Chapter XL: Thomas Aquinas (1)

I. THOMAS’S CONCEPTION OF HUMAN BEATITUDE.

II. MAN’S CAPACITY TO KNOW GOD.

III. HOW GOD KNOWS.

IV. HOW THE ANGELS KNOW.

V. HOW MEN KNOW.

VI. KNOWLEDGE THROUGH FAITH PERFECTED IN LOVE.

I

With Albert it seemed most illuminating to outline the masses of his work of Aristotelian purveyorship and inchoate reconstruction of the Christian encyclopaedia in conformity with the new philosophy. Such a treatment will not avail for Thomas. His achievement, even measured by its bulk, was as great as Albert’s. But its size and encyclopaedic inclusiveness do not represent its integral excellences. The intellectual qualities of Thomas, evinced in his work, are of a higher order than those included in intelligent diligence, however exceptional. They must be disengaged from out of the vast product of their energies, in order that they may be brought together, and made to appear in the organic correlation which they held in the mind of the most potent genius of scholasticism.

We are pleased to find some clue to a man’s genius in the race and place from which he draws his origin. So for whatever may be its explanatory value as to Thomas, one may note that he came of Teutonic stocks, which for some generations had been domiciled in the form-giving Italian land. The mingled blood of princely Suabian and Norman lines flowed in him; the nobility of his father’s house, the Counts of Aquinum, was equalled by his mother’s lineage. Probably in 1225 he was born, in Southern Italy, not far from Monte Cassino. Thither, as a child, he was sent to school to the monks, and stayed with them through childhood’s formative period. His education did not create the mind which it may have had part in directing to sacred study. Near his tenth year, the extraordinary boy was returned to Naples, there to study the humanities and philosophy under selected masters. When eighteen, he launched himself upon the intellectual currents of the age by joining the Dominican Order. Stories have come down of the violent, but fruitless opposition of his family. In two years, with true instinct, Thomas had made his way from Naples to the feet of Albert in Cologne. Thenceforth the two were to be together, as their tasks permitted, and the loyal relationship between master and scholar was undisturbed by the latter’s transcendent genius. Plato had the greatest pupil, and Aristotle the greatest master, known to fame. That pupil’s work was a redirecting of philosophy. The work of pupil Thomas perfected finally the matter upon which his master laboured; and the master’s aged eyes beheld the finished structure that was partly his, when the pupil’s eyes had closed. Thomas, dying, left Albert to defend the system that was to be called “Thomist,” after him who constructed and finished it to its very turret points, rather than “Albertist,” after him who prepared the materials.

To return to the time when both still laboured. Thomas in 1245 accompanied his master to Paris, and three years later went back with him to Cologne. Thereafter their duties often separated them. We know that in 1252 Thomas was lecturing at Paris, and that he there received with Bonaventura the title of _magister_ in 1257. After this he is found south of the Alps; it was in the year 1263 that Urban IV. at Rome encouraged him to undertake a critical commentary upon Aristotle, based on a closer rendering into Latin of the Greek. In 1268, at the height of his academic fame, he is once more at Paris; which he leaves for the last time in 1272, having been directed to establish a _studium generale_ at Naples. Two years later he died, on his way to advise the labours of the Council assembled at Lyons.[577]

Thomas wrote commentaries upon the Aristotelian _De interpretatione_ and _Posterior Analytics_; the _Physics_, the _De coelo et mundo_, the _Meteorum_, the _Metaphysics_, _Ethics_, _Politics_, and certain other Aristotelian treatises. His work shows such a close understanding of Aristotle as the world had not known since the days of the ancient Peripatetics. Of course, he lectured on the _Sentences_, and the result remains in his Commentaries on them. He lectured, and the resulting Commentaries exist in many tomes, on the greater part of both the Old and New Testaments. It would little help our purpose to catalogue in detail his more constructive and original works, wherein he perfected a system of philosophy and sacred knowledge. Chief among them were the _Summa contra Gentiles_ and the _Summa theologiae_, the latter the most influential work of all western mediaeval scholasticism. Many of his more important shorter treatises are included in the _Quaestiones disputatae_, and the _Quodlibetalia_. They treat of many matters finally put together in the _Summa theologiae_. _De malo in communi, de peccatis, etc._; _De anima_; _De virtutibus in communi, etc._; _De veritate_; _De ideis_; _De cognitione angelorum_; _De bono_; _De voluntate_; _De libero arbitrio_; _De passionibus animae_; _De gratia_;--such are titles drawn from the _Quaestiones_. The _Quodlibetalia_ were academic disputations held in the theological faculty, upon any imaginable thesis having theological bearing. Some of them still appear philosophical, while many seem bizarre to us; for example: Whether an angel can move from one extreme to the other without passing through the middle. One may remember that such questions had been put, and put again, from the time of the Church Fathers. This question answered by Thomas whether an angel may pass from one extreme to the other without traversing the middle is pertinent to the conception of angels as completely immaterial beings,--a conception upon the elaboration of which theologians expended much ingenious thought.

In the earlier Middle Ages, when men were busy putting together the ancient matter, the personalities of the writers may not clearly appear. It is different in the twelfth century, and very different in the thirteenth, when the figures of at least its greater men are thrown out plainly by their written works. Bonaventura is seen lucidly reasoning, but with his ardently envisioning piety ever reaching out beyond; the personality of Albert most Teutonically wrestles itself into salience through the many-tomed results of his very visible efforts; when we come to Roger Bacon, we shall find wormwood, and many higher qualities of mind, flowing in his sentences. And the consummate fashioning faculty, the devout and intellectual temperament of Thomas, are writ large in his treatises. His work has unity; it is a system; it corresponds to the scholastically creative personality, from the efficient concord of whose faculties it proceeded. The unity of Thomas’s personality lay in his conception of man’s _summum bonum_, which sprang from his Christian faith, but was constructed by reason from foundation to pinnacle; and it is evinced in the compulsion of an intellectual temperament that never let the pious reasoner’s energies or appetitions stray loitering or aberrant from that goal. Likewise the unity of his system consists in its purpose, which is to present that same _summum bonum_, credited by faith, empowered, if not empassioned, by piety, and constructed by reason. To fulfil this purpose in its utmost compass, reason works with the material of all pertinent knowledge; fashioning the same to complete logical consistency of expression.

Therefore, it is from his conception of this _summum bonum_ as from a centre of illumination, that we may trace the characteristic qualities alike of Thomas and his work. His faith, his piety, and his intellectual nature are revealed in his thought of supreme felicity. Man’s chief good being the ground of the system, the thought and study which Thomas puts upon the created universe and upon God, regarded both as Creator and in the relationships of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, conduce to make large and sure and ample this same chief good of man. To it likewise conduce the Incarnation, and the Sacraments springing therefrom; in accord with it, Thomas accepts or constructs his metaphysics, his psychology, his entire thought of human capacity and destiny, and sets forth how nearly man’s reason may bring him to this goal, and where there is need of divine grace. In this goal, moreover, shall be found the sanction of human knowledge, and the justification of the right enjoyment of human faculties; it determines what elements of mortal life may be gathered up and carried on, to form part of the soul’s eternal beatitude.

Thomas’s intellectual powers work together in order to set his thought of man’s _summum bonum_ on its surest foundations, and make clear its scope: his faculty of arrangement, and serious and lucid presentation; his careful reasoning, which never trips, never overlooks, and never either hurries or is taken unprepared; his marvellous unforgetfulness of everything which might remotely bear on the subject; his intellectual poise, and his just weighing of every matter that should be taken into the scales of his determination. Observing these, we may realize how he seemed to his time a new intellectual manifestation of God’s illuminating grace. There was in him something unknown before; his argument, his exposition, was new in power, in interest, in lucidity. On the quality of newness the wretched old biographer rings his reiteration:

“For in his lectures he put out _new_ topics (_articulos_), inventing
a _new_ and clear way of drawing conclusions and bringing _new_
reasons into them, so that no one, who had heard him teach _new_
doubts and allay them by _new_ arguments, would have doubted that God
had illumined with rays of _new_ light one who became straightway of
such sure judgment, that he did not hesitate to teach and write _new_
opinions, which God had deigned _newly_ to inspire.”[578]

His biographer’s view is justified. Thomas was the greatest of the schoolmen. His way of teaching, his translucent exposition, came to his hearers as a new inspiration. Only Bonaventura (likewise Italian-born) may be compared with him for clearness of exposition--of solution indeed; and Thomas is more judicial, more supremely intellectual; his way of treatment was a stronger incitement and satisfaction to at least the minds of his auditors. Albert, with his mass of but half-conquered material, could not fail to show, whether he would or not, the doubt-breeding difficulties of the new philosophy, which was yet to be worked into Christian theology. Thomas exposed every difficulty and revealed its depths; but then he solved and adjusted everything with an argumentation from whose careful inclusiveness no questions strayed unshepherded. Placed with Thomas, Albert shows as the Titan whose strength assembles the materials, while Thomas is the god who erects the edifice. The material that Thomas works with, and many of his thoughts and arguments, are to be found in Albert; and the pupil knew his indebtedness to the great master, who survived him to defend his doctrines. But what is not in Albert, is Thomas, Thomas himself, with his disentangled reasoning, his clarity, his organic exposition, his final construction of the mediaeval Christian scheme.[579]

In the third book of his _Summa philosophica contra Gentiles_, and in the beginning of _Pars prima secundae_ of his _Summa theologiae_, Thomas expounds man’s final end, _ultimus finis_, which is his supreme good or perfect beatitude. The exposition in the former work, dating from the earlier years of the author’s academic activities, seems the simpler at first reading; but the other includes more surely Thomas’s last reasoning, placed in the setting of argument and relationship which he gave it in his greatest work. We shall follow the latter, borrowing, however, from the former when its phrases seem to present the matter more aptly to our non-scholastic minds. The general position of the topic is the same in both _Summae_; and Thomas gives the reason in the Prologus to _Pars prima secundae_ of the _Summa theologiae_. His way of doing this is significant:

“Man is declared to be made in the image of God in this sense (as
Damascenus[580] says) that by ‘image’ is meant _intellectual_, _free
to choose_, and _self-potent to act_. Therefore, after what has been
said of the Exemplar God, and of those things which proceed from the
divine power according to its will, there remains for us to consider
His image, to wit, man, in so far as he is himself the source
(_principium_) of his acts, possessing free will and power over them.”

Thereupon Thomas continues, opening his first Quaestio:[581]

“First one must consider the final end (_ultimus finis_) of human
life, and then those things through which man may attain this end, or
deviate from it. For one must accept from an end the rationale of
those things which are ordained to that end.”

Assuming the final end of human life to be beatitude, Thomas considers wherein man as a rational creature may properly have one final end, on account of which he wills all that he wills. Quaestio ii. shows that man’s beatitude cannot consist in riches, honours, fame, power, pleasures of the body, or in any created good, not even in the soul. Man gains his beatitude _through_ the soul; but in itself the soul is not man’s final end. The next Quaestio is devoted to the gist of the matter: what beatitude is, and what is needed for it. Thomas first shows in what sense beatitude is something increate (_increatum_). He has already pointed out that _end_ (_finis_) has a twofold meaning: the thing itself which we desire to obtain, and the fruition of it.

“In the first sense, the final end of man is an increate good, to wit
God, who alone with His infinite goodness can perfectly fulfil the
wish (_voluntas_) of man. In the second sense the final end of man is
something created existing in himself; which is nought else than
attainment or fruition (_adeptio vel fruitio_) of the final end. The
final end is called beatitude. If then man’s beatitude is viewed as
cause or object, it is something increate; but if it is considered in
its beatific essence (_quantum ad ipsam essentiam beatitudinis_) it is
something created.”

Thomas next shows:

“... that inasmuch as man’s beatitude is something created existing in
himself, it is necessary to regard it as action (_operatio_). For
beatitude is man’s ultimate perfection. But everything is perfect in
so far as it is actually (_actu_, _i.e._ in realized actuality): for
potentiality without actuality is imperfect. Therefore beatitude
should consist in man’s ultimate actuality. But manifestly action
(_operatio_) is the final actuality of the actor (_operantis_); as the
Philosopher shows, demonstrating that everything exists for its action
(_propter suam operationem_). Hence it follows of necessity that man’s
beatitude is action.”

The next point to consider is whether beatitude is the action of man’s senses or his intellect. Drawing distinctions, Thomas points out that

“the action of sense cannot pertain to beatitude essentially; because
man’s beatitude essentially consists in uniting himself to the
increate good; to which he cannot be joined through the action of the
senses. Yet sense-action may pertain to beatitude as an antecedent or
consequence: as an antecedent, for the imperfect beatitude attainable
in this life, where the action of the senses is a prerequisite to the
action of the mind; as a consequence, in that perfect beatitude which
is looked for in heaven; because, after the resurrection, as Augustine
says, from the very beatitude of the soul, there may be a certain
flowing back into the body and its senses, perfecting them in their
actions. But not even then will the action by which the human mind is
joined to God depend on sense.”

Beatitude then is the action of man’s intellectual part; and Thomas next inquires, whether it is an action of the intelligence or will (_intellectus aut voluntatis_). With this inquiry we touch the pivot of Thomas’s attitude, wherein he departs from Augustine, in apparent reliance on the word of John: “This is eternal life that they should know thee, the one true God.” Life eternal is man’s final end; and therefore man’s beatitude consists in knowledge of God, which is an act of mind. Thomas argues this at some length. He refers to the distinction between what is essential to the existence of beatitude, and what is joined to it _per accidens_, like enjoyment (_delectatio_).

“I say then, that beatitude in its essence cannot consist in an act of
will. For it has appeared that beatitude is the obtaining
(_consecutio_) of the final end. But obtaining does not consist in any
act of will; for will attaches to the absent when one desires it, as
well as to the present in which one rests delighted. It is evident
that the desire for an end is not an obtaining of it, but a movement
toward it. Enjoyment attaches to will from the presence of the end;
but not conversely does anything become present because the will shall
delight in it. Therefore there must be something besides an act of
will, through which the end may become present to the will. This is
plain respecting the ends of sense (_fines sensibiles_). For if to
obtain money were an act of will, the miser would have obtained it
from the beginning. And so it comes to pass with respect to an end
conceived by the mind; we obtain it when it becomes present to us
through an act of the intellect; and then the delighted will rests in
the end obtained. Thus, therefore, the essence of beatitude consists
in an act of mind. But the delight which follows beatitude pertains to
will, even in the sense in which Augustine says: ‘beatitudo est
gaudium de veritate,’ because indeed joy is the consummation of
beatitude.”

The supremely intellectual attitude of the Angelic Doctor, shows at once, and as it were universally, in his conviction of the primacy of the true over the good, and of knowledge over will. Sometimes he argues these points directly; and again, his temperamental attitude appears in the course of argument upon other points. For example, Quaestio xvi. of _Pars prima_ has for its subject _Veritas_. And in the first article, which discusses whether truth is in the thing (_in re_) or only in the mind, he argues thus:

“As _good_ signifies that upon which desire (_appetitus_) is bent, so
_true_ signifies that at which understanding aims. There is this
difference between desire and understanding or any kind of cognition:
cognition exists in so far as what is known (_cognitum_) is in the
knower; but desire is as the desirous inclines toward the desired.
Thus the end (_terminus_ == _finis_) of desire, which is the _good_,
is in the desirable thing; but the end of knowing, which is the true,
is in mind itself.”

In _Articulus 4_, Thomas comes to his point: that the true _secundum rationem_ (_i.e._ according to its formal nature) is prior to the good.

“Although both the good and the true have been taken as convertible
with being, yet they differ in their conception (_ratione_); and that
the true is prior to the good appears from two considerations: First,
the true is more closely related to being, which is prior to the good;
for the true regards being itself, simply and directly; while the
ratio of the good follows being as in some way perfect, and therefore
desirable. Secondly, cognition naturally precedes desire. Therefore,
since the true regards cognition, and the good regards desire, the
true is prior to the good _secundum rationem_.”

This argument, whatever validity it may have, is significant of its author’s predominantly intellectual temperament, and consistent with his conception of man’s supreme beatitude as the intellectual vision of God. Obviously, moreover, the setting of the true above the good is another way of stating the primacy of knowledge over will, which is also maintained: “Will and understanding (_intellectus_) mutually include each other: for the understanding knows the will; and the will wills that the understanding should know.”[582] Evidently all rational beings have will as well as understanding; God wills, the Angels will, man wills. Indeed, how could knowledge progress but for the will to know? Yet of the two, considered in themselves, understanding is higher than will--

“for its object is the _ratio_, the very essential nature, of the
desired good, while the object of will is the desired good whose
_ratio_ is in the understanding.... Yet will may be the higher, if it
is set upon something higher than the understanding.... When the thing
in which is the good is nobler than the soul itself, in which is the
rational cognizance (_ratio intellecta_), the will, through relation
to that thing, is higher than the understanding. But when the thing in
which is the good, is lower than the soul, then in relation to that
thing, the understanding is higher than the will. Wherefore the love
of God is better than the cognizance (_cognitio_); but the cognizance
of corporeal things is better than the love. Yet taken absolutely, the
understanding is higher than the will.”[583]

These positions of the Angelic Doctor were sharply opposed in his lifetime and afterwards. Without entering the lists, let us rather follow him on his evidently Aristotelian path, which quickly brings him to his next conclusion: “That beatitude consists in the action of the speculative rather than the practical intellect, as is evident from three arguments:

“First, if man’s beatitude is action, it ought to be the man’s best
(optima) action. But man’s best action is that of his best faculty in
respect to the best object. The best faculty is intelligence, whose
best object is the divine good, which is not an object of the
practical, but of the speculative intelligence. Wherefore, in such
action, to wit, in contemplation of things divine, beatitude chiefly
consists. And because _every one seems to be that which is best in
him_, as is said in the _Ethics_, so such action is most proper to man
and most enjoyable.

“Secondly, the same conclusion appears from this, that contemplation
above all is sought on account of itself. The perfection (_actus_,
full realization) of the practical intelligence is not sought on
account of itself, but for the sake of action: the actions themselves
are directed toward some end. Hence it is evident that the final end
cannot consist in the _vita activa_, which belongs to the practical
intelligence.

“Thirdly, it is plain from this, that in the _vita contemplativa_ man
has part with those above him, to wit, God and the Angels, unto whom
he is made like through beatitude; but in those matters which belong
to the _vita activa_, other animals, however imperfectly, have somehow
part with him.

“And so the final and perfect beatitude which is looked for in the
life to come, in principle consists altogether in contemplation. But
the imperfect beatitude which may be had here, consists first and in
principle in contemplation, and secondly in the true operation of the
practical intellect directing human actions and passions, as is said
in the tenth book of the _Ethics_.”

It being thus shown that perfect beatitude lies in the action of the speculative intelligence, Thomas next shows that it cannot consist in consideration of the speculative sciences--

“for the consideration of a science does not reach beyond the potency
(_virtus_) of the principles of that science, seeing that the whole
science is contained potentially (_virtualiter_) in its principles.
But the principles of speculative sciences are received through the
senses, as the Philosopher makes clear. Therefore the entire
consideration of the speculative sciences cannot be extended beyond
that to which a cognition of sense-objects (_sensibilium_) is able to
lead. Man’s final beatitude, which is his perfection, cannot consist
in the cognition of sense-objects. For no thing is perfected by
something inferior, except as there may be in the inferior some
participation in a superior. Evidently the nature (_forma_) of a
stone, or any other sensible thing, is inferior to man, save in so far
as something higher than the human intelligence has part in it, like
the light of reason.... But since there is in sensible forms some
participation in the similitude of spiritual substances, the
consideration of the speculative sciences is, in a certain way,
participation in true and perfect beatitude.”

Neither can perfect beatitude consist in knowledge of the higher, entirely immaterial, or, as Thomas calls them, separate (_separatae_) substances, to wit, the Angels. Because it cannot consist in that which is the perfection of intelligence only from participation. The object of the intelligence is the true. Whatever has truth only through participation in something else cannot make the contemplating intelligence perfect with a final perfection. But the angels have their being (_esse_) as they have their truth, from the participation of the divine in them. Whence it remains that only the contemplation of God, Who alone is truth through His essential being, can make perfectly blessed. “But,” adds Thomas, “nothing precludes the expectation of some imperfect beatitude from contemplating the angels, and even a higher beatitude than lies in the consideration of the speculative sciences.”

So the conclusion is that “the final and perfect beatitude can be only in the vision of the divine essence. The proof of this lies in the consideration of two matters: first, that man is not perfectly blessed (_beatus_) so long as there remains anything for him to desire or seek; secondly, that the perfection of every capacity (_potentiae_), is adjudged according to the nature (_ratio_) of its object.” And a patent line of argument leads to the unavoidable conclusion: “For perfect beatitude it is necessary that the intellect should attain to the very essence of the first cause. And thus it will have its perfection through union with God as its object.”

There are few novel thoughts in Thomas’s conception of man’s supreme beatitude. But he has taken cognizance of all pertinent considerations, and put the whole matter together with stable coherency. He continues, discussing in the succeeding Quaestiones a number of important matters incidental to his central determination of the nature of man’s supreme good. Thus he shows how joy (_delectatio_) is a necessary accompaniment of beatitude, which, however, in principle consists in the action of the mind, which is _visio_, rather than in the resulting _delectatio_. The latter consists in a quieting or satisfying of the will, through the goodness of that in which it is satisfied. When the will is satisfied in any action, that results from the goodness of the action; and the good lies in the action itself rather than in the quieting of the will.[584] Here Thomas’s reasoning points to an active ideal, an ideal of energizing, rather than repose. But he concludes that for beatitude “there must be a concurrence of _visio_, which is the perfect cognizance of the intelligible end; the getting it, which implies its presence; and the joy or fruition, which implies the quieting of that which loves in that which is loved.”[585] Thomas also shows how rectitude of will is needed, and discusses whether a body is essential; his conclusion being that a body is not required for the perfect beatitude of the life to come; yet he gives the counter considerations, showing the conduciveness of the perfected body to the soul’s beatitude even then. Next he follows Aristotle in pointing out how material goods may be necessary for the attainment of the imperfect beatitude possible on earth, while they are quite impertinent to the perfect beatitude of seeing God; and likewise he shows how the society of friends is needed here, but not essential hereafter, and yet a concomitant to our supreme felicity.

The course of argument of the Liber iii. of the _Contra Gentiles_ is not dissimilar. A number of preliminary chapters show how all things tend to an end; that the end of all is God; and that to know God is the end of every intellectual being. Next, that human _felicitas_ does not consist in all those matters, in which the _Summa theologiae_ also shows that _beatitude_ does not lie; but that it consists in contemplation of God. He puts his argument simply:

“It remains that the ultimate felicity of man lies in contemplation of
truth. For this is the sole action (_operatio_) of man which is proper
to man alone. This alone is directed to nothing else, as an end; since
the contemplation of truth is sought for its own sake. Through this
action, likewise, man is joined to higher substances (_beings_)
through likeness of action, and through knowing them in some way. For
this action, moreover, man is most sufficient by himself, needing but
little external aid. To this also all other human acts seem to be
directed as to an end. For to the perfection of contemplation,
soundness of body is needed, to which all the arts of living are
directed. Also quiet from the disturbance of passions is required, to
which one comes through the moral virtues, and prudence; and quiet
also from tumults, to which end all rules of civil life are ordained;
and so, if rightly conceived, all human business seems to serve the
contemplation of truth. Nor is it possible for the final felicity of
man to consist in the contemplation which is confined to an
intelligence of beginnings (_principiorum_), which is most imperfect
and general (_universalis_), containing a knowledge of things
potentially: it is the beginning, not the end of human study. Nor can
that felicity lie in the contemplation of the sciences, which pertain
to the lowest things, since felicity ought to lie in the action of the
intelligence in relationship to the noblest intelligible verities. It
remains that man’s final felicity consists in the contemplation of
wisdom pursuant to a consideration of things divine. From which it
also is evident by the way of induction, what was before proved by
arguments, that the final felicity of man consists only in
contemplation of God.”[586]

Having reached this central conclusion of the _Contra Gentiles_, as well as of the _Summa theologiae_, Thomas proceeds to trim it further, so as clearly to differentiate that knowledge of God in which lies the ultimate felicity of intelligent beings from other ways of knowing God, which do not fully represent this supreme and final bliss. He first excludes the sort of common and confused knowledge of God, which almost all men draw from observing the natural order of things; then he shuts out the knowledge of God derived from logical demonstration, through which, indeed, one rather approaches a proper knowledge of Him;[587] next, he will not admit that supreme felicity lies in the cognition of God through faith; since that is still imperfect. This felicity consists in seeing[588] the divine essence, an impossibility in this life, when we see as in a glass. The supreme felicity is attainable only after death. Hereupon Thomas continues with the very crucial discussion of the capacity of the rational creature to know God. But instead of following him further in the _Contra Gentiles_, we will rather turn to his final presentation of this question in his _Summa theologiae_.

II

The great _Summa_, having opened with an introductory consideration of the character of _sacra doctrina_,[589] at once fixes its attention upon the existence and attributes of God. These having been reviewed, Thomas begins Quaestio xii. by saying, that “as we have now considered what God is in His own nature (_secundum se ipsum_) it remains to consider what He is in our cognition, that is, how He is known by creatures.” The first question is whether any created intelligence whatsoever may be able to see God _per essentiam_. Having stated the counter arguments, and relying on John’s “we shall see Him as He is,” Thomas proceeds with his solution thus:

“Since everything may be knowable so far as it exists in
actuality,[590] God, who is pure actuality, without any mingling of
potentiality, is in Himself, most knowable. But what is most knowable
in itself, is not knowable to every intelligence because of the
exceeding greatness of that which is to be known (_propter excessum
intelligibilis supra intellectum_); as the sun, which is most visible,
may not be seen by a bat, because of the excess of light. Mindful of
this, some have asserted that no created intelligence could behold the
essential nature (_essentiam_) of God.

“But this is a solecism. For since man’s final beatitude consists in
his highest action, which is the action of the intelligence, if the
created intelligence is never to be able to see the essential nature
of God, either it will never obtain beatitude, or its beatitude will
consist in something besides God: which is repugnant to the faith. For
the ultimate perfection of a rational creature lies in that which is
the source or principle (_principium_) of its being. Likewise the
argument is against reason. For there is in man a natural desire to
know the cause, when he observes the effect; and from this, wonder
rises in men. If then the intelligence of the rational creature is
incapable of attaining to the first cause of things, an inane desire
must be ascribed to nature.

“Wherefore it is simply to be conceded that the blessed may see the
essential nature of God.”

So this general conclusion, or assumption, is based on faith, and also leaps, as from the head of Jove, the creature of unconquerable human need, which never will admit the inaneness of its yearnings. And now, assuming the possibility of seeing God in his true nature, Thomas proves that He cannot be seen thus through the similitude of any created thing: in order to behold God’s essence some divine likeness must be imparted from the seeing power (_ex parte visivae potentiae_), to wit, the light of divine glory (which is consummated grace) strengthening the intelligence that it may see God. And he next shows that it is impossible to see God by the sense of sight, or any other sense or power of man’s sensible nature. For God is incorporeal. Therefore He cannot be seen through the imagination, but only through the intelligence. Nor can any created intelligence through its natural faculties see the divine essence. “Cognition takes place in so far as the known is in the knower. But the known is in the knower according to the mode and capacity (_modus_) of the knower. Whence any knower’s knowledge is according to the measure of his nature. If then the being of the thing to be known exceeds the measure of the knowing nature, knowledge of it will be beyond the nature of that knower.” In order to see God in His essential nature, the created intellect needs light created by God: _In lumine tuo videbimus lumen_. And it may be given to one created intellect to see more perfectly than another.

Do those who see God _per essentiam_, comprehend Him? No.

“To comprehend God is impossible for any created intelligence. To have
any true thought of God is a great beatitude.... Since the created
light of glory received by any created intelligence, cannot be
infinite, it is impossible that any created intelligence should know
God infinitely, and comprehend Him.”

Again he reasons; They who shall see God in His essence will see what they see through the divine essence united to their intelligence; they will see whatever they see at once, and not successively; for the contents of this intellectual, God-granted vision are not apprehended by means of the respective species or general images, but in and through the one divine essence. But in this life, man may not see God in His essential nature:

“The mode of cognition conforms to the nature of the knower. But our
soul, so long as we live in this life, has its existence (_esse_) in
corporeal matter. Wherefore, by nature, it knows only things that have
material form, or may through such be known. Evidently the divine
essence cannot be known through the natures of material things. Any
cognition of God through any created likeness whatsoever, is not a
vision of His essence.... Our natural cognition draws its origin from
sense; it may extend itself so far as it can be conducted (_manuduci_)
by things of sense (_sensibilia_). But from them our intelligence may
not attain to seeing the divine essence.... Yet since sensible
creatures are effects, dependant on a cause, we know from them that
God exists, and that as first cause He exceeds all that He has caused.
From which we may learn the difference between Himself and His
creatures, to wit, that He is not any of those things which He has
caused....

“Through grace a more perfect knowledge of God is had than through
natural reason. For cognition through natural reason needs both images
(_phantasmata_) received from things of sense, and the natural light
of intelligence, through whose virtue we abstract intelligible
conceptions from them. In both respects human cognition is aided
through the revelation of grace. For the natural light of the
intellect is strengthened through the infusion of light graciously
given (_luminis gratuiti_); while the images in the man’s imagination
are divinely formed so that they are expressive of things divine,
rather than of what naturally is received through the senses, as
appears from the visions of the prophets.”[591]

Natural reason stops with the unity of God, and can give no knowledge of the Trinity of divine Persons. Says Thomas:[592]

“It has been shown that through natural reason man can know God only
_from His creatures_. Creatures lead to knowledge of God as effects
lead to some knowledge of a cause. Only that may be known of God by
natural reason which necessarily belongs to Him as the source of all
existences. The creative virtue of God is common to the whole Trinity;
it pertains to the unity of essence, not to the distinction of
persons. Through natural reason, therefore, those things concerning
God may be known which pertain to the unity of essence, but not those
which pertain to the distinction of persons.... Who strives to prove
the Trinity of Persons by natural reason, doubly disparages faith:
first as regards the dignity of faith itself, which concerns invisible
things surpassing human reason; secondly as derogating from its
efficiency in drawing men to it. For when any one in order to prove
the faith adduces reasons which are not cogent, he falls under the
derision of the faithless; for they think that we use such arguments,
and that we believe because of them. One shall not attempt to prove
things of faith save by authorities, and in discussion with those who
receive the authorities. With others it is enough to argue that what
the faith announces is not impossible.”

Here Thomas seems rationally to recognize the limits upon reason in discovering the divine nature. In the regions of faith, reason’s feet lack the material footing upon which to mount. So Thomas would assert. But will he stand to his assertion? The shadowy line between reason and faith wavers with him. At least so it seems to us, for whom ontological reasoning has lost reality, and who find proofs of God not so much easier than proofs of the Trinity. But Thomas and the other scholastics dwelt in the region of the metaphysically ideal. To them it was not only real, but the most real; and it was so natural to step across the line of faith, trailing clouds of reason. The feet of such as Thomas are as firmly planted on the one side of the line as on the other. And now, as it might also seem, Thomas, having thus formally reserved the realm of faith, quickly steps across the line, to undertake a tremendous metaphysical exposition of the Trinity, of the distinctions between its Persons, of their properties, respective functions, and relationships; and all this is carried on largely in the categories of Aristotelian philosophy. Yet is he not still consistent with himself? For he surely did not conceive the elements of his discussion to lie in the lucubrations or discoveries of the natural reason; but in the data of revelation, and their explanation by saintly doctors. And was not he also a vessel of their inspiration, a son of faith, who might humbly hope for the light of grace, to transfigure and glorify his natural powers in the service of revealed truth?

Thomas’s ideal is intellectual, and yet ends in faith. His intellectual interests, by faith emboldened, strengthened, and pointed heavenward, make on toward the realisation of that intellectual beatitude which is to be consummate hereafter, when the saved soul’s grace-illumined eye shall re-awaken where it may see face to face.

III

Knowledge, then, supplemented in this life by faith, is the primary element of blessedness. We now turn our attention to the forms of knowledge and modes of knowing appropriate to the three rational substances: God, angel, man. The first is the absolute incorporeal being, the primal mover, in whom there is no potentiality, but actuality simple and perfect. The second is the created immaterial or “separated” substance, which is all that it is through participation in the uncreate being of its Creator. The third is the composite creature man, made of both soul and body, his capacities conditioned upon the necessities of his dual nature, his sense-perception and imagination being as necessary to his knowledge, as his rational understanding; for whom alone it is true that sense-apprehension may lead to the intelligible verities of God: “etiam sensibilia intellecta manuducunt ad intelligibilia divinorum.”[593]

The earlier Quaestiones of _Pars prima_, on the nature of God, lead on to a consideration of God’s knowledge and ways of knowing. Those Quaestiones expounded the qualities of God quite as far as comported with Thomas’s realization of the limitation of the human capacity to know God in this life. Quaestio iii. upon the _Simplicitas_ of God, shows that God is not body (_corpus_); that in Him there is no compositeness of form and material; that throughout His nature, He is one and the same, and therefore that He _is_ His _Deitas_, His _vita_, and whatever else may be predicated of Him. Next it is shown (Qu. iv.) that God is perfect; that in Him are the _perfectiones_ of all things, since whatever there may be of perfection in an effect, should be found in the effective cause; and as God is self-existent being, He must contain the whole perfection of being in Himself (_totam perfectionem essendi in se_). Next, that God is the good (_bonum_) and the _summum bonum_; He is infinite; He is in all things (Qu. viii. Art. 1) not as a part of their essence, but as _accidens_, and as the doer is in his deeds; and not only in their beginning, but so long as they exist; He acts upon everything immediately, and nothing is distant from Him; God is everywhere: as the soul is altogether in every part of the body, so God entire is in all things and in each. God is in all things created by Him as the working cause; but He is in the rational creature, through grace; as the object of action is in the actor, as the known is in the knower, and the desired in the wishful. God is immutable (Qu. ix.); for as final actuality (_actus purus_), with no admixture of potentiality, He cannot change; nor can He be _moved_; since His infinitude comprehends the plenitude of all perfection, there is nothing that He can acquire, and no whither for Him to extend. God is eternal (Qu. x.); for him there is no beginning, nor any succession of time; but an interminable now, an all at once (_tota simul_), which is the essence of eternity, as distinguished from the successiveness of even infinite time. And God is One (Qu. xi.). “One does not add anything to being, save negation of division. For One signifies nothing else than undivided being (_ens indivisum_). And from this it follows that One is convertible with being.” That God is One, is proved by His _simplicitas_; by the infiniteness of His perfection; and by the oneness of the world.

“After a consideration,” now says Thomas, “of those matters which
pertain to the divine substance, we may consider those which pertain
to its action (_operatio_). And because certain kinds of action remain
in the doer, while others pass out into external effect, we first
treat of knowledge and will (for knowing is in the knower and willing
in him who wills); and then of God’s power, which is regarded as the
source of the divine action passing out into external effect. Then,
since knowing is a kind of living, after considering the divine
knowledge, the divine life will be considered. And because knowledge
is of the true, there will be need to consider truth and falsity.
Again since every cognition is in the knower, the _rationes_ (types,
essential natures) of things as they are in God the Knower (_Deo
cognoscente_) are called ideas (_ideae_); and a consideration of these
will be joined to the consideration of knowledge.”[594]

Thus clearly laying out his topic, Thomas begins his discussion of God’s knowledge (_scientia Dei_); of the modes in which God knows and the knowledge which He has. In God is the most perfect knowledge. God knows Himself through Himself; in Him knowledge and Knower (_intellectum_ and _intellectus_) are the same.[595] He perfectly comprehends Himself; for He knows Himself so far as He is knowable; and He is absolutely knowable being utter reality (_actus purus_). Likewise He knows things other than Himself. For He knows Himself perfectly, which implies a knowledge of those things to which His power (_virtus_) extends. Moreover, He knows all things in their special natures and distinctions from each other: for the perfection, or perfected actuality, of everything is contained in Him; and therefore God in Himself is able to know all things perfectly, and the special nature of everything exists through some manner of participation in the divine perfection. God knows all things in one, to wit, Himself; and not successively, or by means of discursive reasoning. “God’s knowledge is the cause of things. It stands to all created beings as the knowledge of the artificer to the things he makes. God causes things through His knowledge, since His being is His knowing (_cum suum esse sit suum intelligere_).” His knowledge causes things when it has the will joined with it, and, in so far as it is the cause of things, is called _scientia approbationis_. God knows things which are not actually (_actu_). Whatever has been or will be, He knows by the knowledge of sight (_scientia visionis_, which by implication is equivalent to _scientia approbationis_). For God’s knowing, which is His being, is measured by eternity; and eternity includes all time, as present, and without succession; so the present vision (_intuitus_) of God embraces all time and all things existing at any time, as if present. As for whatever is in the power of God or creature, but which never has been or will be, God knows it not as in vision, but simply knows it.

God also knows evil.

“Whoever knows anything perfectly should know whatever might happen to
it. There are some good things to which it may happen to be corrupted
through evils: wherefore God would not know the good perfectly,
unless He also knew the evil. Everything is knowable so far as it
_is_; but the being (_esse_) of evil is the privation of good: hence
inasmuch as God knows good, He knows evil, as darkness is known
through light.”

Thomas now takes up a point curious perhaps to us, but of importance to him and Aristotle: does God know individuals (_singularia_), the particular as opposed to the universal? This point might seem disposed of in the argument by which Thomas maintained that God knew things in their special and distinct natures. But he now proves that God knows _singularia_ by an argument which bears on his contention that man does not know _singularia_ through the intelligence, but perceives them through sense; and as we shall see, that the angels have no direct knowledge of individuals, being immaterial substances.

“God knows individuals (_cognoscit singularia_). For all perfections
found in creatures pre-exist in higher mode in God. To know
(_cognoscere_) individuals pertains to our perfection. Whence it
follows that God must know them. The Philosopher (Aristotle) holds it
to be illogical that anything should be known to us, and not to
God.... But the perfections which are divided in inferior beings,
exist simply and as one in God. Hence, although through one faculty we
know universals and what is immaterial, and through another,
individuals and what is material; yet God simply, through His
intelligence, knows both.... One must hold that since God is the cause
of things through His knowledge, the knowledge of God extends itself
as far as His causality extends. Wherefore, since God’s active virtue
extends itself not only to forms, from which is received the _ratio_
of the universal, but also to matter, it is necessary that God’s
knowledge should extend itself to individuals, which are such through
matter.”

And replying to a counter-argument Thomas continues:

“Our intelligence abstracts the intelligible species from the
individuating principles. Therefore the intelligible species of our
intelligence cannot be the likeness of the individual principles; and,
for this reason, our intelligence does not know individuals. But the
intelligible species of the divine intelligence, which is the essence
of God, is not immaterial through abstraction, but through itself; and
exists as the principle of all principles entering the composition of
the thing, whether principles of species or of the individual.
Therefore through His essence God knows both universals and
individuals.”[596]

With these arguments still echoing, Thomas shows that God can know infinite things; also future contingencies; also whatever may be stated (_enuntiabilia_). His knowledge, which is His substance, does not change. It is speculative knowledge, in so far as relating to His own unchangeable nature, and to whatever He can do, but does not; it is practical knowledge so far as it relates to anything which He does.

Thomas concludes his direct discussion of God’s knowledge, by an application of the Platonic theory of _ideas_, in which he mainly follows Augustine.

“It is necessary to place _ideas_ in the divine mind. _Idea_ is the
Greek for the Latin _forma_. Thus through _ideas_ are understood the
forms of things existing beyond the things themselves. By which we
mean the prototype (_exemplar_) of that of which it is called the
form; or the principle of its cognition, in so far as the forms of
things knowable are said to be in the knower.”

There must be many ideas or (as Augustine phrases it) stable _rationes_ of things. There is a _ratio_ in the divine mind corresponding to whatever God does or knows.

“Ideas were set by Plato as the principles both of the cognition and
the generation of things, and in both senses they are to be placed in
the divine mind. So far as _idea_ is the principle of the making of a
thing, it may be called the prototype (_exemplar_), and pertains to
practical knowledge (_practicam cognitionem_); but as the principle of
cognition (_principium cognoscitivum_), it is properly called _ratio_,
and may also pertain to speculative knowledge. In the signification of
_exemplar_, it relates to everything created at any time by God: but
when it means _principium cognoscitivum_, it relates to all things
which are known by God, although never coming into existence.”[597]

Such are the divine modes of knowledge. Thomas proceeds to discuss other aspects of the divine nature, the life and power, will and love, which may be ascribed to God. He then passes on to a discussion of the Persons of the Trinity. This completed, he turns to the world of created substances; into which we will follow him so far as to observe the forms of knowledge and ways of knowing proper to angels and mankind. We shall hereafter have to speak of the divine and angelic love, and of man’s love of God; but here, as our field is intellectual, we will simply recall to mind that Thomas applies a like intellectual conception of beatitude to both God and His rational creatures:

“Beatitude, as has been said, signifies the perfect good of the
intellectual nature; as everything desires its perfection, the
intellectual [substance] desires to be _beata_. That which is most
perfect in every intellectual nature, is the intellectual operation
wherein, in a measure, it grasps all things. Wherefore the beatitude
of any created intellectual nature consists in knowing (_in
intelligendo_).”[598]

IV

Thomas regards the creation as a _processio_, a going out of all creatures from God. Every being (_ens_) that in any manner (_quocumque modo_) is, is from God.

“God is the _prima causa exemplaris_ of all things.... For the
production of anything, there is needed a prototype (_exemplar_), in
order that the effect may follow a determined form.... The
determination of forms must be sought in the divine wisdom. Hence one
ought to say that in the divine wisdom are the _rationes_ of all
things: these we have called _ideas_, to wit, prototypal forms
existing in the divine mind. Although such may be multiplied in
respect to things, yet really they are not other than the divine
essence, according as its similitude can be participated in by divers
things in divers ways. Thus God Himself is the first _exemplar_ of
all. There may also be said to be in created things certain
_exemplaria_ of other things, when they are made in the likeness of
such others, or according to the same species or after the analogy of
some resemblance.”[599]