Chapter XI: From the Salonica Fire to the Recall of Sarrail

On August 18, 1917, there occurred one of those catastrophes in which the history of Salonica is so rich. At about three p.m. a fire broke out in a small house occupied by a poor Jewish widow in the central part of the old town. For four months not a drop of rain had fallen, and at Salonica there was no adequate organization for fighting the flames, except a small and ill-equipped fire-brigade inherited from the Turks. The Allied Armies had their own fire-engines, but the C.A.A. had made no arrangements in view of a possible conflagration in the city, for which the local authorities were supposed to provide. Big fires were by no means unknown in Salonica; some thirty years before a considerable part of the town had been destroyed by the flames, and other fires had occurred fairly frequently. The water supply was totally inadequate and the pressure very weak. The great majority of the houses in the old town were of wood and even in the others there was a great deal of woodwork; as if this were not enough, a high wind was blowing at the time. All circumstances were therefore propitious for a first-class fire. In a very short time the flames spread far and wide, and from the poor hovel of the Jewish widow it soon enveloped a large part of the city in a vast conflagration. About sunset the Italian military band was still playing in the Place de la Liberté near the sea, and no one imagined that the flames could possibly come so far down (the quarter where it had broken out was half-way up the hill). But by ten at night the handsome buildings along the sea front were menaced, and had to be rapidly evacuated; during the night they, too, caught fire. The heat of the flames was so terrific that, although these structures were of brick and stone, they were swept away like the wooden hovels. Even the rails of the railway along the quay on the side opposite the houses and many yards away from them, were twisted out of shape by the heat. Throughout the night there was a general exodus of the population from the awful furnace. One saw families abandoning their homes carrying some clothes, bedding and other household goods, which were afterwards set alight by sparks scattered by the wind.

Allied detachments were distributed about the various quarters of the town to prevent pillaging, to which the local hooligans and a certain number of soldiers belonging to one or two of the Allied armies devoted themselves. We were glad to be able to establish that no Italian soldiers took part in these operations, and the same may be said of the British. The military lorries, especially those of the British Army, accomplished admirable salvage work; all through the night and the following day they plied back and forth between the fire zone and the British camps outside the city. Our own lorries were for the most part engaged in clearing our clothing depot, which was the only military establishment in the centre of Salonica; fortunately the flames only just reached its outer wall, which was blackened, and a few days later it was possible to occupy it again. The premises occupied by the C.A.A. were also evacuated for a day or two, as they were at one moment in danger, but the fire never actually reached them. Luckily no military establishment was destroyed, save one or two depots of trifling importance.

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The damage to the city was, however, enormous. All the hotels, very many business houses, all the best shops, a large number of stores and warehouses, the post office and other public buildings and a vast number of private dwellings, especially in the poorer part of the Jewish quarter, were razed to the ground. The banks were spared, and so also were the hospitals, and the flames never reached the new quarters where all the best private houses were situated. One of the most serious losses, because it was irreparable, was that of the beautiful church of St. Demetrius, historically and artistically the most important monument in Salonica.

This catastrophe, although it did not directly affect the Allied armies, created a problem which the military authorities could not disregard, viz., that of housing and feeding many thousands of refugees. By far the greater part of these were Jews, and the Greek authorities, supported in this by General Sarrail, had at first contemplated their evacuation, and it was proposed that they should be sent to Old Greece, to the islands and abroad, so as to avoid exposing them to hardships and to preserve the city from the dangers of epidemics, which the excessive overcrowding in the few remaining houses might easily have caused. This scheme naturally appeared the soundest from the point of view of public health. Incidentally it also presented the advantage, from the Greek point of view, that with the exodus of a large part of the Jewish inhabitants, the Greek element would have come to constitute an absolute majority of the population, thus eliminating the danger that at the future Peace Conference, the Salonica Jews, anything but attached to the Greek régime, might demand autonomy on the basis of “self-determination.”

In any case the question was settled by the Jews themselves, who, save a very small minority, refused to depart. They knew that as long as the Allied armies were there they were assured of a necessary minimum of food, and that they would be able, in a very short time, to make good the losses they had suffered, whereas if they went to Old Greece or elsewhere they would find themselves in the midst of an unfriendly and poor population, where they could not even manage to earn their daily bread. It was said of the Salonica Jews, as of the Armenians, that their idea of paradise was an endless street of shops with Allied soldiers walking up and down it; Salonica, even after the fire, was not very different from this picture. The Jews whose houses were still standing were very generous in giving hospitality to their less fortunate co-religionists, and everyone was ready to limit the space occupied. Provisionally, the British gave shelter to many thousands of the more needy refugees in some large camps on the outskirts of the city, while the Greek Government and all the Allied armies contributed towards feeding them. Little by little, all found shelter of some sort, goodness knows how, and soon trading on a small scale began to spring up again. At first it would be an itinerant pedlar with a tray full of reels of cotton, a few pairs of stockings, some yards of linen or canvas, and a little hardware. Then the tray became a hand-cart, with a somewhat more abundant stock of goods, and the hand-cart was next transformed into a stationary cart. A few days later the cart was sheltered by a few boards; the whole outfit soon began to take on the appearance of a modest hut, a little better stocked, almost a regular shop. The profits of these traders, owing to the great scarcity of goods, were quite fabulous.

For a long time the Greek Government refused to grant any permits to rebuild in the burnt area, because it contemplated a grandiose plan of reconstruction, based on an elaborate scheme which should have made of Salonica a model city, with broad piazze, wide boulevards, imposing public buildings, stately residences, perfect workmen’s dwellings, Rowton houses, an elaborate electric tramway system, electric undergrounds, a university, opera houses, concert halls, and even a forest on the outskirts. But as all this was in the dim and distant future and the inhabitants insisted on being allowed to make some temporary arrangements, permission was finally granted to rebuild the ground floors of the houses, the authorities reserving the right to demolish them without compensation if the general reconstruction plan were carried out. The Salonica merchants did not hesitate to take that risk, and at once began to rebuild. In a few months they had recouped themselves for their losses with a broad margin of profit. One cannot help admiring their persistence, which was amply rewarded. But the problem of general reconstruction has remained unsolved to this day. A wealthy business man told me (and his opinion was confirmed by other experts) that everything depended on the future political status of the city. If it should be endowed with local autonomy and become a free port, the money would easily be found, not only for rebuilding Salonica, but also for the necessary works to prevent the silting up of the harbour; the local Jews, with their own resources and those of their co-religionists abroad, would provide it. But if Salonica were to remain a Greek provincial town, without autonomy, at the mercy of the Athens politicians, no one would invest any capital in it. Indeed, many of the most far-sighted and enterprising business men would leave altogether. I do not know whether this opinion is right, but it certainly represented the conviction of almost the whole of the city’s business community.

On August 31st an Italian detachment made a surprise attack on the summit of Hill 1050. The position was captured with brilliant dash, but before the troops could entrench themselves adequately they were exposed to such a terrific artillery and trench-mortar fire that it was not possible to remain, and General Mombelli, in order to avoid useless losses, recalled the detachment. There were no enemy counter-attacks.

Early in September, General Sarrail undertook an action at his extreme left against the Austrians and Bulgarians in Albania, to liberate the road between Florina and Ersek from the menace of hostile attack, and to push on the Pogradetz on the Lake of Ochrida. With this object in view he made up a group consisting of 3 infantry regiments, some mountain artillery and other minor units. The French line just skirted the Lake of Ochrida and then turned sharp to the south, east of the river Cerava, reached Lake Malik near Nishavetz and continued to the south of the lake, almost parallel with the Koritza-Ersek road. On September 7th, a column of the 176th Regiment occupied Placa between the Lakes of Ochrida and Malik, and drove back the enemy beyond the Cerava. On the 8th, another column forced the passage of the Devoli river, west of Lake Malik. On the 9th, Pogradetz was occupied, this being the only place where some resistance was offered, the enemy forces consisting of Bulgarians, Austrians, Albanians in the Austrian service, and some Saxon troops sent over expressly from another sector of the front. The French pushed forward along the west shore of Lake Ochrida as far as Udunista (9 km. north of Pogradetz) and spread westward as far as Hill 1704, whence they hoped to command the Durazzo-Struga road, one of the lines of supply of the extreme right wing of the enemy. At the same time a column composed of French troops and Albanian irregulars advanced along the upper Skumbi, and on the 21st a French detachment delivered a surprise attack on Golik (6 or 7 km. south of the Durazzo-Struga road), capturing 480 prisoners and putting a similar number of the enemy _hors de combat_, with the loss of only 16 men. Altogether the French made about a thousand prisoners in these operations. In October, there was a slight renewal of activity in this area, but the line occupied varied little, and was finally stabilized along the following points: Udunista, Hill 1704, Velichani Mokra, Gora Top, and thence southward. There was not, however, a continuous line, as on the Western fronts or even in other parts of the Macedonian front, but only a series of more or less isolated posts. The troops in this sector were formed into what was called the Provisional Infantry Division, commanded by General Jacquemot. The detachments forming it soon afterwards returned to their respective units, but subsequently, in consequence of information received concerning a probable Bulgarian counter-offensive along the west shore of Lake Ochrida, with the object of recapturing Pogradetz and perhaps again menacing the Santi Quaranta road, the Provisional Division was reconstituted; but the threatened attack never took place.

The French had thus obtained some not indifferent territorial advantages by means of this very well conducted operation. But they now found themselves with an extended front and their left flank in the air, a situation which, in the face of an enterprising enemy, might have been very dangerous, all the more so as their supplies had to be transported on mule-back over very difficult country. But neither the Bulgarians nor the Austrians were then in a position to attempt operations in that area, which was as arduous for them as for the French.

During the month of November, in consequence of the terrible disaster of Caporetto, there were persistent rumours from various sources of an imminent enemy offensive on the Macedonian and Albanian fronts. The landing of several German divisions at Durazzo and the arrival of numerous reinforcements on the Macedonian front from Roumania were reported, chiefly from neutral countries (Spain and Switzerland). The Austro-German victory on the Italian front was enthusiastically fêted by the enemy forces in the Balkans, and a vigorous propaganda was conducted, especially among the Serbs, by means of grandiloquent proclamations and invitations to make a separate peace, dropped into the Allied lines. General Sarrail did not believe in this offensive, and as things turned out his scepticism proved well founded. All that actually did happen was a slight increase in the enemy’s battalion strength. The number of enemy battalions, which had risen from 239 in February to 267 in May, and had fallen to 237 in August, again rose to 285 in November. These battalions were nearly all Bulgarian, save for a variable but ever-decreasing number of German battalions--they were then eight or nine--and the 177th Turkish Regiment, the last remnant of the 2 Turkish divisions which had been formerly on the Macedonian front; even this was soon afterwards withdrawn. It appears, however, that the actual strength of the battalions had been progressively weakened, so that the increase was more apparent than real.

Besides all their other difficulties, the Russian trouble was now added. In the early days of the campaign the Russian troops had fought very well, especially in the operations round Monastir. But the revolution in Russia had its reaction, although in an attenuated form, also in Macedonia. At first the trouble was caused by the partisans of the old régime, who appeared unwilling to go on fighting for the Russian Republic, and among these there was, it is said, a Brigadier-General. Then the poisonous Bolshevik infection began to spread among the troops, destroying all discipline and patriotic sentiment. Whereas formerly many of the officers had neglected and brutally ill-treated their men, and often embezzled the army funds, now the brutalized and ignorant soldiers began to refuse to obey them. The famous soldiers’ committees were formed, the result of which was the abolition of all respect for authority and the placing of a premium on cowardice and treachery. It was impossible to punish a soldier even if he were guilty of the most infamous crime without the judgment of the committee, and the latter invariably acquitted the accused. If the idiotic blunders of Kerenski and the ignoble infamies of Lenin and Trotzky did not produce such immediate and disastrous effects in Macedonia as they did in Russia, it is because the Russians were but a small minority among the other Allied troops who were not infected by the plague.

At the time of the expedition to Greece the effects of revolutionary ideas among the Russian troops became even more visible, the conduct of the men being disgracefully undisciplined and scandalous. Then there were rumours of “fraternization” at the front between Russians and Bulgarians, and, although no very serious incidents seem to have occurred, the mere possibility of them was in itself alarming. The 7th and 8th Regiments gave most signs of insubordination and demoralization, and one of the most culpable individuals appear to have been Colonel Mindru, the Commander of the 7th Regiment, who hoped to make himself popular by placing himself at the head of the revolutionary movement. General Dietrich, an excellent officer, had been recalled to Russia in the summer of 1917, and after a series of temporary Commanders, General Taranowski had arrived at the beginning of November to take command of the division. But by that time the Bolshevik revolution was triumphant, and the Russian division was going to pieces. At the beginning of January 1918, the Soviets of the 3rd, 7th and 8th Regiments demanded to be withdrawn to the second line, whereas the 4th was ready to remain in the trenches. The more insubordinate elements were sent to North Africa to perform almost forced labour. The others were offered the choice of either continuing to fight or of working in Macedonia as paid labourers. A small minority requested to be sent to fight, and were shipped off to France where they were incorporated in the Russian legion, and so did those of Polish nationality, who joined the Polish Legion. Some of the others agreed to work, but the great majority would neither fight nor work, and these were consequently forced to work, practically as prisoners of war. It is not likely that the French officers and men who had charge of them were particularly tender towards these blackguards who had betrayed the cause of the Entente and were responsible for the indefinite prolongation of the war, to the total advantage of the German.

Gradually the Russian Division was dissolved, by no means a simple matter, owing to the administrative chaos in which its officers had left it. The Russian officers remaining in Macedonia or relegated to Greece did not, save a few exceptions, give a very edifying spectacle of themselves. They continued their unseemly riotous living, extravagantly spending money obtained no one knew how, and bombarded the French _Intendance_, to whom the liquidation of the force was entrusted, for increases of salary, advances, demobilization bonuses, etc. The total number of Russian troops in Macedonia had been about 15,000, so that their disappearance constituted an appreciable reduction of effectives.

The discipline of the French troops of the A.F.O. under Sarrail’s régime had been getting worse and worse, as was proved by the mutinies which occurred in the 57th Division. The immediate cause of the trouble was the impossibility of granting leave to the majority of the men who were entitled to it. Salonica was full of soldiers on their way home on leave, but who could not depart owing to the scarcity of tonnage. The worst disorders occurred among the men of the 242nd Infantry Regiment, who after the end of their period of rest, refused to return to the trenches. The Command was not in a position to apply extreme measures, and had to adopt sometimes the strong and sometimes the gentle manner. Order was, however, finally re-established, and the last ninety mutineers were surrounded and disarmed without bloodshed (July 1917). Similar incidents occurred in the 2bis Zouaves. General Sarrail attributed the trouble to the officers who had, he declares, first encouraged them and then tried to keep in the background.[36]

All these episodes were signs of a very unsatisfactory spirit, and were calculated to make the French Government ever more doubtful of Sarrail’s military qualities. Another incident was now to prove the last straw. We have already spoken of General Sarrail’s situation with regard to the Allies and to French policy. Partly from a legitimate desire to see the Armée d’Orient treated with more consideration and adequately supplied with reinforcement and material, but still more from his incorrigible tendency to political intrigue, he tried, while M. Briand was still in office, to provoke a political campaign against him in France, as he considered him responsible for the troubles of his Army and attributed to his influence the fact that the French Government often gave way to the Allies in matters concerning the Macedonian Campaign. He had sent to Paris a report on the Armée d’Orient whose conditions he described in the darkest colours, insisting that this state of things should be remedied adequately, so as to avoid an otherwise inevitable disaster. So far there was, of course, no harm. But when the _Bonnet Rouge_ scandal broke out it appeared from the papers of the traitor Almereyda that he had had a copy of the Sarrail report in his hands and that he had communicated it to agents of the German Government, who thus came to know the state of weakness of the Macedonian force; had the enemy been in a position to act upon this knowledge the Macedonian campaign might have ended in a very disastrous manner. But who had communicated the precious document to Almereyda? It was discovered in the course of the inquiry that he had received it from a certain Sergeant Paix-Séailles, a journalist and politician, who in all probability ignored the fact that Almereyda was a traitor, but wished to make use of him for the campaign against M. Briand. Paix-Séailles had obtained the document from Captain Mathieu, an officer attached to the Staff of General Sarrail. Mathieu took upon himself the whole responsibility for the affair, and received a disciplinary punishment from the court martial, but it was impossible to eliminate the general conviction that he would never have made such use of so confidential a document if he had not been authorized to do so by his Chief, whose full confidence he enjoyed and whose hostility to Briand was notorious. About the same time the famous Caillaux _dossier_ came to light, in which was a plan for the appointment of General Sarrail as Commander-in-Chief of the French Army; the appointment was to be made after the _coup d’état_ which Caillaux was contemplating. Even if Sarrail himself had no knowledge of this scheme, the mere fact that his name appeared among the persons in whom Caillaux had confidence made a very bad impression.

On November 13th the Painlevé Cabinet fell and was succeeded by that of M. Clemenceau. To the latter the Allied Ministers, in the Versailles meeting of December 2nd, communicated all the complaints against Sarrail. M. Clemenceau studied the various files concerning him very carefully, and thus became acquainted with the above-mentioned episodes. In spite of the pressure of the General’s political friends, Clemenceau had the courage to cut the Gordian knot without hesitating; on December 7th Sarrail received his order of recall, on the 22nd he left Salonica, and after a series of inquiries he was placed on the retired list.

His departure was welcomed with a sense of relief and satisfaction by all the Allies, and even among the French officers it caused no regret, save in a small group of persons in his immediate entourage who had taken advantage of his friendship to obtain exceptional promotion and other advantages for themselves. With General Sarrail his Chief of the Staff, General Michaud, also departed.