Chapter IX: Minor Missions--India and China (2)

But without this perfect information, and for the best, as in the end it proved, Gordon, hot with disappointment that the original summons was not from Li Hung Chang, went straight to that statesman's yamen at Tientsin, ignored Hart, and proclaimed that he had come as the friend of the only man who had given any sign of an inclination to regenerate China. He resided as long as he was in Northern China with Li Hung Chang, whom he found being goaded towards high treason by persons who had no regard for China's interests, and who thought only of the attainment of their own selfish designs. The German Minister, thinking that he had obtained an ally who would render the success of his own plan certain, proposed that Gordon should put himself at the head of Li's army, march on Peking, and depose the Emperor. Gordon's droll comment on this is: "I told him I was equal to a good deal of filibustering, but that this was beyond me, and that I did not think there was the slightest chance of such a project succeeding, as Li had not a sufficient following to give it any chance of success." He recorded his views of the situation in the following note: "The only thing that keeps me in China is Li Hung Chang's safety--if he were safe I would not care--but some people are egging him on to rebel, some to this, and some to that, and all appears in a helpless drift. There are parties at Peking who would drive the Chinese into war for their own ends." Having measured the position and found it bristling with unexpected difficulties and dangers, Gordon at once regretted the promise he had given his own Government in the message from Ceylon. He thought it was above all things necessary for him to have a free hand, and he consequently sent the following telegram to the Horse Guards: "I have seen Li Hung Chang, and he wishes me to stay with him. I cannot desert China in her present crisis, and would be free to act as I think fit. I therefore beg to resign my commission in Her Majesty's Service." Having thus relieved, as he thought, his Government of all responsibility for his acts--although they responded to this message by accusing him of insubordination, and by instructing Sir Thomas Wade to place him under moral arrest--Gordon threw himself into the China difficulty with his usual ardour. Nothing more remained to be done at Tientsin, where he had effectually checked the pernicious counsel pressed on Li Hung Chang most strongly by the German Minister, and in a minor degree by the representatives of France and England. In order to influence the Central Government it was necessary for him to proceed to Peking, and the following unpublished letter graphically describes his views at the particular moment:--

"I am on my way to Peking. There are three parties--Li Hung Chang
(1), the Court (2), the Literary Class (3). The two first are for
peace, but dare not say it for fear of the third party. I have
told Li that he, in alliance with the Court, must coerce the
third party, and have written this to Li and to the Court Party.
By so doing I put my head in jeopardy in going to Peking. I do
not wish Li to act alone. It is not good he should do anything
except support the Court Party morally. God will overrule for the
best. If neither the Court Party nor Li can act, if these two
remain and let things drift, then there will be a disastrous war,
of which I shall not see the end. You know I do not mourn this.
Having given up my commission, I have nothing to look for, and
indeed I long for the quiet of the future.... If the third party
hear of my recommendation before the Court Party acts, then I may
be doomed to a quick exit at Peking. Li Hung Chang is a noble
fellow, and worth giving one's life for; but he must not rebel
and lose his good name. It is a sort of general election which is
going on, but where heads are in gage."

Writing to me some months later, General Gordon entered into various matters relating to this period, and as the letter indirectly throws light on what may be called the Li Hung Chang episode, I quote it here, although somewhat out of its proper place:--

"Thanks for your kind note. I send you the two papers which were
made public in China, and through the Shen-pao some of it was
sent over. Another paper of fifty-two articles I gave Li Hung
Chang, but I purposely kept no copy of it, for it went into--

"1. The contraband of salt and opium at Hongkong.

"2. The advantages of telegraphs and canals, not railways, which
have ruined Egypt and Turkey by adding to the financial
difficulties.

"3. The effeteness of the Chinese representatives abroad, etc.,
etc., etc.

"I wrote as a Chinaman for the Chinese. I recommended Chinese
merchants to do away with middle-men, and to have Government aid
and encouragement to create houses or firms in London, etc.; to
make their own cotton goods, etc. In fact, I wrote as a Chinaman.
I see now and then symptoms that they are awake to the situation,
for my object has been always to put myself into the skin of
those I may be with, and I like these people as much--well, say
nearly as much--as I like my countrymen.

"There are a lot of people in China who would egg on revolts of A
and B. All this is wrong. China must _fara da se_. I painted this
picture to the Chinese of 1900: 'Who are those people hanging
about with jinrickshas?' 'The sons of the European merchants.'
'What are those ruins?' 'The Hongs of the European merchants,'
etc., etc.

"People have asked me what I thought of the advance of China
during the sixteen years I was absent. They looked superficially
at the power military of China. I said they are unchanged. You
come, I must go; but I go on to say that the stride China has
made in commerce is immense, and commerce and wealth are the
power of nations, not the troops. Like the Chinese, I have a
great contempt for military prowess. It is ephemeral. I admire
administrators, not generals. A military Red-Button mandarin has
to bow low to a Blue-Button civil mandarin, and rightly so to my
mind.

"I wrote the other day to Li Hung Chang to protest against the
railway from Ichang to Peking along the Grand Canal. In making it
they would enter into no end of expenses, the coin would leave
the country and they would not understand it, and would be
fleeced by the financial cormorants of Great Britain. They can
understand canals. Let them repair the Grand Canal."

Having arrived at Peking, Gordon was received in several councils by Prince Chun, the father of the young Emperor and the recognised leader of the War Party. The leading members of the Grand Council were also present, and Gordon explained his views to them at length. In the first place, he said, if there were war he would only stay to help them on condition that they destroyed the suburbs of Peking, allowed him to place the city in a proper state of defence, and removed the Emperor and Court to a place of safety. When they expressed their opinion that the Taku forts were impregnable, Gordon laughed, and said they could be taken from the rear. The whole gist of his remarks was that "they could not go to war," and when they still argued in the opposite sense, and the interpreter refused to translate the harsh epithets he applied to such august personages, he took the dictionary, looked out the Chinese equivalent for "idiocy," and with his finger on the word, placed it under the eyes of each member of the Council. The end of this scene may be described in Gordon's own words: "I said make peace, and wrote out the terms. They were, in all, five articles; the only one they boggled at was the fifth, about the indemnity. They said this was too hard and unjust. I said that might be, but what was the use of talking about it? If a man demanded your money or your life, you have only three courses open. You must either fight, call for help, or give up your money. Now, as you cannot fight, it is useless to call for help, since neither England nor France would stir a finger to assist you. I believe these are the articles now under discussion at St Petersburg, and the only one on which there is any question is the fifth." This latter statement I may add, without going into the question of the Marquis Tsêng's negotiations in the Russian capital, was perfectly correct.

Gordon drew up several notes or memorandums for the information of the Chinese Government. The first of these was mainly military, and the following extracts will suffice:--

"China's power lies in her numbers, in the quick moving of her
troops, in the little baggage they require, and in their few
wants. It is known that men armed with sword and spear can
overcome the best regular troops equipped with breech-loading
rifles, if the country is at all difficult and if the men with
spears and swords outnumber their foe ten to one. If this is the
case where men are armed with spears and swords, it will be much
truer when those men are themselves armed with breech loaders.
China should never engage in pitched battles. Her strength is in
quiet movements, in cutting off trains of baggage, and in night
attacks _not pushed home_--in a continuous worrying of her
enemies. Rockets should be used instead of cannon. No artillery
should be moved with the troops; it delays and impedes them.
Infantry fire is the most fatal fire; guns make a noise far out
of proportion to their value in war. If guns are taken into the
field, troops cannot march faster than these guns. The degree of
speed at which the guns can be carried dictates the speed at
which the troops can march. As long as Peking is the centre of
the Government of China, China can never go to war with any
first-class power; it is too near the sea."

The second memorandum was of greater importance and more general application. In it he compressed the main heads of his advice into the smallest possible space, and so far as it was at all feasible to treat a vast and complicated subject within the limits of a simple and practical scheme, he therein shows with the greatest clearness how the regeneration of China might be brought about.

"In spite of the opinion of some foreigners, it will be generally
acknowledged that the Chinese are contented and happy, that the
country is rich and prosperous, and that the people are _au fond_
united in their sentiments, and ardently desire to remain a
nation. At constant intervals, however, the whole of this human
hive is stirred by some dispute between the Pekin Government and
some foreign Power; the Chinese people, proud of their ancient
prestige, applaud the high tone taken up by the Pekin Government,
crediting the Government with the power to support their strong
words. This goes on for a time, when the Government gives in, and
corresponding vexation is felt by the people. The recurrence of
these disputes, the inevitable surrender ultimately of the Pekin
Government, has the tendency of shaking the Chinese people's
confidence in the Central Government. The Central Government
appreciates the fact that, little by little, this prestige is
being destroyed by their own actions among the Chinese people,
each crisis then becomes more accentuated or difficult to
surmount, as the Central Government know each concession is
another nail in their coffin. The Central Government fear that
the taking up of a spirited position by any pre-eminent Chinese
would carry the Chinese people with him, and therefore the
Central Government endeavour to keep up appearances, and to skirt
the precipice of war as near as they possibly can, while never
intending to enter into war.

"The Central Government residing in the extremity of the Middle
Kingdom, away from the great influences which are now working in
China, can never alter one iota from what they were years ago:
they are being steadily left behind by the people they govern.
They know this, and endeavour to stem these influences in all
ways in their power, hoping to keep the people backward and in
ignorance, and to retard their progress to the same pace they
themselves go, if it can be called a pace at all.

"It is therefore a maxim that 'no progress can be made by the
Pekin Government.' To them any progress, whether slow or quick,
is synonymous to slow or quick extinction, for they will never
move.

"The term 'Pekin Government' is used advisedly, for if the
Central Government were moved from Pekin into some province where
the pulsations and aspirations of the Chinese people could have
their legitimate effect, then the Central Government and the
Chinese people, having a unison of thought, would work together.

"From what has been said above, it is maintained that, so long as
the Central Government of China isolates itself from the Chinese
people by residing aloof at Pekin, so long will the Chinese
people have to remain passive under the humiliations which come
upon them through the non-progressive and destructive disposition
of their Government. These humiliations will be the chronic state
of the Chinese people until the Central Government moves from
Pekin and reunites itself to its subjects. No army, no purchases
of ironclad vessels will enable China to withstand a first-class
Power so long as China keeps her queen bee at the entrance of her
hive. There is, however, the probability that a proud people like
the Chinese may sicken at this continual eating of humble pie,
that the Pekin Government at some time, by skirting too closely
the precipice of war may fall into it, and then that sequence may
be anarchy and rebellion throughout the Middle Kingdom which may
last for years and cause endless misery.

"It may be asked--How can the present state of things be altered?
How can China maintain the high position that the wealth,
industry, and innate goodness of the Chinese people entitle her
to have among the nations of the world? Some may say by the
revolt of this Chinaman or of that Chinaman. To me this seems
most undesirable, for, in the first place, such action would not
have the blessing of God, and, in the second, it would result in
the country being plunged into civil war. The fair, upright, and
open course for the Chinese people to take is to work, through
the Press and by petitions, on the Central Government, and to
request them to move from Pekin, and bring themselves thus more
into unison with the Chinese people, and thus save that people
the constant humiliations they have to put up with, owing to the
seat of the Central Government being at Pekin. This
recommendation would need no secret societies, no rebellion, no
treason; if taken up and persevered in it must succeed, and not
one life need be lost.

"The Central Government at Pekin could not answer the Chinese
people except in the affirmative when the Chinese people say to
the Central Government--'By your residing aloof from us in Pekin,
where you are exposed to danger, you separate our interests from
yours, and you bring on us humiliation, which we would never have
to bear if you resided in the interior. Take our application into
consideration, and grant our wishes.'

"I have been kindly treated by the Central Pekin Government and
by the Chinese people; it is for the welfare of both parties that
I have written and signed this paper. I may have expressed myself
too strongly with respect to the non-progressive nature of the
Pekin Government, who may desire the welfare of the Middle
Kingdom as ardently as any other Chinese, but as long as the
Pekin Government allow themselves to be led and directed by those
drones of the hive, the Censors, so long must the Pekin
Government bear the blame earned by those drones in plunging
China into difficulties. In the insect world the bees get rid of
the drones in winter."

There was yet a third memorandum of a confidential nature written to Li Hung Chang himself, of which Gordon did not keep a copy, but he referred to it in the letter written to myself which I have already quoted.

Having thus accomplished his double task, viz.: the prevention of war between Russia and China, and of a rebellion on the part of Li Hung Chang under European advice and encouragement, Gordon left China without any delay. When he reached Shanghai on 16th August he found another official telegram awaiting him: "Leave cancelled, resignation not accepted." As he had already taken his passage home he did not reply, but when he reached Aden he telegraphed as follows: "You might have trusted me. My passage from China was taken days before the arrival of your telegram which states 'leave cancelled.' Do you insist on rescinding the same?" The next day he received a reply granting him nearly six months' leave, and with that message the question of his alleged insubordination may be treated as finally settled. There can be no doubt that among his many remarkable achievements not the least creditable was this mission to China, when by downright candour, and unswerving resolution in doing the right thing, he not merely preserved peace, but baffled the intrigues of unscrupulous diplomatists and selfish governments.

With that incident closed Gordon's connection with China, the country associated with his most brilliant feats of arms, but in concluding this chapter it seems to me that I should do well to record some later expressions of opinion on that subject. The following interesting letter, written on the eve of the war between France and China in 1882, was published by the _New York Herald_:--

"The Chinese in their affairs with foreign nations are fully
aware of their peculiar position, and count with reason that a
war with either France or another Power will bring them perforce
allies outside of England. The only Power that could go to war
with them with impunity is Russia, who can attack them by land. I
used the following argument to them when I was there:--The
present dynasty of China is a usurping one--the Mantchou. We may
say that it exists by sufferance at Pekin, and nowhere else in
the Empire. If you look at the map of China Pekin is at the
extremity of the Empire and not a week's marching from the
Russian frontier. A war with Russia would imply the capture of
Pekin and the fall of the Mantchou dynasty, which would never
dare to leave it, for if they did the Chinamen in the south would
smite them. I said, 'If you go to war then move the Queen
Bee--_i.e._ the Emperor--into the centre of China and then fight;
if not, you must make peace.' The two Powers who can coerce China
are Russia and England. Russia could march without much
difficulty on Pekin. This much would not hurt trade, so England
would not interfere. England could march to Taku and Pekin and no
one would object, for she would occupy the Treaty Ports. But if
France tried to do so England would object. Thus it is that China
will only listen to Russia and England, and eventually she must
fear Russia the most of all Powers, for she can never get over
the danger of the land journey, but she might, by a great
increase of her fleet, get over the fear of England. I say China,
but I mean the Mantchou dynasty, for the Mantchous are despised
by the Chinese. Any war with China would be for France expensive
and dangerous, not from the Chinese forces, which would be soon
mastered, but from the certainty of complications with England.
As for the European population in China, write them down as
identical with those in Egypt in all affairs. Their sole idea is,
without any distinction of nationality, an increased power over
China for their own trade and for opening up the country as they
call it, and any war would be popular with them; so they will egg
on any Power to make it. My idea is that no colonial or foreign
community in a foreign land can properly, and for the general
benefit of the world, consider the questions of that foreign
State. The leading idea is how they will benefit themselves. The
Isle of Bourbon or Réunion is the cause of the Madagascar war. It
is egged on by the planters there, and to my idea they (the
planters) want slaves for Madagascar. I have a very mean opinion
of the views of any colonial or foreign community: though I own
that they are powerful for evil. Who would dare to oppose the
European colony in Egypt or China, and remain in those
countries?"

In a letter to myself, written about this time, very much the same views are expressed:--

"I do not think I could enlighten _you_ about China. Her game is
and will be to wait events, and she will try and work so as to
embroil us with France if she does go to war. For this there
would be plenty of elements in the Treaty Ports. One may say,
humanly speaking, China going to war with France must entail our
following suit. It would be a bad thing in some ways for
civilization, for the Chinese are naturally so bumptious that any
success would make them more so, and if allied to us, and they
had success, it would be a bad look-out afterwards. This in
private. Li Hung Chang as Emperor, if such a thing came to pass,
would be worse than the present Emperor, for he is sharp and
clever, would unite China under a Chinese dynasty, and be much
more troublesome to deal with. Altogether, I cannot think that
the world would gain if China went to war with France. Also I
think it would be eventually bad for China. China being a queer
country, we might expect queer things, and I believe if she did
go to war she would contract with Americans for the destruction
of French fleet, and she would let loose a horde of adventurers
with dynamite. This is essentially her style of action, and Li
Hung Chang would take it up, but do not say I think so."

In a further letter from Jaffa, dated 17th November 1883, he wrote finally on this branch of the subject:--

"I fear I can write nothing of any import, so I will not attempt
it. To you I can remark that if I were the Government I would
consider the part that should be taken when the inevitable fall
of the Mantchou dynasty takes place, what steps they would take,
and how they would act in the break-up, which, however, will only
end in a fresh cohesion of China, for we, or no other Power,
could never for long hold the country. At Penang, Singapore,
etc., the Chinese will eventually oust us in another generation."

There was one other question about China upon which Gordon felt very strongly, viz., the opium question, and as he expressed views which I combated, I feel bound to end this chapter by quoting what he wrote on this much-discussed topic. On one point he agrees with myself and his other opponents in admitting that the main object with the Chinese authorities was increased revenue, not morality. They have since attained their object not only by an increased import duty, but also in the far more extensive cultivation of the native drug, to which the Emperor, by Imperial Edict, has given his formal sanction:--

"PORT LOUIS, _3rd February 1882_.

"About the opium article, I think your article--'History of the
Opium Traffic,' _Times_, 4th January 1884--reads well. But the
question is this. The Chinese _amour propre_ as a nation is hurt
by the enforced entry of the drug. This irritation is connected
with the remembrance of the wars which led to the Treaties about
opium. Had eggs or apples been the cause of the wars, _i.e._ had
the Chinese objected to the import of eggs, and we had insisted
on their being imported, and carried out such importation in
spite of the Chinese wish by force of war, it would be to my own
mind the same thing as opium now is to Chinese. We do not give
the Chinese credit for being so sensitive as they are. As Black
Sea Treaty was to Russia so opium trade is to China.

"I take the root of the question to be as above. I do not mean to
say that all that they urge is fictitious about morality; and I
would go further than you, and say I think they would willingly
give up their revenue from opium, indeed I am sure of it, if they
could get rid of the forced importation by treaty, but their
action in so doing would be simply one of satisfying their _amour
propre_. The opium importation is a constant reminder of their
defeats, and I feel sure China will never be good friends with us
till it is abolished. It is for that reason I would give it up,
for I think the only two alliances worth having are France and
China.

"I have never, when I have written on it, said anything further
than this, _i.e. the Chinese Government will not have it_, let us
say it is a good drug or not. I also say that it is not fair to
force anything on your neighbour, and, therefore, morally, it is
wrong, even if it was eggs.

"Further, I say that through our thrusting these eggs on China,
this opium, we caused the wars with China which shook the
prestige of the Pekin Government, and the outcome of this war of
1842 was the Taeping Rebellion, with its deaths of 13,000,000.
The military prestige of the Mantchous was shaken by these
defeats, the heavy contributions for war led to thousands of
soldiers being disbanded, to a general impoverishment of the
people, and this gave the rebel chief, Hung-tsew-tsiuen, his
chance.

"A wants B to let him import eggs, B refuses, A coerces him;
therefore I say it is wrong, and that it is useless discussing
whether eggs are good or not.

"Can anyone doubt but that, if the Chinese Government had the
power, they would stop importation to-morrow? If so, why keep a
pressure like this on China whom we need as a friend, and with
whom this importation is and ever will be the sole point about
which we could be at variance? I know this is the point with Li
Hung Chang.

"People may laugh at _amour propre_ of China. It is a positive
fact, they are most-pigheaded on those points. China is the only
nation in the world which is forced to take a thing she does not
want. England is the only nation which forces another nation to
do this, in order to benefit India by this act. Put like this it
is outrageous.

"Note this, only certain classes of vessels are subject to the
Foreign Customs Office at Canton. By putting all vessels under
that Office the Chinese Government would make £2,000,000 a year
more revenue. The Chinese Government will not do this however,
because it would put power in hands of foreigners, so they lose
it. Did you ever read the letters of the Ambassador before
Marquis Tsêng? His name, I think, was Coh or Kwoh. He wrote home
to Pekin about Manchester, telling its wonders, but adding,
'These people are wonderful, but the masses are miserable far
beyond Chinese. They think only of money and not of the welfare
of the people.'

"Any foreign nation can raise the bile of Chinese by saying,
'Look at the English, they forced you to take their opium.'

"I should not be a bit surprised did I hear that Li Hung Chang
smoked opium himself. I know a lot of the princes do, so they
say. I have no doubt myself that what I have said is the true and
only reason, or rather root reason. Put our nation in the same
position of having been defeated and forced to accept some
article which theory used to consider bad for the health, like
tea used to be, we would rebel as soon as we could against it,
though our people drink tea. The opium trade is a standing,
ever-present memento of defeat and heavy payments; and the
Chinese cleverly take advantage of the fact that it is a
deleterious drug.

"The opium wars were not about opium--opium was only a _cheval de
bataille_. They were against the introduction of foreigners, a
political question, and so the question of opium import is now.
As for the loss to India by giving it up, it is quite another
affair. On one hand you have gain, an embittered feeling and an
injustice; on the other you have loss, friendly nations and
justice. Cut down pay of all officers in India to Colonial
allowances _above_ rank of captains. Do not give them Indian
allowances, and you will cover nearly the loss, I expect. Why
should officers in India have more than officers in Hongkong?"

In a subsequent letter, dated from the Cape, 20th July 1882, General Gordon replied to some objections I had raised as follows:--

"As for the opium, to which you say the same objection applies as
to tea, etc., it is not so, for opium has for ages been a tabooed
article among Chinese respectable people. I own reluctance to
foreign intercourse applies to what I said, but the Chinese know
that the intercourse with foreigners cannot be stopped, and it,
as well as the forced introduction of opium, are signs of defeat;
yet one, that of intercourse, cannot be stopped or wiped away
while the opium question can be. I am writing in a hurry, so am
not very clear.

"What I mean is that no one country forces another country to
take a drug like opium, and therefore the Chinese feel the
forced introduction of opium as an intrusion and injustice;
thence their feelings in the matter. This, I feel sure, is the
case.

"What could our Government do _in re_ opium? Well, I should say,
let the clause of treaty lapse about it, and let the smuggling be
renewed. Hongkong is a nest of smugglers.

"Pekin would, or rather could, never succeed in cutting off
foreign intercourse. The Chinese are too much mixed up (and are
increasingly so every year) with foreigners for Pekin even to try
it. Also I do not think China would wish to stop its importation
altogether. All they ask is an increased duty on it."