Chapter XL: Thomas Aquinas (3)

“Voluntary acts take their _species_ from the end which is the object
of volition. That from which anything receives its species, occupies
the place held by _form_ in material things. Hence, as it were, the
_form_ of any voluntary act is the end to which it is directed
(_ordinatur_). Manifestly, an act of faith is directed to the object
willed (which is the good) as to an end. But good which is the end of
faith, to wit, the divine good, is the proper object of _caritas_. And
so _caritas_ is called the _form_ of faith, in so far as through
_caritas_ the act of faith is perfected and given form” (Qu. iv. Art.
3).

Thomas makes his conclusion more precise:

“As faith is the consummation of the intellect, that which pertains to
the intellect, pertains, _per se_, to faith. What pertains to will,
does not, _per se_, pertain to faith. The increment making the
difference between the faith which has form and faith which lacks it
(_fides formata_, _fides informis_), consists in that which pertains
to will, to wit, to _caritas_, and not in what pertains to intellect”
(Qu. iv. Art. 4).

Only the _fides_ which is formed and completed in _caritas_ is a virtue (Art. 5). And Thomas says concisely (Qu. vi. Art. 1) what in many ways has been made evident before: For Faith, it is necessary that the _credibilia_ should be propounded, and then that there should be assent to them; but since man, in assenting to those things which are of the Faith, is lifted above his nature, his assent must proceed from a supernatural principle working within him, which is God moving him through grace.

It is not hard to see why two gifts (_dona_) of the Holy Spirit should belong to the virtue Faith, to wit, understanding and knowledge, _intellectus et scientia_. Thomas gives the reasons in an argument germane to his Aristotelian theory of cognition:

“The object of the knowing faculty is _that which is_.... Many kinds
of things lie hidden within, to which the _intellectus_ of man should
penetrate. Beneath the _accidens_ the substantial nature of the thing
lies hidden; beneath words lie their meanings; beneath similes and
figures, lies the figured truth--_veritas figurata_ (for things
intelligible are, as it were, within things sensible); and in causes
lie hidden the effects, and conversely. Now, since human cognition
begins with sense, as from without, it is clear that the stronger the
light of the intellect, the further it will penetrate to the inmost
depths. But the light of our natural intellect is of finite virtue,
and may reach only to what is limited. Therefore man needs the
supernatural light, in order to penetrate to the knowledge which
through the natural light he is not able to know; and that
supernatural light given to man is called the _donum intellectus_”
(Qu. viii. Art. 1).

This gift follows grace. Grace is more perfect than nature. It does not abrogate, but perfects the natural faculties. Nor does it fail in those matters in which man’s natural power is competent (Qu. ix. Art. 1). So, besides the _donum intellectus_, to Faith belongs the _donum scientiae_ also, which brings and guides knowledge of human things (Art. 2).

And now we shall not be surprised to find _sapientia_, the very highest gift of the Spirit, attached to the grace-given virtue caritas. For _caritas_ is the informing principle of Faith, and the highest virtue of the grace-illumined will. The will, be it remembered, belongs to man’s intellectual nature; its object is the good which is known by the mind (_bonum intellectum_). “_Sapientia_ (wisdom, right knowledge as to the highest cause, which is God) signifies rectitude of judgment in accordance with the _rationes divinae_,” the ideas and reasons which exist in God. Rectitude of judgment regarding things divine may arise from rational inquiry; in which case it pertains to the _sapientia_ which is an intellectual virtue. But it may also spring from affinity to those things themselves; and then it is a gift of the Holy Spirit (II. ii., Qu. xlv. Art. 2).

Says Thomas:

“By the name _beatitude_ is understood the final perfection of the
rational or intellectual nature. This consists for this life in such
contemplation as we may have here of the highest intelligible good,
which is God; but above this felicity is that other felicity which we
expect when we shall see God as He is” (_Pars_ I., Qu. lxii Art 1).

But mark: the perfection of the intellectual nature does not consist merely in knowing, narrowly taken. The right action of will is also essential, of the will directed toward the highest good, which is God: and this is _caritas_, of which the corresponding gift from the Spirit is wisdom. In accord with this full consummation of human nature, comprising the perfection of cognition and will, Thomas outlines his conception of the _vita contemplativa_, the life of most perfect beatitude attainable on earth:

“The _vita contemplativa_ is theirs whose resolve is set upon the
contemplation of truth. Resolve is an act of will; because resolve is
with respect to the end, which is the object of will. Thus the _vita
contemplativa_, according to the essence of its action, is of the
intelligence; but so far as it pertains to what moves us to engage in
such action, it is of the will, which moves all the other faculties,
including the intelligence, to act. Appetitive energy (_vis
appetitiva_) moves toward contemplating something, either sensibly or
intellectually: sometimes from love of the thing seen, and sometimes
from love of the knowledge itself, which arises from contemplation.
And because of this, Gregory sets the _vita contemplativa_ in the love
of God--_in caritate Dei_--to wit, inasmuch as some one, from a
willing love (_dilectio_) of God burns to behold His beauty. And
because any one is rejoiced when he attains what he loves, the _vita
contemplativa_ is directed toward _dilectio_[614] which lies in affect
(_in affectu_); by which _amor_ also is intended” (II. ii., Qu. clxxx.
Art. 1).

The moral virtues, continues Thomas, do not pertain _essentially_ to this _vita_. But they may promote it, by regulating the passions and quieting the tumult of outside affairs. In principle it is fixed upon the contemplation of truth, which here we see but in a glass darkly; and so we help ourselves along by contemplating the effects of the divine cause in the world.

Thus final beatitude, and its mortal approach in the _vita contemplativa_ of this earth, is of the mind, both in its knowledge and its love. Immateriality, spirituality, is with Thomas primarily intellectual. Yet his beatitude is not limited to the knowing faculties. It embraces will and love. The grace of God and the gifts of the Holy Spirit touch love as well as knowledge, raising one and both to final unison of aim. Thus far in this life, while in the life to come, these grace-uplifted qualities of knowledge, and that choosing love (_dilectio_) which rises from knowledge of the good, are perfected _in gloria_.

Further than this we shall not go with Thomas, nor follow him, for example, through his exposition of the means of salvation--the Incarnation and the sacraments. Nor need we further mark the prodigious range of his theology, or his metaphysics, logic, or physics. To all this many books have been devoted. We are but seeking to realise his intellectual interests and qualities, in such way as to bring them within the compass of our sympathy. A more encyclopaedic and systematic presentation of his teaching is proper for those who would trace, or perhaps attach themselves to, particular doctrines; or would find in scholasticism, even in Thomas, some special authoritativeness. For us these doctrines have but the validity of all human striving after truth. Moreover, perhaps a truer view of Thomas, the theologian and philosopher, is gained from following a few typical forms of his teaching presented in his own exposition, than by analyzing his thought with later solvents which he did not apply, and presenting his matter classified as he would not have ordered it, and in modern phrases, which have as many meanings foreign to scholasticism as scholasticism has thoughts not to be translated into modern ways of thinking.