Chapter VII (1)

Conference with the Generals after the Battle.--Order to pursue
the Enemy.--Evidences of a Thorough Rout.--"Sweet to die for
such a Cause."--Movements of the Next Day.--What more it was
practicable to do.--Charge against the President of preventing
the Capture of Washington.--The Failure to pursue.--Reflection
on the President.--General Beauregard's Report.--Endorsement
upon it.--Strength of the Opposing Forces.--Extracts relating to
the Battle, from the Narrative of General Early.--Resolutions of
Congress.--Efforts to increase the Efficiency of the Army.

At a late hour of the night, I had a conference with Generals Johnston and Beauregard; the Adjutant-General of the latter, Colonel Jordan, was present, and sat opposite to me at the table.

When, after some preliminary conversation, I asked whether any troops had been sent in pursuit of the enemy, I was answered in the negative. Upon further inquiry as to what troops were in the best position for pursuit, and had been least fatigued during the day, General Bonham's brigade was named. I then suggested that he should be ordered in pursuit; a pause ensued, until Colonel Jordan asked me if I would dictate the order. I at once dictated an order for immediate pursuit. Some conversation followed, the result of which was a modification of the order by myself, so that, instead of immediate pursuit, it should be commenced at early dawn. Colonel Jordan spoke across the table to me, saying, "If you will send the order as you first dictated it, the enemy won't stop till he gets into the Potomac." I believe I remember the words very nearly, and am quite sure that I do remember them substantially. On the 25th of March, 1878, I wrote to General Beauregard as follows:

"Dear Sir: Permit me to ask you to recall the conference held
between General Johnston, yourself, and myself, on the night
after the close of the battle of Manassas; and to give me, if
you can, a copy of the order which I dictated, and which your
adjutant-general, T. J. Jordan, wrote at my dictation, directing
Brigadier-General Bonham to follow the retreating enemy. If you
can not furnish a copy of the order, please give me your
recollection of its substance.

"Yours respectfully,

(Signed) "Jefferson Davis."

To this letter General Beauregard courteously replied that his order-book was in New York, in the hands of a friend, to whom he would write for a copy of the order desired if it should be in said book, and that he would also write to his adjutant, General Jordan, for his recollection of the order if it had not been inscribed in the order-book.

On the 24th of April General Beauregard forwarded to me the answer to his inquiries in my behalf, as follows:

"New York, 63 Broadway, _April 18, 1878_.

"My dear General: In answer to your note, I hasten to say that
properly Mr. Davis is not to be held accountable for our failure
to pursue McDowell from the field of Manassas the night of the
21st of July, 1861.

"As to the order, to which I presume Mr. Davis refers in his
note to you, I recollect the incident very distinctly.

"The night of the battle, as I was about to ascend to your
quarters over my office, Captain E. P. Alexander, of your staff,
informed me that Captain ----, attached to General Johnston's
Army of the Shenandoah, reported that he had been as far forward
as Centreville, where he had seen the Federal army completely
routed and in full flight toward Washington.

"This statement I at once repeated to Mr. Davis, General
Johnston, and yourself, whom I found seated around your
table--Mr. Davis at the moment writing a dispatch to General
Cooper.

"As soon as I had made my report, Mr. Davis with much animation
asserted the necessity for an urgent pursuit that night by
Bonham, who, with his own brigade and that of Longstreet, was in
close proximity to Centreville at the moment. So I took my seat
at the same table with you, and wrote the order for pursuit,
substantially at the dictation of Mr. Davis. But, while writing,
either I happened to remember, or Captain Alexander himself--as
I am inclined to believe--called me aside to remind me that his
informant was known among us of the old army as ---- ----,
because of eccentricities, and in contradistinction with others
of the same name. When I repeated this reminder, Mr. Davis
recalled the _sobriquet_, as he had a precise personal knowledge
of the officers of the old army. He laughed heartily, as did all
present.

"The question of throwing General Bonham forward that night,
upon the unverified report of Captain ----, was now briefly
discussed, with a unanimous decision against it; therefore, the
order was not dispatched.

"It is proper to add in this connection that, so far as I am
aware--and I had the opportunity of knowing what occurred--this
was the only instance during Mr. Davis's stay at Manassas in
which he exercised any voice as to the movement of the troops.
Profoundly pleased with the results achieved by the happy
juncture of the two Confederate armies upon the very field of
battle, his bearing toward the generals who commanded them was
eminently proper, as I have testified on a former occasion; and,
I repeat, he certainly expressed or manifested no opposition to
a forward movement, nor did he display the least disposition to
interfere by opinion or authority touching what the Confederate
forces should or should not do.

"You having at the close of the day surrendered the command,
which had been left in your hands, over both Confederate armies
during the engagement, General Johnston was that night in chief
command. He was decidedly averse to an immediate offensive, and
emphatically discountenanced it as impracticable.

"Very truly, your friend,

(Signed) "Thomas Jordan.

"General P. G. T. Beauregard, _New Orleans, Louisiana_."

General Beauregard, in his letter forwarding the above, wrote, "The account given herewith by General Jordan of what occurred there respecting further pursuit that night agrees with my own recollection."

It was a matter of importance, as I regarded it, to follow closely on the retreating enemy, but it was of no consequence then or now as to who issued the order for pursuit, and, unless requested, I should not have dictated one, preferring that the generals to whom the operations were confided should issue all orders to the troops. I supposed the order, as modified by myself, had been sent. I have found, however, since the close of the war, that it was not, but that an order to the same effect was sent on the night of the 21st of July, for a copy of which I am indebted to the kindness of that chivalrous gentleman, soldier, and patriot, General Bonham. It is as follows:

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac,

"Manassas, _July 21, 1861_.

"(Special Orders, No. 140.)

"I. General Bonham will send, as early as practicable in the
morning, a command of two of his regiments of infantry, a strong
force of cavalry, and one field-battery, to scour the country
and roads to his front, toward Centreville. He will carry with
him abundant means of transportation for the collection of our
wounded, all the arms, ammunition, and abandoned hospital
stores, subsistence, and baggage, which will be sent immediately
to these headquarters.

"General Bonham will advance with caution, throwing out an
advanced guard and skirmishers on his right and left, and the
utmost caution must be taken to prevent firing into our own men.

"Should it appear, while this command is occupied as directed,
that it is insufficient for the purposes indicated, General
Bonham will call on the nearest brigade commander for support.

"II. Colonel P. St. George Cocke, commanding, will dispatch at
the same time, for similar purposes, a command of the same size
and proportions of infantry, artillery, and cavalry on the road
_via_ Stone Bridge; and another command of two companies of
infantry and one of cavalry on the road by which the enemy
retreated toward and _via_ Sudley's Mills.

"By command of Brigadier-General Beauregard:

(Signed) "Thomas Jordan, _A. A. Adjutant-General._

"To Brigadier-General Bonham."

Impressed with the belief that the enemy was very superior to us, both in numbers and appointments, I had felt apprehensive that, unless pressed, he would recover from the panic under which he fled from the field, rally on his reserves, and renew the contest. Therefore it was that I immediately felt the necessity for a pursuit of the fugitives, and insisted that the troops on the extreme left should retain their position during the night of the 21st, as has been heretofore stated. In conference with the generals that night, this subject was considered, and I dictated an order for a movement on the rear of the enemy at early dawn, which, on account of the late hour at which it was given, differed very little from one for an immediate movement. A rainfall, extraordinary for its violence and duration, occurred on the morning of the succeeding day, so that, over places where during the battle one could scarcely get a drink of water, rolled torrents which, in the afternoon of the 22d, it was difficult to cross.

From these and other causes, the troops were scattered to such an extent that but few commands could have been assembled for immediate service. It was well for us that the enemy, instead of retiring in order, so as to be rallied and again brought to the attack, left hope behind, and fled in dismay to seek for safety beyond the Potomac.

Each hour of the day following the battle added to the evidence of a thorough rout of the enemy. Abandoned wagons, stores, guns, caissons, small-arms, and ammunition, proved his complete demoralization. As far as our cavalry went, no hostile force was met, and all the indications favored the conclusion that the purpose of invasion had for the time been abandoned.

The victory, though decisive and important, both in its moral and physical effect, had been dearly bought by the sacrifice of the lives of many of our bravest and best, who at the first call of their country had rushed to its defense.

When riding to the front, I met an ambulance bearing General Barnard Bee from the field, where he had been mortally wounded, after his patriotism had been illustrated by conspicuous exhibitions of skill, daring, and fortitude. Soon after, I learned that my friend Colonel Bartow had heroically sealed with his life-blood his faith in the sanctity of our cause. He had been the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs in the Provisional Congress, and, after the laws were enacted to provide for the public defense, he went to the field to maintain them. It is to such virtuous and devoted citizens that a country is indebted for its prosperity and honor, as well in peace as in war.

Reference has been made to the dispersion of our troops after the battle, and in this connection the following facts are mentioned: In the afternoon of the 22d, with a guide, supposed to be cognizant of the positions at which the different commands would be found, I went to visit the wounded, and among them a youth of my family, who, it was reported to me, was rapidly sinking. After driving many miles, and witnessing very painful scenes, but seldom finding the troops in the position where my guide supposed them to be, and always disappointed in not discovering him I particularly sought, I was, at the approach of night, about to abandon the search, when, accidentally meeting an officer of the command to which the youth belonged, I was directed to the temporary hospital to which the wounded of that command had been removed. It was too late; the soul of the young soldier had just left his body; the corpse lay before me. Around him were many gentle boys, suffering in different degrees from the wounds they had received. One bright, refined-looking youth from South Carolina, severely if not fatally wounded, responded to my expression of sympathy by the heroic declaration that it was "sweet to die for such a cause."

Many kindred spirits ascended to the Father from that field of their glory. The roll need not be recorded here; it has a more enduring depository than the pen can make--the traditions of a grateful people.

The victory at Manassas was certainly extraordinary, not only on account of the disparity of numbers and the inferiority of our arms, but also because of many other disadvantages under which we labored. We had no disciplined troops, and, though our citizens were generally skilled in the use of small-arms, which, with their high pride and courage, might compensate for the want of training while in position, these inadequately substituted military instruction when manoeuvres had to be performed under fire, and could not make the old-fashioned musket equal to the long-range, new-model muskets with which the enemy was supplied. The disparity in artillery was still greater, both in the number and kind of guns; but, thanks to the skill and cool courage of the Rev. Captain W. N. Pendleton, his battery of light, smooth-bore guns, manned principally by the youths whose rector he had been, proved more effective in battle than the long-range rifle-guns of the enemy. The character of the ground brought the forces into close contact, and the ricochet of the round balls carried havoc into the columns of the enemy, while the bolts of their rifle-guns, if they missed their object, penetrated harmlessly into the ground.

The field was very extensive, broken, and wooded. The senior general had so recently arrived that he had no opportunity minutely to learn the ground, and the troops he brought were both unacquainted with the field and with those with whom they had to coöperate. To all this must be added the disturbing fact that the plan of battle, as originally designed, was entirely changed by the movement of the enemy on our extreme left, instead of right and center, as anticipated. The operations, therefore, had to be conducted against the plan of the enemy, instead of on that which our generals had prepared and explained to their subordinate commanders. The promptitude with which the troops moved, and the readiness with which our generals modified their preconceived plans to meet the necessities as they were developed, entitled them to the commendation so liberally bestowed at the time by their countrymen at large.

General Johnston had been previously promoted to the highest grade in our army, and I deemed it but a fitting reward for the services rendered by General Beauregard that he should be promoted to the same grade; therefore, I addressed to him the following letter:

"Manassas, Virginia, _July 21, 1861._

"Sir: Appreciating your services in the battle of Manassas, and
on several other occasions during the existing war, as affording
the highest evidence of your skill as a commander, your
gallantry as a soldier, and your zeal as a patriot, you are
promoted to be a general in the army of the Confederate States
of America, and, with the consent of the Congress, will be duly
commissioned accordingly.

"Yours, etc.,

(Signed) "Jefferson Davis.

"General P. G. T. Beauregard, etc."

The 22d, the day after the battle, was spent in following up the line of the retreating foe, and collecting the large supplies of arms, of ammunition, and other military stores. The supplies of the army were on a scale of such luxurious extravagance as to excite the surprise of those accustomed only to our rigid economy. The anticipation of an easy victory had caused many to come to the battle as to a joyous feast, and the signs left behind them of the extent to which they had been disappointed in the entertainment, constituted the staple of many laughable stories, which were not without their value because of the lesson they contained as to the uncertainties of war, and the mortification that usually follows vain boasting. Among the articles abandoned by the enemy in his flight were some which excited a just indignation, and which indicated the shameless disregard of all the usages of honorable warfare. They were handcuffs, the fit appendage of a policeman, but not of a soldier who came to meet his foeman hilt to hilt. These were reported to have been found in large numbers; some of them were sent to Richmond.

On the night of the 22d I held a second conference with Generals Johnston and Beauregard. All the revelations of the day were of the most satisfactory character as to the completeness of our victory. The large amount gained of fine artillery, small-arms, and ammunition, all of which were much needed by us, was not the least gratifying consequence of our success. The generals, like myself, were well content with what had been done.

I propounded to them the inquiry as to what more it was practicable to do. They concurred as to their inability to cross the Potomac, and to the further inquiry as to an advance to the south side of the Potomac, General Beauregard promptly stated that there were strong fortifications there, occupied by garrisons, which had not been in the battle, and were therefore not affected by the panic which had seized the defeated army. He described those fortifications as having wide, deep ditches, with palisades, which would prevent the escalade of the works. Turning to General Johnston, he said, "They have spared no expense." It was further stated in explanation that we had no sappers and miners, nor even the tools requisite to make regular approaches. If we had possessed both, the time required for such operations would have more than sufficed for General Patterson's army and other forces to have been brought to that locality in such numbers as must have rendered the attempt, with our present means, futile.

This view of the matter rests on the supposition that the fortifications and garrisons described did actually exist, of which there seemed then to be no doubt. If the reports which have since reached us be true, that there were at that time neither fortifications nor troops stationed on the south bank of the Potomac; that all the enemy's forces fled to the north side of the river, and even beyond; that the panic of the routed army infected the whole population of Washington City; and that no preparation was made, or even contemplated, for the destruction of the bridge across the Potomac--then it may have been, as many have asserted, that our army, following close upon the flying enemy, could have entered and taken possession of the United States capital. These reports, however, present a condition of affairs altogether at variance with the information on which we had to act. Thus it was, and, so far as I knew, for the reasons above stated, that an advance to the south bank of the Potomac was not contemplated as the immediate sequence of the victory at Manassas. What discoveries would have been made and what results would have ensued from the establishment of our guns upon the south bank of the river, to open fire upon the capital, are speculative questions upon which it would be useless to enter.

After the conference of the 22d, and because of it, I decided to return to Richmond and employ all the power of my office to increase the strength of the army, so as the better to enable it to meet the public need, whether in offensive-defensive or purely defensive operations, as opportunity should offer for the one, or the renewal of invasion require the other.

A short time subsequent to my return, a message was brought to me from the prison, to the effect that a non-commissioned officer, captured at Manassas, claimed to have a promise of protection from me. The name was given Hulburt, of Connecticut. I had forgotten the name he gave when I saw him; but, believing that I would recognize the person who had attended to Colonel Gardner, and to whom only such a promise had been given, the officer in charge was directed to send him to me. When he came, I had no doubt of his identity, and explained to him that I had directed that he should not be treated as a prisoner, but that, in the multitude of those wearing the same uniform as his, some neglect or mistake had arisen, for which I was very sorry, and that he should be immediately released and sent down the river to the neighborhood of Fortress Monroe, where he would be among his own people. He then told me that he had a sister residing a few miles in the country, whom he would be very glad to visit. Permission was given him to do so, and a time fixed at which he was to report for transportation; and so he left, with manifestations of thankfulness for the kindness with which he had been treated. In due time a newspaper was received, containing an account of his escape, and how he had lingered about the suburbs of Richmond and made drawings of the surrounding fortifications. The treachery was as great as if his drawings had been valuable, which they could not have been, as we had only then commenced the detached works which were designed as a system of defenses for Richmond.

When the smoke of battle had lifted from the field of Manassas, and the rejoicing over the victory had spread over the land and spent its exuberance, some, who, like Job's war-horse, "snuffed the battle from afar," but in whom the likeness there ceased, censoriously asked why the fruits of the victory had not been gathered by the capture of Washington City. Then some indiscreet friends of the generals commanding in that battle, instead of the easier task of justification, chose the harder one of exculpation for the imputed failure. Their ill-advised zeal, combined perhaps with malice against me, induced the allegation that the President had prevented the generals from making an immediate and vigorous pursuit of the routed enemy.

This, as other stories had been, was left to the correction which time it was hoped would bring, the sooner because it was expected to be refuted by the reports of the commanding generals with whom I had conferred on that subject immediately after the battle.

After considerable time had elapsed, it was reported to me that a member of Congress, who had served on that occasion as a volunteer aide to General Beauregard, had stated in the House of Representatives that I had prevented the pursuit of the enemy after his defeat at Manassas.

This gave to the rumor such official character and dignity as seemed to me to entitle it to notice not theretofore given, wherefore I addressed to General Johnston the following inquiry, which, though restricted in its terms to the allegation, was of such tenor as left it to his option to state all the facts connected with the slander, if he should choose to do me that justice, or should see the public interest involved in the correction, which, as stated in my letter to him, was that which gave it in my estimation its claim to consideration, and had caused me to address him on the subject:

"Richmond, Virginia, _November 3, 1861._

"General J. E. Johnston, _commanding Department of the Potomac._

"Sir: Reports have been, and are being, widely circulated to the
effect that I prevented General Beauregard from pursuing the
enemy after the battle of Manassas, and had subsequently
restrained him from advancing upon Washington City. Though such
statements may have been made merely for my injury, and in that
view might be postponed to a more convenient season, they have
acquired importance from the fact that they have served to
create distrust, to excite disappointment, and must embarrass
the Administration in its further efforts to reënforce the
armies of the Potomac, and generally to provide for the public
defense. For these public considerations, I call upon you, as
the commanding general, and as a party to all the conferences
held by me on the 21st and 22d of July, to say whether I
obstructed the pursuit of the enemy after the victory at
Manassas, or have ever objected to an advance or other active
operation which it was feasible for the army to undertake.

"Very respectfully, yours, etc.,

(Signed) "Jefferson Davis."

"Headquarters, Centreville, _November 10, 1861_.

"To his Excellency the President.

"Sir: I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 3d
inst., in which you call upon me, 'as the commanding general,
and as a party to all the conferences held by you on the 21st
and 22d of July, to say whether you obstructed the pursuit after
the victory of Manassas, or have ever objected to an advance or
other active operation which it was feasible for the army to
undertake?'

"To the first question I reply, No. The pursuit was 'obstructed'
by the enemy's troops at Centreville, as I have stated in my
official report. In that report I have also said why no advance
was made upon the enemy's capital (for reasons) as follows:

"The apparent freshness of the United States troops at
Centreville, which checked our pursuit; the strong forces
occupying the works near Georgetown, Arlington, and Alexandria;
the certainty, too, that General Patterson, if needed, would
reach Washington with his army of more than thirty thousand
sooner than we could; and the condition and inadequate means of
the army in ammunition, provisions, and transportation,
prevented any serious thoughts of advancing against the capital.

"To the second question I reply that it has never been feasible
for the army to advance farther than it has done--to the line of
Fairfax Court-House, with its advanced posts at Upton's,
Munson's, and Mason's Hills. After a conference at Fairfax
Court-House with the three senior general officers, you
announced it to be impracticable to give this army the strength
which those officers considered necessary to enable it to assume
the offensive. Upon which I drew it back to its present
position.

"Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

(Signed) "J. E. Johnston."

This answer to my inquiry was conclusive as to the charge which had been industriously circulated that I had prevented the immediate pursuit of the enemy, and had obstructed active operations after the battle of Manassas, and thus had caused the failure to reap the proper fruits of the victory.

No specific inquiry was made by me as to the part I took in the conferences of the 21st and 22d of July, but a general reference was made to them. The entire silence of General Johnston in regard to those conferences is noticeable from the fact that, while his answer was strictly measured by the terms of my inquiry as to pursuit, he added a statement about a conference at Fairfax Court-House, which occurred in the autumn, say October, and could have had no relation to the question of pursuit of the enemy after the victory of Manassas, or other active operations therewith connected. The reasons stated in my letter for making an inquiry, naturally pointed to the conferences of the 21st and 22d of July, but surely not to a conference held months subsequent to the battle, and on a question quite different from that of hot pursuit. In regard to the matter of this subsequent conference I shall have more to say hereafter.

I left the field of Manassas, proud of the heroism of our troops in battle, and of the conduct of the officers who led them. Anxious to recognize the claim of the army on the gratitude of the country, it was my pleasing duty to bear testimony to their merit in every available form. Those who left the field and did not return to share its glory, it was wished, should only be remembered as exceptions proving a rule.

With all the information possessed at the time by the commanding generals, the propriety of maintaining our position, while seeking objects more easily attained than the capture of the United States capital, seemed to me so demonstrable as to require no other justification than the statements to which I have referred in connection with the conference of the 22d of July. It would have seemed to me then, as it does now, to be less than was due to the energy and fortitude of our troops, to plead a want of transportation and supplies for a march of about twenty miles through a country which had not then been denuded by the ravages of war.

Under these impressions, and with such feelings, I wrote to General Beauregard as follows:

"Richmond, Virginia, _August 4, 1861._

"General Beauregard, _Manassas, Virginia._

"My Dear Sir: ... I think you are unjust to yourself in putting
your failure to pursue the enemy to Washington to the account of
short supplies of subsistence and transportation. Under the
circumstances of our army, and in the absence of the knowledge
since acquired, if indeed the statements be true, it would have
been extremely hazardous to have done more than was performed.
You will not fail to remember that, so far from knowing that the
enemy was routed, a large part of our forces was moved by you,
in the night of the 21st, to repel a supposed attack upon our
right, and that the next day's operations did not fully reveal
what has since been reported of the enemy's panic. Enough was
done for glory, and the measure of duty was full; let us rather
show the untaught that their desires are unreasonable, than, by
dwelling on possibilities recently developed, give form and
substance to the criticisms always easy to those who judge after
the event.

"With sincere esteem, I am your friend,

(Signed) "Jefferson Davis."

I had declared myself content and gratified with the conduct of the troops and the officers, and supposed the generals, in recognition of my efforts to aid them by increasing their force and munitions, as well as by my abstinence from all interference with them upon the field, would have neither cause nor motive to reflect upon me in their reports, and it was with equal surprise and regret that in this I found myself mistaken. General Johnston, in his report, represented the order to him to make a junction with General Beauregard as a movement left to his discretion, with the condition that, if made, he should first send his sick and baggage to Culpepper Court-House. I felt constrained to put upon his report when it was received the following endorsement:

"The telegram referred to by General Johnston in this report as
received by him about one o'clock on the morning of the 18th of
July is inaccurately reported. The following is a copy:

"'Richmond, _July 17, 1861_.

"'General J. E. Johnston, _Winchester, Virginia_.

"'General Beauregard is attacked. To strike the enemy a decisive
blow, a junction of all your effective force will be needed. If
practicable, make the movement, sending your sick and baggage to
Culpepper Court-House, either by railroad or by Warrenton. In
all the arrangements, exercise your discretion.

"'S. Cooper, _Adjutant and Inspector-General_.'

"The word 'after' is not found in the dispatch before the words
'sending your sick,' as is stated in the report; so that the
argument based on it requires no comment. The order to move 'if
practicable' had reference to General Johnston's letters of the
12th and 15th of July, representing the relative strength and
positions of the enemy under Patterson and of his own forces to
be such as to make it doubtful whether General Johnston had the
power to effect the movement."

Upon the receipt of General Beauregard's report of the battle of Manassas, I found that it contained matter which seemed to me out of place, and therefore addressed to him the following letter:

"Richmond, Virginia, _October 30, 1861_.

"General Beauregard, _Manassas, Virginia_.

"Sir: Yesterday my attention was called to various newspaper
publications purporting to have been sent from Manassas, and to
be a synopsis of your report of the battle of the 21st of July
last, and in which it is represented that you have been
overruled by me in your plan for a battle with the enemy south
of the Potomac, for the capture of Baltimore and Washington, and
the liberation of Maryland.

"I inquired for your long-expected report, and it has been
to-day submitted to my inspection. It appears, by official
endorsement, to have been received by the Adjutant-General on
the 18th of October, though it is dated August 26, 1861.

"With much surprise I found that the newspaper statements were
sustained by the text of your report. I was surprised, because,
if we did differ in opinion as to the measure and purposes of
contemplated campaigns, such fact could have no appropriate
place in the report of a battle; further, because it seemed to
be an attempt to exalt yourself at my expense; and, especially,
because no such plan as that described was submitted to me. It
is true that, some time before it was ordered, you expressed a
desire for the junction of General Johnston's army with your
own. The movement was postponed until the operations of the
enemy rendered it necessary, and until it became thereby
practicable to make it with safety to the Valley of Virginia.
Hence, I believe, was secured the success by which it was
attended.

"If you have retained a copy of the plan of campaign which you
say was submitted to me through Colonel Chesnut, allow me to
request that you will furnish me with a duplicate of it."

"Very respectfully yours, etc.,"

(Signed) "Jefferson Davis."

As General Beauregard did not think proper to omit that portion of his report to which objection was made, it necessitated, when the entire report was transmitted to Congress, the placing of an endorsement upon it, reviewing that part of the report which I considered objectionable. The Congress, in its discretion, ordered the publication of the report, except that part to which the endorsement referred, thereby judiciously suppressing both the endorsement and the portion of the report to which it related. In this case, and _every other_ official report ever submitted to me, I made neither alteration nor erasure.

That portion of the report which was suppressed by the Congress has, since the war, found its way into the press, but the endorsement which belonged to it has not been published. As part of the history of the time, I will here present both in their proper connection:

"General S. Cooper, _Adjutant and Inspector-General, Richmond
Virginia._

"Before entering upon a narration of the general military
operations in the presence of the enemy on July 21st, I
propose--I hope not unreasonably--first to recite certain events
which belong to the strategy of the campaign, and consequently
form an essential part of the history of the battle.

"Having become satisfied that the advance of the enemy with a
decidedly superior force, both as to numbers and war equipage,
to attack or turn my position in this quarter was immediately
impending, I dispatched, on July 13th, one of my staff, Colonel
James Chesnut, of South Carolina, to submit for the
consideration of the President a plan of operations
substantially as follows:

"I proposed that General Johnston should unite, as soon as
possible, the bulk of the Army of the Shenandoah with that of
the Potomac, then under my command, leaving only sufficient
force to garrison his strong works at Winchester, and to guard
the five defensive passes of the Blue Ridge, and thus hold
Patterson in check. At the same time Brigadier-General Holmes
was to march hither with all of his command not essential for
the defense of the position of Acquia Creek. These junctions
having been effected at Manassas, an immediate, impetuous attack
of our combined armies upon General McDowell was to follow, as
soon as he approached my advanced position, at and around
Fairfax Court-House, with the inevitable result, as I submitted,
of his complete defeat, and the destruction or capture of his
army. This accomplished, the Army of the Shenandoah, under
General Johnston, increased with a part of my forces and
rejoined as he returned by the detachment left to hold the
mountain-passes, was to march back rapidly into the Valley, fall
upon and crush Patterson with a superior force, wheresoever he
might be found. This, I confidently estimated, could be achieved
within fifteen days after General Johnston should march from
Winchester for Manassas.

"Meanwhile, I was to occupy the enemy's works on this side of
the Potomac, if, as I anticipated, he had been so routed as to
enable me to enter them with him or, if not, to retire again for
a time within the lines of Bull Run with my main force.
Patterson having been virtually destroyed, then General Johnston
would reënforce General Garnett sufficiently to make him
superior to his opponent (General McClellan) and able to defeat
that officer. This done, General Garnett was to form an
immediate junction with General Johnston, who was forthwith to
cross the Potomac into Maryland with his whole force, arouse the
people as he advanced to the recovery of their political rights,
and the defense of their homes and families from an offensive
invader, and then march to the investment of Washington, in the
rear, while I resumed the offensive in front. This plan of
operations, you are aware, was not acceptable at the time, from
considerations which appeared so weighty as to more than
counterbalance its proposed advantages. Informed of these views,
and of the decision of the War Department, I then made my
preparations for the stoutest practicable defense of the line of
Bull Run, the enemy having developed his purpose, by the advance
on and occupation of Fairfax Court-House, from which my advance
brigade had been withdrawn.

"The War Department having been informed by me, by telegraph on
July 17th, of the movement of General McDowell, General Johnston
was immediately ordered to form a junction of his army corps
with mine, should the movement in his judgment be deemed
advisable. General Holmes was also directed to push forward with
two regiments, a battery, and one company of cavalry."[179]

"ENDORSEMENT.

"The order issued by the War Department to General Johnston was
not, as herein reported, to form a junction, 'should the
movement in his judgment be deemed advisable.' The following is
an accurate copy of the order:

"'General Beauregard is attacked. To strike the enemy a decisive
blow, a junction of all your effective force will be needed. If
practicable, make the movement, sending your sick and baggage to
Culpepper Court-House, either by railroad or by Warrenton. In
all the arrangements, exercise your discretion.'

"The words 'if practicable' had reference to letters of General
Johnston of the 12th and 15th of July, which made it extremely
doubtful if he had the power to make the movement, in view of
the relative strength and position of Patterson's forces as
compared with his own.

"The plan of campaign reported to have been submitted, but not
accepted, and to have led to a decision of the War Department,
can not be found among its files, nor any reference to any
decision made upon it; and it was not known that the army had
advanced beyond the line of Bull Run, the position previously
selected by General Lee, and which was supposed to have
continued to be the defensive line occupied by the main body of
our forces. Inquiry has developed the fact that a message, to be
verbally delivered, was sent by Hon. Mr. Chesnut. If the
conjectures recited in the report were entertained, they rested
on the accomplishment of one great condition, namely, that a
junction of the forces of Generals Johnston and Holmes should be
made with the army of General Beauregard and should gain a
victory. The junction was made, the victory was won; but the
consequences that were predicted did not result. The reasons why
no such consequences could result are given in the closing
passages of the reports of both the commanding generals, and the
responsibility can not be transferred to the Government at
Richmond, which certainly would have united in any feasible plan
to accomplish such desirable results.

"If the plan of campaign mentioned in the report had been
presented in a written communication, and in sufficient detail
to permit proper investigation, it must have been pronounced to
be impossible at that time, and its proposal could only have
been accounted for by the want of information of the forces and
positions of the armies in the field. The facts that rendered it
impossible are the following:

"1. It was based, as related from memory by Colonel Chesnut, on
the supposition of drawing a force of about twenty-five thousand
men from the command of General Johnston. The letters of General
Johnston show his effective force to have been only eleven
thousand, with an enemy thirty thousand strong in his front,
ready to take possession of the Valley of Virginia on his
withdrawal.

"2. It proposed to continue operations by effecting a junction
of a part of the victorious forces with the army of General
Garnett in Western Virginia. General Garnett's forces amounted
only to three or four thousand men, then known to be in rapid
retreat before vastly superior forces under McClellan, and the
news that he was himself killed and his army scattered arrived
within forty-eight hours of Colonel Chesnut's arrival in
Richmond.

"3. The plan was based on the improbable and inadmissible
supposition that the enemy was to await everywhere, isolated and
motionless, until our forces could effect junctions to attack
them in detail.

"4. It could not be expected that any success obtainable on the
battle-field would enable our forces to carry the fortifications
on the Potomac, garrisoned, and within supporting distance of
fresh troops; nor after the actual battle and victory did the
generals on the field propose an advance on the capital, nor
does it appear that they have since believed themselves in a
condition to attempt such a movement.

"It is proper also to observe that there is no communication on
file in the War Department, as recited at the close of the
report, showing what were the causes which prevented the advance
of our forces and prolonged, vigorous pursuit of the enemy to
and beyond the Potomac.

(Signed) "Jefferson Davis."

It has not been my purpose to describe the battles of the war. To the reports of the officers serving on the field, in the armies of both Governments, the student of history must turn for knowledge of the details, and it will be the task of the future historian, from comparison of the whole, to deduce the truth.

It is fortunate for the cause of justice that error and misrepresentation have, in their inconsistencies and improbabilities, the elements of self-destruction, while truth is in its nature consistent and therefore self-sustaining. To such general remarks in regard to campaigns, sieges, and battles as may seem to me appropriate to the scope and object of my work, I shall append or insert, from time to time, the evidence of reliable actors in those affairs, as well to elucidate obscurity as to correct error.

From the official reports it appears that the strength of the two armies was: Confederate, 30,167 men of all arms, with 29 guns;[180] Federal, 35,732 men,[181] with a body of cavalry, of which only one company is reported, and a large artillery force not shown in the tabular statement. Of these troops, some on both sides were not engaged in the battle. This, it is believed, was the case to a much larger extent on our side than on that of the enemy. He selected the point of attack, and could concentrate his troops for that purpose, but we were guarding a line of some seven miles front, and therefore widely dispersed.

For the purpose above stated, extracts are herein inserted from a narrative in the "Operations on the Line of Bull Run in June and July, 1861, including the First Battle of Manassas." The name of the author, J. A. Early, will, to all who know him, be a sufficient guarantee for the accuracy of the statements, and for the justice of the conclusions announced. To those who do not know him, it may be proper to state that he was educated as a soldier; after leaving the army became a lawyer, but, when his country was involved in war with Mexico, he volunteered and served in a regiment of his native State, Virginia. After that war terminated, he returned to the practice of his profession, which he was actively pursuing when the controversy between the sections caused the call of a convention to decide whether Virginia should secede from the Union. He was sent, by the people of the county in which he resided, to represent them in that convention. There he opposed to the last the adoption of the ordinance for secession; but, when it was decided, against his opinion, to resort to the remedy of withdrawal from the Union, he, true to his allegiance to the State of which he was a citizen, paused not to cavil or protest, but at once stepped forth to defend her against a threatened invasion. The sword that had rusted in peace gleamed brightly in war. He rose to the high grade of lieutenant-general. None have a more stainless record as a soldier, none have shown a higher patriotism or purer fidelity through all the bitter trials to which we have been subjected since open war was ended and nominal peace began.

Extracts from the narrative of General J. A. Early, of events occurring when he was colonel of the Twenty-fourth Regiment of Virginia Infantry and commanding a brigade:

"On June 19, 1861, I arrived at Manassas Junction and reported
to General P. G. T. Beauregard, the Twenty-fourth Virginia
Regiment having been previously sent to him, under the command
of Lieutenant-Colonel Hairsten, from Lynchburg, where I had been
stationed under the orders of General Robert E. Lee, for the
purpose of organizing the Virginia troops which were being
mustered into service at that place....

"On the morning of July 18th, my brigade was moved, by order of
General Beauregard, to the left of Camp Walker, on the railroad,
and remained there some time....

"On falling back, General Ewell, in pursuance of his
instructions, had burned the bridges on the railroad over Pope's
Run, from Fairfax Station to Union Mills, and while I was at
Camp Walker I saw the smoke ascending from the railroad-bridge
over Bull Run, which was burned that morning.

"The burning of this bridge had not been included in the
previous instructions to Ewell, and I have always been at a loss
to know why it was now fired. That bridge certainly was not
necessary to the enemy for crossing Bull Run, either with his
troops or wagons, as that stream was easily fordable at numerous
places, both above and below. The bridge was, moreover,
susceptible of easy defense, as there were deep cuts leading to
it on both sides. The only possible purpose to be subserved by
the burning of that bridge would have been the prevention for a
short time of the running of trains over it by the enemy, in the
event of our defeat, or evacuation of Manassas without a fight.
As it was, we were afterward greatly inconvenienced by its
destruction." ...

The attack made on the 18th is described as directed against our right center, and as having been met and repulsed in a manner quite creditable to our raw troops, of whom he writes:

"On the 19th they were occupied in the effort to strengthen
their position by throwing up the best defenses they could with
the implements at hand, which consisted of a very few picks and
spades, some rough bowie-knives, and the bayonets of the
muskets.... The position was a very weak one, as the banks on
the opposite side of Bull Run overlooked and commanded those on
the south side, which were but a few feet above the water's
edge, and there was an open field in rear of the strip of woods
on our side of the stream, for a considerable distance up and
down it, which exposed all of our movements on that side to
observation from the opposite one, as the strip of woods
afforded but a thin veil which could be seen through....

"About dusk on the 19th, brigade commanders were summoned to a
conference at McLean's house by General Beauregard, and he then
informed us of the fact that General Johnston had been ordered,
at his instance, from the Valley, and was marching to coöperate
with us. He stated that Johnston would march directly across the
Blue Ridge toward the enemy's right flank, and would probably
attack on that flank at dawn the next morning. Before he had
finished his statement of the plans he proposed pursuing in the
event of Johnston's attack on the enemy's right flank, a party
of horsemen rode up in front of the house, and, dismounting, one
of them walked in and reported himself as Brigadier-General T.
J. Jackson, who had arrived with the advanced brigade of
Johnston's troops by the way of Manassas Gap Railroad, and he
stated that his brigade was about twenty-five hundred strong.
This information took General Beauregard very much by surprise,
and, after ascertaining that General Jackson had taken the cars
at Piedmont Station, General Beauregard asked him if General
Johnston would not march the rest of his command on the direct
road, so as to get on the enemy's right flank. General Jackson
replied with some little hesitation, and, as I thought at the
time, in rather a stolid manner, that he thought not; that he
thought the purpose was to transport the whole force by railroad
from Piedmont Station. This was the first time I ever saw
General Jackson, and my first impressions of him were not very
favorable from the manner in which he gave his information. I
subsequently ascertained very well how it was that he seemed to
know so little, in the presence of the strangers among whom he
found himself, of General Johnston's intended movements, and I
presume nothing but the fact of General Beauregard being his
superior in rank, and his being ordered to report to him, could
have elicited as much information from him, under the
circumstances, as was obtained. After General Jackson had given
the information above stated, and received instructions where to
put his brigade, he retired, and General Beauregard proceeded to
develop fully his plans for the next day. The information
received from General Jackson was wholly unexpected, but General
Beauregard said he thought Jackson was not correctly informed,
and was mistaken; that he was satisfied General Johnston was
marching with the rest of his troops and would attack the
enemy's right flank early next day as he had before stated. Upon
this hypothesis, he directed that when General Johnston's attack
began and he had become fully engaged, of which we were to judge
from the character of the musketry-fire, we should cross Bull
Run from our several positions, and move upon the enemy so as to
attack him on his left flank and rear. He said that he had no
doubt General Johnston's attack would be a complete surprise to
the enemy; that the latter would not know what to think of it;
that when he turned to meet that attack, and soon found himself
assailed on the other side, he would be still more surprised and
would not know what to do; that the effect would become a
complete rout--a perfect Waterloo; and that, when the enemy took
to flight, we would pursue, cross the Potomac, and arouse
Maryland....

"During the 20th General Johnston arrived at Manassas Junction
by the railroad, and that day we received the order from him
assuming command of the combined armies of General Beauregard
and himself.

"Early on the morning of the 21st (Sunday), we heard the enemy's
guns open from the heights north of Bull Run, from which they
had opened on the 18th, and I soon received orders for the
movement of my brigade....