Chapter X: The Mauritius, the Cape, and the Congo (1)

There was a moment of hesitation in Gordon's mind as to whether he would come home or not. His first project on laying down the Indian Secretaryship had been to go to Zanzibar and attack the slave trade from that side. Before his plans were matured the China offer came, and turned his thoughts in a different channel. On his arrival at Aden, on the way back, he found that the late Sir William Mackinnon, a truly great English patriot of the type of the merchant adventurers of the Elizabethan age, had sent instructions that the ships of the British India Steam Packet Company were at his disposal to convey him whereever he liked, and for a moment the thought occurred to him to turn aside to Zanzibar. But a little reflection led him to think that, as he had been accused of insubordination, it would be better for him to return home and report himself at headquarters. When he arrived in London at the end of October 1880, he found that his letters, written chiefly to his sister during his long sojourn in the Soudan, were on the eve of publication by Dr Birkbeck Hill. That exceedingly interesting volume placed at the disposal of the public the evidence as to his great work in Africa, which might otherwise have been buried in oblivion. It was written under considerable difficulties, for Gordon would not see Dr Hill, and made a stringent proviso that he was not to be praised, and that nothing unkind was to be said about anyone. He did, however, stipulate for a special tribute of praise to be given to his Arab secretary, Berzati Bey, "my only companion for these years--my adviser and my counsellor." Berzati was among those who perished with the ill-fated expedition of Hicks Pasha at the end of 1883. To the publication of this work must be attributed the establishment of Gordon's reputation as the authority on the Soudan, and the prophetic character of many of his statements became clear when events confirmed them.

After a stay at Southampton and in London of a few weeks, Gordon was at last induced to give himself a short holiday, and, strangely enough, he selected Ireland as his recreation ground. I have been told that Gordon had a strain of Irish blood in him, but I have failed to discover it genealogically, nor was there any trace of its influence on his character. He was not fortunate in the season of the year he selected, nor in the particular part of the country he chose for his visit. There is scenery in the south-west division of Ireland, quite apart from the admitted beauty of the Killarney district, that will vie with better known and more highly lauded places in Scotland and Switzerland, but no one would recommend a stranger to visit that quarter of Ireland at the end of November, and the absence of cultivation, seen under the depressing conditions of Nature, would strike a visitor with all the effect of absolute sterility. Gordon was so impressed, and it seemed to him that the Irish peasants of a whole province were existing in a state of wretchedness exceeding anything he had seen in either China or the Soudan. If he had seen the same places six months earlier, he would have formed a less extreme view of their situation. It was just the condition of things that appealed to his sympathy, and with characteristic promptitude he put his views on paper, making one definite offer on his own part, and sent them to a friend, the present General James Donnelly, a distinguished engineer officer and old comrade, and moreover a member of a well-known Irish family. Considering the contents of the letter, and the form in which Gordon threw out his suggestions, it is not very surprising that General Donnelly sent it to _The Times_, in which it was published on 3rd December 1880; but Gordon himself was annoyed at this step being taken, because he realised that he had written somewhat hastily on a subject with which he could scarcely be deemed thoroughly acquainted. The following is its text:--

"You are aware how interested I am in the welfare of this
country, and, having known you for twenty-six years, I am sure I
may say the same of you.

"I have lately been over to the south-west of Ireland in the hope
of discovering how some settlement could be made of the Irish
question, which, like a fretting cancer, eats away our vitals as
a nation.

"I have come to the conclusion that--

"1. A gulf of antipathy exists between the landlords and tenants
of the north-west, west, and south-west of Ireland. It is a gulf
which is not caused alone by the question of rent; there is a
complete lack of sympathy between these two classes. It is
useless to inquire how such a state of things has come to pass. I
call your attention to the pamphlets, letters, and speeches of
the landlord class, as a proof of how little sympathy or kindness
there exists among them for the tenantry, and I am sure that the
tenantry feel in the same way towards the landlords.

"2. No half-measured Acts which left the landlords with any say
to the tenantry of these portions of Ireland will be of any use.
They would be rendered--as past Land Acts in Ireland have
been--quite abortive, for the landlords will insert clauses to do
away with their force. Any half-measures will only place the
Government face to face with the people of Ireland as the
champions of the landlord interest. The Government would be bound
to enforce their decision, and with a result which none can
foresee, but which certainly would be disastrous to the common
weal.

"3. My idea is that, seeing--through this cause or that, it is
immaterial to examine--a deadlock has occurred between the
present landlords and tenants, the Government should purchase up
the rights of the landlords over the whole or the greater part of
Longford, Westmeath, Clare, Cork, Kerry, Limerick, Leitrim,
Sligo, Mayo, Cavan, and Donegal. The yearly rental of these
districts is some four millions; if the Government give the
landlords twenty years' purchase, it would cost eighty millions,
which at three and a half per cent. would give a yearly interest
of £2,800,000, of which £2,500,000 could be recovered; the lands
would be Crown lands; they would be administered by a Land
Commission, who would be supplemented by an Emigration
Commission, which might for a short time need £100,000. This
would not injure the landlords, and, so far as it is an
interference with proprietary rights, it is as just as is the law
which forces Lord A. to allow a railway through his park for the
public benefit. I would restrain the landlords from any power or
control in these Crown land districts. Poor-law, roads, schools,
etc., should be under the Land Commission.

"4. For the rest of Ireland, I would pass an Act allowing free
sale of leases, fair rents, and a Government valuation.

"In conclusion, I must say, from all accounts and my own
observation, that the state of our fellow-countrymen in the parts
I have named is worse than that of any people in the world, let
alone Europe. I believe that these people are made as we are,
that they are patient beyond belief, loyal, but, at the same
time, broken-spirited and desperate, living on the verge of
starvation in places in which we would not keep our cattle.

"The Bulgarians, Anatolians, Chinese, and Indians are better off
than many of them are. The priests alone have any sympathy with
their sufferings, and naturally alone have a hold over them. In
these days, in common justice, if we endow a Protestant
University, why should we not endow a Catholic University in a
Catholic country? Is it not as difficult to get a £5 note from a
Protestant as from a Catholic or Jew? Read the letters of ----
and of ----, and tell me if you see in them any particle of kind
feeling towards the tenantry; and if you have any doubts about
this, investigate the manner in which the Relief Fund was
administered, and in which the sums of money for improvements of
estates by landlords were expended.

"In 1833 England gave freedom to the West Indian slaves at a cost
of twenty millions--worth now thirty millions. This money left
the country. England got nothing for it. By an expenditure of
eighty millions she may free her own people. She would have the
hold over the land, and she would cure a cancer. I am not well
off, but I would offer ---- or his agent £1000, if either of them
would live one week in one of these poor devil's places, and feed
as these people do. Our comic prints do an infinity of harm by
their caricatures--firstly, the caricatures are not true, for the
crime in Ireland is not greater than that in England; and,
secondly, they exasperate the people on both sides of the
Channel, and they do no good.

"It is ill to laugh and scoff at a question which affects our
existence."

This heroic mode of dealing with an old and very complicated difficulty scarcely came within the range of practical achievement. The Irish question is not to be solved by any such simple cut-and-dried procedure. It will take time, sympathy, and good-will. When the English people have eradicated their opinion that the Irish are an inferior race, and when the Irish realise that the old prejudice has vanished, the root-difficulty will be removed. At least Gordon deserves the credit of having seen that much from his brief observation on the spot, and his plea for them as "patient beyond belief and loyal," may eventually carry conviction to the hearts of the more powerful and prosperous kingdom.

The Irish question was not the only one on which he recorded a written opinion. The question of retaining Candahar was very much discussed during the winter of 1880-81, and as the Liberal Government was very much put to it to get high military opinion to support their proposal of abandonment, they were very glad when Gordon wrote to _The Times_ expressing a strong opinion on their side. I think the writing of that letter was mainly due to a sense of obligation to Lord Ripon, although the argument used as to the necessity of Candahar being held by any _single_ ruler of Afghanistan was, and is always, unanswerable. But the question at that time was this: Could any such single ruler be found, and was Abdurrahman, recognised in the August of 1880 as Ameer of Cabul, the man?

On 27th July 1880, less than eight weeks after Gordon's resignation of his Indian appointment, occurred the disastrous battle of Maiwand, when Yakoob's younger brother, Ayoob, gained a decisive victory over a British force. That disaster was retrieved six weeks later by Lord Roberts, but Ayoob remained in possession of Herat and the whole of the country west of the Helmund. It was well known that the rivalry between him and his cousin Abdurrahman did not admit of being patched up, and that it could only be settled by the sword. At the moment there was more reason to believe in the military talent of Ayoob than of the present Ameer, and it was certain that the instant we left Candahar the two opponents would engage in a struggle for its possession. The policy of precipitate evacuation left everything to the chapter of accidents, and if Ayoob had proved the victor, or even able to hold his ground, the situation in Afghanistan would have been eminently favourable for that foreign intervention which only the extraordinary skill and still more extraordinary success of the Ameer Abdurrahman has averted. In giving the actual text of Gordon's letter, it is only right, while frankly admitting that the course pursued has proved most successful and beneficial, to record that it might well have been otherwise, and that as a mere matter of argument the probability was quite the other way. Neither Gordon nor any other supporter of the evacuation policy ventured to predict that Abdurrahman, who was then not a young man, and whose early career had been one of failure, was going to prove himself the ablest administrator and most astute statesman in Afghan history.

"Those who advocate the retention of Candahar do so generally on
the ground that its retention would render more difficult the
advance of Russia on, and would prevent her fomenting rebellion
in, India, and that our prestige in India would suffer by its
evacuation.

"I think that this retention would throw Afghanistan, in the hope
of regaining Candahar, into alliance with Russia, and that
thereby Russia would be given a temptation to offer which she
otherwise would not have. Supposing that temptation did not
exist, what other inducement could Russia offer for this
alliance? The plunder of India. If, then, Russia did advance, she
would bring her auxiliary tribes, who, with their natural
predatory habits, would soon come to loggerheads with their
natural enemies, the Afghans, and that the sooner when these
latter were aided by us. Would the Afghans in such a case be
likely to be tempted by the small share they would get of the
plunder of India to give up their secure, independent position
and our alliance for that plunder, and to put their country at
the mercy of Russia, whom they hate as cordially as they do us?
If we evacuate Candahar, Afghanistan can only have this small
inducement of the plunder of India for Russia to offer her. Some
say that the people of Candahar desire our rule. I cannot think
that any people like being governed by aliens in race or
religion. They prefer their own bad native governments to a
stiff, civilized government, in spite of the increased worldly
prosperity the latter may give.

"We may be sure that at Candahar the spirit which induced
children to kill, or to attempt to kill our soldiers in 1879,
etc., still exists, though it may be cowed. We have trouble
enough with the fanatics of India; why should we go out of our
way to add to their numbers?

"From a military point of view, by the retention we should
increase the line we have to defend by twice the distance of
Candahar to the present frontier, and place an objective point to
be attacked. Naturally we should make good roads to Candahar,
which on the loss of a battle there--and such things must be
always calculated as within possibility--would aid the advance of
the enemy to the Indus. The _débouché_ of the defiles, with good
lateral communications between them, is the proper line of
defence for India, not the entry into those defiles, which cannot
have secure lateral communications. If the entries of the defiles
are held, good roads are made through them; and these aid the
enemy, if you lose the entries or have them turned. This does not
prevent the passage of the defiles being disputed.

"The retention of Candahar would tend to foment rebellion in
India, and not prevent it; for thereby we should obtain an
additional number of fanatical malcontents, who as British
subjects would have the greatest facility of passing to and fro
in India, which they would not have if we did not hold it.

"That our prestige would suffer in India by the evacuation I
doubt; it certainly would suffer if we kept it and forsook our
word--_i.e._ that we made war against Shere Ali, and not against
his people. The native peoples of India would willingly part with
any amount of prestige if they obtained less taxation.

"India should be able, by a proper defence of her present
frontier and by the proper government of her peoples, to look
after herself. If the latter is wanting, no advance of frontier
will aid her.

"I am not anxious about Russia; but, were I so, I would care much
more to see precautions taken for the defence of our Eastern
colonies, now that Russia has moved her Black Sea naval
establishment to the China Sea, than to push forward an
outstretched arm to Candahar. The interests of the Empire claim
as much attention as India, and one cannot help seeing that they
are much more imperilled by this last move of Russia than by
anything she can do in Central Asia.

"Politically, militarily, and morally, Candahar ought not to be
retained. It would oblige us to keep up an interference with the
internal affairs of Afghanistan, would increase the expenditure
of impoverished India, and expose us chronically to the reception
of those painfully sensational telegrams of which we have had a
surfeit of late."

During these few months Gordon wrote on several other subjects--the Abyssinian question, in connection with which he curiously enough styled "the Abyssinians the best of mountaineers," a fact not appreciated until their success over the Italians many years later, the registration of slaves in Egypt, and the best way of carrying on irregular warfare in difficult country and against brave and active races. His remarks on the last subject were called forth by our experiences in the field against the Zulus in the first place, and the Boers in the second, and quite exceptional force was given to them by the occurrence of the defeat at Majuba Hill one day after they appeared in the _Army and Navy Gazette_. For this reason I quote the article in its entirety:--

"The individual man of any country in which active outdoor life,
abstinence, hunting of wild game, and exposure to all weathers
are the habits of life, is more than a match for the private
soldier of a regular army, who is taken from the plough or from
cities, and this is the case doubly as much when the field of
operations is a difficult country, and when the former is, and
the latter is not, acclimatised. On the one hand, the former is
accustomed to the climate, knows the country, and is trained to
long marches and difficulties of all sorts inseparable from his
daily life; the latter is unacclimatised, knows nothing of the
country, and, accustomed to have his every want supplied, is at a
loss when any extraordinary hardships or difficulties are
encountered; he has only his skill in his arms and discipline in
his favour, and sometimes that skill may be also possessed by his
foe. The native of the country has to contend with a difficulty
in maintaining a long contest, owing to want of means and want of
discipline, being unaccustomed to any yoke interfering with
individual freedom. The resources of a regular army, in
comparison to those of the natives of the country, are infinite,
but it is accustomed to discipline. In a difficult country, when
the numbers are equal, and when the natives are of the
description above stated, the regular forces are certainly at a
very great disadvantage, until, by bitter experience in the
field, they are taught to fight in the same irregular way as
their foes, and this lesson may be learnt at a great cost. I
therefore think that when regular forces enter into a campaign
under these conditions, the former ought to avoid any unnecessary
haste, for time does not press with them, while every day
increases the burden on a country without resources and
unaccustomed to discipline, and as the forces of the country,
unprovided with artillery, never ought to be able to attack
fortified posts, any advance should be made by the establishment
of such posts. All engagements in the field ought, if possible,
to be avoided, except by corps raised from people who in their
habits resemble those in arms, or else by irregular corps raised
for the purpose, apart from the routine and red-tape inseparable
from regular armies. The regular forces will act as the back-bone
of the expedition, but the rock and cover fighting will be done
better by levies of such specially raised irregulars. For war
with native countries, I think that, except for the defence of
posts, artillery is a great incumbrance, far beyond its value. It
is a continual source of anxiety. Its transport regulates the
speed of the march, and it forms a target for the enemy, while
its effects on the scattered enemy is almost _nil_. An advance of
regular troops, as at present organised, is just the sort of
march that suits an active native foe. The regulars' column must
be heaped together, covering its transport and artillery. The
enemy knows the probable point of its destination on a particular
day, and then, knowing that the regulars cannot halt definitely
where it may be chosen to attack, it hovers round the column like
wasps. The regulars cannot, from not being accustomed to the
work, go clambering over rocks, or beating covers after their
foes. Therefore I conclude that in these wars[1] regular troops
should only act as a reserve; that the real fighting should be
done either by native allies or by special irregular corps,
commanded by special men, who would be untrammelled by
regulations; that, except for the defence of posts, artillery
should be abandoned. It may seem egotistical, but I may state
that I should never have succeeded against native foes had I not
had flanks, and front, and rear covered by irregular forces.
Whenever either the flanks, or rear, or front auxiliaries were
barred in their advance, we turned the regular forces on that
point, and thus strengthening the hindered auxiliaries, drove
back the enemy. We owed defeats, when they occurred, to the
absence of these auxiliaries, and on two occasions to having
cannon with the troops, which lost us 1600 men. The Abyssinians,
who are the best of mountaineers, though they have them, utterly
despise cannon, as they hinder their movements. I could give
instance after instance where, in native wars, regular troops
could not hold their own against an active guerilla, and where,
in some cases, the disasters of the regulars were brought about
by being hampered by cannon. No one can deny artillery may be
most efficient in the contention of two regular armies, but it is
quite the reverse in guerilla warfare. The inordinate haste which
exists to finish off these wars throws away many valuable aids
which would inevitably accrue to the regular army if time was
taken to do the work, and far greater expense is caused by this
hurry than otherwise would be necessary. All is done on the
'_Veni, vidi, vici_' principle. It may be very fine, but it is
bloody and expensive, and not scientific. I am sure it will occur
to many, the times we have advanced, without proper breaches,
bridges, etc., and with what loss, assaulted. It would seem that
military science should be entirely thrown away when combating
native tribes. I think I am correct in saying that the Romans
always fought with large auxiliary forces of the invaded country
or its neighbours, and I know it was the rule of the Russians in
Circassia."

[1] In allusion more particularly to the Cape and China.

Perhaps Gordon was influenced by the catastrophes in South Africa when he sent the following telegram at his own expense to the Cape authorities on 7th April 1881: "Gordon offers his services for two years at £700 per annum to assist in terminating war and administering Basutoland." To this telegram he was never accorded even the courtesy of a negative reply. It will be remembered that twelve months earlier the Cape Government had offered him the command of the forces, and that his reply had been to refuse. The incident is of some interest as showing that his attention had been directed to the Basuto question, and also that he was again anxious for active employment. His wish for the latter was to be realised in an unexpected manner.

He was staying in London when, on visiting the War Office, he casually met the late Colonel Sir Howard Elphinstone, an officer of his own corps, who began by complaining of his hard luck in its just having fallen to his turn to fill the post of Engineer officer in command at the Mauritius, and such was the distastefulness of the prospect of service in such a remote and unattractive spot, that Sir Howard went on to say that he thought he would sooner retire from the service. In his impulsive manner Gordon at once exclaimed: "Oh, don't worry yourself, I will go for you; Mauritius is as good for me as anywhere else." The exact manner in which this exchange was brought about has been variously described, but this is the literal version given me by General Gordon himself, and there is no doubt that, as far as he could regret anything that had happened, he bitterly regretted the accident that caused him to become acquainted with the Mauritius. In a letter to myself on the subject from Port Louis he said: "It was not over cheerful to go out to this place, nor is it so to find a deadly sleep over all my military friends here." In making the arrangements which were necessary to effect the official substitution of himself for Colonel Elphinstone, Gordon insisted on only two points: first, that Elphinstone should himself arrange the exchange; and secondly that no payment was to be made to him as was usual--in this case about £800--on an exchange being effected. Sir Howard Elphinstone was thus saved by Gordon's peculiarities a disagreeable experience and a considerable sum of money. Some years after Gordon's death Sir Howard met with a tragic fate, being washed overboard while taking a trip during illness to Madeira.

Like everything else he undertook, Gordon determined to make his Mauritius appointment a reality, and although he was only in the island twelve months, and during that period took a trip to the interesting group of the Seychelles, he managed to compress an immense amount of work into that short space, and to leave on record some valuable reports on matters of high importance. He found at Mauritius the same dislike for posts that were outside the ken of headquarters, and the same indifference to the dry details of professional work that drove officers of high ability and attainments to think of resigning the service sooner than fill them, and, when they did take them, to pass their period of exile away from the charms of Pall Mall in a state of inaction that verged on suspended animation. In a passage already quoted, he refers to the deadly sleep of his military friends, and then he goes on to say in a sentence, which cannot be too much taken to heart by those who have to support this mighty empire, with enemies on every hand--"We are in a perfect Fools' Paradise about our power. We have plenty of power if we would pay attention to our work, but the fault is, to my mind, the military power of the country is eaten up by selfishness and idleness, and we are trading on the reputation of our forefathers. When one sees by the newspapers the Emperor of Germany sitting, old as he is, for two long hours inspecting his troops, and officers here grudging two hours a week for their duties, one has reason to fear the future."

During his stay at Mauritius he wrote three papers of first-rate importance. One of them on Egyptian affairs after the deposition of Ismail may be left for the next chapter, and the two others, one on coaling stations in the Indian Ocean, and the second on the comparative merits of the Cape and Mediterranean routes come within the scope of this chapter, and are, moreover, deserving of special consideration. With regard to the former of these two important subjects, Gordon wrote as follows, but I cannot discover that anything has been done to give practical effect to his recommendations:--

"I spoke to you concerning Borneo and the necessity for coaling
stations in the Eastern seas. Taking Mauritius with its large
French population, the Cape with its conflicting elements, and
Hongkong, Singapore, and Penang with their vast Chinese
populations, who may be with or against us, but who are at any
time a nuisance, I would select such places where no temptation
would induce colonists to come, and I would use them as maritime
fortresses. For instance, the only good coaling place between
Suez and Adelaide would be in the Chagos group, which contain a
beautiful harbour at San Diego. My object is to secure this for
the strengthening of our maritime power. These islands are of
great strategical importance _vis à vis_ with India, Suez, and
Singapore. Remember Aden has no harbour to speak of, and has the
need of a garrison, while Chagos could be kept by a company of
soldiers. It is wonderful our people do not take the views of our
forefathers. They took up their positions at all the salient
points of the routes. We can certainly hold these places, but
from the colonial feelings they have almost ceased to be our own.
By establishing these coaling stations no diplomatic
complications could arise, while by their means we could unite
all our colonies with us, for we could give them effective
support. The spirit of no colony would bear up for long against
the cutting off of its trade, which would happen if we kept
watching the Mediterranean and neglected the great ocean routes.
The cost would not be more than these places cost now, if the
principle of heavily-armed, light-draught, swift gunboats with
suitable arsenals, properly (not over) defended, were followed."

Chagos as well as Seychelles forms part of the administrative group of the Mauritius. The former with, as Gordon states, an admirable port in San Diego, lies in the direct route to Australia from the Red Sea, and the latter contains an equally good harbour in Port Victoria Mahé. The Seychelles are remarkably healthy islands--thirty in number--and Gordon recommended them as a good place for "a man with a little money to settle in." He also advanced the speculative and somewhat imaginative theory that in them was to be found the true site of the Garden of Eden.

The views Gordon expressed in 1881 as to the diminished importance of the Mediterranean as an English interest, and the relative superiority of the Cape over the Canal route, on the ground of its security, were less commonly held then than they have since become. Whether they are sound is not to be taken on the trust of even the greatest of reputations; and in so complicated and many-sided a problem it will be well to consider all contingencies, and to remember that there is no reason why England should not be able in war-time to control them both, until at least the remote epoch when Palestine shall be a Russian possession.

"I think Malta has very much lost its importance. The
Mediterranean now differs much from what it was in 1815. Other
nations besides France possess in it great dockyards and
arsenals, and its shores are backed by united peoples. Any war
with Great Britain in the Mediterranean with any one Power would
inevitably lead to complications with neutral nations. Steam has
changed the state of affairs, and has brought the Mediterranean
close to every nation of Europe. War in the Mediterranean is _war
in a basin_, the borders of which are in the hands of other
nations, all pretty powerful and interested in trade, and all
likely to be affected by any turmoil in that basin, and to be
against the makers of such turmoil. In fact, the Mediterranean
trade is so diverted by the railroads of Europe, that it is but
of small importance. The trade which is of value is the trade
east of Suez, which, passing through the Canal, depends upon its
being kept open. If the entrance to the Mediterranean were
blocked at Gibraltar by a heavy fleet, I cannot see any advantage
to be gained against us by the fleets blocked up in it--at any
rate I would say, let our _first care_ be for the Cape route, and
secondly for the Mediterranean and Canal. The former route
entails no complications, the latter endless ones, coupled with a
precarious tenure. Look at the Mediterranean, and see how small
is that sea on which we are apparently devoting the greater part
of our attention. Aden should be made a Crown colony. The
Resident, according to existing orders, reports to Bombay, and
Bombay to _that_ Simla Council, which knows and cares nothing
for the question. A special regiment should be raised for its
protection."

While stationed in the Mauritius, Gordon attained the rank of Major-General in the army, and another colonel of Engineers was sent out to take his place. During the last three months of his residence he filled, in addition to his own special post, that of the command of all the troops on the station, and at one time it seemed as if he might have been confirmed in the appointment. But this was not done, owing, as he suggested, to the "determination not to appoint officers of the Royal Artillery or Engineers to any command;" but a more probable reason was that Gordon had been inquiring about and had discovered that the colonists were not only a little discontented, but had some ground for their discontent. By this time Gordon's uncompromising sense of justice was beginning to be known in high official quarters, and the then responsible Government had far too many cares on its shoulders that could not be shirked to invite others from so remote and unimportant a possession as the Mauritius.

Even before any official decision could have been arrived at in this matter, fate had provided him with another destination.

Two passages have already been cited, showing the overtures first made by the Cape Government, and then by Gordon himself, for his employment in South Africa. Nothing came of those communications. On 23rd February 1882, when an announcement was made by myself that Gordon would vacate his command in a few weeks' time, the Cape Government again expressed its desire to obtain the use of his services, and moreover recollected the telegram to which no reply had been sent. Sir Hercules Robinson, then Governor of the Cape, sent the following telegram to the Colonial Secretary, the Earl of Kimberley:--

"Ministers request me to inquire whether H.M.'s Government would
permit them to obtain the services of Colonel Charles Gordon.
Ministers desire to invite Colonel Gordon to come to this Colony
for the purpose of consultation as to the best measures to be
adopted with reference to Basutoland, in the event of Parliament
sanctioning their proposals as to that territory, and to engage
his services, should he be willing to renew the offer made to
their predecessors in April 1881, to assist in terminating the
war and administering Basutoland."

Lord Kimberley then sent instructions by telegraph to Durban, and thence by steamer, sanctioning Gordon's employment and his immediate departure from the Mauritius. The increasing urgency of the Basuto question induced the Cape Government to send a message by telegraph to Aden, and thence by steamer direct to Gordon. In this message they stated that "the services of some one of proved ability, firmness, and energy," were required; that they did not expect Gordon to be bound by the salary named in his own telegram, and that they begged him to visit the Colony "at once"--repeating the phrase twice. All these messages reached Gordon's hands on 2nd April. Two days later he started in the sailing vessel _Scotia_, no other ship being obtainable.

The Cape authorities had therefore no ground to complain of the dilatoriness of the man to whom they appealed in their difficulty, although their telegram was despatched 3rd of March, and Gordon did not reach Cape Town before the 3rd of May. It will be quite understood that Gordon had offered in the first place, and been specially invited in the second place, to proceed to the Cape, for the purpose of dealing with the difficulty in Basutoland. He was to find that, just as his mission to China had been complicated by extraneous circumstances, so was his visit to the Cape to be rendered more difficult by Party rivalries, and by work being thrust upon him which he had several times refused to accept, and for the efficient discharge of which, in his own way, he knew he would never obtain the requisite authority.

Before entering upon this matter a few words may be given to the financial agreement between himself and the Cape Government. The first office in 1880 had carried with it a salary of £1500; in 1881 Gordon had offered to go for £700; in 1882 the salary was to be a matter of arrangement, and on arrival at Cape Town he was offered £1200 a year. He refused to accept more than £800 a year; but as he required and insisted on having a secretary, the other £400 was assigned for that purpose. In naming such a small and inadequate salary Gordon was under the mistaken belief that his imperial pay of £500 a year would continue, but, unfortunately for him, a new regulation, 25th June 1881, had come into force while he was buried away in the Mauritius, and he was disqualified from the receipt of the income he had earned. Gordon was very indignant, more especially because it was clear that he was doing public service at the Cape, while, as he said with some bitterness, if he had started an hotel or become director of a company, his pay would have gone on all the same. The only suggestion the War Office made was that he should ask the Cape Government to compensate him, but this he indignantly refused. In the result all his savings during the Mauritius command were swallowed up, and I believe I understate the amount when I say that his Cape experience cost him out of his own pocket from first to last five hundred pounds. That sum was a very considerable one to a man who never inherited any money, and who went through life scorning all opportunities of making it. But on this occasion he vindicated a principle, and showed that "money was not his object."

As Gordon went to the Cape specially for the purpose of treating the Basutoland question, it may be well to describe briefly what that question was. Basutoland is a mountainous country, difficult of access, but in resources self-sufficing, on the eastern side of the Orange Free State, and separated from Natal and Kaffraria, or the Transkei division of Cape Colony, by the sufficiently formidable Drakensberg range. Its population consisted of 150,000 stalwart and freedom-loving Highlanders, ruled by four chiefs--Letsea, Masupha, Molappo, and Lerothodi, with only the three first of whom had Gordon in any way to deal. Notwithstanding their numbers, courage, and the natural strength of their country, they owed their safety from absorption by the Boers to British protection, especially in 1868, and they were taken over by us as British subjects without any formality three years later. They do not seem to have objected so long as the tie was indefinite, but when in 1880 it was attempted to enforce the regulations of the Peace Preservation Act by disarming these clans, then the Basutos began a pronounced and systematic opposition. Letsea and Lerothodi kept up the pretence of friendliness, but Masupha fortified his chief residence at Thaba Bosigo, and openly prepared for war. That war had gone on for two years without result, and the total cost of the Basuto question had been four millions sterling when Gordon was summoned to the scene. Having given this general description of the question, it will be well to state the details of the matters in dispute, as set forth by Gordon after he had examined all the papers and heard the evidence of the most competent and well-informed witnesses.

His memorandum, dated 26th May 1882, read as follows:--

"In 1843 the Basuto chiefs entered into a treaty with Her
Majesty's Government, by which the limits of Basutoland were
recognised roughly in 1845. The Basuto chiefs agreed by
convention with Her Majesty's Government to a concession of land
on terminable leases, on the condition that Her Majesty's
Government should protect them from Her Majesty's subjects.

"In 1848 the Basuto chiefs agreed to accept the Sovereignty of
Her Majesty the Queen, on the understanding that Her Majesty's
Government would restrain Her Majesty's subjects in the
territories they possessed.

"Between 1848 and 1852, notwithstanding the above treaties, a
large portion of Basutoland was annexed by the proclamation of
Her Majesty's Government, and this annexation was accompanied by
hostilities, which were afterwards decided by Sir George Cathcart
as being undertaken in support of unjustifiable aggression.

"In 1853, notwithstanding the treaties, Basutoland was abandoned,
leaving its chiefs to settle as they could with the Europeans of
the Free State who were settled in Basutoland and were mixed up
with the Basuto people.

"In 1857, the Basutos asked Her Majesty's Government to arbitrate
and settle their quarrels. This request was refused.

"In 1858 the Free State interfered to protect their settlers, and
a war ensued, and the Free State was reduced to great
extremities, and asked Her Majesty's Government to mediate. This
was agreed to, and a frontier line was fixed by Her Majesty's
Government.

"In 1865 another war broke out between the Free State and the
Basutos, at the close of which the Basutos lost territory, and
were accepted as British subjects by Her Majesty's Government for
the second time, being placed under the direct government of Her
Majesty's High Commissioner.

"In 1871 Basutoland was annexed to the _Crown_ Colony of the Cape
of Good Hope, without the Basutos having been consulted.

"In 1872 the _Crown_ Colony became a colony with a responsible
Government, and the Basutos were placed virtually under another
power. The Basutos asked for representation in the Colonial
Parliament, which was refused, and to my mind here was the
mistake committed which led to these troubles.

"Then came constant disputes, the Disarmament Act, the Basuto
War, and present state of affairs.

"From this chronology there are four points that stand out in
relief:--

"1. That the Basuto people, who date back generations, made
treaties with the British Government, which treaties are equally
binding, whether between two powerful states, or between a
powerful state and a weak one.

"2. That, in defiance of the treaties, the Basutos lost land.

"3. That, in defiance of the treaties, the Basutos, without being
consulted or having their rights safeguarded, were handed over to
another power--the Colonial Government.

"4. That that other power proceeded to enact their disarmament, a
process which could only be carried out with a servile race, like
the Hindoos of the plains of India, and which any one of
understanding must see would be resisted to the utmost by any
people worth the name; the more so in the case of the Basutos,
who realised the constant contraction of their frontiers in
defiance of the treaties made with the British Government, and
who could not possibly avoid the conclusion that this disarmament
was only a prelude to their extinction.

"The necessary and inevitable result of the four deductions was
that the Basutos resisted, and remain passively resisting to this
day.

"The fault lay in the British Government not having consulted the
Basutos, their co-treaty power, when they handed them over to the
Colonial Government. They should have called together a national
assembly of the Basuto people, in which the terms of the transfer
could have been quietly arranged, and this I consider is the root
of all the troubles, and expenses, and miseries which have sprung
up; and therefore, as it is always best to go to the root of any
malady, I think it would be as well to let bygones be bygones,
and to commence afresh by calling together by proclamation a
Pitso of the whole tribe, in order to discuss the best means of
sooner securing the settlement of the country. I think that some
such proclamation should be issued. By this Pitso we would know
the exact position of affairs, and the real point in which the
Basutos are injured or considered themselves to be injured.

"To those who wish for the total abandonment of Basutoland, this
course must be palatable; to those who wish the Basutos well, and
desire not to see them exterminated, it must also be palatable;
and to those who hate the name of Basutoland it must be
palatable, for it offers a solution which will prevent them ever
hearing the name again.

"This Pitso ought to be called at once. All Colonial officials
ought to be absent, for what the colony wants is to know what is
the matter; and the colony wishes to know it from the Basuto
people, irrespective of the political parties of the Government.

"Such a course would certainly recommend itself to the British
Government, and to its masters--the British people.

"Provided the demands of the Basutos--who will, for their own
sakes, never be for a severing of their connection with the
colony, in order to be eventually devoured by the Orange Free
State--are such as will secure the repayment to the colony of all
expenses incurred by the Colonial Government in the maintenance
of this connection, and I consider that the Colonial Government
should accept them.

"With respect to the Loyals, there are some 800 families, the
cost of keeping whom is on an average one shilling per diem each
family, that is £40 per diem, or £1200 per month, and they have
been rationed during six months at cost of £7200. Their claims
may therefore be said to be some £80,000. Now, if these 800
families (some say half) have claims amounting to £30 each
individually (say 400 families at £30), £12,000 paid at once
would rid the colony of the cost of subsistence of these
families, viz. £600 a month (the retention of them would only add
to the colonial expenditure, and tend to pauperise them).

"I believe that £30,000 paid at once to the Loyals would reduce
their numbers to one-fourth what they are now. It is proposed to
send up a Commission to examine into their claims; the Commission
will not report under two months, and there will be the delay of
administration at Cape Town, during all which time £1200 a month
are being uselessly expended by the colony, detrimentally to the
Loyals. Therefore I recommend (1) that the sum of £30,000 should
be at once applied to satisfy the minor claims of the Loyals; (2)
that this should be done at once, at same time as the meeting of
the National Pitso.

"The effect of this measure in connection with the meeting of the
National Pitso would be very great, for it would be a positive
proof of the good disposition of the Colonial Government. The
greater claims could, if necessary, wait for the Parliamentary
Commission, but I would deprecate even this delay, and though for
the distribution of the £30,000 I would select those on whom the
responsibility of such distribution could be put, without
reference to the Colonial Government, for any larger sums perhaps
the colonial sanction should be taken.

"I urge that this measure of satisfying the Loyals is one that
presses and cannot well wait months to be settled.

"In conclusion, I recommend (1) that a National Pitso be held;
(2) that the Loyals should at once be paid off.

"I feel confident that by the recommendation No. 1 nothing could
be asked for detrimental to colonial interests, whose Government
would always have the right of amending or refusing any demands,
and that by recommendation No. 2 a great moral effect would be
produced at once, and some heavy expenses saved."

Attached to this memorandum was the draft of a proclamation to the chiefs, etc., of Basutoland, calling on them to meet in Pitso or National Assembly without any agent of the Colonial Government being present. It was not very surprising that such a policy of fairness and consideration for Basuto opinion, because so diametrically opposite to everything that Government had been doing, should have completely taken the Cape authorities aback, nor were its chances of being accepted increased by Gordon entrusting it to Mr Orpen, whose policy in the matter had been something more than criticised by the Ministers at that moment in power at the Cape. Gordon's despatch was in the hands of the Cape Premier early in June, and the embarrassment he felt at the ability and force with which the Basuto side of the question was put by the officer, who was to settle the matter for the Cape Government, was so great that, instead of making any reply, he passed it on to Lord Kimberley and the Colonial Office for solution. It was not until the 7th of August that an answer was vouchsafed to Gordon on what was, after all, the main portion of his task in South Africa. In the interval Gordon was employed on different military and administrative matters, for he had had thrust on him as a temporary charge the functions of Commandant-General of the Cape forces, which he had never wished to accept, but it will be clearer to the reader to follow to the end the course of his Basuto mission, which was the essential cause of his presence in South Africa.

On the 18th July the Ministers requested Gordon to go up to Basutoland. At that moment, and indeed for more than three weeks later, Gordon had received no reply to the detailed memorandum already quoted. He responded to this request with the draft of a convention that would "save the susceptibilities of Mr Orpen between whom and Masupha any _entente_ would seem impossible." The basis of that convention was to be the semi-independence of the Basutos, but its full text must be given in order to show the consistency, as well as the simplicity, of Gordon's proposed remedy of a question that had gone on for years without any prospect of termination.

CONVENTION BETWEEN COLONY, CAPE OF GOOD HOPE, AND THE CHIEF AND
PEOPLE OF BASUTOLAND.

"The Colonial Government having nominated as their
representatives, Colonel C. Griffiths and Dr J. W. Matthews, the
Basuto nation having nominated the Chief Letsea Moshesh and
Masupha Moshesh as their representatives, the following
convention has been agreed upon between these representatives:--

"Art. 1. There shall be a complete amnesty on both sides to all
who have taken part in the late hostilities.

"Art. 2. The question of the succession to Molappo Moshesh's
chieftainship shall be decided by the Chief of the Basuto Nation.

"Art. 3. The Colonial Government engages to respect the integrity
of the Basuto nation within the limits to be hereafter decided
upon, and also to use its best endeavours to have these limits
respected by the Orange Free State.

"Art. 4. The Colonial Government will appoint a Resident to the
Basuto nation, with two sub-residents. The Resident will consult
with the leading Chief of the Basuto Nation on all measures
concerning the welfare of that country, but the government of the
Basutos in all internal affairs will remain under the
jurisdiction of the chiefs.

"Art. 5. The Supreme Council of Basutoland will consist of the
leading chiefs and the Resident; the minor chiefs of Basutoland
will form a council with the sub-residents. These minor councils
can be appealed against by any non-content to the Supreme
Council.

"Art. 6. A hut-tax will be collected of 10s. per hut by the
chiefs, and will be paid to the Resident and sub-resident. The
sum thus collected will be used in paying the Resident £2000 a
year, all included: the sub-residents £1200 a year, all included;
in providing for the education of people (now costing £3320 a
year); in making roads, etc.

"Art. 7. The chiefs collecting hut-tax will be paid 10 per cent.
of the sums they collect.

"Art. 8. The frontier line will be placed under headmen, who will
be responsible that no thieving be permitted, that spoors are
followed up. For this these headmen will be paid at the rate of
£20 to £60 per annum, according to the length of frontier they
are responsible for.

"Art. 9. All passes must be signed by Residents or sub-residents
for the Orange Free State, or for the Cape Colony.

"_Query_--Would it be advisable to add chiefs and missionaries
after sub-residents?

"Art. 10. Colonial warrants will be valid in Basutoland, the
chiefs being responsible that prisoners are given up to Resident
or sub-residents.

"Art. 11. All communications between Basutoland and the Orange
Free State to be by and through the Resident.

"Art. 12. This Convention to be in quadruplicate, two copies
being in possession of the Colonial Government, and two copies in
possession of the Basuto chiefs.

"Art. 13. On signature of this Convention, and on the fulfilment
of Art. 1, amnesty clause, the Colonial Government agrees to
withdraw the military forces and the present magisterial
administration."

To this important communication no answer was ever vouchsafed, but on 7th August, long after it was in the hands of Ministers, Mr Thomas Scanlan, the Premier, wrote a long reply to the earlier memorandum of 26th May. The writer began by quoting Lord Kimberley's remarks on that memorandum, which were as follows:--