Chapter XII: Book THE EIGHTH (1)

CH. I.—Of the Order in which the King left his Affairs in the Kingdom of Naples upon his Return into France.—1495.

To continue my Memoirs, and for your better information, we must return to our discourse of the king, who, from his first arrival at Naples to his departure, minded nothing but his pleasures, and his ministers attended to nothing but their own advantage. His youth might excuse him in some measure; but nothing could excuse them, for the king referred all to their management; and if they only had had the discretion to advise him to put strong garrisons into three or four of the chief castles, such as that of Gaeta; nay, if he had only garrisoned the castle of Naples (whose magazines and furniture had been given away and embezzled, as you have heard), the kingdom of Naples had been his at this day; for, if he had been master of that castle, the town would never have revolted. Upon the conclusion of this Italian alliance, he assembled all his forces together, and ordered 500 French men-at-arms, 2,500 Swiss, and some French foot to remain to guard the kingdom; and with the rest he resolved to march back into France by the same way he came; while the confederates were determined to stop him. The King of Spain had sent, and was still sending, his caravels[388] into Sicily, though with but few men on board them. However, before our king’s departure they had garrisoned Rheggio in Calabria, which is near to Sicily. I had often acquainted my master with their designs of sending supplies thither, for the ambassador of Naples had told me so, supposing they had got there already; and if the king had sent any forces thither in time, he would certainly have taken the castle; and the town had declared for him before. For want of our sending thither, the enemy landed, forces at Mantia and Tropea. The townsmen of Otranto in Apulia had set up our king’s colours; but, being informed of the new alliance, and considering how near neighbours they were both to Brindisi and Gallipoli, and how difficult it would be to furnish themselves with troops, they pulled them down again, and erected the standard of Arragon; and Don Frederic, who was at Brindisi, supplied them with a garrison. There was a universal change in the minds of the people through the whole kingdom; and fortune, which had been so propitious but two months before, began now to frown upon us; both in relation to the alliance, the king’s departure, and the great want in which he left the kingdom, and that rather in respect of officers than soldiers.

The supreme command was committed to Monsieur de Montpensier[389], of the house of Bourbon, a brave soldier, and a noble gentleman; but his valour was greater than his wisdom, and, besides, he was so intolerably lazy, he would never rise till noon. In Calabria he left the Lord d’Aubigny, a Scotchman (a brave and worthy knight), to command in chief. The king had made him grand constable of the kingdom, and given him (as I said before) the county of Acri, and the marquisate of Squillazzo. At his first coming thither the king had made the seneschal of Beaucaire, Stephen de Vers, governor of Gaeta, Duke of Nola, and lord high chamberlain, and all the money in that kingdom passed through his hands; but he took more upon him than he was able to perform; yet he was very desirous of keeping the kingdom of Naples. The king created the Lord Dom Julian[390] of Lorraine, Duke of St. Angelo, in which post he behaved himself with a great deal of honour and reputation. He left Gabriel de Montfaucon[391] at Manfredonia. He was a person for whom the king had a great esteem; but he managed things imprudently there; for, though he found it well provided with corn and everything else, yet he delivered it up in four days for want of provisions. To all his followers the king gave great estates in land; but several sold whatever they found in their castles, and it was reported that Gabriel did so too. At Trani he left William de Villeneuf[392] to defend the town; but, being betrayed and sold by some of his own servants to Frederic, he was kept by him a long time in the galleys. He left Tarento to the command of George de Suilly[393], who behaved himself well, and held out till he was forced by famine to surrender, and then died there of the plague. In Aquila he placed the bailiff of Vitry[394], who discharged his duty as he ought to do; and Gratian des Guerres[395] did the same in Abruzzo. The king left them very little money, only assignments upon the revenue, and of that but very little was ever raised. The king took care to make a handsome provision for the princes of Salerno and Bisignano, who served him faithfully, as long as it was in their power to do so. He also gratified the Colonne in whatever they demanded, and gave them and their friends the possession of about thirty towns; which, if they had defended as they ought and as they swore to do, they would have done his majesty singular service, and reaped the honour and advantage of it themselves; for I do not believe they had been so great for a hundred years before. But they had no patience to stay till the king had left Italy, before they fell to caballing. It is true they were engaged with us upon the Duke of Milan’s account, for they are naturally Gibellines. However, that ought not to have led them to break their oaths, especially after they had been so civilly treated; besides, the king had done more for them than this; for, under pretence of friendship, he carried prisoners with him the Lord Virgil Ursini and the Count de Petillane, and several others of the Ursini who were their enemies; which, indeed, was a little severe, for, though they were prisoners of war, yet the king knew they were to have had passports. But his intention was to carry them no farther than Asti, and then to dismiss them upon their parole of honour. This he did at the request of the Colonne; and yet, before he could get thither, the Colonne revolted, and appeared the first against him without the least pretence or occasion.

CH. II.—How the King departed from Naples, and returned to Rome, from whence the Pope fled to Orvieto; of the Conference the King had with the Lord of Argenton upon his Return from Venice; and his Deliberation about the Restitution of the Florentine Towns.—1495.

As soon as the king had settled his affairs as he designed, he began his march with what forces he could collect, which, I believe, were about nine hundred men-at arms (including his guards), and two thousand five hundred Swiss; in all, of his standing army about seven thousand men, besides about fifteen hundred more who followed the camp as servants, and were able to bear arms. The Count de Petillane, who had reviewed them, and knew their number better than I did, told me after the battle (of which I shall speak presently) that they were nine thousand effective men. The king bent his march directly towards Rome[396], where his Holiness, having no mind to attend him, determined to go to Padua, and put himself under the protection of the Venetians, and lodgings were prepared for him in that city; but afterwards they changed their minds, and both they and the Duke of Milan sent forces to him to Rome for the defence of the town, which arrived in time enough; yet the Pope durst not stay, though the king had done him all imaginable honour and service, and had sent ambassadors on purpose to desire him to stay; but he retired to Orvieto, and from thence to Perusia, leaving the cardinals to receive his majesty at Rome. The king was received very honourably by them; but he made no stay among them, nor suffered the least injury to be done to anybody. From thence I was sent for to attend him at Siena[397], where I waited on his majesty, who received me graciously. He asked me, in a jesting way, whether the Venetians had sent any forces to fall upon his rear; for his men were all young, and he thought no troops were able to engage with them. I humbly replied that upon my leaving Venice the Signory informed me, in the presence of one of their secretaries called Loredano, that they and the Duke of Milan would bring forty thousand men into the field, not to molest him, but to defend themselves; and on the day I set out from Venice they ordered one of their proveditors who was employed against us to inform me, at Padua, that their army should not pass a river near Parma (which, if I mistake not, is called the Oglio), unless his majesty invaded the Duke of Milan; and the said proveditor and I took private tokens and directions how we might correspond with each other, if there should be any occasion, to make a treaty of peace; for I was unwilling to refuse any overture of that nature, because I knew not how my master’s affairs might succeed. There was present at our conference one Monsieur Lewis Marcel, who (as a kind of treasurer) had that year the command of the Mots Viere[398], and had been sent by them to escort me. There were besides in the company some of the Marquis of Mantua’s servants, who were carrying him money; but they were at a distance, and heard nothing of our discourse. From these or others I procured for the king a list of the confederate army, their horse, foot, and Stradiots, and the chief officers that commanded them all; but few about the king believed what I told him.

After the king had halted two days at Siena to refresh his troops, I earnestly pressed his majesty to march onward, for the enemy were not yet together, and I feared nothing till the Germans came up; for the King of the Romans was busily raising both men and money. But, notwithstanding all I said to the contrary, the king would have two things first solemnly debated in council, which took up but a little time: one was, whether he should restore all the Florentine towns, and receive thirty thousand ducats (which was an arrear of a former gift), and seventy thousand more which they offered to lend him, besides a reinforcement of three hundred men-at-arms (under the command of Francisco Secco, an experienced and brave commander, and one in whom the king put great confidence), and two thousand foot, to secure his passage into his own kingdom. It was my opinion (and several others agreed with me) that the king should restore all but Leghorn, which he should keep till he had reached Asti. If he had followed our advice, he would have been able to have paid his army, and have had enough to have bribed the enemy, and then he might have fought them as he pleased; but we could not get a hearing; Monsieur de Ligny prevented it (who was a young gentleman, and cousin-german to the king); but he scarce knew why he did so, unless it were in compassion to the Pisans. The other point to be debated was set on foot by Monsieur de Ligny himself, and proposed in council by one Gaucher de Tinteville[399], and by a party in Siena who wished to have Monsieur de Ligny for their governor; for that town is always divided into factions, and is governed the worst of any in Italy. My judgment was demanded first, and I answered that I thought it would be better for the king to march forward than to amuse himself with things of so little importance, which could not be of any service to him for a week; besides, that town belonged to the emperor, and to dispose of it in that manner was to set the whole empire against us. Everybody agreed with my opinion, and yet it was carried against us; and Monsieur de Ligny was made the governor of Siena, with large promise of a revenue, but he never received any. This trifling debate detained us six or seven days, during which time the king diverted himself among the ladies; and he left in this town above three hundred of his choicest troops, to the great weakening of his army. He then advanced towards Pisa[400], by the way of Poggibonzi, a castle belonging to the Florentines; but those who were left at Siena were driven out in a month.

CH. III.—Of the memorable Preachings of Friar Jerome of Florence.—1495.

I had almost forgotten to mention that while I was at Florence, on my way to join the king, I went to pay a visit to a certain friar called Friar Jerome[401], who, by report, was a very holy man, and had lived in a reformed convent fifteen years. There went along with me one John Francis[402], a very prudent person, and steward of the king’s household. The occasion of my going to visit him was upon the account that he had always, both in the pulpit and elsewhere, spoken much in the king’s favour, and his words had kept the Florentines from confederating against us; for never any preacher had so much authority in a city. Whatever had been said or written to the contrary, he always affirmed that our king would come into Italy, saying that he was sent by God to chastise the tyranny of the princes, and that none would be able to oppose him. He foretold likewise that he would come to Pisa and enter it, and that the State of Florence should be dissolved on that day. And so it fell out; for Peter de Medicis was driven out that very day. Many other things he presaged long before they came to pass: as, for instance, the death of Laurence de Medicis; and he openly declared that he knew it by revelation; as likewise he predicted that the reformation of the Church should be owing to the sword. This is not yet accomplished; but it very nearly occurred, and he still maintains that it shall come to pass.

Many persons blamed him for pretending to receive divine revelations, but others believed him; for my part I think him a good man. I asked him whether our king would return safe into France, considering the great preparations of the Venetians against him, of which he gave a better account than I could, though I had lately come from Venice. He told me he would meet with some difficulties by the way, but he would overcome them all with honour, though he had but a hundred men in his company; for God, who had conducted him thither, would guard him back again. But because he had not applied himself as he ought to the reformation of the Church, and because he had permitted his soldiers to rob and plunder the poor people (as well those who had freely opened their gates to him as the enemy who had opposed him), therefore God had pronounced judgment against him, and in a short time he would receive chastisement. However, he bade me tell him that if he would have compassion upon the people, and command his army to do them no wrong, and punish them when they did, as it was his office to do, God would then mitigate, if not revoke, his sentence; but that it would not be sufficient for him to plead that he did them no wrong himself, and that he would meet the king when he came, and tell him so from his own mouth; and so he did, and pressed hard for the restitution of the Florentine towns. When he mentioned the sentence of God against him, the death of the dauphin[403] came very fresh into my mind; for I knew nothing else that could touch the king so sensibly. This I have thought fit to record, to make it the more manifest that this whole expedition was a mystery conducted by God Himself.

CH. IV.—How the King retained Pisa and several other Florentine Towns in his Hands, while the Duke of Orleans on the other Side entered Novara, in the Duchy of Milan.—1495.

While the king (as I said before) was at Pisa, the people of that town, both men and women, begged of us that for God’s sake we would intercede for them to the king, that they might not again be subjected to the tyranny of the Florentines, who, indeed, treated them very barbarously; but they fared as well as their neighbours, who are subject to other States in Italy. Pisa and Florence had been at war for three hundred years before the Florentines subdued them. These supplications, being delivered with tears in their eyes, wrought strangely upon our soldiers; so that, forgetting what our king had promised and sworn before the altar of St. John in Florence, they all unanimously (including even the very archers and Swiss) interposed in their behalf, and threatened all such as wished that the king should keep his oath, and particularly the Cardinal of St. Malo[404], who, in other places, I have called the General of Languedoc; and him I heard an archer threaten myself, and others talked as boldly to the Marshal de Gié. The President Gannay, for three nights together, durst not lie in his own quarters; and the great promoter of all this was the Count de Ligny. The Pisans daily made their sad complaints to the king, and moved us all to compassion, though we had no reason to relieve them.

One day after dinner, as the king was playing at tables with the Lord de Piennes, and only two or three of the gentlemen of the bed-chamber waiting on him, forty or fifty armed gentlemen of his household entered the room, and, in the name of the rest, the son of Sallezard the elder[405] made a speech to the king in favour of the Pisans, and charged some of the persons above named of nothing less than betraying him; but the king reprimanded them severely, and there never was any such thing afterwards.

Six or seven days the king spent to no purpose at Pisa; and, having altered the garrison, he put into the castle one Entragues[406], a servant to the Duke of Orleans, but an ill-conditioned man. Monsieur de Ligny had recommended him to the king, and by his interest a detachment of infantry from Berry was left with him. This Entragues managed his affairs so well (I suppose by means of his money), that he got Pietrasanta into his hands, and another town not far off, called Mortano; besides which, he had another government at Librefatta, near Lucca. The castle of the town of Sarzana, which was extremely well fortified by the interest of Monsieur de Ligny, was put in the hands of the bastard of Roussi[407], who was the Count’s servant. Another castle, called Sarzanello, he put into the hands of one of his other servants; and the king left great bodies of his forces in these places (though he will never have so much need of them again), and rejected the assistance and offers of the Florentines, who, upon his refusal, grew desperate. And yet, before he left Siena, he had intelligence that the Duke of Orleans had taken the city of Novara[408] from the Duke of Milan; and it was therefore certain that the Venetians would declare war against him; for they had sent him word that if he invaded the Duke of Milan, they should be obliged, by the alliance they had lately made, to assist him; and their army, which was numerous, was quite ready to take the field.

Now you must understand, that just upon the conclusion of the league, the Duke of Milan had a design upon Asti, supposing he should have found no troops in it. But my letters prevented him, and hastened the supplies which the Duke of Bourbon sent thither; and first there arrived forty lances of the Marshal de Gié’s troops, who had been left behind in France, all very well appointed; and after them five hundred foot from the Marquis di Saluzzo. The arrival of these forces diverted the Duke of Milan’s army, commanded by Galeas di St. Severino, who was posted at Annone, a castle belonging to the said duke, within two miles of Asti. Some time after they were joined by three hundred and fifty men-at-arms, and gentlemen of Dauphiny, and all the Frank-Archers of that country, and about two thousand Swiss; so that they were in all fully seven thousand five hundred fighting men. It was a prodigious expense and trouble to assemble these forces, and when that was done, they did not answer the end for which they were designed; for they were sent for to have assisted the king, and instead of that he was forced to support them. The king had written to the Duke of Orleans and his chief officers that they should attempt nothing against the Duke of Milan, but only have a care to secure Asti, and come to meet his majesty as far as the river Tesino, where they were to assist and favour his passage, there being no other river where he could be stopped; for the Duke of Orleans had been left at Asti, and had gone no further with the king. However, notwithstanding the king’s orders to the contrary, he was so pleased with the honour of having Novara delivered into his hands (which was but ten leagues from Milan) that he could not contain himself, but entered it in a triumphal manner; and the whole city, both Guelphs and Gibellines, received him with all imaginable demonstrations of joy; and the Marchioness of Montferrat was a great instrument in carrying out the plot. The castle held out two or three days; but if in the meanwhile he had gone or sent to Milan, where his party was strong, he would have been received with more joy (as I have been told by many great persons of that duchy) than ever greeted him at his own castle at Blois; and during the first three days he might have done it with ease, for the Duke of Milan’s forces were at Annone, near Asti, when Novara was surprised, and came not up till four days after; but perhaps he durst not rely upon the information he received.

CH. V.—How King Charles crossed several dangerous Passages over the Mountains between Pisa and Sarzana; and how the Germans burned Pontremoli.—1495.

From Siena the king was come to Pisa, as you have already heard, and from Pisa he marched to Lucca, where he was well received by the townsfolk, and stayed with them two days; and from thence he went to Pietrasanta, where Monsieur Entragues was governor; and neither he himself, nor any that were about him, had the least fear or apprehension of the enemy. Yet he found great difficulty in his march over the mountains betwixt Lucca and that place, where there were several passes very easy to have been defended by small bodies of foot; but the confederates were not assembled as yet. Not far from Pietrasanta, on one side there is the pass of Seierre, or Salto della Cerva, and on the other that of Roctaillé, or Rotaio, with a deep marsh at the foot of it, over which we were forced to march upon a causeway, as if it had been through a standing pool. This was the pass of which I had heard so much, and which I dreaded more than all the rest between Pisa and Pontremoli; for a small body of troops, with a cart overturned in the midst of it, and two pieces of cannon, would have stopped our passage, and left our army helpless. From Pietrasanta the king marched to Sarzana, where the Cardinal of St. Peter ad Vincula met him, and offered (if he pleased to send some of his forces thither) to make Genoa revolt to him. This proposal was referred to a council of officers, of whom I was one, and it was concluded by all that it should not be attempted; for if the king got the victory, Genoa would surrender of course; and if he lost the battle, it would do him no good; and this was the first time we ever heard fighting mentioned. Our resolution was reported to the king; but for all that, he sent thither the Lord de Bresse (since Duke of Savoy), the Lord de Beaumont de Polignac[409], my brother-in-law, and the Lord d’Aubijoux[410], of the house of Amboise, with six-score men-at-arms, and five hundred archers, newly sent him by sea out of France. I wondered that a prince of his age should not have one minister of state about him that durst be plain with him, and tell him the dangers to which he exposed his person; but indeed he put no confidence in what I said.

We had a few forces at sea, which came from Naples, under the command of Monsieur de Miolans, Governor of Dauphiny, and one Stephen de Neves, of Montpelier; they were in all about eight galleys, and were arrived at Spezzia and Rapalo, where they were defeated at the time I speak of, and in the same place where our men had beaten King Alphonso’s forces in the beginning of this expedition, and by the same party who had been on our side at that battle (that is to say, Signor John Lewis di Fieschi, and Signor John Adorno); and everything was changed in Genoa. It had been better management to have had them on the king’s side, though that would have been little enough. Monsieur de Bresse and the Cardinal advanced into the suburbs of Genoa, expecting their party in the town would rise in their favour; but the Duke of Milan had taken care to prevent any insurrection; and the Adorni and Signor John Lewis di Fieschi had given such orders about the affair that our forces were in great danger of being handled as they had been at sea, considering the smallness of their numbers; nor did anything prevent it but the fear the prevailing party in Genoa had, that if they sallied out of the town, the Fregosi would rise up in arms and shut the gates upon them; however, our men met with difficulty enough before they got to Asti; and they were not at the battle, where they might have been more serviceable and better employed.

From Sarzana the king marched on towards Pontremoli, which he was forced to pass, it being the entrance into the mountains. The town and castle were strong, and the country about them almost inaccessible; and had they been well garrisoned, they could never have been taken; but it seemed as if what Friar Jerome told me proved true, that God would lead him, as it were, by the hand, till he was out of all danger; for the enemy were blind and stupid, and had not put above three or four hundred men to defend that important pass. The king sent his vanguard to Pontremoli, under the command of the Marshal de Gié and Signor John James di Trivulce, whom he had entertained in his service ever since King Ferrand’s flight out of Naples. This Trivulce was a gentleman of Milan, of a noble family, a good officer, a worthy man, and a great enemy to the Duke of Milan, for he had been banished by him; and by his means the place was presently delivered without an assault, and the garrison marched out. But a great inconvenience ensued upon this; for, as I have already mentioned, when the Duke of Milan was there last, there happened a dispute between the townsmen and some of the Germans (forty of whom were slain by the townsmen), so that the Swiss, in revenge, and contrary to their articles, now put all the men to the sword, plundered the town, set fire to it, and burned it and all the magazines, with about ten of their own men, who, being drunk, could not escape, and it was not in the Marshal de Gié’s power to prevent it. After they had committed this outrage, they besieged the castle, in order to have used those who were in it after the same manner, though the garrison consisted of none but Signor John James di Trivulce’s troops, who had been put into it when the enemy marched out; neither would they give over their attack till the king himself sent to command them to desist. The destruction of this place was a great inconvenience to the king, as much for the dishonour it brought on us as for the provisions that were spoiled, of which there was great plenty, and we were in extremity of want, though the people were not much against us, excepting only those about the town, who had suffered more particularly. But if the king had hearkened to the overtures made him by Signor John James di Trivulce, several places and persons of importance would have surrendered and allied themselves to him; for he advised him to set up the young duke’s standard, who was son of John Galeas, the last Duke of Milan, that lies buried at Pavia, as you have heard; which young duke was in the Lord Ludovic’s power. But the king would not be persuaded to do it, out of kindness to the Duke of Orleans, who laid claim to the duchy. After this the king marched from Pontremoli, and encamped in a small valley, where there were not ten houses, and the name of which I have forgotten. He lay in that camp five days (I know not why), with his army in great distress for provisions, and the main body thirty miles behind the vanguard, with high and steep rocks all around, where such great cannon had never been seen till then; for those with which Duke Galeas had passed that way were but four falconets, which perhaps weighed five hundred pounds a-piece, and yet the people regarded them with infinite wonder.

CH. VI.—How the Duke of Orleans behaved himself in the City of Novara.—1495.

But to return now to the Duke of Orleans. As soon as he had taken the Castle of Novara, he lay still for some days, and then marched to Vigevano. Two little towns[411] hard by sent to him and offered to receive his troops; but he wisely refused the overtures they made him. The citizens of Pavia sent twice to him likewise, and certainly he was mightily to blame in refusing their offer. However, he drew up in battle array before the town of Vigevano, where the Duke of Milan’s whole army was encamped, and commanded by the sons of Galeas St. Severino, whom I have so often mentioned before. The town is worth nothing, not a jot better than St. Martin de Cande.[412] I came thither not long after the Duke of Milan had been there, and the chief officers who were there showed me the places where their armies had been drawn up, both within and without the town; and if the Duke of Orleans had advanced but a hundred paces farther, the enemy must have retreated over the river Tesino, where they had made a large bridge of boats, and were drawn up on the bank; and I saw them demolish an earthwork which they had made on the other side to secure their retreat; for they had resolved to quit both the town and the castle, which would have been a great disadvantage to them. This is the place where the Duke of Milan generally resides, and indeed it is the best seat for hunting and hawking, and all kinds of sports, that I ever yet saw.

But perhaps the Duke of Orleans thought the town stronger than it really was, and that he had done enough already, without attempting anything farther; and therefore he marched off to a place called Trecate, the lord of which place had a conference with me not long after, and had something in charge from the Duke of Milan. To this town of Trecate the chief citizens of Milan sent to invite the Duke thither, and tempt him into their town, offering their children as hostages; and they could easily have put him into possession of it, as I have been credibly informed since by persons of great authority who were there at that time; for the Duke of Milan would not have found men enough to have defended the castle, and the nobility and commons both desired the destruction of the house of Sforza. The Duke of Orleans also, and his men, have told me the same, but they durst not trust the citizens; and they wanted a person that understood them and their ways better than they did; besides, his great officers were not all of the same opinion in relation to that affair.

A body of two thousand Germans sent by the King of the Romans, and about a thousand German horse under the command of Monsieur Frederic Capelare, a native of the county of Ferrette, now joined the Duke of Milan’s army. With this reinforcement Galeas and the rest of the officers were so mightily encouraged that they marched directly to Trecate, and offered the Duke of Orleans battle; but he was advised not to fight, though his army was more numerous than theirs. Perhaps his officers were unwilling to hazard their army, lest the loss of a battle should be the ruin of the king, of whom they could get no intelligence, because the couriers were all stopped. Upon this the Duke of Orleans retreated with his whole army to Novara, having with great indiscretion neglected the favourable opportunity of supplying the town with provisions, or preserving as they ought what was already in their magazines, though they might have got enough at that time in the country round about without money; but when they wanted it afterwards, the enemy was within half a league of the town.

CH. VII.—How the King passed the Apennine Mountains with his Train of Artillery, by the Assistance of the Swiss; and of the great Danger to which the Marshal de Gié and his whole Vanguard were exposed.—1495.

We left the king encamped in a valley on this side Pontremoli, in great want of provisions, and yet he stayed there five days without any manner of necessity for doing so. Our Swiss, who had committed the great fault at Pontremoli[413], did us a singular piece of service at this time; they were fearful their crime would give the king a displeasure against them, and that his majesty would never endure them more; and therefore, to atone for what was past, they came to him of themselves, and offered to convey his great guns over those almost impassable mountains (and well I may call them so, for their height and steepness), where there was no track or path to direct them. I have seen most of the chief mountains both in Italy and Spain, but none of them are to be compared to these; and this offer the Swiss made upon condition the king would forgive them, which he did. Our train consisted of fourteen extraordinary great guns. At the farther end of the valley we began to climb up a very steep path, where our mules could scarce get up; but these Swiss corded themselves two and two abreast, and drew a hundred and sometimes two hundred in a company, till they were weary, and then they were relieved by as many more; besides these, there were the horses belonging to the artillery, and every one of the courtiers who had any carriage, lent a horse to hasten their passage; but had it not been for these Swiss, the horses would never have done it; and to speak truth, they helped over not only the artillery, but the whole army; for had it not been for them, not a man could have passed the mountains; wherefore they were well assisted; and besides, they had as great a desire to be over as the rest of the army; they had committed many faults, but this good action did more than sufficiently atone for all. However, the greatest part of the difficulty was not to get the artillery up; for as soon as our men were at the top, they saw great deep valleys below them, to which there was no way but what nature had prepared; so that our horses and men were forced to draw backward, and the letting the guns down was infinitely more trouble than the hauling them up; and besides, the smiths and the carpenters were forced to be constantly by; for if any of the guns slipped, they had to be mended before they could go on. Many advised the king, for expedition’s sake, to break up his great guns, but he would by no means consent to it.

The Marshal de Gié was thirty miles before us, and pressed the king to hasten his march; and yet it was three days before we could reach him, and by that time the enemy was come within sight. Their army was encamped in a large field about half a league from him; and if they had attacked him, he would certainly have been defeated. The marshal afterward took up his quarters at Fornovo, a strong town at the entrance into the plain, and this he did to keep the enemy from assaulting us on the mountains; but we had a better guardian than he to protect us, for God put other thoughts into the heads of our enemies, and so blinded their understandings with avarice that they were resolved to wait for our coming into the plain, that nothing might escape them; for they thought if they should attack us upon the mountains we might retreat to Pisa, or some of the towns we had in the territory of Florence; but they were mistaken, for those places were too remote; and if they had beaten us, they might have pursued as fast as we could have fled, and they would have had the advantage of knowing the country better than we.

Thus far on our side the war was not begun; but the Marshal de Gié sent the king word that he had passed the mountains, and that having sent out a party of forty horse to reconnoitre the enemy, they had been charged by the Estradiots, and one of them (called Lebeuf) being slain, the Estradiots cut off his head, put it upon the top of a lance, carried it to their proveditor, and demanded a ducat. These Estradiots are of the same nature with the Genetaires[414]; they are horse and foot, and habited like Turks, only they wear no turbans upon their heads. They are hardy people, and lie abroad all the year round with their horses; they were all Greeks, from the places which the Venetians possess in those parts, some of them from Naples and Romagna and the Morea, others from Albania and Durazzo. Their horses are all Turkish, and very good; the Venetians employ them often in their wars, and put great confidence in them. I saw them all upon their first landing at Venice, and they mustered in the island where the abbey of St. Nicholas is built, and their number was near fifteen hundred; they are stout, active fellows, and will plague an army terribly when they once undertake it.

These Estradiots, as I said before, having beaten our party, pursued them to the marshal’s quarters, where the Swiss were posted, of whom they killed three or four, and carried away their heads according to their custom. For the Venetians, having been at war against the Turks formerly, in the time of Mahomet, the present Turk’s father, Sultan Mahomet would not suffer his soldiers to give quarter, but allowed them a ducat for every head, and the Venetians did the same. My opinion is they did it on purpose to terrify us, and indeed so they did; but the Estradiots themselves were no less affrighted with our artillery; for a shot from a falconet having killed one of their horses, they retired with great precipitation; but in their retreat they took one of our Swiss captains, who had gotten on horseback to watch their retreat, and, being unarmed, was run through the body with a lance. This captain was a wise man, and they carried him before the Marquis of Mantua (who was captain-general for the Venetians) and his uncle, the Lord Rodolph of Mantua, and the Count di Cajazzo, who commanded for the Duke of Milan, and who knew him extremely well. The enemy’s army had taken the field (at least all of them that were joined, for some were still to come up) about eight days before, but lay still in expectation of their confederates; so that the king might have gone back into France without any impediment in the world, had he not squandered away his time to no purpose by the way, as you have heard; but God had ordered it otherwise.

CH. VIII.—How the Marshal de Gié withdrew with his Army to the Mountains, and waited until the King came up to him.—1495.

The Marshal de Gié, fearing to be attacked, retired to the mountains. He had with him (as he told me) about eight score men-at-arms, and eight hundred Swiss, and no more, and from us he could not expect any assistance; for, by reason of our heavy cannon, we could not join him in less than a day and a half. The king, in his march, lay at the houses of two little marquises. Our vanguard, being posted upon the mountain, was awaiting an attack by the enemy, whom they saw drawn up in order of battle at a good distance in the plain; but God (who had always preserved our army) infatuated our adversaries’ understanding. Our Swiss captain, being examined by the Count di Cajazzo, who commanded their army, and was then in their van, was asked what number of men-at-arms were with the marshal, though the count knew our strength as well as we did ourselves, for he had been with us during the whole campaign.

The Swiss magnified our forces, represented us to be much stronger than we were, and said the marshal had with him three hundred men-at-arms and fifteen hundred Swiss. The count told him plainly that he lied, for in the whole army we had not above three thousand Swiss, and it was improbable we would send half of them in our van; upon which the captain was sent prisoner to the Marquis of Mantua’s tent, where a council of war was called, in order to consult how to attack us. The marquis believed what the Swiss captain had said, and urged that their infantry were not so good as the Swiss; that all their forces had not joined them; that it would be a great injury to the allies to engage without them; and that, if they should lose the battle, the Signory would have just reason to blame their conduct; that it would be better, therefore, to wait for our coming into the plain, where we must pass in front of them; and the two proveditors being of the same opinion, the rest durst not oppose. Others affirmed, that if they routed our vanguard, the King must of necessity be taken prisoner; but, for all that, it was concluded to await us in the plain, and they confidently believed that none of us could escape. This I have been informed of since by the very persons whom I have mentioned; for, afterwards, we discoursed together, and the Marshal de Gié and I had this relation from their own mouths. Upon this they retired into the plain, being assured that within a day or two the king must of necessity come to Fornovo; and in the meantime the rest of the confederate forces arrived in their camp, and the way was so narrow we were obliged to march close by them.

Upon our descending from the mountains, we had a prospect of the plain of Lombardy, which is the pleasantest and best country in the world, and most plentiful in everything; yet, though I call it a plain, it is scarce passable for horses, for it is as full of ditches as Flanders, or rather more, but much better, and more fruitful both in corn, wine, and fruit; and their ground never lies fallow. It pleased us exceedingly to see so fine a country after the famine and hardships which we had suffered since our departure from Lucca; but our train of artillery gave us great trouble, especially to let down, so steep and difficult was the pass. In the enemy’s camp there were great numbers of tents and pavilions, which made it look very large, and indeed so it was. The Venetians made good their message by me to the king, when they promised that the Duke of Milan and they would bring forty thousand men into the field; and if they had not their full number, they wanted not much of it, for they were five and thirty thousand effective men, and of them four-fifths were in the Venetian pay. They had at least two thousand six hundred men-at-arms barded, every one attended by his bowman on horseback, or some other person in livery, making four horses to every man-at-arms. Their Estradiots and other light horse were about five thousand, and the rest were infantry, encamped in a very strong position, and furnished with a large train of artillery.

CH. IX.—How the King and his small Army arrived at Fornovo, near the Camp of his Enemies, who awaited him in very fine Order, and with a Determination to defeat and capture him.—1495.

The king descended from the mountains about noon, and took up his quarters in Fornovo on the 5th of July, being Sunday, in the year 1495. We found good store of provision in the town both for our horses and ourselves. The people received us very kindly, for nobody did them the least injury; they brought us victuals and bread, but their bread was small and black, and they sold it very dear, and their wine was three parts water; they brought us likewise some of their fruits, and were exceedingly diligent in attending our army. I ordered them to bring me a little of everything, which I had tested in my presence; for we had great suspicion that this plenty of provisions had been left there on purpose to poison us, so that at first nobody touched them; and our suspicion was much increased by the death of two of our Swiss, who were found dead in a cellar, having killed themselves with excessive drinking, or else died of cold in the cellar; but before night our horses began to eat, and at last the soldiers followed their example, and we refreshed ourselves very well. I must say this in honour of the Italians, that we never found that they endeavoured to do us any mischief by poison; if they had, we could hardly have secured ourselves in this march. On the Sunday (as I said before) we arrived about noon at Fornovo; most of our people of quality ate nothing but a crust of bread at the place where the king alighted and drank; and, indeed, at that time there was little else to be got; for the provisions that were in the town nobody durst venture to taste.

Presently after this refreshment, the Estradiots sallied out of their camp, and dashing up to our very army, gave us a strong alarm. Our men, being unacquainted with their way of fighting, drew out into the field, and put themselves into order of battle, with a van, main body, and rear so exactly well distanced that they were not a bowl’s cast one from another, so that upon any disaster they might easily have supported each other; but no action happened at that time, and both parties retired to their camps. Our tents were but few, and our camp extended so near to theirs that twenty of their Estradiots were enough to give us an alarm at any time; wherefore they lay constantly in our front, having the benefit of a wood, through which they might march close up to us before they were discovered. We lay betwixt two little hills in a valley, divided by a small river called Tarro, which is usually fordable on foot, unless it is swelled by the waters from the mountains, which fall very suddenly, and are as suddenly gone. The valley in which we lay encamped, being full of gravel and great stones, was very incommodious for our cavalry; it was about a quarter of a league in width; and upon the hill on our right hand, within half a league of us, the enemy were posted, so that we were obliged to pass in sight of their whole army, with only that river between us. On that side on which we were quartered, beyond the hill on the left hand, there was another road which we might have taken; but then we should have seemed to have been afraid of them. About two days before, it was proposed to me by some prudent persons in our army, who now began to be apprehensive of their danger, that I should go and desire a parley with the enemy, and should take another along with me, to observe their numbers and the situation of their camp. I had no great inclination to undertake this duty (and without a safe-conduct there was no going at all); wherefore I told them that, at my departure from Venice, and at Padua, I had taken my leave very kindly of the proveditors, and that we had promised correspondence upon occasion, and therefore I did not question but upon any overture of a treaty they would meet me half way; whereas, if I should condescend to go to them, it would but make them the more arrogant; besides, I feared it was too late.

The same Sunday I wrote to the proveditors (one of them was called Luca Pisani, and the other Melchior Trivisano), desiring that, according to the agreement between ourselves at my departure from Padua, they would send me a passport, in order that I might have a conference with them. They sent me word they would have done it with all their hearts, had we not begun a war against the Duke of Milan; however, one of them (as they should agree) would meet me in some place midway between the two armies. I had their answer the same night, but none of those who had influence with the king attached any importance to it. I was fearful of going too far, lest they should have interpreted it as cowardice; so that I pressed it no farther that night, though I would willingly have done anything to have delivered the king and his army out of danger, had I been able.

About midnight the Cardinal of St. Malo left the king; and his tent being near mine, he came to me, and told me that the king would march the next morning, and that he was resolved to pass by them, and when he began to march, that he would fire some of his great guns into their army by way of defiance, and then march on in as good order as he could. I am of opinion this was the Cardinal’s own advice, for he was ignorant in such cases, and knew not what counsel to give; and it had been much more prudent in the king to have called a council of his officers and all the grave men about him, to have consulted what measures it would be proper to take in that exigence of affairs; but the result would have been the same, for in this very march I had seen many things concerted in council with very great prudence, but managed quite contrary when they came to be executed. I told the Cardinal that if we came so near as to fire into their camp, they would certainly come out and skirmish with us, and that then it would be impossible to avoid a general battle; besides, it did not consist with the overture I had made, so that I was extremely concerned to hear the resolution the king had taken. However, such had been my condition from the beginning of this king’s reign, that I durst not object, for fear I should disoblige his favourites, and make them my enemies; for they had, indeed, greater authority with him than they ought to have had.