Chapter VIII: Greek Affairs

We have already seen what difficulties and anxieties were inflicted on the Allied armies by the attitude of Greece. The surrender of Rupel and of the IV Greek Army Corps aroused a strong reaction in a part of Greek public opinion--that part which still supported Venizelos in his pro-Entente policy. As early as February, 1916, General Sarrail had gone to Athens to try to induce the King and the Government to alter their policy, at all events in the sense of a benevolent neutrality. He received the impression that the King wished to remain neutral at all costs, that the Premier, M. Skouloudis, and the General Staff were frankly pro-German, and that Venizelos still hoped for the intervention of Greece on the side of the Allies; Venizelos, however, stated that it would be necessary to reconstitute and re-equip the whole army before it could take the field. After the treachery of Rupel, the situation became more critical, and a sort of Committee of Public Safety was created at Salonica for the defence of the nation’s interests and honour. Sarrail did not interfere with the movement, but was sceptical as to its success.

In June, the Powers seemed at last inclined to take strong measures against the Athens Government. Venizelists were being constantly arrested in Greece and the Allies insulted, so that a naval demonstration was decided on, together with the landing of a strong contingent of Allied troops to be sent from Salonica. But Britain and France were not in absolute agreement as to the line of action to be taken, while both Governments hesitated before deciding on measures capable of provoking an open rupture and of driving Greece definitely into the arms of the Central Empires. Nor was there complete understanding between General Sarrail and the French Admiral, Dartige du Fournet, as each of them wished to have the operations under his own control. But when the troops were embarked at Salonica and ready to sail for the Piræus, M. Skouloudis resigned (June 20th), and was succeeded by M. Zaïmis, a statesman apparently more favourable to the Entente; the King thereupon accepted the Allies’ Note demanding the demobilization of part of the army, the withdrawal of all Greek troops from Macedonia and Thessaly, and the cession to the Allies of the fleet and a certain amount of war material--with the firm intention of doing nothing of the kind. The expedition was therefore suspended.

In August, 1916, Venizelos was already contemplating a revolutionary movement at Salonica, under the protection of the Allies, but he did not yet dare to act, hesitating at the thought of provoking civil war. His followers were bolder, and on August 30th an insurrection against the Athens Government broke out, under the leadership of Colonels Zimbrakakis and Mazarakis, the ex-Prefect Argyropoulo and M. Tsanas. The gendarmerie and the artillery joined the insurgents, whereas the infantry, commanded by Colonel Tricoupis, Chief of the Staff of the III Corps, remained faithful to the King. There were some encounters on the Place d’Armes, near the barracks, and General Sarrail seized the occasion to order the immediate evacuation of Salonica by the Royalist troops, “to liberate Macedonia from all armed forces who were vassals of Germany.”[24] The Committee of Public Safety, with the assent of Sarrail, took possession of the administration, and Colonel Zimbrakakis summoned Venizelos to Salonica. The latter arrived on September 9th, unhindered by the Royal Government. According to General Sarrail, with whom other observers are also in agreement on this point, there was a tacit understanding between Constantine and Venizelos. There is, however, no proof of it, and the personal hostility which had long existed between the two seems to incompatible with such a supposition. But it is certain that with the arrival of Venizelos at Salonica that city was secured for Greece, whatever the outcome of the war might be, and with Salonica the future of the kingdom was also assured. If the Central Empires won, King Constantine might count, owing to his anti-Entente policy, on their benevolence, whereas if the Allies won Venizelos might claim anything of them. If Constantine had been a little more astute he might have taken advantage of this curious situation, in his own interest.

Venizelos, with General Danglis and Admiral Coundouriotis, constituted a “triumvirate” which assumed authority under the name of “Provisional Government of National Defence.” Its rule was limited to Greek Macedonia (except the territories beyond the Struma occupied by the Bulgarians and Germans), Crete and the other islands of the Archipelago. Even in those territories the new Government had many adversaries, and without the support of the Armée d’Orient and of the Allied fleets it would have been unable to hold its own, because its professedly interventionist attitude was not very popular. Epirus, the Greeks of Koritza, and Thessaly hesitated, and Sarrail, in order to avoid conflicts between Greeks, created the so-called Neutral Zone between Macedonia and Thessaly. This territory was never violated, a fact which proved advantageous to King Constantine, as it prevented the penetration of Venizelist elements into the kingdom.

Venizelos at once set to work to raise an army capable of fighting by the side of the Allies in Macedonia. It was a case not only of creating an army out of nothing, but also of rehabilitating Greece from the discredit which the ambiguous policy of the King, her intriguing politicians, and the inadequate sense of dignity and lack of political instinct of a great part of the army and of the people, had cast on her. Deserted as he was by almost everyone in Greece, the undertaking seemed well nigh impossible, and the fact that he succeeded at all is a proof of his eminent qualities as well as of unhoped for good luck.

On September 22, 1916, a first Greek battalion was formed and sent to the Struma incorporated in a French unit under a British Command. On November 14th it was joined by two more battalions, and thus the first regiment was formed. In March, 1917, two more regiments were created, and the three constituted a division which was called the Serres Division, because the first nucleus was formed of men belonging to the old Serres Division who had escaped after the surrender of the IV Corps. During the spring, drafts from the islands arrived and were formed into a second division--that of the Archipelago, and some months later the Cretan Division also arrived. The three divisions were welded into an Army Corps, known as the National Defence Army Corps; this was in fact the National Defence Army, commanded by General Zimbrakakis (whom we have seen as Colonel).[25] Immense efforts had been necessary to achieve this result. In Macedonia, real Greeks were few, and not all of them very keen on intervention; the other elements of the population were decidedly opposed to it, or, like the Turks, openly pro-German. Everybody did their best to evade military service, with such pretexts as commerce, work necessary for the Allied armies, propaganda, or the production of documents and certificates of some neutral nationality acquired with lightning speed.

The National Defence Government had to resort to every kind of violence to raise even a few volunteers. General Sarrail has published in the article already quoted a series of telegrams from that Government to the local authorities in the various territories which had recognized Venizelos containing very stringent instructions to force the inhabitants to join the colours.[26]

To face p. 140.
]

But in any case this Government had to be considered an ally; France and Britain recognized it officially and sent diplomatic agents to Salonica as their representatives, although they did not break off relations with the Athens Government. Italy never recognized the new Government, a fact which was the cause of disagreement between us and our Allies. The Greeks of both persuasions did not fail to take advantage of this lack of unity in the Allies’ policy, and incidents between them and all the Allies were by no means infrequent. The Salonica Venizelists were particularly incensed against us. Their Press did not scruple to attack us in the most violent and coarsest manner, circulating the most idiotic libels, such as the statement that the Italian Government was starving the inhabitants of the Dodecannese to death, when it was notorious that it was feeding them and selling them food below cost price, so that prices were lower in those islands than in Italy. A more serious incident was the absolutely unprovoked murder, by a Greek sergeant, of two unarmed Italian soldiers of the Territorial Militia while they were washing clothes in a stream. The assassin was discovered and arrested by our _carabinieri_ and handed over to the Greek authorities for punishment. The Greek court acquitted him and the Public Prosecutor actually exalted him as a hero! The British, too, were irritated against the Greeks, and even the French, who protected them officially, in private conversation expressed the greatest contempt for them. General Sarrail states that, as soon as it had been recognized by France and Britain, the National Defence Government tried to revive a number of old claims for preposterous indemnities demanded by Salonica natives for requisitions or doubtful damages. The Finance Minister at one moment had even decreed that the State Treasury was to refuse French bank notes, so that the C.A.A. had to buy drachmæ at the rate of 80 for 100 francs, even when the money was to be spent for the Venizelist Army.

On September 11th the Zaïmis Cabinet, which was moderately pro-Entente, fell and was succeeded by that of M. Kalogheropoulo, but as the Allies refused to treat with the latter, it too fell on October 4th. Professor Lambros then became Premier, with a frankly anti-Ally policy, and thus we come to the catastrophe of December 1st. The Greek Government, after having undertaken to withdraw the troops from Thessaly and to hand over the fleet and war material, failed to do so. After endless shuffling, the Allied fleets were sent to the Piræus and a policy of coercion was decided on. As a pledge for the cession of war material, the Government was to hand over 10 mountain batteries at once. Admiral Dartige had certain strategic points in Athens and the road between the capital and the Piræus occupied by detachments of French seamen with machine guns. Then he went himself to Athens, and communicated his plan of operations to the King.[27] Suddenly there was a general burst of rifle fire. The detachment at the Zappeion and those along the Athens-Piræus road were surrounded by Greek soldiers, as were also the Allied legations. The French seamen had fallen into a regular ambush, and 200 of them were killed. Admiral Dartige and several detachments of seamen were taken prisoners and escorted to the Piræus. Both he and the Foreign Ministers then agreed to accept six batteries instead of ten, while the rest of the material was to be handed over on December 15th.

General Sarrail received the most contradictory instructions (which he quotes textually in his memoirs). Whereas the French G.H.Q. and the Government ordered him to take the military measures necessary to re-establish the prestige of the Entente in Greece and sent out the 16th Colonial Division, which he was to reinforce with other troops from Salonica, the French Minister at Athens and Admiral Dartige, anxious for the safety of the foreign colonies, insisted on nothing being done. Sarrail himself wanted to take action, occupying various strategic points in Greece and blowing up the railway bridges at Corinth and Lamia. The French Government had entrusted General Sarrail with the conduct of the operations to be carried out in Greece, but Admiral Dartige had held back the 16th Division. The British and Italian Governments were adverse to any energetic action against King Constantine because, in view of the general military situation and of that on the Macedonian front in particular, they thought that it would be dangerous to _brusquer les choses_. Thus, while the Greek Government had suppressed all the Allied controls, the Athens wireless station began to communicate with Sofia once more, and the Venizelists were subjected to the most ferocious persecution, the Allies presented a fresh ultimatum to Greece (these documents now came to be called _pen_-ultimatums) on December 14th, demanding merely the withdrawal of the troops from Thessaly, without mentioning the cession of war material or claiming any satisfaction for the massacre of December 1st. The Greek Government accepted without hesitation, and the 16th Colonial Division departed for Salonica.

These events undoubtedly weakened the prestige of the Entente in the East, because it was clearly seen that the Allies were by no means agreed as to the policy to be followed and that they dare not take strong measures. This consequently strengthened King Constantine and the pro-German and neutralist elements. The only thing that the Allies did decide to do was to impose a blockade on Greece, which aroused great irritation against them without being sufficient to reduce the Athens Government to obedience. At the Rome Conference in January, 1917, at which General Sarrail had been present, although little attention was paid to him, no conclusion concerning Greece was arrived at, except that of doing nothing for the present. But the situation at Athens rendered that of the Armée d’Orient ever more difficult, and it was necessary to find some solution for the former if the Macedonian front were to be made safe. The Greek Government, although it had withdrawn its troops from Thessaly, left many officers and strong detachments of _gendarmerie_ there, which might serve as cadres for the reservists. From the Peloponnese many soldiers were allowed to go to Thessaly on leave. Whereas at Athens provisions were lacking, they were being concentrated in abundance in the north; every now and then the control officers, who had been re-established, found arms and ammunition depots. Bands, comprising soldiers and reservists, were also formed.[28] It was to oppose these bands and to prevent them from penetrating into the Neutral Zone that General Sarrail sent detachments to Kozani and Grevena. But the Greek question continued to provoke inter-Allied incidents; according to Sarrail, General Phillips, the Chief of the British Military Mission in Greece, tried to minimize the importance of the trickery and chicanes of the Greeks; even two French officers supported King Constantine--General Bousquier, Chief of the French Military Mission at Athens, and General Baumann at Corfu (always according to the French C.-in-C.).

The Greeks at Salonica having assumed a truculent attitude towards ourselves, the Italian troops received orders that, while they were to avoid giving rise to any incidents, they were to ensure respect for the Italian name and uniform. An Italian soldier who, having been insulted without the slightest provocation by a Greek, gave him a sound thrashing, received an encomium and a reward. General Petitti, in accordance with instructions from his own Government, did not recognize the National Defence Government in any way, and merely exchanged visiting cards with M. Venizelos, to whom he had been introduced by the Italian Consul. But he refused to allow forced recruiting for the National Defence Army among the inhabitants of the Italian area in the Krusha Balkan. Subsequently our Command agreed that the native labourers in our employ, if subject to military service, should be exchanged with others who were exempt from such duties. Colonel Bodrero, commanding the Italian garrison at Salonica, was, however, on terms of friendship with M. Venizelos, and saw him often. He also assisted at a religious ceremony of a political Venizelist character at Santa Sofia, at a moment when it was reported that Italy was about to recognize the Provisional Government. But nothing came of these _avances_.

Finally, in April, the Powers decided to occupy Thessaly, and General Sarrail received instructions to keep himself in readiness for the operation, but the date was not yet fixed. He was then ordered to proceed to Thessaly after the offensive in Macedonia, scheduled for May, had been carried out. At first the intention was merely to secure the harvest in Thessaly, both because it would be useful for the Armée d’Orient, and because it would render the blockade of Greece more effective. But Sarrail wished to go much further; he actually proposed to upset King Constantine and establish a republic in Greece with Venizelos as President. To this, however, both Britain and Italy raised strong objection; two monarchies were certainly not going to co-operate in upsetting another one, especially in view of the Russian situation. After protracted discussions, it was agreed that Constantine should be forced to abdicate, and that his son Prince Alexander should be placed on the throne, with Venizelos as Prime Minister. The conduct of the Allied action in Greece was entrusted to M. Jonnart, former Governor-General of Algeria, as High Commissioner for the Entente. Even Sarrail was placed under his orders, which did not please the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief in the Orient. On June 3rd he sent a detailed report on the situation to M. Jonnart, to whom he submitted the plan of operations which he proposed to execute. On the 6th, Jonnart reached Salonica to make his final arrangements with Sarrail and Venizelos. In order to avoid any possibility of resistance on the part of King Constantine, it was decided to occupy simultaneously Thessaly to secure the harvest, the Isthmus of Corinth to prevent the troops in the Peloponnesus, who were faithful to the King, from entering Continental Greece, and the Piræus with a view to advancing on Athens and forcing the King to abdicate.

M. Jonnart immediately left for the Piræus. On June 8th, a French column commanded by General Venel advanced across the Neutral Zone into Thessaly, while a Franco-British-Russian force, commanded by General Régnault, embarked for the Piræus and the Isthmus of Corinth. In Thessaly there was no resistance, except at Larissa, where a Greek regiment opened fire on the French cavalry, but was soon reduced to impotence. On the 10th, M. Jonnart, who had established his quarters on board the French battleship _Justice_, had a meeting with M. Zaïmis, the new Greek Premier. The Isthmus of Corinth was occupied, and the ships conveying the troops destined for Athens were anchored off the Piræus. On the 11th, Jonnart, in the name of the Protecting Powers of Greece (France, Britain and Russia), sent an ultimatum to Zaïmis, in which the abdication of King Constantine was demanded, in order that Constitutional Government might be re-established in the country, as the Constitution had been violated by the illegal dissolution of the Chamber; the King himself was invited to choose his successor, who, however, was not to be the Diadoch on account of his notoriously anti-German sentiments. A reply was demanded within twenty-four hours. Constantine now realized that all resistance was useless--his own capital was within range of the guns of the fleet, and troops were ready to land at the Piræus. That same evening M. Zaïmis informed M. Jonnart that the ultimatum had been accepted unconditionally, and on the 12th he sent him the official reply of the Greek Government to the same effect. When the news of the King’s abdication became known in the city, there were some demonstrations in his favour; but the landing of the French and Russian troops (the British were at Corinth) removed all danger of a rising, In order to preclude any contact with the population and to draw off the attention of the crowd, some empty Royal motor cars, with the blinds down, issued from the main entrance of the Palace and drove towards the Zappeion, while the King and his family departed secretly at about 17 hrs. in the direction of the Royal villa of Tatoï, and thence proceeded to the little port of Oropos in the Eubœa Channel, where they embarked on the Royal yacht _Sphacteria_. Together with another vessel for the suite and the baggage, and escorted by two French destroyers, the _Sphacteria_ sailed for Italy, whence the ex-King and his family went into exile in Switzerland.

In the meanwhile Prince Alexander, Constantine’s second son, who had been designated as successor, had taken the oath of allegiance to the Constitution. M. Jonnart then published a proclamation to the Greek people, announcing the raising of the blockade, the re-establishment of good relations between the Protecting Powers and Greece, and the imminent restoration of national unity. After a conversation with M. Jonnart, M. Zaïmis ordered the expulsion from Greece of a certain number of personages implicated in Constantine’s policy, including the ex-Premiers Gounaris, Skouloudis and Lambros, six other Ministers, General Dousmanis and another General, Colonel Metaxas, Assistant Chief of the Staff, and Admiral Hösslin, the head of the German propaganda service and several others--in all 160 people. Immediately after ascending the throne, King Alexander announced in a proclamation to the people that “he would follow in the glorious footsteps of his father,” which was not exactly what was desired, and the phrase had a somewhat disconcerting effect. But he corrected this faux pas directly after in a letter to M. Zaïmis in which he promised faithfully to respect the Constitution and declared himself ready to co-operate with the Protecting Powers for the pacification of public feeling and the reconciliation of the country (June 20th).

On the 21st the delegates of M. Venizelos met those of M. Zaïmis, and M. Venizelos himself arrived at Salamis, where he had a conversation with M. Jonnart on board the _Justice_. It was then decided to re-convoke the Chamber elected in 1915, in which the majority was Venizelist and had been illegally dissolved by Constantine. King Alexander having agreed to send for Venizelos, Zaïmis resigned (June 27th), and Venizelos re-entered Athens under the protection of French troops who had occupied all the strategic positions in the city, and of 400 Cretan gendarmes. The new Cabinet comprised Venizelos himself as Premier and Minister of War, Politis, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Repoulis (Interior), Admiral Coundouriotis (Marine), Empiricos (Communications), etc. Jonnart had authorized Venizelos to modify certain points of the Constitution and to suspend the permanency of the judiciary, so as to cleanse the State of Royalist[29] officials. The process was carried out without excessive squeamishness. Many officials, magistrates and officers were dismissed; the trials and convictions for political offences, and the sentences of deportation or exile were innumerable. The population, which had attacked the Venizelists after December 1st with the utmost ferocity, and with the complicity or the help of the authorities had committed the most diabolical cruelties against them, accepted the new régime without resistance, if without enthusiasm. There was still a strong Royalist party, comprising almost the whole of the upper class and a great part of the officers. But its chiefs having been arrested or deported, it was in no position to offer any resistance. The mass of the people, although less enthusiastic about Constantine than the higher classes, was hostile to Venizelos because he represented war, and they had no wish to fight. But there was also an ardently Venizelist minority, comprising some of the best elements of the country, who saw beyond mean party struggles and immediate material interests. It was this group which, with support of the Allies, ended by triumphing.

Thus the National Defence Government came to an end, and Greece was once more united. In Italy, the Greek situation was never fully understood, nor the inner meaning of these events. For some time before the great war Italo-Greek relations had been unfriendly on account of the Dodecannese question and our interests in Albania. Italian public opinion had defended Albanian independence, whereas Greece aspired to annex the southern part of the country, including Argyrocastro and Koritza which Greeks described as “Northern Epirus.” During the Balkan War the Greeks had occupied Epirus and South Albania, but later they had had to evacuate the latter territory; on the outbreak of the Great War they invaded it again and devastated it. The feelings of Greece towards the Entente were uncertain; our intervention rendered her somewhat hostile because she did not, for the above-mentioned reasons, wish to find herself in alliance with Italy.[30] The insolent and petulant attitude of the Greek press intensified anti-Greek feeling in Italy. Greece’s failure to meet her engagements arising from the Serbo-Greek Alliance, and later her whole attitude towards the Allies in Macedonia, culminating in the surrender of Rupel and the IV Army Corps, convinced Italian public opinion that the great majority of the Greek people were pro-German. On the other hand we were suspicious of Venizelos because he represented the Imperialist spirit of unlimited Greek expansion, and Italians did not believe that Greek Imperialism had a sound basis, because they considered that the Greeks lacked the qualities required in a race destined to rule. But in Italy it was not perhaps understood that Venizelos himself was a much bigger man than the _milieu_ in which his activity was displayed, and that he was in reality rendering services to the Entente and therefore to us. In Britain and France, on the other hand, public opinion wrongly believed that he had his people absolutely behind him and that that people was, as a whole, up to his standard.

The real reason why Britain and France, especially the latter, desired Greek intervention in the war and therefore supported Venizelos, was that a hostile Greece might prove fatal to the Macedonian expedition. If Greece were really neutral the Armée d’Orient might hold its own on its positions, but a new offensive could only be attempted with any hope of success if fresh reinforcements were forthcoming. These might have been drawn from the French front or from Italy; but the British, French and Italian G.H.Q.’s were irremovably opposed to the sending of more troops from what were regarded as the essential fronts to the East. The Serbs were not even able to fill up the gaps caused by battle and sickness. The only source of supply for man-power which could still be tapped was Greece. No one really wanted Greek assistance--neither the French nor the British, and still less the Italians and the Serbs. Everybody knew that the Greek Army was torn by political strife, disorganized, lacking in artillery and equipment, badly led and anything but friendly to the Entente, and that it could not therefore represent an important addition of strength to the Allies. There were, it is true, the three National Defence Divisions which included good material, and the officers at least were all volunteers. But they were only nine regiments in all, with a few mountain batteries. There was therefore nothing else to be done but to get the whole of Greece, _nolens volens_, into the war, and trust to the Allied military missions and to a vast cleansing operation to make something useful out of the Greek Army. It would certainly have been preferable if a few already war-trained divisions from France or Italy had been available. But the Government of the Great Powers were not friendly towards the Macedonian campaign, and would not realize that 3 or 4 divisions, withdrawn from the fronts of Italy or France would not have weakened those armies perceptibly, whereas in Macedonia they might have just tilted the balance in our favour. But as this course was rejected it was necessary to have recourse to Greece, a necessity which was not understood in Italy. We did not desire Greek intervention because we knew what enormous demands for compensation Greece would afterwards make, demands which were to some extent incompatible with our own interests. But on the other hand we were even more opposed than the French or the British to the sending of fresh troops to Macedonia. The only other solution was to withdraw the Armée d’Orient altogether, or let it be starved for men and remain in idleness, with the ever-present risk of being driven into the sea by the enemy. France and Britain, who attached a little more importance than we did--though not very much more--to the Macedonian expedition, finally decided to apply for Greek help, trusting in Venizelos. Italy, in her opposition to the vast aspirations of Venizelist Greece, had the appearance of supporting Constantine, and this did us a great deal of harm. We had, perhaps, interests to defend in the Near East which were to some extent in contrast with those of other Allies. But in order to defend them adequately we should have done nothing to make our policy appear in any way suspected of pro-Germanism--and at that time to be pro-Constantine was regarded as equivalent to being pro-German. Instead, Italian public opinion and the press, and some of our officers and diplomats assumed an attitude which made our Near Eastern policy suspect in the eyes of the French, and even of the British. We continued to suffer the great harm which these circumstances caused us for a long time afterwards, especially at the Peace Conference. Moreover, our pro-Constantine policy did not succeed. France and Britain brought about Constantine’s fall and the return of Venizelos. We limited ourselves to occupying Epirus for a short time, as a _pendant_ to the French occupation of Thessaly; we made ourselves still more unpopular with the Venizelists, without gaining the sympathies of the Royalists. Our true policy should have been to send important reinforcements to the East. Had we done so we should have been, after the Armistice, in a far better position to defend our own aspirations and interests in the negotiations with our Allies.

Let us now see what the Greek Army really was. I have mentioned the National Defence Army Corps. This was the best that Greece could produce in the way of a military force, and subsequently, as we shall see, its regiments behaved well. But even their _moral_ at first left something to be desired. Desertions were numerous, and when M. Jonnart arrived there had been no less than 700 of them in the Archipelago Division alone.[31] Up to that moment only a few Greek detachments had been sent to the front, and always incorporated in Allied units and on relatively quiet sectors. After the fall of Constantine, Greece entered into a state of war with the Central Empires, and the French set to work to reorganize the Greek Army so that it might co-operate effectively in Macedonia.

The task was no easy one. The first thing to be done was to proceed to the cleansing of the officers’ corps. This was indispensable, because nearly all the Staff officers had studied in Germany and, like the great majority of field officers, were imbued with pro-German sentiments. But the result of this process was that the Army was left with hardly any Staff officers at all, and very few officers of superior rank. It thus became necessary to promote large numbers of uneducated junior officers and of still more ignorant N.C.O.’s. A hasty and intensive course of military training had to be imparted to all. Even the troops of the National Defence Army had but scanty notions of modern warfare, trenches, barbed wire, the scientific use of machine guns, hand grenades, camouflage, signalling, etc. As for their supply and transport services, they were even more defective, so that at first everything had to be provided and transported by the Allies, and the latter, even at the end of the campaign, had to supply the Greeks with most of their services. The experience which the Greeks had gained in the Balkan Wars was of no use whatever, in fact they were a hindrance rather than a help; the former had been, so to speak, retail wars, whereas this was a wholesale one. In the former, the armies were small and could live on the country, in the latter, not only were the armies much larger, but the country had been so completely devastated that it could supply practically nothing. The troops of the National Defence Corps were now no longer lacking in military spirit, but it was necessary to infuse it into those of the old regular army. The men on the whole were not bad, but most of the officers were inadquately trained, and it was indispensable to instil into all of them the conviction that intervention in the war was necessary for the salvation of Greece.

The chief difficulties which the French Military Mission found itself up against were Oriental indolence, scanty love of hard work, and dislike of discipline. At the front, even when they had fought well and successfully, the Greek soldiers did not want to tire themselves by digging trenches and strengthening their positions, so that they could not have held out against vigorous counter-attacks; consequently, after every successful attack, when an enemy reaction was feared, the Greeks would be relieved by other troops. In the training courses the French instructors had to work themselves to death trying to persuade their pupils that discipline and military knowledge were indispensable. As one of these officers said to me: “_Ils ne nous détestent pas, mais il nous trouvent trés gênant._” On the other hand sporadic cases of indiscipline and mutiny were less alarming than they would have been in a European army, although they were serious enough in themselves. Greek detachments, while travelling towards the Macedonian front, were apt to disperse en route, because, if the men happened to be passing near their own homes, they could not resist the temptation of going to visit their families. There were graver cases of mutiny proper, especially at Lamia and Larissa, provoked by Royalist propagandists who spread catastrophic and fantastic rumours or appealed to the Royalist and neutralist sentiments with which a part of the army was imbued; this is not surprising in view of the violent political passions by which the Army was torn and of the fact that the men realized the war very slightly. Cases of desertion to the enemy, although not infrequent, were far less numerous than was commonly believed at Salonica. On the whole it must be admitted that the French Mission carried out its task as well as it was possible for it to do with the material which it had to handle. But superhuman patience was necessary, and we must not be surprised if French officers at times indulged in the most bitter and often unjustified diatribes against the Greeks.

The troops of the National Defence Corps were scattered about the various sectors of the front to complete their training under the ægis of French units. As their training progressed, they were incorporated into ever larger units, so that whereas at first each Greek company was placed between companies belonging to other armies, later they were grouped in battalions, then in regiments, and finally in divisions. For a time there was one Greek division on the Monastir front, and one with the I Group of Divisions west of the Vardar; later on, two were grouped together, and early in 1918, all three were united in the latter sector, thus constituting a complete army corps. Until that moment the Greek Command was a Corps Command, under General Zimbrakakis, with its G.H.Q. at Salonica, and later at Boemitza, near front of the I Group. The latter, however, continued to be commanded by a French General--first General Gérome, and then General d’Anselme.

In the late autumn of 1917, detachments of the Greek Regular Army began to reach Salonica. Their training was divided into three periods--the first in Old Greece, the second at the training camp at Naresh, near Salonica, and the third in a quiet sector of the front. The last detachments did not reach Macedonia until the eve of the offensive of September, 1918. The 1st, 2nd and 13th Divisions composed the I Army Corps; the others were not embodied in corps until after the Armistice, but served under Allied units in different sectors. To the I Corps (Gen. Paraskevopoulo) was entrusted the lower Struma area in the summer of 1918, at first under the command of the British XVI Corps, and subsequently directly under the British G.H.Q.

After the revolution of June, 1917, General Danglis was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Army. He was a good soldier, but rather old; when the bulk of the troops had been transferred to Macedonia he moved his own G.H.Q. from Athens to Salonica. Later on he was relieved of his Command, and succeeded by General Paraskevopoulo. But the Greek Chief Command never really operated, save as an administrative and disciplinary organ, because there never was a real Greek Army. There were divisions and even corps, but the effective Army Command was always French or British. The lines of communication, the commissariat, the _intendance_ only existed in embryo. The mobilization had never been general from fear of provoking insurrections, and had to be effected gradually and partially; only the youngest classes were called to the colours, so that there was a lack of men for the rear services. The Greeks, like other Oriental peoples, were lacking in the sense of organization, and even as collaborators they were the despair of the British Q service which had to supply them. The Greek officers recognized it themselves openly, and said that everything with which the British undertook to supply them arrived regularly, whereas the supplies for which the Greek _intendance_ was responsible arrived with considerable delay or remained on the road. Another difficulty was the inveterate habit of the Greek soldier of selling his kit to civilians. The temptation was considerable, as the prices paid for these articles were very high, and there was a regular secret organization for such purchases, besides private transactions between friends or relations. The result was that certain units had to be re-equipped two or three times before they had marched a kilometre. The same thing happened at Salonica even among other Allied armies, but to a much smaller extent, and such cases were always severely punished at once.

But with all their faults we must not forget that the Greeks did give a useful contribution to the Macedonian campaign. As we shall see later, the units that had occasion to fight behaved well, and the great sobriety and endurance of the men proved valuable assets in country as difficult and as poor in resources as Macedonia. If their losses in the war were trifling in comparison with those of the other Allies, and even as a percentage of the total numbers engaged, their utility lay in having, to some extent, solved the crisis of effectives from which the Armée d’Orient was suffering so grievously and which, in view of the reluctance of Great Powers to send reinforcements to Macedonia, had seemed well nigh insoluble. By entrusting to the Greeks, as was done in the summer of 1918, the whole of the Struma front, which, although it was not one of the very difficult sectors, required, nevertheless, a considerable number of troops to hold on account of its extension, the concentration of British troops elsewhere was rendered possible.

The Greek front on the Struma was nothing else than the old front of the British XVI Corps, and was now held by the three divisions of the Greek I Corps. Three more divisions were with the I Groupement between Nonte and the Vardar under French command, and another division was placed under another French General in the Cerna loop on the eve of the offensive. The rest of the Greek forces remained in reserve. The 9th Division, which was in Epirus, had originally been intended to co-operate with the Italian XVI Corps in Albania; but it was considered advisable to avoid contact between Italians and Greeks, and it was therefore sent to Macedonia in the summer of 1918, part of it being conveyed by sea via Salonica and the rest marching overland via Ersek and Koritza. During their passage through Albania the various units of that division were supplied, at General Franchet d’Espérey’s request, by the Italian military authorities, and the latter is said to have stated that the greatest success of his whole career was to have induced the Italians to feed the Greeks!