Chapter I: The Chicago Riot (3)

Chief of Police Garrity testified that there were 3,500 policemen in the department at the time of the riot, and that he had "practically every policeman in the city of Chicago down there," indicating Thirty-fifth Street and Rhodes Avenue as "practically in the heart of the district where the most trouble was." The widest distribution from that center, he said, was over an area bounded by Lake Michigan, Ashland Avenue, Van Buren Street, and Sixty-ninth Street.

The heaviest concentration of police, however, was in the "Black Belt." The Stanton Avenue Police Station at Thirty-fifth Street and Rhodes Avenue is at about the center of the most congested Negro residential area. Asked how many policemen were assigned to that vicinity (the area from Twenty-second to Thirty-ninth streets), Chief Garrity said, "We had in the neighborhood of 2,800 men in that territory." Later the chief said only "the necessary sergeants and one or two men at each station were held back for emergency calls" in all other parts of the city. This means that four-fifths of the total police force was concentrated there.

Although there is no direct testimony as to the existence of flying squadrons of police, yet such bodies appear to have been operating. Probably the most important of these was the patrol under Police Captain Mullen, who said that his territory extended from Twenty-second to Thirty-ninth streets and from the lake to the Rock Island tracks, or roughly the "Black Belt." Chief Deputy Alcock[9] sent eighty-eight policemen into this district on Sunday afternoon, twenty-five more at midnight, and fifty more on Monday morning.

In describing the disposition of police details, Chief Garrity said: "They were routed by him [Alcock] according to conditions existing in different districts. Some districts might have a hundred men in the block and in the next block there might be only ten, according to what conditions were." Forces were moved from one point of disturbance to another by means of patrol wagons on request of local commanders.

The 2,800 policemen in the "Black Belt" were under the command of Chief Deputy Alcock with headquarters in the Stanton Avenue Station. He "used his discretion in the number of men assigned to the different points and the handling of them in the different territories."

Riot orders were given by Chief Garrity as follows: "Wherever possible suppress the riot and restore peace"; "the second day I ordered a dead line on Wentworth Avenue and Twenty-second Street to, I think, Sixty-third Street"; "instructions were that 'you will allow no colored people to go across to the west and no white people to go across to the east.'" Cabarets, saloons, and public places were ordered closed, and all large gatherings of either whites or Negroes were prohibited from Van Buren to Sixty-ninth streets and from Ashland Avenue to the lake. The chief added, "Closing clubrooms and everything in the district west of Wentworth Avenue as well as east of it." A general policy was adopted of search and seizure of persons suspected of carrying weapons on the street, and of houses from which firing came. Captain Mullen testified before the coroner's jury at the Eugene Williams inquest that on July 29 Chief Deputy Alcock lined up the policemen in front of the Stanton Avenue Station and gave them their orders. They were told to "preserve the peace; that was all."

Police records of clashes were incomplete and often inaccurate. This was in part due, and naturally so, to the stress of the moment. In many cases the station lists of injured were far from complete and in few instances were the names of witnesses given. Even the dates and hours of clashes were loosely recorded. Persons arrested were frequently not booked at all, while on the other hand it was not uncommon to find innocent persons charged with serious offenses. Henry Scholz, policeman of the Twenty-sixth Precinct, threw much light on police records while being examined in connection with certain automobile arrests:

They were all discharged, booked for "disorderly," because
we couldn't find the guns in the mix-up. It was the first or
second day down there and they were bringing them in right
and left, and I suppose in the mix-up they mislaid the guns,
or put them away somewhere, or booked them to someone else.
We held them about a week trying to find the guns and trying
to find the officers that got the guns.

It is important to know how the distribution and routing of police affected the general riot situation. As already shown four-fifths of the police forces were concentrated in the "Black Belt." This undoubtedly both weakened police forces elsewhere and also prevented or delayed reinforcements in outside districts. Only 34 per cent of the total number of reported injuries occurred in the area of concentration. Negro hatred of the police is worth mentioning again here, especially since many of the deaths and injuries occurred during clashes between white policemen and Negro mobs.

That other districts where danger existed were poorly protected is shown by the fact that fatal clashes occurred there without interruption by the police. The most conspicuous case is noted in the "Loop" atrocities on July 29, where two Negroes, Hardwick and Williams, were killed, several were injured and robbed, and business property of whites was damaged. A police sergeant said that only three officers and one sergeant were in the district on the night of July 28-29. In the Stock Yards district, where 41 per cent of the injuries and several deaths occurred, there is no record of an attempt by the police to increase the riot forces. In this district gang raids by whites were practically beyond control. On July 28 B. F. Hardy, a Negro, was killed at Forty-sixth Street and Cottage Grove Avenue. Sergeant Clancy later testified that there were no policemen in this district until after the trouble. The foreman of the grand jury investigated the activities of the Deering Street Station under Police Captain Gallery. He says: "They didn't have a sufficient number of policemen to handle the situation. If I remember correctly, he had eight patrolmen covering a district of any number of square miles."

In spite of the concentration of police in the "Black Belt" some parts of that area seem at times not to have been properly guarded. Several serious clashes occurred there after the police arrived in force. Theodore Copling, Negro, was shot to death at Thirtieth and State streets in the heart of the "Black Belt" on July 30. This had been a riotous corner for three days, yet no policemen were at hand. The nearest was a detective sergeant on Twenty-ninth Street between Federal and State streets. Samuel Banks, Negro, was shot and killed near the corner of Twenty-seventh and Dearborn streets on July 30 at 11:00 P.M., yet Lieutenant Burns, in charge of this district, testified at the inquest that twelve to fourteen officers were at Twenty-seventh and Dearborn streets immediately before the shooting.

It was undoubtedly the relatively large number of clashes which the police were unable to prevent that led the coroner's jury to recommend that "(6) there should be organization of the force for riot work for the purpose of controlling rioting in its incipient stages."

The conduct of individual policemen received much adverse criticism from the Negroes. This was to be expected in the circumstances, but disregarding the general prejudice of which white officers were accused, certain cases of discrimination, abuse, brutality, indifference, and neglect on the part of individuals are deserving of examination.

Abusive and brutal treatment was complained of by Horace Jennings, 3422 South Aberdeen Street. He reported to the state's attorney's office that Policeman G----, of the Grand Crossing Station, approached him, as he lay wounded by a mob attack, with the words, "Where's your gun, you black ---- of a ----? You damn niggers are raising hell"; that the officer hit him on the head, and he did not regain consciousness until some time later in the Burnside Hospital; and he further charged that Gallagher took a purse containing $13 when he searched him.

Three Negroes were rescued by the police from a white mob of twenty-five or thirty men. Scott, one of the Negroes, was taken from the street car on which all three were riding, by the command of a policeman to "come out of there, you big rusty brute, you. I ought to shoot you," and was given a blow on the head. According to a witness he was again struck by the policeman as he was pushed into the patrol wagon. He was subjected to rough treatment at the jail and was kept incommunicado from July 28 to August 4, not being permitted to notify his wife or an attorney. None of the twenty-five or thirty white rioters was arrested. There was some evidence of fear on the part of the police to arrest rioting whites.

Fear by policemen of Negroes is also disclosed. George Crumm, white, 124 East Forty-sixth Street, informed the state's attorney's office that he was beaten by a Negro mob, got police assistance, and pointed out the rioters, but the police "didn't seem to want to interfere any."

On several occasions policemen left the scene of riots on questionable excuses while the rioting was in progress. Of the three mounted policemen at Thirty-fifth Street and Wabash Avenue who rushed to the spot where a mob was attacking Otterson, two accompanied the automobile of Otterson to the hospital. The mob was not quelled or dispersed. When the house of William O'Deneal, Negro, 4742 Wells Street, was attacked, the police took O'Deneal to the station and left the mob to sack and burn his house. At the killing of William Dozier, Negro, all three police officers who responded to notice of an attack by a white mob of 300 or more, left in the same patrol wagon. The names of witnesses were not taken. It was the custom for all to accompany the wagon, according to Officer McDonough.

Political "pull" exercised with the police on behalf of rioters has been indicated. It was noted that one of "Ragen's Colts" said an officer of the Stock Yards Station "tipped them off" to stay away from their club because Attorney General Brundage's office was out investigating them.

Indifference both to extreme lawlessness during the riot and to the procedure of the inquest marked the examination of Captain of Police Mullen before the coroner's jury. He was in command of twelve mounted men and between sixty-three and 100 men on foot at Thirty-fifth Street and Wabash Avenue when a clash between the police and a Negro mob occurred. While it appears to be the fact that he left just before the heavy firing to telephone from a saloon one block away, yet the building he was in was struck by bullets. The following excerpt from the inquest speaks for itself:

_Q._: What time did the shooting take place at the building
known as the Angelus Building? What time did that occur? Was
there any shooting at that building?

_Mullen_: Not that I heard.

_Q._: Had there been any shooting done there that evening
around ... before you left?

_Mullen_: Not to my knowledge.

_Q._: When was the shooting done, and where were you?

_Mullen_: What do you mean shooting?

Three men were killed and many injured at Thirty-fifth Street and Wabash Avenue at this time. Firing broke out near-by almost immediately.

_Q._: There were some shots fired at Thirty-fifth and State,
Captain, at eight that night, right after the volley was fired,
we have absolute evidence.

_Mullen_: Well, you may have, but I have not.

Yet Captain Mullen was in command of the police who killed two more men and inflicted other wounds when the Negroes ran before the police advance.

_Militia._--The rapid growth of the riot both in violence and territorially created such alarm among the authorities and the public that the question of its control became a matter of paramount concern to the community. Before twenty-four hours had elapsed requests were made to the local authorities for the militia. The representations were based on insufficiency of police forces and were strongly urged before the chief of police.

Chief Garrity steadily refused to ask for troops, in spite of his repeated statement that the police force was insufficient. He gave as his reason the belief that inexperienced militiamen would add to the deaths and disorders. Mayor Thompson supported the chief's refusal until outside pressure compelled him to ask the governor for aid. On the other hand the chief deputy of police was quoted by State's Attorney Hoyne as having said at the outbreak of the riot that the police would not be able to handle the situation, and that troops were needed. In this he was supported by Mr. Hoyne. From observation of conditions on the first three days of the riot, the chief of staff of the troops, Colonel Ronayne, concluded that the police were insufficient in numbers, that no improvement was apparent in the general situation, and that therefore the troops were necessary. He saw no reason, however, for putting the city under martial law. Other military men were of the same opinion.

During all of this time Governor Lowden kept in close touch with the situation from his quarters at the Blackstone Hotel. When the riot appeared to be subsiding he started to keep an appointment out of town but, on hearing that there was a renewal of violence, returned to the city on a special train. When the request was made for the active co-operation of the troops he acted with promptness.

The troops themselves were clearly of high caliber. For the most part they were in home service during the war and were older men than are ordinarily found in militia organizations. They "usually came from the higher type of business men, men of affairs, men that knew how to think," as one of their commanding officers described them. They were all American-born.

The militia discipline was of the best. Not a single case of breach of discipline was reported to the regimental commanders. No guardhouse was necessary during the riot, a remarkable commentary on troop conduct.

The militia had been given special drills in the suppression of riots and insurrections for a year and a half previous to this occasion, and were, in the estimation of their commanding officer, "probably better prepared for riot drill than any troops ever put on duty in the state."

The activities of the militia did not begin as early as many citizens wished. Though troops began to mobilize in the armories on Monday night, July 28, they were not called to actual duty on the streets until 10:30 P.M., Wednesday, July 30. When called to active duty they were distributed in the areas of conflict. Between 5,000 and 6,000 troops were called out. This number was made up entirely of white troops from the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Infantry, Illinois National Guard, and from the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Reserve Militia regiments of the militia. Colored troops who had composed the Eighth Regiment were not reorganized at that time, and therefore none participated.

Distribution of troops was determined not by the militia command but by the police, because the city was not under martial law, the civil authority being merely insufficient, not broken. The Third Infantry covered the territory from Thirty-first to Thirty-eighth streets and from State to Halsted streets; Eleventh Infantry from Thirty-ninth to Forty-seventh streets, and from State to Halsted streets; Tenth Infantry from Forty-eighth to Fifty-fifth streets (later extended to Sixty-third Street by details from the First Infantry), and from Cottage Grove to Stewart avenues. The First, Fourth, and Ninth Infantry were held in reserve. Detachments responded to calls from the chief of police in districts outside these areas. Headquarters for the commanding general and his chief of staff were in the Congress Hotel at the northern boundary of the riot zone.

The orders under which the militia operated did not have the authority of martial law. The purpose of the orders was to effect a thorough co-operation with the police only, and not to take over any duties other than the preservation of law and order. Except in this respect, civilian routine remained undisturbed. The method of co-operation put the commanding officer of a regiment in absolute control, within the limits above described, in his district. The police reduced their number to normal requirements by removing their reserves as soon as the militia moved in. The patrolmen then went about on ordinary duties in the districts. Persons arrested by the militia were turned over to the police.

Responsibility for the preservation of law and order rested on the regimental commanders. Careful instructions were given troops for preventing violence: they were to act as soldiers in a gentlemanly manner; they were furnished with arms to enable them to perform their duties; they were to use the arms only when necessary; they were to use bayonet and butt in preference to firing, but if the situation demanded shooting, they were not to hesitate to deliver an effective fire. Above all, the formation of mobs was to be prevented.

The manner in which the militia was received by various elements in the communities where stationed is illuminating. Police officers were glad that the troops came to relieve them. Two policemen on duty with a patrol exclaimed, when they heard the militia had come in force, "Thank God! We can't stand up under this much longer!" The police at Cottage Grove Avenue said, "We are tickled to death to see you fellows come in; you have never looked so good to us before!" A regimental commander said his organization was "welcomed into the zone, of course, by everybody, and I'd say especially by the colored people." A similar report came from another regimental commander.

But there was some show of hostility to the troops. Hoodlums fired on some detachments when they first came in, and Colonel Bolte reported a hatred for the troops by "the Hamburg Athletic Club, the Ragen's, and the Emeralds, and a whole bunch of them over there who didn't like to be controlled!" Volunteer ex-service men with no legal status, but who aided the police at the time, and deputy sheriffs with overseas training ridiculed the militia with such taunts as, "Tin soldiers!" The effect of this attitude on the populace necessitated the arrest of some disturbers and the removal of unauthorized persons from the streets.

It is a singular fact that militia activities were principally against gangs of hoodlums, and the majority of these gangs were composed of white youths. Said one commander, "Rowdies of the white population tried to get through the lines and had to be arrested." "At one time a heavy truck or two loaded with white gangsters attempted to break through the militia but was checked." Plenty of trouble "with the Ragen's and other similar organizations" was reported by yet another commander.

The militia unquestionably prevented mob formations, raids, and "sniping." They checked marauders still in search of prey. In many cases they prevented the initial moves of lawlessness by taking stations at critical points long before raiders arrived.

There was a marked contrast between the militia and the police. The troops were under definite orders; commanders had absolute control of their forces and knew at all times where and how many effectives were available. Precision and promptness of movement was the rule. Reserves were always at hand. Discipline was always good. Only one person, a white man, was killed by the troops. Whatever other restraining causes contributed, it is certain that the riot was not revived after the troops were posted.

Most of the troops were withdrawn on August 8.

_Volunteers._--Many Negro ex-service men, formerly members of the old Eighth Regiment (Negro) of the Illinois National Guard, donned their uniforms, armed, and offered their services to the police and militia. The militia on duty found that these Negro volunteers had no authority or military status and consequently ordered them to disband, which they did.

Before the troops were called out, however, a determined effort was made by one Britton, white police reserve, to organize ex-soldiers for volunteer service. He said as many as thirty-five joined him. They were denied permits to carry weapons but are reported to have done so. It was these men who used an automobile, driven with the mufflers open, to clear the streets.

Evidence of the use of liquor was noticed among these men during their active period. Some were involved in the killing of Samuel Banks, Negro; some in the robbery of a restaurant and in misdeeds of a minor character. Following the implication of individuals among them in these crimes, numbers of the ex-soldiers were arrested by the police, but were released by order of Chief Garrity on account of the assistance many of them had rendered the department and because of representations of business men who felt that the arrests were unjust.

_Deputy sheriffs._--In addition to police, militiamen, and volunteers, another group composed of specially recruited deputy sheriffs, appeared in the riot zone as preservers of the peace. They were sworn in by Sheriff Peters, of Cook County, after citizens had appealed to him, he said, to quell the riot. In regard to their formation, numbers, orders, and duties, the sheriff had this to say:

I advertised for ex-service men to serve as deputy sheriffs. A
thousand or more applied. They were all men who had returned
from the war and were out of work. I hired 500 of them, kept
them in the army uniforms, and instructed them to shoot to
kill any disturbers or rioters. The presence of these men and
the show of authority thereby made was effective, and the riot
was quelled.

Fifteen thousand dollars was spent on this force.

It appears that these deputies came on the scene toward the end of the riot week and at once fell into disfavor with the militia, whom they ridiculed as "tin soldiers" in much the same manner as did the volunteers. Two regimental commanders of militia said the special deputies "did not behave in a very pleasant manner" and "in the majority of instances were no good." The sheriff was notified to call them in and they soon disappeared. There is no record of organized methods of procedure or of their activities.

_Restoration of order._--Long before actual hostilities ceased, and even before the arrival of the militia, various agencies, in addition to the police, were at work trying to hold lawlessness in check and restore order. Efforts of citizens of both races helped greatly in bringing about peace. As long as the rioting was in progress thousands of Negroes were cut off from their employment. The Stock Yards workers especially were affected, since Negroes living east of Wentworth Avenue would have been forced to go to work on foot through the district in which the worst rioting occurred. The hostilities also cut off the food supply in the main riot areas. The dealers in the "Black Belt," principally Jewish merchants, became alarmed lest temporary lack of funds due to the separation from work and wages should lead Negroes to loot their stores.

On August 1, the various packing companies made the unpaid wages of Negro employees available for them by establishing pay stations at the Chicago Urban League at 3032 Wabash Avenue, the Wabash Avenue Young Men's Christian Association at 3763 Wabash Avenue, the South Side Community Service House at 3201 South Wabash Avenue, and the Binga State Bank, Thirty-eighth and State streets. Approximately 6,000 employees were paid in this way. Banks within the district made small temporary loans to stranded persons, sometimes without security. The cashier of the Franklin State Bank at Thirty-fifth Street and Michigan Avenue said that he had made loans of more than $200 to Negroes in sums of $2 and $3 on their simple promise to pay, and that every dollar had been repaid.

All the local newspapers in their editorial columns took a vigorous stand against disorder, urged the people to be calm and avoid crowds, and were insistent that those responsible for rioting should be brought to justice. The _Tribune_, for example, published editorials under the following captions: "Regain Order and Keep It," "Sane Men and Rioters," "This Is No Holiday," "The Facts of the Riot," and "Penalties for Rioters." All of these articles were calm appeals for tolerance, sanity, and dispassionate inquiry for the facts. The _Evening American_, in an editorial entitled "This Is Chicago's Crisis; Keep a Cool Head," said:

Chicago is facing its crisis today.

In one great section of the city law and order for the time
being seem to have been flung to the four winds. White men and
colored men are shooting one another down in the streets for
no earthly cause except that the color of their faces differs.

These mobs are not representative of whites or blacks. They
are the hoodlums of both races. But the law abiding whites
and blacks are innocent victims.

Hotheads and smoking gun barrels have almost wrested the rule
from the keepers of the peace.

It is worse than a calamity, this race rioting. It is a deadly,
ghastly scourge, a dire contagion that is sweeping through a
community for no reason except that mob violence is contagious.

It is up to the cool-headed men of Chicago to settle the great
difficulty. It is up to the serious-minded business men of the
city to get together and find a solution to a problem which
has become so serious.

To meet violence with violence is but making matters worse.
Gun toting at a time like this only adds fuel to the fire
already raging.

Reason is the solution. It is mightier than the six-gun. How it
is to be exerted is for the level-headed citizenry to decide,
and decide at once.

Hardly an hour passes that more names are not added to the
already long list of slain in the South Side rioting.

There is no time to be lost. Other matters must be put aside
for the moment and a solution reached for Chicago's greatest
problem.

Labor unions also took a hand in the efforts toward peace. Unionists of both races were exhorted to co-operate in bringing about harmonious relations, and meetings for this purpose were planned by trade-union leaders, as described in the section of this report dealing with the Negro in industry. Probably the most effective effort of union labor was the following article in the _New Majority_, the organ of the Chicago Federation of Labor, prominently displayed:

FOR WHITE UNION MEN TO READ

Let any white union worker who has ever been on strike where
gunmen or machine gun have been brought in and turned on him
and his fellows search his memory and recall how he felt. In
this critical moment let every union man remember the tactics
of the boss in a strike when he tries by shooting to terrorize
striking workers into violence to protect themselves.

Well, that is how the Negroes feel. They are panic-stricken
over the prospect of being killed.

A heavy responsibility rests on the white portion of the
community to stop assault on Negroes by white men. Violence
against them is not the way to solve the vexed race problem.

This responsibility rests particularly heavy upon the white
men and women of organized labor, not because they had anything
to do with starting the present trouble, but because of their
advantageous position to help end it. Right now it is going
to be decided whether the colored workers are to continue to
come into the labor movement or whether they are going to feel
that they have been abandoned by it and lose confidence in it.

It is a critical time for Chicago.

It is a critical time for organized labor.

All the influence of the unions should be exerted on the
community to protect colored fellow-workers from the unreasoning
frenzy of race prejudice. Indications of the past have been
that organized labor has gone further in eliminating race
hatred than any other class. It is up against the acid test
now to show whether this is so.

Various social agencies took steps to help in the emergency and restore order. The American Red Cross has a branch at Thirty-fifth Street and Michigan Avenue. As soon as the rioting became serious a special relief headquarters was established here, and food was distributed to needy families cut off from work. The Urban League was used as a headquarters for the distribution of food.

The Urban League had for several years, through its employment bureau, handled a large proportion of the city's Negro labor supply and was conversant with difficulties likely to result from the rioting. It made food surveys of the entire Negro area, printed and distributed thousands of circulars and dodgers urging Negroes to stay off the streets, refrain from dangerous discussions of the riot, and co-operate with the police in every way to maintain order. The League sent telegrams to the governor and mayor suggesting plans for curbing disorder, organized committees of citizens to aid the authorities in restoring order, and served as a bureau of information and medium of communication between the white and Negro groups during the worst hostilities.

The Young Men's Christian Association was similarly active within the area of its efforts. Religious bodies, ministers' associations, and individual ministers exerted their influence over their respective groups by advising the citizens to "keep cool," "hold their heads," and generally to let the authorities settle the riot. Negro business men and one Negro alderman sent wagons through the streets bearing large signs which advised Negroes not to congregate on streets, engage in arguments, or participate in any way in the disorders. The signs further stated that people would be advised when it would be safe to return to work. Other persons went about speaking on street corners urging co-operation with the police and militia. Appeals by officials and leading citizens were published in the white and Negro papers, carrying similar advice. During the riot a committee of citizens representing forty-eight social, civic, commercial, and professional organizations met at the Union League Club and petitioned the governor to take steps to quiet the existing disorder and appoint a commission to study the situation with a view to preventing a repetition of it. As a result of this appeal followed by similar urgings by many committees, the present Chicago Commission on Race Relations was appointed and began its work.

_Aftermath of the riot._--After the restoration of order community activities were superficially the same as before the riot, but under the surface there remained a deepened bitterness of race feeling which spread far beyond the time and territorial limits of the riot itself.

All the deep-seated causes of friction which had developed so largely from the failure to work out an adjustment of the increased Negro population due to the migration were and are still present, undiminished in influence. Consciousness of racial difference and more or less unconscious fear and distrust were increased and spread by the riot. Among the whites this was evidenced by the general belief that Negroes were gathering stores of arms and ammunition. Among the Negroes a growing race solidarity has been marked. There is a greater lack of confidence in the white man's law and machinery of protection. Continued bombings of Negro houses in mixed areas and failure to apprehend the culprits no doubt strengthen this attitude.

Reports of various Negro gatherings held soon after the riot show this to be the case. Many Negroes frankly urged their brothers that they must arm themselves and fight if attacked. At one meeting a Negro is reported to have said:

The recent race riots have done at least one thing for the
colored race. In the past we Negroes have failed to appreciate
what solidarity means. We have, on the contrary, been much
divided. Since the riot we are getting together and devising
ways and means of protecting our interests. The recent race
riots have convinced us that we must take steps to protect
ourselves. Never again will we be found unprepared. It is
the duty of every man here to provide himself with guns and
ammunition. I, myself, have at least one gun and at least
enough ammunition to make it useful.

The riot furnished the gang and hoodlum element a chance to indulge in lawlessness. Fear of death and injury may help to hold that element in check. But it cannot be argued that fear of punishment is much of a factor, for very few convictions of rioters were secured.

Quick justice would have been a salutary means of curbing tendencies to riot, according to both the coroner's jury and the grand jury. The coroner's jury said: "One remedy for race rioting is a speedy conviction and punishment of those guilty, regardless of race or color, giving all concerned a fair and impartial hearing." Its eighth recommendation reads: "Above all, a strict enforcement of the law by public officials, fair and impartial, will do more than any other agency in restoring the good name of Chicago, and prevent rioting from any cause from again disturbing the peace of our city."

The August, 1919, grand jury said: "This jury feels that in order to allay further race prejudice and to prevent the re-enactment of shameful crimes committed during the recent riots, efficient, prompt, and fearless justice on the part of the judiciary be meted out to the guilty ones, whether they be white or black."

In a fair consideration of whether swift and impartial justice was meted out, it must be noted that it was extremely hard to secure evidence sufficient for successful prosecution. Police attention upon arriving at the scene of a clash was directed more to removing the injured than apprehending the guilty. Where attempts were made to search out the offenders, it was next to impossible to get results on account of the keen race consciousness which made Negroes disclaim knowledge of Negro culprits and white people deny seeing specific white men act aggressively. Many of the crowds were neighborhood gatherings and leaders were often the sons of neighbors.

In most of the riot cases brought before the state's attorney's office the same difficulty was experienced. Whole blocks of residents were subpoenaed and accurately described the assaults, but failed entirely to recognize any of the assailants. The grand jury found the same obstacle. The foreman, referring to the kind of testimony brought before that body by Negroes on complaints against whites, said: "... they [the grand jury] usually found it to be hearsay testimony. Some other individual told them about So-and-So. That a crime had been committed there was no question, but to get at the root of it was absolutely impossible."

In spite of these difficulties, those familiar with the riot situation believe that more arrests of active rioters might have been made and more convictions obtained. A study of the riot deaths shows that justice failed to be as swift and sure as the coroner's and grand juries recommended. The blame for this failure is variously placed on the police, state's attorney, judge, or jury, according to the prejudice of the one attempting to fix blame, or his connection with any of these agencies. The fact remains that the punitive results of the legal processes were too negligible to furnish a proper deterrent to future rioters.

Of the thirty-eight persons whose death constituted the riot's principal toll--

Fifteen met death at the hands of mobs. The coroners' jury recommended that the members of the unknown mobs be apprehended. None were ever found.

Six were killed under circumstances establishing no criminal responsibility: three white men were killed by Negroes in self-defense, and three Negroes were shot by policemen in the discharge of their duty.

Four Negroes lost their lives in the Angelus riot. The coroner made no recommendations, and the cases were not carried farther.

Four cases--two Negro and two white--led to recommendations from the coroner's jury for further investigation of certain persons, but sufficient evidence was lacking for indictments.

Nine cases resulted in indictments, four of which led to convictions.

Thus in only four cases was criminal responsibility for death fixed and punishment meted out to the guilty.

Indictments and convictions are divided according to the race of the persons criminally involved as follows:

====================================================
| Negro | White
----------------+-------+---------+-------+---------
| Cases | Persons | Cases | Persons
+-------+---------+-------+---------
Indictments[10] | 6 | 17 | 3 | 4
Convictions | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2
----------------+-------+---------+-------+---------

There is evidence that the riot of 1919 aroused many citizens of both races to a quickened sense of the suffering and disgrace which had come and might come again to the community, and developed a determination to prevent a recurrence of so disastrous an outbreak of race hatred. This was manifest, as another section of this report shows, in the courage and control which people of both races displayed on at least two occasions in 1920 when confronted suddenly with events out of which serious riots might easily have grown.

This examination of the facts of the riot reveals certain outstanding features, as follows:

1. The riot violence was not continuous, hour by hour, but was intermittent.

2. The greatest number of injuries occurred in the district west of Wentworth Avenue, inclusive of Wentworth, and south of the Chicago River to Fifty-fifth Street, or, broadly speaking, in the Stock Yards district. The next greatest number occurred in the so-called "Black Belt," Twenty-second to Thirty-ninth streets, inclusive, Wentworth to the lake, exclusive of Wentworth; Thirty-ninth to Fifty-fifth streets, inclusive, Clark Street to Michigan Avenue, exclusive of Michigan.

3. Organized raids occurred only after a period of sporadic clashes and spontaneous mob outbreaks.

4. Main thoroughfares witnessed 76 per cent of the injuries on the South Side. The streets which suffered most severely were State, Halsted, Thirty-first, Thirty-fifth, and Forty-seventh. Transfer corners were always centers of trouble.

5. Most of the rioting occurred after working hours. This was particularly true after the street-car strike started.

6. Gangs, particularly among the young whites, formed definite nuclei for crowd and mob leadership. "Athletic clubs" supplied the leaders of many gangs.

7. Whites usually employed fists and clubs in their attacks upon Negroes; Negroes used firearms and knives in their attacks.

8. Crowds and mobs engaged in rioting were usually composed of a small nucleus of leaders and an acquiescing mass of spectators. The leaders were young men, usually between sixteen and twenty-one. Dispersal was most effectively accomplished by sudden, unexpected gun fire.

9. Rumor kept the crowds in an excited, potential mob state. The press was responsible for wide dissemination of much of the inflammatory matter in spoken rumors, though editorials calculated to allay race hatred and help the forces of order were factors in the restoration of peace.

10. The police lacked sufficient forces for handling the riot; they were hampered by the Negroes' distrust of them; routing orders and records were not handled with proper care; certain officers were undoubtedly unsuited to police or riot duty.

11. The personnel of the militia employed in this riot was of an unusually high type. This unquestionably accounts for the confidence placed in them by both races. Riot training, definite orders, and good staff work contributed to their efficiency.

12. The machinery of justice was affected by prejudices and political rivalries.

From their reviews of the evidence brought before them, the coroner's jury and the grand jury presented analyses of the riot, and each made recommendations of a remedial sort. These recommendations follow:

CORONER'S JURY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. We believe that a representative committee of white and
colored people, working together, could suggest and bring
about the necessary and advisable changes.

2. In specifically attacking the housing situation: The
correction of the evil by enlarging the living quarters and
placing them in a better sanitary state would in part solve
the difficulty. We believe voluntary segregation would follow
and to a considerable extent remove one cause of unrest.

This is a matter that might well be considered by the Real
Estate Board and by improvement clubs and organizations of
property owners in the South Division, and by the Health
Department.

3. In regard to the "athletic clubs": Properly governed and
controlled they should be encouraged and fostered and, when
necessary, disciplined.

4. Hoodlumism evokes this comment: Citizens of Chicago, make
your hoodlum element amenable to law, break up and destroy
hoodlumism as you would a pestilence. It is our belief that
this element can be brought under control of the law, and it
must be done if we are to remove the danger of rioting from any
cause. Vicious hoodlumism, entirely aside from race hatred,
was present in practically all of the thirty-eight killings,
known as race riots.

5. We earnestly urge that fathers and mothers teach their
children the lesson of remaining at home when rioting occurs,
and furthermore, they should be kept occupied, as idleness
and bad association often cause young people to become bad
men and women.

6. One remedy for race rioting is a speedy conviction and
punishment of those guilty, regardless of race or color, giving
all concerned a fair and impartial hearing.

7. Tolerance must be practiced between both white and colored in
the discussion of the race problem, practiced in our everyday
intercourse, in public conveyances, and in meetings of all
kinds.

8. Our attention was called strikingly to the fact that at the
time of race rioting the arrests made for rioting by the police
of colored rioters were far in excess of the arrests made of
white rioters. The failure of the police to arrest impartially
at the time of rioting, whether from insufficient effort or
otherwise, was a mistake and had a tendency to further incite
and aggravate the colored population.

9. In cases of murder it is of the utmost importance that
expert criminologists should arrive on the scene at the
earliest possible moment, and that a complete examination may
be made of the scene of the murder before the body is removed
or handled, and while the necessary evidence for conviction
may be obtained, which otherwise may be lost or destroyed. We
have found in the riot cases many instances where the removal
of bodies by inexperienced men, in some cases police officers,
destroyed valuable evidence.

We heartily concur with Coroner Hoffman as to the fact that
Chicago badly needs a permanent murder-investigation squad,
which the coroner planned and has so persistently advocated
in the past. We believe that this squad should be equipped
with motor vehicles and subject to call at any hour of the
day or night. This squad should consist of six or more trained
policemen, working in relays of eight hours, a photographer,
a finger-print expert, a coroner's physician and chemist, the
coroner or deputy coroner, and a state's attorney. In addition
thereto, two trained policemen from the police department
precinct wherein the murder occurred, and a representative
of the City News Bureau. This squad should be available for
immediate service, and it should be the duty of the police at
the scene of the murder to allow no one to handle the body or
enter premises where murder occurred until the arrival of the
squad.

10. The police force should be enlarged. It is too small to
cope with the needs of Chicago, and under the present living
conditions the policeman's pay is entirely inadequate and
should be substantially increased.

Superannuated and incapacitated members of the police force
should be retired under a proper and satisfactory pension
system.

There should be organization of the force for riot work, for
the purpose of controlling rioting in its incipient stages.

GRAND JURY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is reasonable to believe that the colored people, if
provided with proper housing facilities and an area sufficient
in extent, would voluntarily segregate themselves. The present
neighborhood known as the "Black Belt" could, by reasonable
public improvement, assisted by our leading public citizens,
be made a decent place to live in for a much larger population
than it now accommodates.... This movement should enlist the
financial and moral support of the industries employing large
numbers of the black race.

2. Facilities for bathing, playgrounds, police protection,
better housing and neighborhood conditions, are matters
deserving the earnest attention of the proper authorities.

3. The employment of the colored people is imperative to the
welfare of this community. Discriminating against the Negro,
or, in other words, failure to give him an opportunity to make
an honest livelihood after having induced him to migrate to
this section of the country, simply adds to the already far
too great number of hoodlums that infest our city.

4. This jury feels that in order to allay further race prejudice
and to prevent the re-enactment of shameful crimes committed
during the recent riots, efficient, prompt, and fearless
justice on the part of the law-enforcing officers, as well
as on the part of the judiciary, be meted out to the guilty
ones, whether they be white or black.

5. ... There is a lack of co-operation and harmony among the
agencies of law enforcement, which impairs their efficiency,
leads to miscarriages of justice, and wastes the public funds.

6. The parole law should be amended so that a criminal once
paroled and subsequently arrested may not a second time be
paroled.

7. The efficiency of the police force would be further greatly
increased by the co-operation of the judiciary in refusing to
grant wholesale continuances without carefully scrutinizing the
results thereof when members of the police force are required
to act as witnesses.

8. The police department is in need of a thorough
house-cleaning. Every officer, no matter what his position
is, who fails in his full duty should be dismissed. Grafters
and those who allow themselves to be dominated by political
influences, who are paid to protect the lives and property of
our citizens, should be dismissed and punished to the fullest
extent of the law.

9. It is the opinion of this jury that the police force is
also inadequate in numbers, and at least one thousand (1,000)
officers should be added to the existing force.

10. Policemen who have arrived at the age where their usefulness
is a matter of the past should be pensioned, notwithstanding
their present number, and notwithstanding the fact that the
pension fund is already taxed to its utmost. The needed funds
for this purpose should be provided.

11. ... payment of salaries to public officers commensurate
with the increased cost of living.

12. The authorities employed to enforce the law should
thoroughly investigate clubs and other organizations posing
as athletic and social clubs which really are organizations
of hoodlums and criminals formed for the purpose of furthering
the interest of local politics.

13. The jury also finds that vice of all kinds is rampant in
the "Black Belt," and a thorough cleaning up of that district is
absolutely essential to the peace and welfare of the community.

14. Political influence to a large extent is responsible for
the brazenness with which the Chicago bum, pickpocket, and gun
and hold-up man operates. It is also the opinion of the jury
that the indeterminate-sentence law frequently operates in a
miscarriage of justice, and it is our opinion that the court
should fix the sentence of offenders at the time of their
conviction.

15. Because of the large number of young boys involved in the
rioting, the jury recommends the resumption of the activities
of the Y.M.C.A., the Knights of Columbus, and Salvation Army,
as well as other similar organizations....