous position. But after events make it desirable to state and recollect the precise circumstances of this first offer to him from the Cape Government.

While at Lausanne, General Gordon's attention was much given to the study of the Eastern Question, and I am not at all sure that the real reason of his declining the Cape offer was not the hope and expectation that he might be employed in connection with a subject which he thoroughly understood and had very much at heart. He drew up a memorandum on the Treaties of San Stefano and Berlin, which, for clearness of statement, perfect grasp of a vital international question, and prophetic vision, has never been surpassed among State papers. Although written in March 1880, and in my possession a very short time afterwards, I was not permitted to publish it until September 1885, when it appeared in the _Times_ of the 24th of that month. Its remarkable character was at once appreciated by public men, and Sir William Harcourt, speaking in the House four days later, testified to the extraordinary foresight with which "poor Gordon" diagnosed the case of Europe's sick man. I quote here this memorandum in its integrity:--

"The Powers of Europe assembled at Constantinople, and
recommended certain reforms to Turkey. Turkey refused to accede
to these terms, the Powers withdrew, and deliberated. Not being
able to come to a decision, Russia undertook, on her own
responsibility, to enforce them. England acquiesced, provided
that her own interests were not interfered with. The
Russo-Turkish War occurred, during which time England, in various
ways, gave the Turks reason to believe that she would eventually
come to their assistance. This may be disputed, but I refer to
the authorities in Constantinople whether the Turks were not
under the impression during the war _that England would help
them, and also save them, from any serious loss eventually_.
England, therefore, provided this is true, did encourage Turkey
in her resistance.

"Then came the Treaty of San Stephano. It was drawn up with the
intention of finishing off the rule of Turkey in Europe--there
was no disguise about it; but I think that, looking at that
treaty from a Russian point of view, it was a very bad one for
Russia. Russia, by her own act, had trapped herself.

"By it (the Treaty of San Stephano) Russia had created a huge
kingdom, or State, south of the Danube, with a port. This new
Bulgarian State, being fully satisfied, would have nothing more
to desire from Russia, but would have sought, by alliance with
other Powers, to keep what she (Bulgaria) possessed, and would
have feared Russia more than any other Power. Having a seaport,
she would have leant on England and France. Being independent of
Turkey, she would wish to be on good terms with her.

"Therefore I maintain, that _once_ the Russo-Turkish War had been
permitted, no greater obstacle could have been presented to
Russia than the maintenance of this united Bulgarian State, and I
believe that the Russians felt this as well.

"I do not go into the question of the Asia Minor acquisitions by
Russia, for, to all intents and purposes, the two treaties are
alike. By both treaties Russia possesses the strategical points
of the country, and though by the Berlin Treaty Russia gave up
the strip south of Ararat, and thus does not hold the road to
Persia, yet she stretches along this strip, and is only distant
two days' march from the road, the value of which is merely
commercial.

"By both treaties Russia obtained Batoum and the war-like tribes
around it. Though the _only port_ on the Black Sea between Kertch
and Sinope, a distance of 1000 miles, its acquisition by Russia
was never contested. It was said to be a worthless
possession--'grapes were sour.'

"I now come to the changes made in the San Stephano Treaty (which
was undoubtedly, and was intended to be, the _coup de grâce_ to
Turkish rule in Europe) by the Treaty of Berlin.

"By the division of the two Bulgarias we prolonged, without
alleviating, the agony of Turkey in Europe; we repaired the great
mistake of Russia, from a Russian point of view, in making one
great State of Bulgaria. We stipulated that Turkish troops, with
a hostile Bulgaria to the north, and a hostile Roumelia to the
south, should occupy the Balkans. I leave military men, or any
men of sense, to consider this step. We restored Russia to her
place, as the protector of these lands, which she had by the
Treaty of San Stephano given up. We have left the wishes of
Bulgarians unsatisfied, and the countries unquiet. We have forced
them to look to Russia more than to us and France, and we have
lost their sympathies. And for what? It is not doubted that ere
long the two States will be united. If Moldavia and Wallachia
laughed at the Congress of Paris, and united while it (the
Congress) was in session at Paris, is it likely Bulgaria will
wait long, or hesitate to unite with Roumelia, because Europe
does not wish it?

"Therefore the union of the two States is certain, only it is to
be regretted that this union will give just the chance Russia
wants to interfere again; and though, when the union takes place,
I believe Russia will repent it, still it will always be to
Russia that they will look till the union is accomplished.

"I suppose the Turks are capable of appreciating what they gained
by the Treaty of Berlin. _They were fully aware that the Treaty
of San Stephano was their_ coup de grâce. But the Treaty of
Berlin was supposed to be beneficial to them. Why? By it Turkey
lost _not only Bulgaria_ and _Roumelia_ (for she has virtually
lost it), but _Bosnia_ and _Herzegovina_, while she gained the
utterly impossible advantage of occupying the Balkans, with a
hostile nation to north and south.

"I therefore maintain that the Treaty of Berlin did no good to
Turkey, but infinite harm to Europe.

"I will now go on to the Cyprus convention, and say a few words
on the bag-and-baggage policy. Turkey and Egypt are governed by a
ring of Pashas, most of them Circassians, and who are perfect
foreigners in Turkey. They are, for the greater part, men who,
when boys, have been bought at prices varying from £50 to £70,
and who, brought up in the harems, have been pushed on by their
purchasers from one grade to another. Some have been dancing boys
and drummers, like Riaz and Ismail Eyoub of Egypt. I understand
by bag-and-baggage policy the getting rid of, say, two hundred
Pashas of this sort in Turkey, and sixty Pashas in Egypt. These
men have not the least interest in the welfare of the countries;
they are aliens and adventurers, they are hated by the
respectable inhabitants of Turkey and Egypt, and they must be got
rid of.

"Armenia is lost; it is no use thinking of reforms in it. The
Russians virtually possess it; the sooner we recognise this fact
the better. Why undertake the impossible?

"What should be done? Study existing facts, and decide on a
definite line of policy, and follow it through. Russia, having a
definite line of policy, is strong; we have not one, and are weak
and vacillating. 'A double-minded man is unstable in all his
ways.'

"Supposing such a line of policy as follows was decided upon and
followed up, it would be better than the worries of the last four
years:--

"1. The complete purchase of Cyprus.

"2. The abandonment of the Asia Minor reforms.

"3. The union of Bulgaria and Roumelia, with a port.

"4. The increase of Greece.

"5. Constantinople, a State, under European guarantees.

"6. Increase of Montenegro, and Italy, on that coast.

"7. Annexation of Egypt by England, _either directly or by having
paramount and entire authority_.

"8. Annexation of Syria by France--ditto--ditto--ditto. (By this
means France would be as interested in stopping Russian progress
as England is.)

"9. Italy to be allowed to extend towards Abyssinia.

"10. Re-establishment of the Turkish Constitution, and the
establishment of a similar one in Egypt (these Constitutions, if
not interfered with, would soon rid Turkey and Egypt of their
parasite Pashas).

"I daresay this programme could be improved, but it has the
advantage of being _definite_, and a definite policy, however
imperfect, is better than an unstable or hand-to-mouth policy.

"I would not press these points at once; I would keep them in
view, and let events work themselves out.

"I believe, in time, this programme could be worked out without a
shot being fired.

"I believe it would be quite possible to come to terms with
Russia on these questions; I do not think she has sailed under
false colours when her acts and words are generally considered.
She is the avowed enemy of Turkey, she has not disguised it. Have
_we_ been the friend of Turkey? How many years have elapsed
between the Crimean war and the Russo-Turkish war? What did we do
to press Turkey to carry out reforms (as promised by the Treaty
of 1856) in those years? _Absolutely nothing._

"What has to be done to prevent the inevitable crash of the
Turkish Empire which is impending, imperilling the peace of the
world, is _the re-establishment of the Constitution of Midhat,
and its maintenance, in spite of the Sultan_. By this means, when
the Sultan and the ring of Pashas fall, there would still exist
the chambers of representatives of the provinces, who would carry
on the Government for a time, and at any rate prevent the foreign
occupation of Constantinople, or any disorders there, incident on
the exit of the Sultan and his Pashas."

Having partially explained how General Gordon declined one post for which he appeared to be well suited, I have to describe how it was that he accepted another for which neither by training nor by character was he in the least degree fitted. The exact train of trifling circumstances that led up to the proposal that Gordon should accompany the newly-appointed Viceroy, the Marquis of Ripon, to India cannot be traced, because it is impossible to assign to each its correct importance. But it may be said generally, that the prevalent idea was that Lord Ripon was going out to the East on a great mission of reform, and some one suggested that the character of that mission would be raised in the eyes of the public if so well known a philanthropist as Gordon, whose views on all subjects were free from official bias, could be associated with it. I do not know whether the idea originated with Sir Bruce Seton, Lord Ripon's secretary, while at the War Office, but in any case that gentleman first broached the proposition to Sir Henry Gordon, the eldest brother of General Gordon. Sir Henry not merely did not repel the suggestion, but he consented to put it before his brother and to support it. For his responsibility in this affair Sir Henry afterwards took the fullest and frankest blame on himself for his "bad advice." When the matter was put before General Gordon he did not reject it, as might have been expected, but whether from his desire to return to active employment, or biassed by his brother's views in favour of the project, or merely from coming to a decision without reflection, he made up his mind at once to accept the offer, and the official announcement of the appointment was made on 1st May, with the additional statement that his departure would take place without delay, as he was to sail with Lord Ripon on the 14th of that month.

It was after his acceptance of this post, and not some months before, as has been erroneously stated, that General Gordon had an interview with the Prince of Wales under circumstances that may be described. The Prince gave a large dinner-party to Lord Ripon before his departure for India, and Gordon was invited. He declined the invitation, and also declined to give any reason for doing so. The Prince of Wales, with his unfailing tact and the genuine kindness with which he always makes allowance for such little breaches of what ought to be done, at least in the cases of exceptional persons like Gordon, sent him a message: "If you won't dine with me, will you come and see me next Sunday afternoon?" Gordon went, and had a very interesting conversation with the Prince, and in the middle of it the Princess came into the room, and then the Princesses, her daughters, who said they would "like to shake hands with Colonel Gordon."

Before even the departure Gordon realised he had made a mistake, and if there had been any way out of the dilemma he would not have been slow to take it. As there was not, he fell back on the hope that he might be able to discharge his uncongenial duties for a brief period, and then seek some convenient opportunity of retiring. But as to his own real views of his mistake, and of his unfitness for the post, there never was any doubt, and they found expression when, in the midst of a family gathering, he exclaimed: "Up to this I have been an independent comet, now I shall be a chained satellite."

The same opinion found expression in a letter he wrote to Sir Halliday Macartney an hour before he went to Charing Cross:--

"MY DEAR MACARTNEY,--You will be surprised to hear that I have
accepted the Private Secretaryship to Lord Ripon, and that I am
just off to Charing Cross. I am afraid that I have decided in
haste, to repent at leisure. Good-bye.--Yours,

C. G. GORDON."

His own views on this affair were set forth in the following words:--

"Men at times, owing to the mysteries of Providence, form judgments which they afterwards repent of. This is my case. Nothing could have exceeded the kindness and consideration with which Lord Ripon has treated me. I have never met anyone with whom I could have felt greater sympathy in the arduous task he has undertaken."

And again, writing at greater length to his brother, he explains what took place in the following letter:--

"In a moment of weakness I took the appointment of Private
Secretary to Lord Ripon, the new Governor-General of India. No
sooner had I landed at Bombay than I saw that in my irresponsible
position I could not hope to do anything really to the purpose in
the face of the vested interests out there. Seeing this, and
seeing, moreover, that my views were so diametrically opposed to
those of the official classes, I resigned. Lord Ripon's position
was certainly a great consideration with me. It was assumed by
some that my views of the state of affairs were the Viceroy's,
and thus I felt that I should do him harm by staying with him. We
parted perfect friends. The brusqueness of my leaving was
unavoidable, inasmuch as my stay would have put me into the
possession of secrets of State that--considering my decision
eventually to leave--I ought not to know. Certainly I might have
stayed a month or two, had a pain in the hand, and gone quietly;
but the whole duties were so distasteful that I felt, being
pretty callous as to what the world says, that it was better to
go at once."

If a full explanation is sought of the reasons why Gordon repented of his decision, and determined to leave an uncongenial position without delay, it may be found in a consideration of the two following circumstances. His views as to what he held to be the excessive payment of English and other European servants in Asiatic countries were not new, and had been often expressed. They were crystallised in the phrase, "Why pay a man more at Simla than at Hongkong?" and had formed the basis of his projected financial reform in Egypt in 1878, and they often found expression in his correspondence. For instance, in a letter to the present writer, he proposed that the loss accruing from the abolition of the opium trade might be made good by reducing officers' pay from Indian to Colonial allowances. With Gordon's contempt for money, and the special circumstances that led to his not wanting any considerable sum for his own moderate requirements and few responsibilities, it is not surprising that he held these views; but no practical statesman could have attempted to carry them out. During the voyage to India the perception that it would be impossible for Lord Ripon to institute any special reorganisation on these lines led him to decide that it would be best to give up a post he did not like, and he wrote to his sister to this effect while at sea, with the statement that it was arranged that he should leave in the following September or October.

He reached Bombay on the 28th of May, and his resignation was received and accepted on the night of the 2nd June. What had happened in that brief interval of a few days to make him precipitate matters? There is absolutely no doubt, quite apart from the personal explanation given by General Gordon, both verbally and in writing, to myself, that the determining cause was the incident relating to Yakoob Khan.

That Afghan chief had been proclaimed and accepted as Ameer after the death of his father, the Ameer Shere Ali. In that capacity he had signed the Treaty of Gandamak, and received Sir Louis Cavagnari as British agent at his capital. When the outbreak occurred at Cabul, on 1st September, and Cavagnari and the whole of the mission were murdered, it was generally believed that the most guilty person was Yakoob Khan. On the advance of General Roberts, Yakoob Khan took the first opportunity of making his escape from his compatriots and joining the English camp. This voluntary act seemed to justify a doubt as to his guilt, but a Court of Inquiry was appointed to ascertain the facts. The bias of the leading members of that Court was unquestionably hostile to Yakoob, or rather it would be more accurate to say that they were bent on finding the highest possible personage guilty. They were appointed to inquire, not to sentence. Yet they found Yakoob guilty, and they sent a vast mass of evidence to the Foreign Department then at Calcutta. The experts of the Foreign Department examined that evidence. They pronounced it "rubbish," and Lord Lytton was obliged to send Mr (afterwards Sir) Lepel Griffin, an able member of the Indian Civil Service, specially versed in frontier politics, to act as Political Officer with the force in Afghanistan, so that no blunders of this kind might be re-enacted.

But nothing was done either to rehabilitate Yakoob's character or to negotiate with him for the restoration of a central authority in Afghanistan. Any other suitable candidate for the Ameership failing to present himself, the present ruler, Abdurrahman, being then, and indeed until the eve of the catastrophe at Maiwand, on 27th July 1880, an adventurous pretender without any strong following, Lord Lytton had been negotiating on the lines of a division of Afghanistan into three or more provinces. That policy, of which the inner history has still to be written, had a great deal more to be said in its favour than would now be admitted, and only the unexpected genius and success of Abdurrahman has made the contrary policy that was pursued appear the acme of sound sense and high statesmanship. When Lord Ripon reached Bombay at the end of May, the fate of Afghanistan was still in the crucible. Even Abdurrahman, who had received kind treatment in the persons of his imprisoned family at Candahar from the English, was not regarded as a factor of any great importance; while Ayoob, the least known of all the chiefs, was deemed harmless only a few weeks before he crossed the Helmund and defeated our troops in the only battle lost during the war. But if none of the candidates inspired our authorities with any confidence, they were resolute in excluding Yakoob Khan. Having been relieved from the heavier charge of murdering Cavagnari, he was silently cast on the not less fatal one of being a madman.

Such was the position of the question when Lord Ripon and his secretary landed at Bombay. It was known that they would alter the Afghan policy of the Conservative Government, and that, as far as possible, they would revert to the Lawrentian policy of ignoring the region beyond the passes. But it was not known that they had any designs about Yakoob Khan, and this was the bomb they fired on arrival into the camp of Indian officialdom.

The first despatch written by the new secretary was to the Foreign Department, to the effect that Lord Ripon intended to commence negotiations with the captive Yakoob, and Mr (now Sir) Mortimer Durand, then assistant secretary in that branch of the service, was at once sent from Simla to remonstrate against a proceeding which "would stagger every one in India." Lord Ripon was influenced by these representations, and agreed to at least suspend his overtures to Yakoob Khan, but his secretary was not convinced by either the arguments or the facts of the Indian Foreign Department. He still considered that Afghan prince the victim of political injustice, and also that he was the best candidate for the throne of Cabul. But he also saw very clearly from this passage of arms with the official classes that he would never be able to work in harmony with men who were above and before all bureaucrats, and with commendable promptness he seized the opportunity to resign a post which he thoroughly detested. What he thought on the subject of Yakoob Khan is fully set forth in the following memorandum drawn up as a note to my biography of that interesting and ill-starred prince in "Central Asian Portraits." Whether Gordon was right or wrong in his views about Yakoob Khan is a matter of no very great importance. The incident is only noteworthy as marking the conclusion of his brief secretarial experience, and as showing the hopefulness of a man who thought that he could make the all-powerful administrative system of India decide a political question on principles of abstract justice. The practical comment on such sanguine theories was furnished by Mr Durand being appointed acting private secretary on Gordon's resignation.

General Gordon's memorandum read as follows:--

"Yacoob was accused of concealing letters from the Russian
Government, and of entering into an alliance with the Rajah of
Cashmere to form a Triple Alliance. Where are these letters or
proof of this intention? They do not exist.

"Yacoob came out to Roberts of his own free will. He was
imprisoned. It was nothing remarkable that he was visited by an
Afghan leader, although it was deemed evidence of a treacherous
intention. Roberts and Cavagnari made the Treaty of Gandamak. It
is absurd to say Yacoob wanted an European Resident. It is
against all reason to say he did. He was coerced into taking
one. He was imprisoned, and a Court of Enquiry was held on him,
composed of the President Macgregor, who was chief of the staff
to the man who made the Treaty, by which Cavagnari went to Cabul,
and who had imprisoned Yacoob. This Court of Enquiry asked for
evidence concerning a man in prison, which is in eyes of Asiatics
equivalent to being already condemned. This Court accumulated
evidence, utterly worthless in any court of justice, as will be
seen if ever published. This Court of _Enquiry_ found him guilty
and sentenced him to exile. Was that their function? If the
secret papers are published, it would be seen that the despatches
from the Cabulese chiefs were couched in fair terms. They did not
want to fight the English. They wanted their Ameer. Yacoob's
defence is splendid. He says in it: 'If I had been guilty, would
I not have escaped to Herat, whereas I put myself in your hands?'
The following questions arise from this Court of Enquiry. Who
fired first shot from the Residency? Was the conduct of Cavagnari
and his people discreet in a fanatical city? Were not those who
forced Cavagnari on Yacoob against his protest equally
responsible with him? Yacoob was weak and timid in a critical
moment, and he failed, but he did not incite this revolt. It was
altogether against his interests to do so. What was the
consequence of his unjust exile? Why, all the trouble which
happened since that date. Afghanistan was quiet till we took her
ruler away. It was an united Afghanistan. This mistake has cost
£10,000,000, all from efforts to go on with an injustice. The
Romans before their wars invoked all misery on themselves before
the Goddess Nemesis if their war was unjust. We did not invoke
her, but she followed us. Between the time that the Tory
Government went out, and the new Viceroy Ripon had landed at
Bombay, Lytton forced the hand of the Liberal Government by
entering into negotiations with Abdurrahman, and appointing the
Vali at Candahar, so endeavouring to prevent justice to Yacoob.
Stokes, Arbuthnot, and another member of Supreme Council all
protested against the deposition of Yacoob, also Sir Neville
Chamberlaine."

Lest it should be thought that Gordon was alone in these opinions, I append this statement, drawn up at the time by Sir Neville Chamberlaine:--

"An unprejudiced review of the circumstances surrounding the
_émeute_ of September 1879 clearly indicates that the spontaneous
and unpremeditated action of a discontented, undisciplined, and
unpaid soldiery had not been planned, directed, or countenanced
by the Ameer, his ministers, or his advisers. There is no
evidence to prove or even to suspect that the mutiny of his
soldiers was in any way not deplored by the Ameer, but was
regarded by him with regret, dismay, and even terror. Fully
conscious of the very grave misapprehensions and possible
accusation of timidity and weakness on our part, I entertain,
myself, very strong convictions that we should have first
permitted and encouraged the Ameer to punish the mutinous
soldiers and rioters implicated in the outrage before we
ourselves interfered. The omission to adopt this course
inevitably led to the action forced on the Ameer, which
culminated in the forced resignation of his power and the total
annihilation of the national government. The Ameer in thus
resigning reserved to himself the right of seeking, when occasion
offered, restoration to his heritage and its reversion to his
heir. Nothing has occurred to justify the ignoring of these
undeniable rights."

Gordon's resignation was handed in to Lord Ripon on the night of the 2nd of June, the news appeared in the London papers of the 4th, and it had one immediate consequence which no one could have foreseen. But before referring to that matter I must make clear the heavy pecuniary sacrifice his resignation of this post entailed upon Gordon. He repaid every farthing of his expenses as to passage money, etc., to Lord Ripon, which left him very much out of pocket. He wrote himself on the subject: "All this Private Secretaryship and its consequent expenses are all due to my not acting on my _own_ instinct. However, for the future I will be wiser.... It was a living crucifixion.... I nearly burst with the trammels.... A £100,000 a year would not have kept me there. I resigned on 2 June, and never unpacked my official dress."

The immediate consequence referred to was as follows: In the drawer of Mr J. D. Campbell, at the office at Storey's Gate of the Chinese Imperial Customs, had been lying for some little time the following telegram for Colonel Gordon from Sir Robert Hart, the Inspector-General of the Department in China:--

"I am directed to invite you here (Peking). Please come and see
for yourself. The opportunity of doing really useful work on a
large scale ought not to be lost. Work, position, conditions, can
all be arranged with yourself here to your satisfaction. Do take
six months' leave and come."

As Mr Campbell was aware of Gordon's absence in India, he had thought it useless to forward the message, and it was not until the resignation was announced that he did so. In dealing with this intricate matter, which was complicated by extraneous considerations, it is necessary to clear up point by point. When Gordon received the message he at once concluded that the invitation came from his old colleague Li Hung Chang, and accepted it on that assumption, which in the end proved erroneous. It is desirable to state that since Gordon's departure from China in 1865 at least one communication had passed between these former associates in a great enterprise. The following characteristic letter, dated Tientsin, 22nd March 1879, reached Gordon while he was at Khartoum:--

"DEAR SIR,--I am instructed by His Excellency the Grand
Secretary, Li, to answer your esteemed favour, dated the 27th
October 1878, from Khartoum, which was duly received. I am right
glad to hear from you. It is now over fourteen years since we
parted from each other. Although I have not written to you, but I
often speak of you, and remember you with very great interest.
The benefit you have conferred on China does not disappear with
your person, but is felt throughout the regions in which you
played so important and active a part. All those people bless you
for the blessings of peace and prosperity which they now enjoy.

"Your achievements in Egypt are well known throughout the
civilized world. I see often in the papers of your noble works on
the Upper Nile. You are a man of ample resources, with which you
suit yourself to any kind of emergency. My hope is that you may
long be spared to improve the conditions of the people amongst
whom your lot is cast. I am striving hard to advance my people to
a higher state of development, and to unite both this and all
other nations within the 'Four Seas' under one common
brotherhood. To the several questions put in your note the
following are the answers:--Kwoh Sung-Ling has retired from
official life, and is now living at home. Yang Ta Jên died a
great many years ago. Na Wang's adopted son is doing well, and is
the colonel of a regiment, with 500 men under him. The Pa to'
Chiaow Bridge, which you destroyed, was rebuilt very soon after
you left China, and it is now in very good condition.

"Kwoh Ta jên, the Chinese Minister, wrote to me that he had the
pleasure of seeing you in London. I wished I had been there also
to see you; but the responsibilities of life are so distributed
to different individuals in different parts of the world, that it
is a wise economy of Providence that we are not all in the same
spot.

"I wish you all manner of happiness and prosperity. With my
highest regards,--I remain, yours very truly

"(For LI HUNG CHANG), TSÊNG LAISUN."

Under the belief that Hart's telegram emanated from Li Hung Chang, and inspired by loyalty to a friend in a difficulty, as well as by affection for the Chinese people, whom in his own words he "liked best next after his own," Gordon replied to this telegram in the following message: "Inform Hart Gordon will leave for Shanghai first opportunity. As for conditions, Gordon indifferent."

At that moment China seemed on the verge of war with Russia, in consequence of the disinclination of the latter power to restore the province of Kuldja, which she had occupied at the time of the Mahommedan uprising in Central Asia. The Chinese official, Chung How, who had signed an unpopular treaty at Livadia, had been sentenced to death--the treaty itself had been repudiated--and hostilities were even said to have commenced. The announcement that the Chinese Government had invited Gordon to Peking, and that he had promptly replied that he would come, was also interpreted as signifying the resolve to carry matters with a high hand, and to show the world that China was determined to obtain what she was entitled to. Those persons who have a contemptuous disregard for dates went so far even as to assert that Gordon had resigned because of the Chinese invitation. Never was there a clearer case of _post hoc, propter hoc_; but even the officials at the War Office were suspicious in the matter, and their attitude towards Gordon went near to precipitate the very catastrophe they wanted to avoid.

On the same day (8th June) as he telegraphed his reply to the Chinese invitation, he telegraphed to Colonel Grant, Deputy Adjutant-General for the Royal Engineers at the Horse Guards: "Obtain me leave until end of the year; am invited to China; will not involve Government." Considering the position between China and Russia, and the concern of the Russian press and Government at the report about Gordon, it is not surprising that this request was not granted a ready approval. The official reply came back: "Must state more specifically purpose and position for and in which you go to China." To this Gordon sent the following characteristic answer: "Am ignorant; will write from China before the expiration of my leave." An answer like this savoured of insubordination, and shows how deeply Gordon was hurt by the want of confidence reposed in him. In saying this I disclaim all intention of criticising the authorities, for whose view there was some reasonable justification; but the line they took, while right enough for an ordinary Colonel of Engineers, was not quite a considerate one in the case of an officer of such an exceptional position and well-known idiosyncrasies as "Chinese" Gordon. On that ground alone may it be suggested that the blunt decision thus given in the final official telegram--"Reasons insufficient; your going to China is not approved," was somewhat harsh.

It was also impotent, for it rather made Gordon persist in carrying out his resolve than deterred him from doing so. His reply was thus worded: "Arrange retirement, commutation, or resignation of service; ask Campbell reasons. My counsel, if asked, would be for peace, not war. I return by America." Gordon's mind was fully made up to go, even if he had to sacrifice his commission. Without waiting for any further communication he left Bombay. As he had insisted on repaying Lord Ripon his passage-money from England to India which, owing to his resignation, the Viceroy would otherwise have had to pay out of his own pocket, Gordon was quite without funds, and he had to borrow the sum required to defray his passage to China. But having made up his mind, such trifling difficulties were not likely to deter him. He sailed from Bombay, not merely under the displeasure of his superiors and uncertain as to his own status, but also in that penniless condition, which was not wholly out of place in his character of knight-errant. But with that solid good sense, which so often retrieved his reputation in the eyes of the world, he left behind him the following public proclamation as to his mission and intentions. It was at once a public explanation of his proceedings, and a declaration of a pacific policy calculated to appease both official and Russian irritation:

"My fixed desire is to persuade the Chinese not to go to war with
Russia, both in their own interests and for the sake of those of
the world, especially those of England. In the event of war
breaking out I cannot answer how I should act for the present,
but I should ardently desire a speedy peace. It is my fixed
desire, as I have said, to persuade the Chinese not to go to war
with Russia. To me it appears that the question in dispute cannot
be of such vital importance that an arrangement could not be come
to by concessions upon both sides. Whether I succeed in being
heard or not is not in my hands. I protest, however, at being
regarded as one who wishes for war in any country, still less in
China. Inclined as I am, with only a small degree of admiration
for military exploits, I esteem it a far greater honour to
promote peace than to gain any paltry honours in a wretched war."

With that message to his official superiors, as well as to the world, Gordon left Bombay on 13th June. His message of the day before saying, "Consult Campbell," had induced the authorities at the Horse Guards to make inquiries of that gentleman, who had no difficulty in satisfying them that the course of events was exactly as has here been set forth, and coupling that with Gordon's own declaration that he was for peace not war, permission was granted to Gordon to do that which at all cost he had determined to do. When he reached Ceylon he found this telegram: "Leave granted on your engaging to take no military service in China," and he somewhat too comprehensively, and it may even be feared rashly if events had turned out otherwise, replied: "I will take no military service in China: I would never embarrass the British Government."

Having thus got clear of the difficulties which beset him on the threshold of his mission, Gordon had to prepare himself for those that were inherent to the task he had taken up. He knew of old how averse the Chinese are to take advice from any one, how they waste time in fathoming motives, and how when they say a thing shall be done it is never performed. Yet the memory of his former disinterested and splendid service afforded a guarantee that if they would take advice and listen to unflattering criticism from any one, that man was Gordon. Still, from the most favourable point of view, the mission was fraught with difficulty, and circumstances over which he had no control, and of which he was even ignorant, added immensely to it. There is no doubt that Peking was at that moment the centre of intrigues, not only between the different Chinese leaders, but also among the representatives of the Foreign Powers. The secret history of these transactions has still to be revealed, and as our Foreign Office never gives up the private instructions it transmits to its representatives, the full truth may never be recorded. But so far as the British Government was concerned, its action was limited to giving the Minister, Sir Thomas Wade, instructions to muzzle Gordon and prevent his doing anything that wasn't strictly in accordance with official etiquette and quite safe, or, in a word, to make him do nothing. The late Sir Thomas Wade was a most excellent Chinese scholar and estimable person in every way, but when he tried to do what the British Government and the whole arrayed body of the Horse Guards, from the Commander-in-Chief down to the Deputy-Adjutant General, had failed to do, viz. to keep Gordon in leading strings, he egregiously failed. Sir Thomas Wade went so far as to order Gordon to stay in the British Legation, and to visit no one without his express permission. Gordon's reply was to ignore the British Legation and to never enter its portals during the whole of his stay in China.

That was one difficulty in the situation apart from the Russian question, but it was not the greatest, and as it was the first occasion on which European politics re-acted in a marked way on the situation in China, such details as are ascertainable are well worth recording at some length.

There is no doubt that the Russian Government was very much disturbed at what seemed an inevitable hostile collision with China. The uncertain result of such a contest along an enormous land-frontier, with which, at that time, Russia had very imperfect means of communication, was the least cause of its disquietude. A war with China signified to Russia something much more serious than this, viz., a breach of the policy of friendship to its vast neighbour, which it had consistently pursued for two centuries, and which it will pursue until it is ready to absorb, and then in the same friendly guise, its share of China. Under these circumstances the Russian Government looked round for every means of averting the catastrophe. It is necessary to guard oneself from seeming to imply that Russia was in any sense afraid, or doubtful as to the result of a war with China; her sole motives were those of astute and far-seeing policy. Whether the Russian Ambassador at Berlin mooted the matter to Prince Bismarck, or whether that statesman, without inspiration, saw his chance of doing Russia a good turn at no cost to himself is not certain, but instructions were sent to Herr von Brandt, the German Minister at Peking, a man of great energy, and in favour of bold measures, to support the Peace Party in every way. He was exactly a man after Prince Bismarck's own heart, prepared to go to any lengths to attain his object, and fully persuaded that the end justifies the means. His plan was startlingly simple and bold. Li Hung Chang, the only prominent advocate of peace, was to rebel, march on Peking with his Black Flag army, and establish a Government of his own. There is no doubt whatever that this scheme was formed and impressed on Li Hung Chang as the acme of wisdom. More than that, it was supported by two other Foreign Ministers at Peking, with greater or less warmth, and one of them was Sir Thomas Wade. These plots were dispelled by the sound sense and candid but firm representations of Gordon. But for him, as will be seen, there would have been a rebellion in the country, and Li Hung Chang would now be either Emperor of China or a mere instance of a subject who had lost his head in trying to be supreme.

Having thus explained the situation that awaited Gordon, it is necessary to briefly trace his movements after leaving Ceylon. He reached Hongkong on 2nd July, and not only stayed there for a day or two as the guest of the Governor, Sir T. Pope Hennessey, but found sufficient time to pay a flying visit to the Chinese city of Canton. Thence he proceeded to Shanghai and Chefoo. At the latter place he found news, which opened his eyes to part of the situation, in a letter from Sir Robert Hart, begging him to come direct to him at Peking, and not to stop _en route_ to visit Li Hung Chang at Tientsin. As has been explained, Gordon went to China in the full belief that, whatever names were used, it was his old colleague Li Hung Chang who sent for him, and the very first definite information he received on approaching the Chinese capital was that not Li, but persons whom by inference were inimical to Li, had sent for him. The first question that arises then was who was the real author of the invitation to Gordon that bore the name of Hart. It cannot be answered, for Gordon assured me that he himself did not know; but there is no doubt that it formed part of the plot and counter-plot originated by the German Minister, and responded to by those who were resolved, in the event of Li's rebellion, to uphold the Dragon Throne. Sir Robert Hart was a man of long-proved ability and address, who has rendered the Chinese almost as signal service as did Gordon himself, and on this occasion he was actuated by the highest possible motives, but it must be recorded that his letter led to a temporary estrangement between himself and Gordon, who I am happy to be able to state positively did realise long afterwards that he and Hart were fighting in the same camp, and had the same objects in view--only this was not apparent at the time. Gordon went to China only because he thought Li Hung Chang sent for him, but when he found that powerful persons were inciting him to revolt, he became the first and most strenuous in his advice against so imprudent and unpatriotic a measure. Sir Robert Hart knew exactly what was being done by the German Minister. He wished to save Gordon from being drawn into a dangerous and discreditable plot, and also in the extreme eventuality to deprive any rebellion of the support of Gordon's military genius.