Chapter X: The Mauritius, the Cape, and the Congo (2)

"I have received the memorandum on the Basuto question by
Major-General Gordon. I do not think it necessary to enter upon a
discussion of the policy suggested in this memorandum, but it
will doubtless be borne in mind by your Ministers that, as I
informed you by my telegram of the 6th of May last, H.M.'s
Government cannot hold out any expectation that steps will be
taken by them to relieve the colony of its responsibilities in
Basutoland."

The interpretation placed, and no doubt correctly placed, on that declaration of Government policy was that under no circumstances was it prepared to do anything in the matter, and that it had quite a sufficient number of troubles and worries without the addition of one in remote and unimportant Basutoland. Having thus got out of the necessity of discussing this important memorandum, under the cloak of the Colonial Office's decision in favour of inaction, the Premier went on to say that he was "most anxious to avoid the resumption of hostilities on the one hand or the abandonment of the territory on the other." There was an absolute ignoring in this statement of Gordon's deliberate opinion that the only way to solve the difficulty was by granting Basutoland semi-independence on the terms of a Convention providing for the presence of a British Resident, through whom all external matters were to be conducted. At the same time Mr Scanlan informed Gordon that he was sending up Mr Sauer, then Secretary for Native Affairs, who was a nominee of Mr Orpen, the politician whose policy was directly impugned.

On Mr Sauer reaching King William's Town, where Gordon was in residence at the Grand Depôt of the Cape forces, he at once asked him to accompany him to Basutoland. Gordon at first declined to do this on two grounds, viz. that he saw no good could ensue unless the convention were granted, and also that he did not wish Mr Sauer, or any other representative of the Cape Government, as a companion, because he had learnt that "Masupha would only accept his proposed visit as a private one, and then only with his private secretary and two servants."

After some weeks' hesitation Gordon was induced by Mr Sauer to so far waive his objection as to consent to accompany him to Letsea's territory. This Basuto chief kept up the fiction of friendly relations with the Cape, but after Gordon had personally interviewed him, he became more than ever convinced that all the Basuto chiefs were in league. Mr Sauer was of opinion that Letsea and the other chiefs might be trusted to attack and able to conquer Masupha. There was no possibility of reconciling these clashing views, but Gordon also accompanied Mr Sauer to Leribe, the chief town of Molappo's territory, north of, and immediately adjoining that of, Masupha. Here Gordon found fresh evidence as to the correctness of his view, that all the Basuto leaders were practically united, and he wrote a memorandum, dated 16th September, which has not been published, showing the hopelessness of getting one chief to coerce the others. Notwithstanding the way he had been treated by the Cape Government, which had ignored all his suggestions, Gordon, in his intense desire to do good, and his excessive trust in the honour of other persons, yielded to Mr Sauer's request to visit Masupha, and not only yielded but went without any instructions or any prior agreement that his views were to prevail. The consequence was that Mr Sauer deliberately resolved to destroy Gordon's reputation as a statesman, and to ensure the triumph of his own policy by an act of treachery that has never been surpassed.

While Gordon went as a private visitor at the special invitation of Masupha to that chief's territory, Mr Sauer, who was well acquainted with Gordon's views, and also the direct author of Gordon's visit at that particular moment, incited Letsea to induce Lerothodi to attack Masupha. At the moment that the news of this act of treachery reached Masupha's ears, Gordon was a guest in Masupha's camp, and the first construction placed upon events by that chief was, that Gordon had been sent up to hoodwink and keep him quiet, while a formidable invasion was plotted of his territory. When Masupha reported this news to Gordon, he asked what he advised him to do, and it has been established that the object of the question was to ascertain how far Gordon was privy to the plot. Gordon's candid reply--"Refuse to have any dealings with the Government until the forces are withdrawn," and his general demeanour, which showed unaffected indignation, convinced Masupha of his good faith and innocence of all participation in the plot.

A very competent witness, Mr Arthur Pattison (letter in _The Times_, 20th August 1885), bears this testimony: "Gordon divined his character marvellously, and was the only man Masupha had the slightest regard for. Masupha, if you treat him straightforwardly, is as nice a man as possible, and even kind and thoughtful; but, if you treat him the other way, he is a fiend incarnate."

Had Masupha not been thus convinced, Gordon's death was decided on, and never in the whole course of his career, not even when among the Taepings on the day of the Wangs' murder in Soochow, nor among Suleiman's slave-hunters at Shaka, was he in greater peril than when exposed by the treacherous proceedings of Sauer and Orpen to the wrath of Masupha. On his return in safety he at once sent in his resignation, but those who played him false not merely never received their deserts for an unpardonable breach of faith to a loyal colleague, but have been permitted by a lax public opinion at the Cape to remain in the public service, and are now discharging high and responsible duties.

Gordon's mission to the leading Basuto chief, and the policy of conciliation which he consistently and ably advocated from the beginning to the end of his stay at the Cape, were thus failures, but they failed, as an impartial writer like Mr Gresswell says, solely because "of Mr Sauer's intrigues behind his back." It is only necessary to add what Gordon himself wrote on this subject on his return, and to record that practically the very policy he advocated was carried into force, not by the Cape Government, but over its head by the British Government, two years later, in the separation of Basutoland from the Cape Colony, and by placing it in its old direct dependence under the British Crown.

"I have looked over the Cape papers; the only thing that is
misrepresented, so far as I could see in a ten minutes' glance at
them, is that Sauer says I knew of his intentions of sending an
expedition against Masupha. He puts it thus: 'Gordon knew that an
expedition was being organised against Masupha.' He gives
apparently three witnesses that I knew well. It is quite true;
but read the words. _I knew Sauer was going_ to try the useless
expedient of an expedition against Masupha, and _before he did
so_ we _agreed I should go and try and make peace_. While
carrying on this peace mission, Sauer sends the expedition. So
you see he is verbally correct; yet the deduction is false; in
fact, who would ever go up with peace overtures to a man who was
to be attacked during those overtures, as Masupha was? Garcia
knew well enough what a surprise it was to him and me when we
heard Sauer was sending the expedition. Garcia was with me at the
time."

And again, when at Jaffa, General Gordon adds further, on the 27th of July 1883:--

"I saw Masupha one day at 10 A.M., and spoke to him; Sauer was
twenty miles away. At 1 P.M. I came back, and wrote to Sauer an
account of what had passed; before I sent it off I received a
letter from Sauer. I believe it is wished to be made out that
Sauer wrote this letter after he had heard what had passed
between Masupha and me. This is not the case, for Sauer, having
let me go to Masupha, changed his mind and wrote the letter, but
this letter had nothing to do with my interview with Masupha."

With this further quotation of Gordon's own words I may conclude the description of the Basuto mission, which, although deemed a failure at the time, was eventually the direct cause of the present administrative arrangement in that important district of South Africa.

"In order you should understand the position of affairs, I recall
to your memory the fact that Scanlan, Merriman, and yourself all
implied to me doubts of Orpen's policy and your desire to remove
him; that I deprecated any such change in my favour; that I
accepted the post of Commandant-General on Merriman's statement
that the Government desired me to eradicate the red-tape system
of the colonial forces; that I made certain reports to the
Government upon the settlement of the Basuto question in May and
July, showing my views; that the Government were aware of the
great difference between my views and those of Orpen, both by
letter and verbally to Merriman; also to my objections to go up.
Sauer was told by me the same thing. I conversed with him _en
route_, and I told him if I visited Masupha I could not
afterwards fight him, for I would not go and spy upon his
defences. Sauer asked me to go to Masupha; he knew my views; yet
when I was there negotiating, he, or rather Orpen, moved
Lerothodi to attack Masupha, who would, I believe, have come to
terms respecting the acceptance of magistrates, a modified
hut-tax, and border police. The reported movement of Lerothodi
prevented my coming to any arrangement. I told Masupha, when he
sent and told me of Lerothodi's advance, not to answer the
Government until the hostile movements had ceased. The Government
sent me up, knowing my views, and against my wish, and knowing I
was not likely to mince matters. There are not more than two
Europeans in Basutoland who believe in Orpen or his policy, while
the natives have lost all confidence in him. Sauer shut his eyes
to all this, and has thrown in his lot with Orpen. Masupha is a
sincere man, and he does not care to have placed with him
magistrates, against whom are complaints, which Sauer ignores. To
show you I was in earnest, I offered to remain as magistrate with
Masupha for two years, so much did I desire a settlement of the
Basuto question. I did not want nor would I have taken the post
of Governor's Agent. The chiefs and people desire peace, but not
at any price. They have intelligence enough to see through
wretched magistrates like some of those sent up into the native
territories. They will accept a convention like the one I sent
down to the Colonial Secretary on the 19th of July, and no other.
I do not write this to escape being a scapegoat--in fact, I like
the altar--only that you may know my views. As long as the
present magistrates stay there, no chance exists for any
arrangement. As to the Premier's remark that I would not fight
against Masupha, is it likely I could fight against a man with
whom I am life and soul? Would I fight against him because he
would not be controlled by some men like ---- and ----? Even
suppose I could sink my conscience to do so, what issue would
result from the action of undisciplined and insubordinate troops,
who are difficult to keep in order during peace-time, and about
whom, when I would have made an example of one officer, a
Minister telegraphs to me to let him down easy. I beg to recall
to you that Her Majesty's Government disapproved of the former
Basuto war; therefore, why should I, who am an outsider to the
colony, even pretend I could make war against a noble people, who
resist magistrates of no capacity? The Government were well
warned by me, and they cannot, therefore, plead being led
astray."

Intimately connected with the Basuto question was the larger one of the right treatment to be generally extended to the natives, and on that subject General Gordon drew up, on 19th October 1882, the following masterly note, which elicited the admiration of one of the Cape Premiers, Mr Merriman, who said--"As a Colony we must try to follow out the ideas sketched by General Gordon."

The following is the full text of this interesting and valuable state paper:--

THE NATIVE QUESTION.

"1. The native question of South Africa is not a difficult one to
an outsider. The difficulty lies in procuring a body of men who
will have strength of purpose to carry out a definite policy with
respect to the natives.

"2. The strained relations which exist between the colonist and
the native are the outcome of employing, as a rule, magistrates
lacking in tact, sympathy, and capacity to deal with the natives,
in the Government not supervising the action of these
magistrates, and in condoning their conduct, while acknowledging
those faults which come to their cognisance.

"3. The Colonial Government act in the nomination of native
magistrates as if their duties were such as any one could
fulfil, instead of being, as they are, duties requiring the
greatest tact and judgment. There can be no doubt but that in a
great measure, indeed one may say entirely, disturbances among
the natives are caused by the lack of judgment, or of honesty, or
of tact, on the part of the magistrates in the native
territories. There may be here and there good magistrates, but
the defects of the bad ones re-act on the good ones. Revolt is
contagious and spreads rapidly among the natives.

"4. One may say no supervision, in the full sense of the term,
exists over the actions of magistrates in native territories.
They report to headquarters what suits them, but unless some very
flagrant injustice is brought to light, which is often condoned,
the Government know nothing. The consequence is that a continual
series of petty injustices rankle in the minds of the natives,
eventually breaking out into a revolt, in the midst of which
Government does not trouble to investigate the causes of such
revolt, but is occupied in its suppression. The history of the
South African wars is essentially, as Sir G. Cathcart puts it,
"Wars undertaken in support of unjustifiable acts." Sir Harry
Smith was recalled for supporting an inefficient official of the
now Free State Territory. Any one who chooses can investigate the
causes of the late wars, and will find out that they arose in a
great measure from the ignorance of the Government, their support
of incapable officials, and their weakness in not investigating
causes before they proceeded to coercion.

"5. Government by coercion is essentially rotten. The Duke of
Wellington said that any fool could govern by that means. And it
is still more rotten when Government governs by the rule of
coercion without the power of coercion except at great expense.

"6. A properly constituted Commission of independent men
proceeding to the native territories, not accepting the
hospitality of those whose conduct they _go_ to investigate, not
driving through the territories in hot haste, as is the manner of
some Ministers, but a Commission who would patiently and
fearlessly inquire into every detail of administration, into
every grievance, is the _sine quâ non_ of any quiet in the native
territories. This Commission should detail on brass plates the
_modus vivendi_, the limits of territory of each district chief,
and a body of trustees should be appointed to watch over any
infraction of such charter.

"7. It must be borne in mind that these native territories cost
the Colony for administration some £9000 per annum for
administration of magistracies; the receipts are some £3000,
leaving a deficit of some £6000 per annum. To this deficit has to
be added some £150,000 for regular troops. The last rebellion of
Transkei ended in capture of some £60,000 worth of cattle, and
that from natives of Colony driven into rebellion, and cost
Government of Colony with Basuto war nearly £4,000,000. It is
surely worth while, from a financial point of view, to
investigate the administration of the Transkei.

"8. The present state of the Transkei is one of seething
discontent and distrust which the rivalry of the tribes alone
prevents breaking out into action, to be quelled again at great
expense and by the ruin of the people, and upset of all
enterprise to open up the country. Throughout the Transkei is one
general clamour against the Government for broken promises, for
promises made and never kept. Magistrates complain no answers are
given to their questions; things are allowed to drift along as
best they can. A fair open policy towards the Pondos would obtain
from them all the Colony could require, but as things are now,
the Pondos are full of distrust, and only want the chance to turn
against the Colony. There are in Transkei 399,000 natives, and
2800 Europeans. Therefore, for the benefit of these 2800
Europeans, 399,000 natives are made miserable, and an expenditure
of £210,000 is incurred by the Colony with the probability of
periodical troubles.

"9. However disagreeable it might be, the Commission of
Investigation should inquire into the antecedents of each
magistrate, and also his capabilities.

"10. With respect to Basutoland, it is understood that no revenue
from that country is to go to the Colony, therefore it can be no
object to Colony to insist on the installation of magistrates in
that country. If the magistrates of Transkei are the cause of
discontent among the natives, then what object is there in
insisting on their installation in Basutoland? The Pondos, a far
inferior people, are happy under their own chiefs--far happier
than the natives of Transkei. Why should the Colony insist on
sending men who are more likely to goad the Basutos into
rebellion than anything else? The administration of Basutoland is
on a scale costing £30,000 per annum.

"11. It is argued that should the Colony go to war with Masupha
the other chiefs would hold aloof. This is quite erroneous. A war
with Masupha means a war with the Basuto nation, with a rising in
the Transkei, and perhaps in Pondoland, and would affect Natal
and Her Majesty's Government.

"12. The only remedy is the sending up of his Excellency the
Governor, or of some high neutral officer, to Basutoland, and the
calling together of the people to decide on their future
government and connection with Colony. Or, should the British
Government refuse this small concession, which could not involve
it, then the Colony should send up an independent Commission to
meet the Basuto people, and arrange a _modus vivendi_. Whichever
course is followed it is a _sine quâ non_ that the present
officials in Basutoland should be relieved at once, as they have
lost the confidence both of Europeans and natives. The Basutos
desire peace, and it is an error to describe their demeanour as
aggressive. It is not unnatural that after what they have
suffered from the hands of Colonial Government they should desire
at least as nearly as much self-government as the Pondos enjoy.
Certainly the present magisterial administration of the Transkei
is very far from being a blessing, or conducive to peace.

"13. Nothing can possibly be worse than the present state of
affairs in native administration, and the interests of the Colony
demand a vertebrate government of some sort, whoever it may be
composed of, instead of the invertebrate formation that is now
called a government, and which drifts into and creates its own
difficulties.

C. G. GORDON.

"October 19, 1882.

"_P.S._--Should Her Majesty's Government manage to arrange with
Basutos in a satisfactory manner, 10,000 splendid cavalry could
be counted on as allies in any contingencies in Natal, etc."

The vital part of Gordon's Cape experiences was the Basuto mission, and as it is desirable that it should not be obscured by other matters, I will only touch briefly on his work as Commandant-General, apart from that he performed as Adviser to the Cape Government in the Basuto difficulty. The post of Commandant-General was forced upon him in the first weeks of his arrival from the Mauritius by the combined urgency of Sir Hercules Robinson, the Governor, and Mr Merriman, then Premier. Much against his inclination, Gordon agreed to fill the post thus thrust upon him, but only for a time. It entailed an infinity of work and worry. His instructions were to break up a red-tape system, and such a task converted every place-holder into his enemy. Still that opposition rather made his task attractive than otherwise, but in a little time he found that this opposition would not stop short of insubordination, and that to achieve success it would be necessary to cashier a good many officers as a wholesome example. It was while matters were in this preliminary stage that Mr Merriman's ministry went out of office, and was succeeded by another under Mr Scanlan. The measures which were favoured by the one were opposed by the other, and Gordon soon saw that the desire for a thorough reorganisation of the Cape forces, which, if properly supported, he could have carried out, was no longer prevalent among the responsible Ministers. Still he drew up an elaborate programme for the improvement of the Colonial Regular forces, by which they might be increased in numbers and improved in efficiency, at the same time that the annual expenditure was reduced. This document shows that mastery of detail which was one of his most striking characteristics, and if his advice had been taken, the Cape would have acquired nearly 4000 troops at no greater cost than it already expended on 1600. In a second memorandum, he not only showed the necessity existing for that larger force, but also how, by administrative alterations in the Transkeian provinces, its cost might be diminished and most conveniently discharged. Although I do not quote these two documents, I cannot help saying that Gordon, in the whole course of his life, never wrote anything more convincing than the advice he gave the Cape Government, which, owing to local jealousies and the invincible bulwark of vested interests, was never carried into effect, although the Basuto question was subsequently composed on Gordon's lines by the Imperial Government, and there has been peace there during all the other South African troubles.

The closing passages between Gordon and the Cape Ministers need only be briefly referred to. Gordon resigned because he saw he could do no good in Basutoland; the Cape Premier accepted his resignation because Gordon "would not fight the Basutos." The intercommunications were much more numerous, but that is their pith. Gordon came down to Cape Town and sailed for England on 14th October, after having been five and a half months in South Africa. He had been treated by the Cape authorities without any regard for justice, and little for courtesy. The leading paper even admitted this much when it observed that "at least General Gordon was entitled to the treatment of a gentleman." But the plain truth was that Gordon was summoned to South Africa and employed by the Government, not as was ostentatiously proclaimed, and as he himself believed, for the attainment of a just solution of the Basuto difficulty, and for the execution of much-needed military reforms, but in order that his military experience and genius might be invoked for the purpose of overthrowing Masupha and of annexing Basutoland, which two years of war and five millions of money had failed to conquer. Hence their disappointment and resentment when Gordon proclaimed that justice was on the side of Masupha; that under no circumstances would he wage war with him; and that the whole origin of the trouble lay in the bad policy, the incompetent magistrates, and the insubordinate military officers of the Cape Government. The indictment was a terrible one; it was also true in every line and every particular.

Having thus vindicated his own character, as well as the highest principles of Government, Gordon left the Cape a poorer and a wiser man than he was on his arrival. I have explained the personal loss he incurred through the inadequacy of his pay and the cutting-off of his army allowance. It has been stated that when he had taken his passage for England he was without any money in his pocket, and that he quaintly said to a friend: "Do you think it is right for a Major-General of the British Army to set out on a journey like this without sixpence in his pocket?" There is nothing improbable in such an occurrence, and it was matched only sixteen months later, when he was on the point of starting for Khartoum in the same impecunious condition.

Gordon arrived in England on 8th November, and after some correspondence with the King of the Belgians, which will be referred to later in connection with the Congo mission, he again left England on 26th December. On this occasion he was going to carry out a long-cherished desire to visit and reside in the Holy Land, so that he might study on the spot the scenes with which his perfect knowledge of the Bible--his inseparable companion--had made him in an extraordinary degree familiar. In the best sense of the word, he was going to take a holiday. There was to be absolute quiet and rest, and at the same time a congenial occupation. He sailed for Jaffa as a guest on one of Sir William Mackinnon's steamers, but he at once proceeded to Jerusalem, where he lived alone, refusing to see any one, with his books as companions, and "mystifying people as to what he was doing." During his stay at Jerusalem he entered with much zest and at great length into the questions of the various sites in the old Jewish capital. I do not propose to follow the course of his labours in that pursuit, as several works contain between them, I should say, every line he wrote on the subject, and the general reader cannot be expected to take any interest in abstruse and much-debated theological and topographical questions. But even in the midst of these pursuits he did not lose his quickness of military perception. After a brief inspection he at once declared that the Russian Convent commanded the whole city, and was in itself a strong fortress, capable of holding a formidable garrison, which Russia could despatch in the guise of priests without any one being the wiser. From Jerusalem, when the heat became great, he returned to Jaffa, and his interest aroused in worldly matters by the progress of events in Egypt, and the development of the Soudan danger, which he had all along seen coming, was evoked by a project that was brought under his notice for the construction across Palestine of a canal to the head of the Gulf of Akabah. In a letter to myself he thus dilates upon the scheme:--

"Here is the subject which I am interested in if it could be
done. The reasons are:--

"1. We are in Egypt supporting an unpopular sovereign, whose
tenure ends with departure of our troops. We offer no hope to the
people of any solace by this support, and by the supporting of
the Turco-Circassian Pashas, who I know by experience are
_hopeless_. We neither govern nor take responsibility; yet we
support these vampires.

"2. We are getting mixed up with the question of whether the
interest of £90,000,000 will be paid or not.

"3. We are mixed up with the Soudan, where we provoked the
rebellion, and of the responsibility of which government we
cannot rid ourselves.

"4. We are in constant and increasing hot water with the French,
and we gain no benefit from it, for the Canal will remain theirs.

* * * * *

"On the other hand, if we get a Firman from Sultan for the
Palestine Canal--

"1. We lose the sacred sites of Jordan River, Capernaum,
Bethsaida, and Tiberias, Jericho, not Engedi.

"2. We swamp a notoriously unhealthy valley, where there are no
missions.

"3. We cut off the pest of the country of Palestine, the
Bedouins.

"4. We are free of all four objections _in re_ occupation of
Egypt.

"5. We gain the fertile lands of Moab and Ammon.

"6. Cyprus is 150 miles from the Mediterranean _débouché_.

"7. We get a waterway for large ships to within fifty miles of
Damascus.

"8. We can never be bothered by any internal commotion, except
for the twenty-five miles from Haifa to Tiberias, for the
waterway of the Canal would be ten miles wide, except in Arabah
Valley, where there are on both sides wastes and deserts.

"9. We get rid of unhealthiness of a narrow cut with no current,
which is the case with Suez Canal now, where the mud is
pestilential from ships' refuse and no current.

"10. It would isolate Palestine, render it quiet from Bedouins;
it would pave the way to its being like Belgium, under no Great
Power, for religious views would be against Palestine ever being
owned by a Great Power.

"11. Up the ladder of Tyre to Gaza would be 10,000 square miles;
population 130,000, quite a small country.

"Do not quote me if you write this. Oddly enough, Ezekiel xlvii.
10 seems to say the Dead Sea shall have fish like the great Sea
(_i.e._ Mediterranean). Zechariah xiv. speaks of two rivers, one
going to Dead Sea, the other to Mediterranean.

"The cost would be--

Canal from Haifa to Jordan, £2,000,000
Compensation to Jordan peoples, 1,000,000
Canal through Akabah, 6,000,000
Ports at Haifa, 1,000,000
Ports at Akabah, 500,000
___________

£10,500,000
===========

say, twelve to fifteen millions, and what a comfort to be free of
Egypt and Soudan for ever!

"Revenue, Palestine, £120,000, of which £80,000 goes to Sultan.
Do not quote _me_, for I have written part of this to Mr W. (the
late Sir William) Mackinnon of B.I.S.N.C., besides which H.M.
Government may object. You may say you had a letter from a
correspondent."

He wrote in a similar strain to other correspondents, but I have never succeeded in discovering whether, from an engineering point of view, the scheme was at all feasible. It seems to me that its suggestion is somewhat destructive of Gordon's own declarations as to the superior merits of the Cape route, nor does Sir Henry Gordon much strengthen the case when, perceiving the inconsistency, he goes out of his way to declare that Gordon only meant the Palestine canal to be a commercial route. Any attempt to limit its usefulness could not destroy the character claimed for it by its promoters, as an equally short and more secure route than that by Suez. Yet it needs no gift of second sight to predict that when any project of rivalry to the masterpiece of Lesseps is carried out, it will be by rail to the Persian Gulf, whether the starting-point be the Bosphorus or the Levant.

In the midst of his interesting researches near Mount Carmel, a summons from the outer world reached Gordon in the form of a letter from Sir William Mackinnon, telling him that the King of the Belgians now called on him to fulfil a promise he had made some years before.

When Gordon first returned from the Cape the King of the Belgians wrote, reminding him of his old promise, dating from 1880, to enter into his service on the Congo, and stating that the difficulty of having an internationally recognised Congo flag, which Gordon had made a _sine quâ non_ of his appointment, could be most speedily solved by Gordon joining him as counsellor at once. This Gordon could not agree to, and he went to Palestine, there to await the King's summons, which came by Sir William Mackinnon's note in October 1883. It then became necessary for Gordon to obtain the official permission of his Government to take up this post, of the exact nature of which the Foreign Office had been already informed, both by General Gordon and King Leopold.

Gordon at once telegraphed to the War Office for the leave rendered necessary by his being on the active list, and that Department replied, asking for particulars. When these were furnished through the Foreign Office the decision was announced that "the Secretary of State declines to sanction your employment on the Congo." The telegraph clerk, more discerning or considerate than Her Majesty's Government, altered "declines" into "decides," and Gordon, in happy ignorance of the truth, proceeded with all possible despatch _via_ Acre and Genoa to Brussels, which he reached on New Year's Day, 1884. That very night he wrote me a short note saying, "I go (_D.V._) next month to the Congo, but keep it secret." Such things cannot be kept secret, and four days later a leading article in _The Times_ informed his countrymen of Gordon's new mission.

On reaching Brussels the mistake in the telegram was discovered, and Gordon here learnt that his Congo mission was vetoed. Then came the difficulty to know what was to be done. Without leave he could not go anywhere without resigning his commission; he was not qualified for a pension, and there were engagements he had voluntarily contracted that he would not see broken, and persons who would suffer by his death, whose interests he was in every way bound to safeguard. Therefore, if he was to carry out his engagement with the King of the Belgians, it was obviously necessary that he should resign the British Army, and that the King should compensate him for his loss. The King said at once: "Retire from the army and I will compensate you," but in a matter of such importance to others Gordon felt nothing should be left to chance, and that a definite contract should be made. For this he had neither the patience nor the business knowledge, and he delegated the task of arranging the matter to his brother, Sir Henry Gordon, who negotiated with the late Sir William Mackinnon as representing the King. They agreed that the value of Gordon's pension if commuted would be £7288, and the King of the Belgians was to provide that sum, which was to be paid into a trust fund. In this and every other matter the King behaved towards Gordon in the most generous and cordial manner, furnishing a marked contrast with the grudging and parsimonious spirit of the British Government towards Gordon in China, at the Cape, and now again when destined for the Congo.

All the arrangements connected with this subject were made in three days, and while Gordon gave instructions for his will to be prepared for the disposal of the trust fund after his death, he wrote the same day (6th January) to Mr H. M. Stanley, then acting for the King on the Congo, announcing his own appointment, offering to "serve willingly with or under him," and fixing his own departure from Lisbon for 5th of February. _Dis aliter visum._ For the moment he worked up some enthusiasm in his task. "We will kill the slave-traders in their haunts"; and again, "No such efficacious means of cutting at root of slave trade ever was presented as that which God has, I trust, opened out to us through the kind disinterestedness of His Majesty," are passages in the same letter, yet all the time there is no doubt his heart and his thoughts were elsewhere. They were in the Soudan, not on the Congo.

The night of this letter he crossed from Brussels, and went straight to his sister's house, long the residence, and, practically speaking, the home of his family, 5 Rockstone Place, Southampton. On the 7th of the month--that is, the same day as he arrived--he wrote the formal letter requesting leave to resign his commission in the Queen's army, and also stating, with his usual candour, that King Leopold II. had guaranteed him against any pecuniary loss. To that letter it may at once be stated that no reply was ever sent. Even the least sympathetic official could not feel altogether callous to a voluntary proposition to remove the name of "Chinese" Gordon from the British army list, and the sudden awakening of the public to the extraordinary claims of General Gordon on national gratitude, and his special fitness to deal with the Soudan difficulty warned the authorities that a too rigid application of office rules would not in his case be allowed. By no individual effort, as has been too lightly granted by some writers, but by the voice of the British people was it decided that not only should Gordon have leave to go to the Congo, without resigning his commission, but also that he should be held entitled to draw his pay as a British general while thus employed. But this was not the whole truth, although I have no doubt that the arrangement would have been carried out in any case. In their dilemma the Government saw a chance of extrication in the person of Gordon, the one man recognised by the public and the press as capable of coping with a difficulty which seemed too much for them. The whole truth, therefore, was that the Congo mission was to wait until after Gordon had been sent to, and returned from, the Soudan. He was then to be placed by the British Government entirely at the disposal of the King of the Belgians. As this new arrangement turned on the assent of the King, it was vital to keep it secret during the remainder of the 15th and the whole of the 16th of that eventful January.

When Gordon arrived at Waterloo Station, at a little before two o'clock on 15th January, and was met there by myself, I do not think that he knew definitely what was coming, but he was a man of extraordinary shrewdness, and although essentially unworldly, could see as clearly and as far through a transaction as the keenest man of business. What he did know was that the army authorities were going to treat him well, but his one topic of conversation the whole way to Pall Mall was not the Congo but the Soudan. To the direct question whether he was not really going, as I suspected, to the Nile instead of the Congo, he declared he had no information that would warrant such an idea, but still, if the King of the Belgians would grant the permission, he would certainly not be disinclined to go there first. I have no doubt that those who acted in the name of the Ministry in a few minutes discovered the true state of his mind, and that Gordon then and there agreed, on the express request of the Government of Mr Gladstone, to go and see the King, and beg him to suspend the execution of his promise until he had gone to the Soudan to arrest the Mahdi's career, or to relieve the Egyptian garrisons, if the phrase be preferred. It should also be stated that Gordon's arrangement with the King of the Belgians was always coupled with this proviso, "provided the Government of my own country does not require my services." The generosity of that sovereign in the matter of the compensation for his Commission did not render that condition void, and however irritating the King may have found the circumstances, Gordon broke neither the spirit nor the letter of his engagement with his Majesty by obeying the orders of his own Government.

Late the same evening I was present at his brother's house to receive an account for publication of his plans on the Congo, but surrounded by so large a number of his relatives summoned to see their hero, many of them for the last time, it was neither convenient nor possible to carry out this task, which was accordingly postponed till the following morning, when I was to see him at the Charing Cross Hotel, and accompany him by the early boat train to Dover. On that night his last will was signed and witnessed by his uncle, Mr George Enderby, and myself. The next morning I was at the hotel before seven, but instead of travelling by this early train, he postponed his departure till ten o'clock, and the greater part of those three hours were given to an explanation, map in hand, of his plans on the Congo. The article, based on his information, appeared in _The Times_ of 17th January 1884, but several times during our conversation he exclaimed, "There may be a respite," but he refused to be more definite. Thus he set out for Brussels, whether he was accompanied by his friend Captain (now Colonel) F. Brocklehurst, who was undoubtedly acting as the representative of the authorities. I believe I may say with confidence that if he did not actually see the King of the Belgians on the evening of the same day, some communication passed indirectly, which showed the object of his errand, for although his own letter communicating the event is dated 17th, from Brussels, it is a fact within my own knowledge that late in the evening of the 16th a telegram was received--"Gordon goes to the Soudan."

The first intimation of something having happened that his brother Sir Henry Gordon received, was in a hurried letter, dated 17th January, which arrived by the early post on Friday, 18th, asking him to "get his uniform ready and some patent leather boots," but adding, "I saw King Leopold to-day; he is furious." Even then Sir Henry, although he guessed his destination, did not know that his departure would be so sudden, for Gordon crossed the same night, and was kept at Knightsbridge Barracks in a sort of honourable custody by Captain Brocklehurst, so that the new scheme might not be prematurely revealed. Sir Henry, a busy man, went about his own work, having seen to his brother's commission, and it was not until his return at five o'clock that he learnt all, and that Gordon was close at hand. He at once hurried off to see him, and on meeting, Gordon, in a high state of exhilaration, exclaimed, "I am off to the Soudan." Sir Henry asked "When?" and back came the reply, "To-night!" He had got his respite.

To him at that moment it meant congenial work and the chance of carrying out the thoughts that had been surging through his mind ever since Egyptian affairs became troubled and the Mahdi's power rose on the horizon of the Soudan. The reality was to prove far different. He was to learn in his own person the weakness and falseness of his Government, and to find himself betrayed by the very persons who had only sought his assistance in the belief that by a miracle--and nothing less would have sufficed--he might relieve them from responsibilities to which they were not equal. Far better would it have been, not only for Gordon's sake, but even for the reputation of England, if he had carried out his original project on the Congo, where, on a less conspicuous scene than the Nile, he might still have fought and won the battle of humanity.

I am placed in a position to state that on the morning of the 17th, at 10 A.M., he wrote to his sister from Brussels, as follows--"Do not mention it, but there is just a chance I may have to go to Soudan for two months, and then go to Congo," and again in a second letter at two o'clock, "Just got a telegram from Wolseley saying, 'Come back to London by evening train,' so when you get this I shall be in town, _but keep it a dead secret_, for I hope to leave it again the same evening. I will not take Governor-Generalship again, I will only report on situation." After this came a post-card--18th January, 6 A.M. "Left B., am now in London; I hope to go back again to-night." That very night he left for Egypt.

That he was not detained the whole day in the Barracks is shown in the following letter, now published for the first time, which gives the only account of his interview with the members of the Government that sent him out:--

"19. 1, 1884.

"MY DEAR AUGUSTA,--I arrived in town very tired, at 6 A.M.
yesterday, went with Brocklehurst to Barracks, washed, and went
to Wolseley. He said Ministers would see me at 3 P.M. I went back
to Barracks and reposed. At 12.30 P.M. Wolseley came for me. I
went with him and saw Granville, Hartington, Dilke, and
Northbrook. They said, 'Had I seen Wolseley, and did I understand
their ideas?' I said 'Yes,' and repeated what Wolseley had said
to me as to their ideas, which was '_they would evacuate
Soudan_.' They were pleased, and said 'That was their idea; would
I go?' I said 'Yes.' They said 'When?' I said 'To-night,' and it
was over. I started at 8 P.M. H.R.H. The Duke of Cambridge and
Lord Wolseley came to see me off. I saw Henry and Bob (R. F.
Gordon); no one else except Stokes--all very kind. I have taken
Stewart with me, a nice fellow. We are now in train near Mont
Cenis. I am not moved a bit, and hope to do the people good. Lord
Granville said Ministers were very much obliged to me. I said I
was much honoured by going. I telegraphed King of the Belgians at
once, and told him 'Wait a few months.' Kindest love to
all.--Your affectionate brother,

"C. G. GORDON."

As further evidence of the haste of his departure, I should like to mention that he had hardly any clothes with him, and that Mrs Watson, wife of his friend Colonel Watson, procured him all he required--in fact, fitted him out--during the two days he stayed at Cairo. These kindly efforts on his behalf were thrown away, for all his baggage--clothes, uniforms, orders, etc.--was captured with the money at Berber and never reached him. His only insignia of office at Khartoum was the Fez, and the writer who described him as putting on his uniform when the Mahdists broke into the town was gifted with more imagination than love of truth.