Chapter V: The Serbians

OF all the peoples who participated in the Great War the fate of the Serbs represent the most tragic. Our subsequent disagreements with the Yugo-Slavs should not make us forget the heroic part played by the Serbians even though unfortunately they have forgotten the immense benefits which we conferred upon them. It is the merit of the Italians if the miserable remnants of the Serbian Army, after the disastrous retreat through Albania, were saved from death by starvation, together with thousands and thousands of Serbian civilians, who found a refuge and a warm welcome in Italy, when their country was overrun by the enemy. Let us hope that in the not too distant future the Serbs will remember these facts, and also remember the many Italians who died on Serbian soil fighting for the liberation of Serbia.

After the retreat through Albania the Serbian Army found itself in the most appalling condition. Before the third enemy invasion it comprised some 400,000 men, with 70,000 horses and 65,000 oxen (the mechanical transport service was extremely limited). By the time it reached the Adriatic it was reduced by hunger, cold and sickness, as well as by fighting, to barely 150,000 men, 40,000 horses and 10,000 oxen. Part of the army marched towards Scutari and Alessio and the rest towards Durazzo. The second group was accompanied by several thousand civilian refugees, and also by old King Peter, who was seriously ill, and the Prince Regent Alexander, who was ill, too, for a part of the time. As regards armament, equipment and food, everything was lacking. The soldiers had been living for many months on 200 to 300 grammes of biscuit every five days.

The work of the Italian Navy in saving the Serbians has often been ignored. The Serbians appear to have forgotten or altogether denied it, as have also some of their foreign apologists. It may therefore be of interest to repeat what Admiral Sechi, the Italian Minister of Marine, said in the Senate on July 19, 1920 in this connexion. After reminding his hearers that the transport of the remnants of the Serbian Army with their supplies, from the ports of Northern Albania, where they had arrived exhausted and famished, to Valona, was the work of the Italian Navy, it was, he said, one of the Allied Governments that, at the end of October 1915 requested the Italian Government to provide for these necessities, and “in spite of the almost insuperable difficulties of the operation, especially on account of the insidious enemy attacks, and the almost total lack of any landing facilities in the places of disembarkation, the Italian Navy granted the request and the transport was carried out successfully and without interruption.” It was the Italian Navy which provided the transport of supplies for the Serbian Army (about 28,000 tons). In all about 245,000 Serbian soldiers, 25,000 Austrian prisoners whom they brought with them, over 10,000 animals, and a great deal of material, was thus transported. In spite of the ever-present danger of enemy submarines, in all this vast movement not a single ship was lost, nor did a single Serbian soldier die.[14] But we did not only provide transport and food for these most unfortunate warriors and civilians. Our military and naval medical officers worked admirably for the assistance of the Serbians, saving thousands from death by hunger, exhaustion and infection, as typhus and cholera were raging among the Serbians. An English writer has described in eloquent language this work in a book on the Italian Navy. “Day and night,” writes Archibald Hurd, “caring nothing for the risk of infection, striving with all weapons of modern research to prevent this plague spot from infecting half a continent, the naval and military doctors, with their sailor and soldier orderlies, fed, tended, bandaged, and with hands soft as women’s nursed these poor spectres of fellow creatures.”[15] On December 17 it was decided to send the Serbs to Corfu. They were now reduced to 100,000 men with 54,000 rifles, 160 machine guns, and 70 guns. When they were transported to Valona King Peter also went to Corfu and embarked on the Italian torpedo boat destroyer, _G. C. Abba_. He wished to receive the salute of the officers of the ship thanking them with generous words for all they had done and the dangers they had faced on their mission of charity. Reminding them of Garibaldi, their own national hero--to many of them already, perhaps, almost a legendary figure--he told them that he had himself twice met that famous soldier. Recalling to them the dark pages of their own national history, with its eventual triumph, he suggested to them that possibly Serbia might be the Piedmont of all the Serbians, and even in this, its blackest hour, the forerunner of an undreamed of and triumphant unity.[16] The Austrian prisoners were re-embarked for Italy and interned in Sardinia, but many of them died of cholera during the voyage. It may be added that while the most generous material assistance was lavished on the Serbians by our Command, as well as by our officers and men, the moral treatment accorded them by one or two of our officers left something to be desired. Although this does not in any way justify the ingratitude which the Serbs have subsequently shown towards Italy, it may serve in part to explain it. Even a cruel phrase or a lack of consideration for anyone who has suffered so terribly are enough to cancel the memory of the great benefits received. As we shall see, Generals Petitti and Mombelli did everything in their power to make the Serbians forget these unfortunate incidents, and they succeeded, at least for the time being.

The bulk of the Serbian troops were concentrated at Corfu, save a small number at Bizerta. The first convoy embarked on January 6, 1916 and during the winter the Allies, especially the British and the French, set to work to re-equip and reorganize the army, and it must be said the soldiers were greatly desirous of going to Salonica as soon as possible to take part once more in the struggle against the invader, although at that time to hope for success seemed madness. The Serbian Government and Parliament also established themselves at Corfu, where they remained until after the Armistice. The reorganization of the army was carried out fairly quickly, and about the middle of April the first detachments began to arrive at Salonica; to these were added the troops who escaped from Monastir or down the Vardar Valley. Throughout the second half of 1916 and the winter of 1916–17 the Serbians continued to arrive, and in May 1917 the army was complete. But the Serbs did not wait until then to begin fighting, because, as we have seen, they took a very prominent part in the operations of the summer and autumn of 1916. As each detachment reached Salonica it was first concentrated in the Serbian camp at Mikra near the city, and then sent towards the front, and its training in modern war methods was completed in Macedonia.

The reorganized Serbian Army then comprised about 150,000 men, divided, as we have seen, into 3 armies of 2 divisions each. Each division comprised 3 regiments of 3 battalions each. As regards armament they were fairly well equipped, and the number of rifles[17] was higher than in the other armies in Macedonia because they had very few transport or lines-of-communication troops. The Allies to a very great extent supplied them with these services.

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The Crown Prince Alexander, nominally Commander-in-Chief, kept his modest Court at Salonica, but he spent a good part of the year at the Serbian front with the soldiers, with whom he was very popular. King Peter also resided habitually at Salonica, where he led an extremely retired life an account of his illness, and he saw hardly anyone. The military household of the Prince was composed for the most part of field officers who had been seriously wounded, and as Minister of the Royal Household he afterwards appointed M. Balugich, who was considered to be one of the shrewdest diplomats in the Balkans. The various foreign Governments had their representatives at Corfu, as the Serbian Foreign Office was there, but the Prince Regent wished to have a small diplomatic corps attached to his own person. The British and French Governments acceded to this wish immediately, the former sending Admiral Troubridge and the latter Commander Picot as honorary A.D.C.’s. Later on he also wished to have an Italian officer, in the person of Colonel Bodrero, formerly Commander of the Italian troops in Salonica and afterwards in Valona, and the request was finally granted. Admiral Troubridge, an attractive type of naval officer, had been Commander of the squadron which had pursued the _Goeben_ and _Breslau_ at the beginning of the war, and had afterwards commanded the British naval batteries on the Danube. After the Serbian _débâcle_ he followed the remnants of the army to Corfu, and it was on that occasion that Prince Alexander got to know and appreciate him. Admiral Troubridge had great affection for Italy, whose language and literature he knew extremely well, and he liked to be in the company of Italian officers whom he often invited to his house, and in turn, he often went to their mess. He did his best to maintain friendly relations between Serbians and Italians, and gave excellent advice to Prince Alexander.

The actual Commander-in-Chief of the Serbian Army was the Chief of the General Staff, General Boyovich, and the armies, afterwards reduced to two, were commanded by the Voivods Michich and Stepanovich.

In the spring of 1916, Voivod Michich, Commander of the I Army, was appointed Chief of the General Staff in the place of General Boyovich, who took command of the said army in his place. The change was made on the eve of the general offensive, because the plan of operation was to a large extent the work of Michich himself. Although General Boyovich was an excellent soldier and had always greatly distinguished himself, Voivod Michich was a man of genius, one of the ablest leaders that the Balkans has ever produced. Personally he was a very sympathetic figure, jovial, always serene and good-tempered, even in the most tragic moments, and always certain of final victory. The soldiers had such great confidence in him that during the long period in which illness kept him in hospital, they used to say: “We shall never be able to return to our country if we have not Michich to lead us to victory.” He never ceased to show cordiality towards Italy, and even after the Armistice, in spite of the infatuation of hatred against Italy with which the Serbian people had been filled, probably as a result of a propaganda conducted by persons interested in sowing dissension, his feelings towards us never changed, and if one day Italo-Serbian relations improve, it will certainly be due in part to the work of the gallant Voivod. His death, which occurred a short time ago, is a real loss from every point of view.

In a general way the Serbians in Salonica conducted themselves modestly, as was but becoming in their condition of exiles living on charity--I use the word without any intention of offence. In this connexion they offered a notable contrast to the Russian officers after the Bolshevik revolution. Even their Commands and offices were very simple, and their leaders were singularly free from bureaucratic formalities.

The Serbs were supplied by the British and French, but even the material supplied by the former reached them through the French _Intendance_. They were not however, satisfied with this system, and often complained of the manner in which the French treated them, both on account of the insufficiency and the bad quality of part of the supplies--they actually declared that the goods of excellent quality supplied by the British were exchanged during transit through the French offices, for others of inferior quality. They also objected to the tone which the French adopted towards them, never letting them forget that it was they (the French) who were maintaining them. The French on their part complained of the excessive demands of the Serbians, to whom they attributed what they called _la mentalité des sinistrés_.

Relations between officers and soldiers were not always good. The soldiers complained of being neglected and ill-treated by their officers, and even accused some of them of financial dishonesty. An American doctor, who had lived long in Serbia and with the Serbian Army and knew the language well, assured me that these accusations were justified, and that the Serbian civil and military administration was both corrupt and incompetent. He believed, indeed, that when the Serbian Government succeeded in re-establishing itself in Serbia it would encounter serious difficulties with the population because the Austrian Government, although politically oppressive, had accustomed it to a more honest and competent civil service than that of the Serbian State. These difficulties were due in part, according to this same American, to the great gap existing between the slightly educated classes, to whom the officers belonged, and the ignorant peasants, who formed the common soldiers. The officers did not take sufficient care for the well-being of their men, and a very large number of them lived comfortably at Salonica, where they had little to do, while the soldiers and the rest of the officers were fighting and suffering great hardships at the front. There is certainly some exaggeration in all this, but there is also some truth. In a general way, the officers of the old Serbian Army were excellent, but as a really educated bourgeoisie does not exist in the country, most of the reserve officers, drawn from the semi-educated middle classes, left a great deal to be desired. Another difficulty was due to the fact that the Government was at Corfu while the army, which represented all that remained of the nation, was in Macedonia, and the former soon lost all touch with the latter. The atmosphere of Corfu had become a hotbed of personal ambitions, intrigues and petty spite. The Serbians themselves called it their Capua. Among the Serbians moreover, as I have said, secret societies flourished, and these found a field of great activity in the conditions of the moment. Even exile did not make the Serbians forget the habit of conspiracy.

From the moment the Serbian Army took up its position in Macedonia its front extended from the eastern arm of the Cerna to the neighbourhood of Nonte. Divided after its reorganization into 3 armies, these were as we have seen, in consequence of the reduction of the effectives, reduced to 2 of 3 divisions each, plus the cavalry division. The I Army (Drina, Morava and Timok Divisions) commanded by Voivod Michich, had its H.Q. at Votchtaran and occupied the western sector; the II (Vardar, Danube and Shumadia Divisions), commanded by Voivod Stepanovich, occupied the eastern sector, with its H.Q. at Dragomantzi. Although the Serbian G.H.Q. was at Salonica, there was also an advanced G.H.Q. near Mount Floka. The ground on the Serbian front was extremely rough, with huge masses of rock, high peaks and great forests spread over it. The area of the II Army was a particularly uncomfortable one, as it was almost everywhere exposed to the enemy fire. The roads were few and bad, and communications extremely difficult. For its supplies, the I Army made use of the Monastir railway as far as Sakulevo, then of the décauville for a few kilometres, and finally of the ordinary roads. The II Army could not use the railway beyond Vertekop. At the railway terminus there were motor parks supplied by the British, who organized an excellent service, principally with small Ford lorries which could go anywhere, even over the most impossible roads. The Serbians knew how to make the best use of the scanty agricultural resources of the country, and although they complained that the least fertile areas had been assigned to them, they managed so well that their horses never lacked forage and always appeared fat and well fed. They were indeed excellent horse-masters.

In the early days of the Macedonian campaign our relations with the Serbs were somewhat cold. We could not help admiring their splendid military qualities and burning patriotism, although we did not fail to notice their serious defects of character, due to Oriental tradition. The Serbs, on their part, were irritated against us on account of the incidents in Albania already mentioned. General Petitti, however, made every effort to eliminate misunderstandings by means of a conciliatory and cordial policy. He began by the cession of materials, of which the Serbians were in sore need, and did it with the greatest possible tact, so as to avoid in any way hurting their feelings. The Serbs, as we have said, were dependent on the French for their services, and General Petitti, knowing that the latter were not always adequate, often assisted them with motor vehicles, movable huts, etc., whenever the occasion arose. As it was necessary to evacuate the civilian population from a part of the Italian area, he made a point of always consulting the Serbian authorities, to whom he showed the greatest possible deference, before taking any action, and he provided transport and even food for the people who were being evacuated. Relations between our troops and the Serbian troops and the civilian population never gave rise to any incident, and the Serbians could not help admiring the order and efficiency of our transport and other services and the condition of our animals, to which they were not accustomed in Macedonia, except in the case of their own horses. In his work of conciliating the Serbians, General Petitti found useful collaborators in Lieutenant Cangià, Italian liaison officer with the I Serbian Army, in Captain Goad, British liaison officer with the 35th Division, and in Dr. Reiss the Swiss scientist, who was a good friend of ours and of the Serbians.

When General Petitti was requested to grant facilities for the journey of Voivod Michich’s wife from Italy, he arranged that she should cross on one of our best steamers and then travel on an Italian staff car from Santi Quaranta, escorted by an Italian officer. The Voivod had first applied to the French authorities, who informed him that his wife must travel via Patras. He therefore preferred that she should avail herself of the facilities offered by the Italians.

On the occasion of the fighting in February 1917 on Hill 1050, Voivod Michich, who had been present, sent a message to General Petitti[18] expressing his unbounded admiration for the dash and gallantry of our troops, which was sent to Italy and published, and made a very good impression.

Personal relations between our officers and soldiers and the Serbians went on improving, and many cordial individual friendships were formed. General Mombelli continued General Petitti’s policy for a _rapprochement_ with the Serbians and intensified it. He was on excellent terms with the Prince Regent and neglected nothing to render himself a _persona grata_ with him and his army. Our Command was very generous in concessions of motor transport to Serbian officers and officials travelling between Salonica, the Serbian front, and Corfu, and they constantly applied to us for this purpose, preferring our service even to that which was subsequently instituted by their own Command.

We also co-operated in Serbian propaganda in Macedonia. In the small strip of Serbian territory reoccupied after the capture of Monastir, there was a mixed Serbo-Bulgarian population of somewhat uncertain political sentiments, but predominantly Bulgarian. The Serbian Government did everything to spread the Serbian idea among the inhabitants by means of schools and propaganda. In the villages of Brod and Tepavci, which were in our military area, General Mombelli had some schools built by Italian soldiers for the native children. The Serbian Relief Fund (a British association) and the American Red Cross provided food, clothes, furniture etc. and also some nurses, while the Serbian Government provided the teachers. The inauguration of the school at Brod was a very pleasant festival of Italo-Serb cordiality.

The great weakness of the Serbian Army was its deficiency in effectives, and this became more serious day by day. While all the Allies in Macedonia suffered from the same trouble, because the Governments and General Staffs were reluctant to send reinforcements (only our expeditionary force was kept up to strength, at all events until the autumn of 1917), the condition of the Serbs was far more serious, because, save for small groups of volunteers from Europe and America, very often of advanced age and unable to endure hardships, there was no source whence reinforcements could be drawn to make good the constant losses caused by fighting and sickness. “Our reinforcements,” said a field officer attached to the Serbian G.H.Q., “are always the same--the men who come out of hospital more or less cured.” This was a cause of great depression among the Serbians, and in spite of their intense patriotism, there were, as we shall see, moments in which their faith faltered and they contemplated the possibility of concluding a separate peace. This tendency among certain parties was very marked, and resulted in sundry plots and intrigues.