Chapter XIV

Military Laws and Measures.--Agricultural Products
diminished.--Manufactures flourishing.--The Call for
Volunteers.--The Term of Three Years.--Improved Discipline.--The
Law assailed.--Important Constitutional Question raised.--Its
Discussion at Length.--Power of the Government over its own
Armies and the Militia.--Object of Confederations.--The
War-Powers granted.--Two Modes of raising Armies in the
Confederate States.--Is the Law necessary and proper?--Congress
is the Judge under the Grant of Specific Power.--What is meant
by Militia.--Whole Military Strength divided into Two
Classes.--Powers of Congress.--Objections answered.--Good
Effects of the Law.--The Limitations enlarged.--Results of the
Operations of these Laws.--Act for the Employment of
Slaves.--Message to Congress.--"Died of a Theory."--Act to use
Slaves as Soldiers passed.--Not Time to put it in Operation.

The agricultural products were diminished every year during the war. Its demands diminished the number of cultivators, and their labors were more extensively devoted to grain-crops. The amount of the cotton-crop was greatly reduced, and numbers of bales were destroyed when in danger of falling into the hands of the enemy.

The manufacturing industry became more extensive than ever before, and in many branches more highly developed. The results in the ordnance department of the Government, stated elsewhere in these pages, serve as an illustration of the achievements in many branches of industry.

During the first year of the war the authority granted to the President to call for volunteers in the army for a short period was sufficient to secure all the military force which we could fit out and use advantageously. As it became evident that the contest would be long and severe, better measures of preparation were enacted. I was authorized to call out and place in the military service for three years, unless the war should sooner end, all white men residents of the Confederate States between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five years, and to continue those already in the field until three years from the date of their enlistment. But those under eighteen years and over thirty-five were required to remain ninety days. The existing organization of companies, regiments, etc., was preserved, but the former were filled up to the number of one hundred and twenty-five men. This was the first step toward placing the army in a permanent and efficient condition. The term of service being lengthened, the changes by discharges and by receiving recruits were diminished, so that, while additions were made to the forces already in the field, the discipline was greatly improved. At the same time, on March 13, 1862, General Robert E. Lee was "charged with the conduct of the military operations of the armies of the Confederacy" under my direction. Nevertheless, the law upon which our success so greatly depended was assailed with unexpected criticism in various quarters. A constitutional question of high importance was raised, which tended to involve the harmony of coöperation, so essential in this crisis, between the General and the State governments. It was advanced principally by the Governor of Georgia, Hon. Joseph E. Brown, and the following extracts are taken from my reply to him, dated

Executive Department, Richmond, _May_ 29, 1862.

"I propose, from my high respect for yourself and for other
eminent citizens who entertain opinions similar to yours, to set
forth somewhat at length my own views on the power of the
Confederate Government over its own armies and the militia, and
will endeavor not to leave without answer any of the positions
maintained in your letters.

"The main, if not the only, purpose for which independent states
form unions, or confederations, is to combine the power of the
several members in such manner as to form one united force in
all relations with foreign powers, whether in peace or in war.
Each state, amply competent to administer and control its own
domestic government, yet too feeble successfully to resist
powerful nations, seeks safety by uniting with other states in
like condition, and by delegating to some common agent the use
of the combined strength of all, in order to secure advantageous
commercial relations in peace, and to carry on hostilities with
effect in war.

"Now, the powers delegated by the several States to the
Confederate Government, which is their common agent, are
enumerated in the eighth section of the Constitution; each power
being distinct, specific, and enumerated in paragraphs
separately numbered. The only exception is the eighteenth
paragraph, which by its own terms is made dependent on those
previously enumerated, as follows: '18. To make all laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the
foregoing powers,' etc.

"Now the _war-powers_ granted to the Congress are conferred in
the following paragraphs: No. 1 'gives authority to raise
revenue necessary to pay the debts, provide for _the common
defense_, and carry on the Government,' etc. No. 11, 'To declare
war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules
concerning captures on land and water.' No. 12, 'To raise and
support armies, but no appropriations of money to that use shall
be for a longer term than two years.' No. 13, 'To provide and
maintain a navy.' No. 14, 'To make rules for the government and
regulation of _the land and naval forces_.'

"It is impossible to imagine a more broad, ample, and
unqualified delegation of the whole war power of each State than
is here contained, with the solitary limitation of the
appropriations to two years. The States not only gave power to
raise money for the common defense, to declare war, to raise and
support armies (in the plural), to provide and maintain a navy,
to govern and regulate both land and naval forces, but they went
further, and covenanted, by the third paragraph of the tenth
section, not 'to engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in
such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.'

"I know of but two modes of raising armies within the
Confederate States, viz., voluntary enlistment and draft, or
conscription. I perceive, in the delegation of power to raise
armies, no restriction as to the mode of procuring troops. I see
nothing which confines Congress to one class of men, nor any
greater power to receive volunteers than conscripts into its
service. I see no limitation by which enlistments are to be
received of individuals only, but not of companies, or
battalions, or squadrons, or regiments. I find no limitation of
time of service, but only of duration of appropriation. I
discover nothing to confine Congress to waging war within the
limits of the Confederacy, nor to prohibit offensive war. In a
word, when Congress desires to raise an army, and passes a law
for that purpose, the solitary question is under the eighteenth
paragraph, viz., 'Is the law one that is necessary and proper to
execute the power to raise armies?'

"On this point you say: `But did the necessity exist in this
case? The conscription act can not aid the Government in
increasing its supply of _arms_ or _provisions_, but can only
enable it to call a larger number of men into the field. The
difficulty has never been to get _men_. The States have already
furnished the Government more than it can arm,' etc.

"I would have very little difficulty in establishing to your
entire satisfaction that the passage of the law was not only
necessary, but that it was absolutely indispensable; that
numerous regiments of twelve months' men were on the eve of
being disbanded, whose places could not be supplied by raw
levies in the face of superior numbers of the foe, without
entailing the most disastrous results; that the position of our
armies was so critical as to fill the bosom of every patriot
with the liveliest apprehension; and that the provisions of this
law were effective in warding off a pressing danger. But I
prefer to answer your objection on other and broader grounds.

"I hold that, when a specific power is granted by the
Constitution, like that now in question, 'to raise armies,'
Congress is the judge whether the law passed for the purpose of
executing that power is 'necessary and proper.' It is not enough
to say that armies might be raised in other ways, and that,
therefore, this particular way is not 'necessary.' The same
argument might be used against _every_ mode of raising armies.
To each successive mode suggested, the objection would be that
other modes were practicable, and that, therefore, the
particular mode used was not 'necessary.' The true and only test
is to inquire whether the law is intended and calculated to
carry out the object; whether it devises and creates an
instrumentality for executing the specific power granted; and,
if the answer be in the affirmative, the law is constitutional.
None can doubt that the conscription law is calculated and
intended to 'raise armies'; it is, therefore, 'necessary and
proper' for the execution of that power, and is constitutional,
unless it comes in conflict with some other provision of our
Confederate compact.

"You express the opinion that this conflict exists, and support
your argument by the citation of those clauses which refer to
the militia. There are certain provisions not cited by you,
which are not without influence on my judgment, and to which I
call your attention. They will aid in defining what is meant by
'militia,' and in determining the respective powers of the
States and the Confederacy over them.

"The several States agree 'not to keep troops or ships of war in
time of peace.'[194] They further stipulate that, 'a
well-regulated militia being necessary for the security of a
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall
not be infringed.'[195]

"'That no person shall be held to answer for a capital or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment
of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the _land_ or _naval
forces_, or in _the militia_ when in actual service in times of
war or public danger.'[196]

"What, then, are militia? They can only be created by law. The
arms-bearing inhabitants of a State are liable to become its
militia, if the law so order; but, in the absence of a law to
that effect, the men of a State capable of bearing arms are no
more militia than they are seamen.

"The Constitution also tells us that militia are not _troops_,
nor are they any part of the _land_ or _naval forces_; for
militia exist in time of peace, and the Constitution forbids the
States to keep troops in time of peace, and they are expressly
distinguished and placed in a separate category from land or
naval forces in the sixteenth paragraph above quoted; and the
words _land_ and _naval forces_ are shown by paragraphs 12, 13,
and 14, to mean the Army and Navy of the Confederate States.

"Now, if militia are not the citizens taken singly, but a body
created by law; if they are not troops; if they are no part of
the Army and Navy of the Confederacy, we are led directly to the
definition, quoted by the Attorney-General, that militia are 'a
body of soldiers in a State enrolled for discipline.' In other
words, the term 'militia' is a collective term meaning a body of
men organized, and can not be applied to the separate
individuals who compose the organization.

"The Constitution divides the whole military strength of the
States into only two classes of organized bodies: one, the
armies of the Confederacy; the other, the militia of the States.

"In the delegation of power to the Confederacy, after exhausting
the subject of declaring war, raising and supporting armies, and
providing a navy, in relation to all which the grant of
authority to Congress is _exclusive_, the Constitution proceeds
to deal with the other organized body, the militia; and, instead
of delegating power to Congress alone, or reserving it to the
States alone, the power is divided as follows, viz.: Congress is
to have power 'to provide for calling forth the militia to
execute the laws of the _Confederate_ States, suppress
insurrections, and _repel invasions_.'[197]

"'To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the
militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed
in the service of the Confederate States; _reserving_ to _the
States respectively the appointment of the officers_, and the
_authority of training the militia_, according to the discipline
prescribed by Congress.'[198]

"Congress, then, has the power to provide for _organizing_ the
arms-bearing people of the State into militia. Each _State_ has
the power to officer and _train_ them when organized.

"_Congress_ may call forth the militia to execute Confederate
laws; the _State_ has not surrendered the power to call them
forth to execute State laws.

"Congress may call them forth to repel invasion; so may the
State, for the power is impliedly reserved of governing all the
militia, except the part in actual service of the Confederacy.

"I confess myself at a loss to perceive in what manner these
careful and well-defined provisions of the Constitution,
regulating the organization and government of the militia, can
be understood as applying in the remotest degree to the armies
of the Confederacy, nor can I conceive how the grant of
_exclusive_ power to declare and carry on war by armies raised
and supported by the Confederacy is to be restricted or
diminished by the clauses which grant a _divided_ power over the
militia. On the contrary, the delegation of authority over the
militia, so far as granted, appears to me to be plainly an
_additional_ enumerated power intended to strengthen the hands
of the Confederate Government in the discharge of its paramount
duty, the common defense of the States.

"You state, after quoting the twelfth, fifteenth, and sixteenth
grants of power to Congress, that 'these grants of power all
relate to the same subject-matter, and are all contained in the
same section of the Constitution, and, by a well-known rule of
construction, must be taken as a whole and construed together.'

"This argument appears to me unsound. _All_ the powers of
Congress are enumerated in one section, and the three paragraphs
quoted can no more control each other by reason of their
location in the same section than they can control any of the
other paragraphs preceding, intervening, or succeeding. So far
as the subject-matter is concerned, I have already endeavored to
show that the armies mentioned in the twelfth paragraph are a
subject-matter as distinct from the militia mentioned in the
fifteenth and sixteenth as they are from the navy mentioned in
the thirteenth. Nothing can so mislead as to construe together,
and as a whole, the carefully separated clauses which define the
different powers to be exercised over distinct subjects by the
Congress.

"But you add that, 'by the grant of power to Congress to raise
and support armies without qualification, the framers of the
Constitution intended the regular armies of the Confederacy, and
not armies composed of the whole militia of all the States.'

"I must confess myself somewhat at a loss to understand this
position. If I am right that the militia is a body of enrolled
State soldiers, it is not possible in the nature of things that
armies raised by the Confederacy can 'be composed of the whole
militia of all the States.' The militia may be called forth in
whole or in part into the Confederate service, but do not
thereby become part of the 'armies raised' by Congress. They
remain militia, and go home when the emergency which provoked
their call has ceased. Armies raised by Congress are of course
raised out of the _same population_ as the militia organized by
the States, and to deny to Congress the power to draft a citizen
into the army, or to receive his voluntary offer of services,
because he is a member of the State militia, is to deny the
power to raise an army at all; for, practically, all men fit for
service in the army may be embraced in the militia organization
of the several States. You seem, however, to suggest, rather
than directly to assert, that the conscript law may be
unconstitutional, because it comprehends all arms-bearing men
between eighteen and thirty-five years; at least, this is an
inference which I draw from your expression, 'armies composed of
the _whole_ militia of _all_ the States.' But it is obvious
that, if Congress have power to draft into the armies raised by
it any citizens at all (without regard to the fact whether they
are, or not, members of militia organizations), the power must
be coextensive with the exigencies of the occasion, or it
becomes illusory; and the extent of the exigency must be
determined by Congress; for the Constitution has left the power
without any other check or restriction than the Executive veto.
Under ordinary circumstances, the power thus delegated to
Congress is scarcely felt by the States. At the present moment,
when our very existence is threatened by armies vastly superior
in numbers to ours, the necessity for defense has induced a
call, not for 'the whole militia of all the States,' not for any
militia, but for men to compose _armies_ for the Confederate
States.

"Surely there is no mystery in this subject. During our whole
past history, as well as during our recent one year's experience
as a new Confederacy, the militia 'have been called forth to
repel invasion' in numerous instances, and they never came
otherwise than as bodies organized by the States with their
company, field, and _general officers_; and, when the emergency
had passed, they went home again. I can not perceive how any one
can interpret the conscription law as taking away from the
States the power to appoint officers to their militia. You
observe on this point in your letter that, unless your
construction is adopted, 'the very object of the States in
reserving the power of appointing the officers is defeated, and
that portion of the Constitution is not only a nullity, but the
whole military power of the States, and the entire control of
the militia, with the appointment of the officers, is vested in
the Confederate Government, whenever it chooses to call its own
action "raising an army," and not "calling forth the militia."'

"I can only say, in reply to this, that the power of Congress
depends on the real nature of the act it proposes to perform,
not on the name given to it; and I have endeavored to show that
its action is really that of 'raising an army,' and bears no
semblance to 'calling forth the militia.' I think I may safely
venture the assertion that there is not one man out of a
thousand of those who will do service under the conscription act
that will describe himself while in the Confederate service as
being a militiaman; and, if I am right in this assumption, the
popular understanding concurs entirely with my own deductions
from the Constitution as to the meaning of the word 'militia.'

"My answer has grown to such a length, that I must confine
myself to one more quotation from your letter. You proceed:
'Congress shall have power to _raise armies_. How shall it be
done? The answer is clear. In conformity to the provisions of
the Constitution, which expressly provides that, when the
militia of the States are called forth to _repel invasion_, and
employed in the service of the Confederate States, which is now
the case, the State shall appoint the officers.

"I beg you to observe that the answer which you say is clear is
not an answer to the question put. The question is, How are
armies to be raised? The answer given is, that, when militia are
called upon to repel invasion, the State shall appoint the
officers.

"There seems to me to be a conclusive test on this whole
subject. By our Constitution, Congress may declare war,
_offensive_ as well as _defensive_. It may acquire territory.
Now, suppose that, for good cause and to right unprovoked
injuries, Congress should declare war against Mexico and invade
Sonora. The militia could not be called forth in such a case,
the right to call it being limited 'to repel invasions.' Is it
not plain that the law now under discussion, if passed under
such circumstances, could by no possibility be aught else than a
law to 'raise an army'? Can one and the same law be construed
into a 'calling forth the militia,' if the war be defensive, and
a 'raising of armies,' if the war be offensive?

"At some future day, after our independence shall have been
established, it is no improbable supposition that our present
enemy may be tempted to abuse his naval power by depredations on
our commerce, and that we may be compelled to assert our rights
by offensive war. How is it to be carried on? Of what is the
army to be composed? If this Government can not call on its
arms-bearing population otherwise than as militia, and if the
militia can only be called forth to repel invasion, we should be
utterly helpless to vindicate our honor or protect our rights.
War has been well styled 'the terrible litigation of nations.'
Have we so formed our Government that in this litigation we must
never be plaintiffs? Surely this can not have been the intention
of the framers of our compact.

"In no respect in which I can view this law can I find just
reason to distrust the propriety of my action in approving and
signing it; and the question presented involves consequences,
both immediate and remote, too momentous to permit me to leave
your objections unanswered.

"Jefferson Davis."

The operation of this law was suspended in the States of Kentucky, Missouri, and Maryland, because of their occupation by the armies of the Federal Government. The opposition to it, where its execution was continued, soon became limited, and before June 1st its good effects were seen in the increased strength and efficiency of our armies. At the same time I was authorized to commission officers to form bands of "Partisan Rangers," either of infantry or cavalry, which were subsequently confined to cavalry alone. On September 27, 1862, all white men between the ages of thirty-five and forty-five were placed in the military service for three years. All persons subject to enrollment might be enrolled wherever found, and were made subject to the provisions of the law. Authority was also given for the reception of volunteers from the States in which the law was suspended. On February 11, 1864, it was enacted by Congress that all white men between the ages of seventeen and fifty should be in the military service for the war; also, that all then in the service between the ages of eighteen and forty-five should be retained during the war. An enrollment was also ordered of all persons between the ages of seventeen and eighteen and between forty-five and fifty years, who should constitute a reserve for State defense and detail duty. On February 17th all male free negroes between the ages of eighteen and fifty years were made liable to perform duties with the army, or in connection with the military defenses of the country in the way of work upon the fortifications, or in Government works for the production or preparation of materials of war, or in military hospitals. The Secretary of War was also authorized to employ for the same duties any number of negro slaves not exceeding twenty thousand.

In the operation of the military laws we found the exemption from military duty accorded by the law to all persons engaged in certain specified pursuits or professions to be unwise. Indeed, it seems to be indefensible in theory. The defense of home, family, and country is universally recognized as the paramount political duty of every member of society; and, in a form of government where each citizen enjoys an equality of rights and privileges, nothing can be more invidious than an unequal distribution of duties or obligations. No pursuit nor position should relieve any one who is able to do active duty from enrollment in the army, unless his functions or services are more useful to the defense of his country in another sphere. But the exemption from service of entire classes should be wholly abandoned.

The act of February 17, 1864 (above mentioned), which authorized the employment of slaves, produced less results than had been anticipated. It, however, brought forward the question of the employment of the negroes as soldiers in the army, which was warmly advocated by some and as ardently opposed by others. My own views upon it were expressed freely and frequently in intercourse with members of Congress, and emphatically in my message of November 7, 1864, when, urging upon Congress the consideration of the propriety of a radical modification of the theory of the law, I said:

"Viewed merely as property, and therefore as the subject of
impressment, the service or labor of the slave has been
frequently claimed for short periods in the construction of
defensive works. The slave, however, bears another relation to
the state--that of a person. The law of last February
contemplates only the relation of the slave to the master, and
limits the impressment to a certain term of service.

"But, for the purposes enumerated in the act, instruction in the
manner of camping, marching, and packing trains is needful, so
that even in this limited employment length of service adds
greatly to the value of the negro's labor. Hazard is also
encountered in all the positions to which negroes can be
assigned for service with the army, and the duties required of
them demand loyalty and zeal.

"In this aspect the relation of person predominates so far as to
render it doubtful whether the private right of property can
consistently and beneficially be continued, and it would seem
proper to acquire for the public service the entire property in
the labor of the slave, and to pay therefor due compensation,
rather than to impress his labor for short terms; and this the
more especially as the effect of the present law would vest this
entire property in all cases where the slave might be recaptured
after compensation for his loss had been paid to the private
owner. Whenever the entire property in the service of a slave is
thus acquired by the Government, the question is presented by
what tenure he should be held. Should he be retained in
servitude, or should his emancipation be held out to him as a
reward for faithful service, or should it be granted at once on
the promise of such service; and if emancipated what action
should be taken to secure for the freed man the permission of
the State from which he was drawn to reside within its limits
after the close of his public service? The permission would
doubtless be more readily accorded as a reward for past faithful
service, and a double motive for zealous discharge of duty would
thus be offered to those employed by the Government--their
freedom and the gratification of the local attachment which is
so marked a characteristic of the negro and forms so powerful an
incentive to his action. The policy of engaging to liberate the
negro on his discharge after service faithfully rendered seems
to me preferable to that of granting immediate manumission, or
that of retaining him in servitude. If this policy should
commend itself to the judgment of Congress, it is suggested
that, in addition to the duties heretofore performed by the
slave, he might be advantageously employed as a pioneer and
engineer laborer, and, in that event, that the number should be
augmented to forty thousand.

"Beyond this limit and these employments it does not seem to me
desirable under existing circumstances to go.

"A broad, moral distinction exists between the use of slaves as
soldiers in defense of their homes and the incitement of the
same persons to insurrection against their masters. The one is
justifiable, if necessary, the other is iniquitous and unworthy
of civilized people; and such is the judgment of all writers on
public law, as well as that expressed and insisted on by our
enemies in all wars prior to that now waged against us. By none
have the practices of which they are now guilty been denounced
with greater severity than by themselves in the two wars with
Great Britain, in the last and in the present century, and in
the Declaration of Independence in 1776, when an enumeration was
made of the wrongs which justified the revolt from Great
Britain. The climax of atrocity was deemed to be reached only
when the English monarch was denounced as having 'excited
domestic insurrection among us.'

"The subject is to be viewed by us, therefore, solely in the
light of policy and our social economy. When so regarded, I must
dissent from those who advise a general levy and arming of the
slaves for the duty of soldiers. Until our white population
shall prove insufficient for the armies we require and can
afford to keep in the field, to employ as a soldier the negro,
who has merely been trained to labor, and, as a laborer, the
white man accustomed from his youth to the use of arms, would
scarcely be deemed wise or advantageous by any; and this is the
question now before us. But should the alternative ever be
presented of subjugation, or of the employment of the slave as a
soldier, there seems no reason to doubt what should then be our
decision. Whether our view embraces what would, in so extreme a
case, be the sum of misery entailed by the dominion of the
enemy, or be restricted solely to the effect upon the welfare
and happiness of the negro population themselves, the result
would be the same. The appalling demoralization, suffering,
disease, and death, which have been caused by partially
substituting the invaders' system of police for the kind
relation previously subsisting between the master and slave,
have been a sufficient demonstration that external interference
with our institution of domestic slavery is productive of evil
only. If the subject involved no other consideration than the
mere right of property, the sacrifices heretofore made by our
people have been such as to permit no doubt of their readiness
to surrender every possession in order to secure independence.
But the social and political question which is exclusively under
the control of the several States has a far wider and more
enduring importance than that of pecuniary interest. In its
manifold phases it embraces the stability of our republican
institutions, resting on the actual political equality of all
its citizens, and includes the fulfillment of the task which has
been so happily begun--that of Christianizing and improving the
condition of the Africans who have by the will of Providence
been placed in our charge. Comparing the results of our own
experience with those of the experiments of others who have
borne similar relations to the African race, the people of the
several States of the Confederacy have abundant reason to be
satisfied with the past, and to use the greatest circumspection
in determining their course. These considerations, however, are
rather applicable to the improbable contingency of our need of
resorting to this element of assistance than to our present
condition. If the recommendation above, made for the training of
forty thousand negroes for the service indicated, shall meet
your approval, it is certain that even this limited number, by
their preparatory training in intermediate duties, would form a
more valuable reserve force in case of urgency than threefold
their number suddenly called from field-labor, while a fresh
levy could to a certain extent supply their places in the
special service for which they are now employed."

Subsequent events advanced my views from a prospective to a present need for the enrollment of negroes to take their place in the ranks. Strenuously I argued the question with members of Congress who called to confer with me. To a member of the Senate (the House in which we most needed a vote) I stated, as I had done to many others, the fact of having led negroes against a lawless body of armed white men, and the assurance which the experiment gave me that they might, under proper conditions, be relied on in battle, and finally used to him the expression which I believe I can repeat exactly: "If the Confederacy falls, there should be written on its tombstone, 'Died of a theory.'" General Lee was brought before a committee to state his opinion as to the probable efficiency of negroes as soldiers, and disappointed the probable expectation by his unqualified advocacy of the proposed measure.

After much discussion in Congress, a bill authorizing the President to ask for and accept from their owners such a number of able-bodied negro men as he might deem expedient subsequently passed the House, but was lost in the Senate by one vote. The Senators of Virginia opposed the measure so strongly that only legislative instruction could secure their support of it. Their Legislature did so instruct them, and they voted for it. Finally, the bill passed, with an amendment providing that not more than twenty-five per cent. of the male slaves between the ages of eighteen and forty-five should be called out. But the passage of the act had been so long delayed that the opportunity was lost. There did not remain time enough to obtain any result from its provisions.

[Footnote 194: Article I, section 10, paragraph 3.]

[Footnote 195: Ibid., section 9, Part XIII.]

[Footnote 196: Ibid., section 9, paragraph 16.]

[Footnote 197: Section 8, paragraph 15.]

[Footnote 198: Ibid., paragraph 16.]

APPENDIXES.

[Transcriber's Note: There is no Appendix A.]