Chapter XI (1)

The Issue.--The American Idea of Government.--Who was
responsible for the War?--Situation of Virginia.--Concentration
of the Enemy against Richmond.--Our Difficulty.--Unjust
Criticisms.--The Facts set forth.--Organization of the
Army.--Conference at Fairfax Court-House.--Inaction of the
Army.--Capture of Romney.--Troops ordered to retire to the
Valley.--Discipline.--General Johnston regards his Position as
unsafe.--The First Policy.--Retreat of General Johnston.--The
Plans of the Enemy.--Our Strength magnified by the
Enemy.--Stores destroyed.--The Trent Affair.

It has been shown that the Southern States, by their representatives in the two Houses of Congress, consistently endeavored even to the last day, when they were by their constituents permitted to remain in the halls of Federal legislation, to maintain the Constitution, and preserve the Union which the States had by their independent action ordained and established. On the other hand, proof has been adduced to show that the Northern States, by a majority of their representatives in the Congress, had persisted in agitation injurious to the welfare and tranquillity of the Southern States, and at the last moment had refused to make any concessions, or to offer any guarantees to check the current toward secession of the complaining States, whose love for the Union rendered them willing to accept less than justice should have readily accorded. The issue was then presented between submission to empire of the North, or the severance of those ties consecrated by many memories, and strengthened by those habits which render every people reluctant to sever long-existing associations.

The authorities heretofore cited have, I must believe, conclusively shown that the question of changing their government was one that the States had the power to decide by virtue of the unalienable right announced in the Declaration of Independence, and which had been proudly denominated the American idea of government. The hope and the wish of the people of the South were that the disagreeable necessity of separation would be peacefully met, and be followed by such commercial regulations as would least disturb the prosperity and future intercourse of the separated States. Every step taken by the Confederate Government was directed toward that end. The separation of the States having been decided on, it was sought to effect it in such manner as would be just to the parties concerned, and preserve as far as possible, under separate governments, the fraternal and mutually beneficial relations which had existed between the States when united, and which it was the object of their compact of union to secure. To all the proofs heretofore offered I confidently refer for the establishment of the fact that whatever of bloodshed, of devastation, or shock to republican government has resulted from the war, is to be charged to the Northern States. The invasions of the Southern States, for purposes of coercion, were in violation of the written Constitution, and the attempt to subjugate sovereign States, under the pretext of "preserving the Union," was alike offensive to law, to good morals, and the proper use of language. The Union was the voluntary junction of free and independent States; to subjugate any of them was to destroy constituent parts, and necessarily, therefore, must be the destruction of the Union itself.

That the Southern States were satisfied with a Federal Government such as their fathers had formed, was shown by their adoption of a Constitution so little differing from the instrument of 1787. It was against the violations of that instrument, and usurpations offensive to their pride and injurious to their interests, that they remonstrated, argued, and finally appealed to the inherent, undelegated power of the States to judge of their wrongs, and of the "mode and measure of redress."

After many years of fruitless effort to secure from their Northern associates a faithful observance of the compact of union; after its conditions had been deliberately and persistently broken, and the signs of the times indicated further and more ruthless violations of their rights as equals in the Union, the Southern States, preferring a peaceful separation to continuance in a hostile Union, decided to exercise their sovereign right to withdraw from an association which had failed to answer the ends for which it was formed. It has been shown how they endeavored to effect the change with strict regard to the principles controlling a dissolution of partnership, and how earnestly they desired to remain in friendly relations to the Northern States, and how all their overtures were rejected. When they pleaded for peace, the United States Government deceptively delayed to answer, while making ready for war. To the calm judgment of mankind is submitted the question, Who was responsible for the war between the States?

Virginia, whose history, from the beginning of the Revolution of 1776, had been a long course of sacrifices for the benefit of her sister States, and for the preservation of the Union she had mainly contributed to establish, clung to it with the devotion of a mother. It has been shown how her efforts to check dissolution were persisted in when the aggrieved were hopeless and the aggressors reckless, and how her mediations were rejected in the "Peace Congress," which on her motion had been assembled. Sorrowing over the failure of this, her blessed though unsuccessful attempt to preserve the Union _of the Constitution_, she was not permitted to mourn as a neutral, but was required by the United States Government to choose between furnishing troops to subjugate her Southern sisters or the reclamation of the grants she had made to the Federal Government when she became a member of the Union. The first was a violation of the letter and the spirit of the Constitution; the second was a reserved right. The voice of Henry called to her from the ground; the spirits of Washington and Jefferson moved among her people.

There was but one course consistent with her stainless reputation and often-declared tenets, as to the liberties of her people, which she could have adopted. As in 1776, reluctantly she bowed to the necessity of separation from the Crown, so in 1861 the ordinance of secession was adopted. Having exhausted all other means, she took the last resort, and, if for this she was selected as the first object of assault, "methinks the punishment exceedeth the offense."

The large resources and full preparation of the United States Government enabled it to girt Virginia as with a wall of fire. It has been shown that she was threatened from the east, from the north, and from the west. The capital of the State and of the Confederacy, Richmond, was the objective point, and on this the march of three columns concentrated. On the east, the advance of the enemy was on several occasions feasible, when we consider the number of his forces at and about Fortress Monroe, in comparison with the small means retained for the defense of the capital. On the north, the most formidable army of the enemy was assembled; to oppose it we had the comparatively small Army of the Potomac. This being regarded as the line on which the greatest danger was apprehended, our efforts were mostly directed toward giving it the requisite strength. Troops, as rapidly as they could be raised and armed, were sent forward for that purpose. From the beginning to the close of the war, we mainly relied for the defense of the capital on its aged citizens, boys too young for service, and the civil employees of the executive departments. On several occasions these were called out to resist an attack. They answered with alacrity, and always bore themselves gallantly, more than once repelling the enemy in the open field. Had it been practicable to do so, it would surely have been proper to keep a large force in reserve for the defense of the capital, so often and vauntingly proclaimed to be the object of the enemy's campaign. Perhaps the propriety of such provision gave currency and credence to rumors that we had a large force at Richmond. This even led to the application for a detachment from it to reënforce our Army of the Potomac, which caused me to write to General J. E. Johnston at Manassas, Virginia, on September 5, 1861, as follows:

"You have again been deceived as to the forces here. We never
have had anything near to twenty thousand men, and have now but
little over one fourth of that number.... Since the date of your
glorious victory the enemy have grown weaker in numbers, and far
weaker in the character of their troops, so that I had felt it
remained with us to decide whether another battle should soon be
fought or not. Your remark indicates a different opinion.... I
wish I could send additional force to occupy Loudon, but my
means are short of the wants of each division I am laboring to
protect. One ship-load of small-arms would enable me to answer
all demands, but vainly have I hoped and waited."

Then, there, and everywhere, our difficulty was the want of arms and munitions of war. Lamentable cries came to us from the West for the supplies which would enable patriotic citizens to defend their homes. The resource upon which the people had so confidently relied, the private arms in the hands of citizens, proved a sad delusion, and elsewhere it has been shown how deficient we were in ammunition, or the means of providing it. The simple fact was, the country had gone to war without counting the cost.

Undue elation over our victory at Manassas was followed by dissatisfaction at what was termed the failure to reap the fruits of victory; and rumors, for which there could be no better excuse than partisan zeal, were circulated that the heroes of the hour were prevented from reaping the fruits of the victory by the interference of the President. Naturally there followed another rumor, that the inaction of the victorious army, to which reënforcements continued to be sent, was due to the policy of the President; and he also was held responsible, and with more apparent justice, for the failure to organize the troops of the several States, as the law contemplated, into brigades and divisions composed of the soldiers of each.

Though these unjust criticisms weakened the power of the Government to meet its present and provide for its future necessities, I bore them in silence, lest to vindicate myself should injure the public service by turning the public censure to the generals on whom the hopes of the country rested. That motive no longer exists; and, to justify the faith of those who, without a defense continued to uphold my hands, I propose to set forth the facts by correspondence and otherwise. So far as, in doing this, blame shall be transferred from me to others, it will be the incident, not the design, as it would be most gratifying to me only to notice for praise each and all who wore the gray.

The fiction of my having prevented the pursuit of the enemy after the victory of Manassas was exploded after it had acquired an authoritative and semi-official form in the manner and for the reasons heretofore set forth. It only remains, therefore, to notice the other points indicated above:

First, the organization of the army.

Disease and discontent are known to be the attendants of armies lying unemployed in camps, especially, as in our case, when the troops were composed of citizens called from their homes under the idea of a pressing necessity, and with the hope of soon returning to them.

Our citizen soldiers were a powerful political element, and their correspondence, finding its way to the people through the press and to the halls of Congress by direct communication with the members, was felt, by its influence both upon public opinion and general legislation. Members of Congress, and notably the Vice-President, contended that men should be allowed to go home and attend to their private affairs while there were no active operations, and that there was no doubt but that they would return whenever there was to be a battle. The experience of war soon taught our people the absurdity of such ideas, and before its close probably none would have uttered them.

There were very many men out of the army who were anxious to enter it, but for whom we had not arms. This gave rise to the remark, more humorous than profound, that we "stood around the camps with clubs to keep one set in and an other set out." Had this been true, it was certainly justifiable to refuse to exchange a trained man for a recruit. All who have seen service know that one old soldier is, in campaign, equal to several who have everything of military life to learn.

A marked characteristic of the Southern people was individuality, and time was needful to teach them that the terrible machine, a disciplined army, must be made of men who had surrendered their freedom of will. The most distinguished of our citizens were not the slowest to learn the lesson, and perhaps no army ever more thoroughly knew it than did that which Lee led into Pennsylvania, and none ever had a leader who in his own conduct better illustrated the lesson.

Our largest army in 1861 was that of the Potomac. It had been formed by the junction of the forces under General J. E. Johnston with those under General P. G. T. Beauregard, with such additions as could be hurriedly sent forward to meet the enemy on the field of Manassas. They were combined into brigades and divisions as pressing exigencies required.

By the act of February 28, 1861, the President was authorized to receive companies, battalions, and regiments to form a part of the provisional army of the Confederate States, and, with the advice and consent of Congress, to appoint general officers for them; and by the act of March 6th the President was to apportion the staff and general officers among the respective States from which the volunteers were received. It will thus be seen that the States generously surrendered their right to preserve for those volunteers the character of State troops and to appoint general officers when furnishing a sufficient number of regiments to require such grade for their command; but, in giving their volunteers to form the provisional army of the Confederacy, it was distinctly suggested that the general officers should be so appointed as to make a just apportionment among the States furnishing the troops.

During the repose which followed the battle of Manassas, it was deemed proper that the regiments of the different States should be assembled in brigades together, and, as far as consistent with the public service, that the spirit of the law should be complied with by the assignment of brigadier-generals of the same State from which the troops were drawn. Instructions to that end were therefore given, and again and again repeated, but were for a long time only partially complied with, until the delay formed the basis of the argument that those who had by association become thoroughly acquainted would more advantageously be left united. In the mean time, frequent complaints came to me from the army, of unjust discrimination, the law being executed in regard to the troops of some States but not of others, and of serious discontent arising therefrom.

The duty to obey the law was imperative, and neither the Executive nor the officers of the army had any right to question its propriety. I, however, considered the policy of that law wise, and was not surprised when it was stated to me that the persistent obstruction to its execution was repressing the spirit to volunteer in places to which complaints of such supposed favoritism had been transmitted.

About the 1st of October, at the request of General Johnston, I went to his headquarters, at Fairfax Court-House, for the purpose of conference.

At the time of this visit to the army, the attention of the general officers, who then met me in conference, was called to the obligation created by law to organize the troops, when the numbers tendered by any State permitted it, into brigades and divisions composed of the regiments, battalions, or companies of such State, and to assign general and staff officers in the ratio of the troops thus received. After my return to the capital, the importance of the subject weighed so heavily upon me as to lead to correspondence with the generals, which will be best understood by the following extracts from my letters to them--which are here appended:

"Major-General G. W. Smith, _Army of Potomac_.

"... How have you progressed in the solution of the problem I
left--the organization of the troops with reference to the
States, and term of service? If the volunteers continue their
complaints that they are commanded by strangers and do not get
justice, and that they are kept in camp to die when reported for
hospital by the surgeon, we shall soon feel a reaction in the
matter of volunteering. Already I have been much pressed on both
subjects, and have answered by promising that the generals would
give due attention, and, I hoped, make satisfactory changes. The
authority to organize regiments into brigades and the latter
into divisions is by law conferred only on the President; and I
must be able to assume responsibility of the action taken by
whomsoever acts for me in that regard. By reference to the law,
you will see that, in surrendering the sole power to appoint
general officers, it was nevertheless designed, as far as should
be found consistent, to keep up the State relation of troops and
generals. Kentucky has a brigadier, but not a brigade; she has,
however, a regiment--that regiment and brigadier might be
associated together. Louisiana had regiments enough to form a
brigade, but no brigadier in either corps; all of the regiments
were sent to that corps commanded by a Louisiana general.
Georgia has regiments now organized into two brigades; she has
on duty with that army two brigadiers, but one of them serves
with other troops. Mississippi troops were scattered as if the
State were unknown. Brigadier-General Clark was sent to remove a
growing dissatisfaction, but, though the State had nine
regiments there, he (Clark) was put in command of a post and
depot of supplies. These nine regiments should form two
brigades. Brigadiers Clark and (as a native of Mississippi)
Whiting should be placed in command of them, and the regiments
for the war put in the army man's brigade. Both brigades should
be put in the division commanded by General Van Dorn, of
Mississippi. Thus would the spirit and intent of the law be
complied with, disagreeable complaint be spared me, and more of
content be assured under the trials to which you look forward.
It is needless to specify further. I have been able in writing
to you to speak freely, and you have no past associations to
disturb the judgment to be passed upon the views presented. I
have made and am making inquiries as to the practicability of
getting a corps of negroes for laborers to aid in the
construction of an intrenched line in rear of your present
position.

"Your remarks on the want of efficient staff-officers are
realized in all their force, and I hope, among the elements
which constitute a staff-officer for volunteers, you have duly
estimated the qualities of forbearance and urbanity. Many of the
privates are men of high social position, of scholarship and
fortune. Their pride furnishes the motive for good conduct, and,
if wounded, is turned from an instrument of good to one of great
power for evil...."

"Richmond, Virginia, _October 16, 1861_.

"General Beauregard, _Manassas, Virginia_.

"... I have thought often upon the questions of reorganization
which were submitted to you, and it has seemed to me that,
whether in view of disease, or the disappointment and suffering
of a winter cantonment on a line of defense, or of a battle to
be fought in and near your position, it was desirable to combine
the troops, by a new distribution, with as little delay as
practicable. They will be stimulated to extraordinary effort
when so organized, in that the fame of their State will be in
their keeping, and that each will feel that his immediate
commander will desire to exalt rather than diminish his
services. You pointed me to the fact that you had observed that
rule in the case of the Louisiana and Carolina troops, and you
will not fail to perceive that others find in the fact a reason
for the like disposal of them. In the hour of sickness, and the
tedium of waiting for spring, men from the same region will best
console and relieve each other. The maintenance of our cause
rests on the sentiments of the people. Letters from the camp,
complaining of inequality and harshness in the treatment of the
men, have already dulled the enthusiasm which filled our ranks
with men who by birth, fortune, education, and social position
were the equals of any officer in the land. The spirit of our
military law is manifested in the fact that the State
organization was limited to the regiment. The volunteers come in
sufficient numbers to have brigadiers, but have only colonels.
It was not then intended (is the necessary conclusion) that
those troops should be under the immediate command of officers
above the grade of colonel. The spirit of the law, then,
indicates that brigades should be larger than customary, the
general being charged with the care, the direction, the
preservation of the men, rather than the internal police."

"Richmond, Virginia, _October_ 20, 1861.

"General Beauregard, _Manassas, Virginia_.

"My Dear General:... Two rules have been applied in the
projected reorganization of the Army of the Potomac:

"1. As far as practicable, to keep regiments from the same State
together; 2. To assign generals to command the troops of their
own State. I have not overlooked the objections to each, but the
advantages are believed to outweigh the disadvantages of that
arrangement. In distributing the regiments of the several States
it would, I think, be better to place the regiments for the war
in the same brigade of the State, and assign to those brigades
the brigadiers whose services could least easily be dispensed
with. For this, among other reasons, I will mention but one: the
commission of a brigadier expires upon the breaking up of his
brigade (see the law for their appointment). Of course, I would
not for slight cause change the relations of troops and
commanders, especially where it has been long continued and
endeared by the trials of battle; but it is to be noted that the
regiment was fixed as the unit of organization, and made the
connecting link between the soldier and his home. Above that,
all was subject to the discretion of the Confederate
authorities, save the pregnant intimation in relation to the
distribution of generals among the several States. It was
generous and confiding to surrender entirely to the Confederacy
the appointment of generals, and it is the more incumbent on me
to carry out as well as may be the spirit of the volunteer
system."

"Richmond, _May 10, 1862_.

"General J. E. Johnston.

"... Your attention has been heretofore called to the law in
relation to the organization of brigades and divisions--orders
were long since given to bring the practice and the law into
conformity. Recently reports have been asked for from the
commanders of separate armies as to the composition of their
respective brigades and divisions. I have been much harassed,
and the public interest has certainly suffered, by the delay to
place the regiments of some of the States in brigades together,
it being deemed that unjust discrimination was made against
them, and also by the popular error which has existed as to the
number of brigadiers to which appointments could be specially
urged on the grounds of residence. While some have expressed
surprise at my patience when orders to you were not observed, I
have at least hoped that you would recognize the desire to aid
and sustain you, and that it would produce the corresponding
action on your part. The reasons formerly offered have one after
another disappeared, and I hope you will, as you can, proceed to
organize your troops as heretofore instructed, and that the
returns will relieve us of the uncertainty now felt as to the
number and relations of the troops, and the commands of the
officers having brigades and divisions.... I will not dwell on
the lost opportunity afforded along the line of northern
Virginia, but must call your attention to the present condition
of affairs and probable action of the enemy, if not driven from
his purpose to advance on the Fredericksburg route....

"Very truly yours,

"Jefferson Davis."

On the 26th of May General Johnston's attention was again called to the organization of the ten Mississippi regiments into two brigades, and was reminded that the proposition had been made to him in the previous autumn, with an expression of my confidence that the regiments would be more effective in battle if thus associated.

I will now proceed to notice the allegation that I was responsible for inaction by the Army of the Potomac, in the latter part of 1861 and in the early part of 1862. After the explosion of the fallacy that I had prevented the pursuit of the enemy from Manassas in July, 1861, my assailants have sought to cover their exposure by a change of time and place, locating their story at Fairfax Court-House, and dating it in the autumn of 1861.

When at that time and place I met General Johnston for conference, he called in the two generals next in rank to himself, Beauregard and G. W. Smith. The question for consideration was, What course should be adopted for the future action of the army? and the preliminary inquiry by me was as to the number of the troops there assembled. To my surprise and disappointment, the effective strength was stated to be but little greater than when it fought the battle of the 21st of the preceding July. The frequent reënforcements which had been sent to that army in nowise prepared me for such an announcement. To my inquiry as to what force would be required for the contemplated advance into Maryland, the lowest estimate made by any of them was about twice the number there present for duty. How little I was prepared for such a condition of things will be realized from the fact that previous suggestions by the generals in regard to a purpose to advance into Maryland had induced me, when I went to that conference, to take with me some drawings made by the veteran soldier and engineer, Colonel Crozêt, of the falls of the Potomac, to show the feasibility of crossing the river at that point. Very little knowledge of the condition and military resources of the country must have sufficed to show that I had no power to make such an addition to that army without a total disregard of the safety of other threatened positions. It only remained for me to answer that I had not power to furnish such a number of troops; and, unless the militia bearing their private arms should be relied on, we could not possibly fulfill such a requisition until after the receipt of the small-arms which we had early and constantly striven to procure from abroad, and had for some time expected.

After I had written the foregoing, and all the succeeding chapters on kindred subjects, a friend, in October, 1880, furnished me with a copy of a paper relating to the conference at Fairfax Court-House, which seems to require notice at my hands.

Therefore I break the chain of events to insert here some remarks in regard to it.

The paper appears to have been written by General G. W. Smith, and to have received the approval of Generals Beauregard and J. E. Johnston, and to bear date the 31st of January, 1862.

It does not agree in some respects with my memory of what occurred, and is not consistent with itself. It was not necessary that I should learn in that interview the evil of inactivity. My correspondence of anterior date might have shown that I was fully aware of it, and my suggestions in the interview certainly did not look as if it was necessary to impress me with the advantage of action.

In one part of the paper it is stated that the reënforcements asked for were to be "seasoned soldiers," such as were there present, and who were said to be in the "finest fighting condition." This, if such a proposition had been made, would have exposed its absurdity, as well as the loophole it offered for escape, by subsequently asserting that the troops furnished were not up to the proposed standard.

In another part of the paper it is stated that there were hope and expectation that, before the end of the winter, arms would be introduced into the country, and that then we could successfully invade that of the enemy; but this supply of arms, however abundant, could not furnish "seasoned soldiers," and the two propositions are therefore inconsistent. In one place it is written that "it was felt it might be better to run the risk of almost certain destruction fighting upon the other side of the Potomac, rather than see the gradual dying out and deterioration of this army during a winter," etc.; but, when it was proposed to cross into eastern Maryland on a steamer in our possession for a partial campaign, difficulties arose like the lion in the path of the sluggard, so that the proposition was postponed and never executed. In like manner the other expedition in the Valley of Virginia was achieved by an officer not of this council, General T. J. Jackson.

In one place it is written that the President stated, "At that time no reënforcements could be furnished to the army of the character asked for." In another place he is made to say he could not take any troops from the points named, and, "without arms from abroad, could not reënforce that army." Here, again, it is clear from the answer that the proposition had been for such reënforcement as additional arms would enable him to give. Those arms he expected to receive, barring the dangers of the sea, and of the enemy, which obstacles alone prevented the "positive assurance that they would be received at all."

It was, as stated, with deep regret and bitter disappointment that I found, notwithstanding our diligent efforts to reënforce this army before and after the battle of Manassas, that its strength had but little increased, and that the arms of absentees and discharged men were represented by only twenty-five hundred on hand. I can not suppose that General Johnston could have noticed the statement that his request for conference had set forth the object of it to be to discuss the question of reënforcement. He would have known that in Richmond, where all the returns were to be found, any consideration of reënforcement, by the withdrawal of troops from existing garrisons, could best be decided. Very little experience or a fair amount of modesty without any experience would serve to prevent one from announcing his conclusion that troops could be withdrawn from a place or places without knowing how many were there, and what was the necessity for their presence.

I was at the conference by request; the confidence felt in those officers is shown by the fact that I met them alone, and did not require any minutes to be made of the meeting. About four months afterward a paper was prepared to make a record of the conversation; the fact was concealed from me, whereas, both for accuracy and frankness, it should have been submitted to me, even if there had been nothing due to our official relations. Twenty years after the event, I learned of this secret report, by one party, without notice having been given to the other, of a conversation said to have lasted two hours.

I have noticed the improbabilities and inconsistencies of the paper, and, without remark, I submit to honorable men the concealment from me in which it was prepared, whereby they may judge of the chances for such co-intelligence as needs must exist between the Executive and the commanders of armies to insure attainable success.

The position at Fairfax Court-House, though it would answer very well as a point from which to advance, was quite unfavorable for defense; and when I so remarked, the opinion seemed to be that to which the generals had previously arrived. It, therefore, only remained to consider what change of position should be made in the event of the enemy threatening soon to advance. But in the mean time I hoped that something could be done by detachments from the army to effect objects less difficult than an advance against his main force, and particularly indicated the lower part of Maryland, where a small force was said to be ravaging the country and oppressing our friends. This, I thought, might be feasible by the establishment of a battery near to Acquia Creek, where the channel of the Potomac was said to be so narrow that our guns could prevent the use of the river by the enemy's boats, and, by employing a steamboat lying there, troops enough could be sent over some night to defeat that force, and return before any large body could be concentrated against them. The effect of the battery and of the expedition, it was hoped, would be important in relieving our friends and securing recruits from those who wished to join us. Previously, General Johnston's attention had been called to possibilities in the Valley of the Shenandoah, and that these and other like things were not done, was surely due to other causes than "the policy of the Administration," as will appear by the letters hereto annexed:

"Richmond, Virginia, _August_ 1, 1861.

"General J. E. Johnston:

"... General Lee has gone to western Virginia, and I hope may be
able to strike a decisive blow in that quarter, or, failing in
that, will be able to organize and post our troops so as to
check the enemy, after which he will return to this place.

"The movement of Banks will require your attention. It may be a
_ruse_, but, if a real movement, when your army has the
requisite strength and mobility, you will probably find an
opportunity, by a rapid movement through the passes, to strike
him in rear or flank, and thus add another to your many claims
to your country's gratitude.... We must be prompt to avail
ourselves of the weakness resulting from the exchange of the new
and less reliable forces of the enemy, for those heretofore in
service, as well as of the moral effect produced by their late
defeat....

"I am, as ever, your friend,

"Jefferson Davis."

From the correspondence which occurred after the conference at Fairfax Court-House, I select a reply made to General Smith, who had written to me in advocacy of the views he had then expressed about large reënforcements to the Army of the Potomac, for an advance into Maryland. Nothing is more common than that a general, realizing the wants of the army with which he is serving, and the ends that might be achieved if those wants were supplied, should overlook the necessities of others, and accept rumors of large forces which do not exist, and assume the absence of danger elsewhere than in his own front.

"Richmond, Virginia, _October_ 10, 1861.

"Major-General G. W. Smith, _Army of the Potomac_.

"... Your remarks about the moral effect of repressing the hope
of the volunteers for an advance are in accordance with the
painful impression made on me when, in our council, it was
revealed to me that the Army of the Potomac had been reduced to
about one half the legalized strength, and that the arms to
restore the numbers were not in depot. As I there suggested,
though you may not be able to advance into Maryland and expel
the enemy, it may be possible to keep up the spirits of your
troops by expeditions such as that particularly spoken of
against Sickles's brigade on the lower Potomac, or Banks's
above. By destroying the canal and making other rapid movements
wherever opportunity presents, to beat detachments or to destroy
lines of communication....

"Very truly, your friend,

"Jefferson Davis".

"Richmond, Virginia, _November_ 18, 1861.

"General J. E. Johnston.

"... If a large force should be landed on the Potomac below
General Holmes, with the view to turn or to attack him, the
value of the position between Dumfries and Fredericksburg will
be so great that I wish you to give to that line your personal
inspection. With a sufficient force, the enemy may be prevented
from leaving his boats, should he be able to cross the river. To
make our force available at either of the points which he may
select, it will be necessary to improve the roads connecting the
advance posts with the armies of the Potomac and of the Acquia,
as well as with each other, and to have the requisite teams to
move heavy guns with celerity....

"Very respectfully yours,

"Jefferson Davis."

In November, 1861, reports became current that the enemy were concentrating troops west of the Valley of the Shenandoah with a view to a descent upon it. That vigilant, enterprising, and patriotic soldier, General T. J. Jackson, whose steadiness under fire at the first battle of Manassas had procured for him the _sobriquet_ of "Stonewall," was then on duty as district commander of the Shenandoah Valley.

He was a West Virginian; and, though he had not acquired the fame which subsequently shed such luster upon his name, he possessed a well-deserved confidence among the people of that region. Ever watchful and daring in the discharge of any duty, he was intensely anxious to guard his beloved mountains of Virginia. This, stimulating his devotion to the general welfare of the Confederacy, induced him to desire to march against the enemy, who had captured Romney. On the 20th of November, 1861, he wrote to the War Department, proposing an expedition to Romney, in western Virginia. It was decided to adopt his proposition, endorsed by the commander of the department, and, further to insure success, though not recommended in the endorsement, his old brigade, then in the Army of the Potomac, was selected as a part of the command with which he was to make the campaign. General Johnston remonstrated against this transfer, and the correspondence is subjoined for a fuller understanding of the matter:

"Headquarters, Valley District, _November_ 20, 1861.

"Hon. J. P. Benjamin, _Secretary of War_.

"Sir: I hope you will pardon me for requesting that, at once,
all the troops under General Loring be ordered to this point.
Deeply impressed with the importance of absolute secrecy
respecting military operations, I have made it a point to say
but little respecting my proposed movements in the event of
sufficient reënforcements arriving, but, since conversing with
Lieutenant-Colonel J. L. T. Preston upon his return from General
Loring, and ascertaining the disposition of the General's
forces, I venture to respectfully urge that, after concentrating
all his troops here, an attempt should be made to capture the
Federal forces at Romney. The attack on Romney would probably
induce McClellan to believe that the Army of the Potomac had
been so weakened as to justify him in making an advance on
Centreville; but, should this not induce him to advance, I do
not believe anything will during the present winter. Should the
Army of the Potomac be attacked, I would be at once prepared to
reënforce it with my present volunteer force, increased by
General Loring's. After repulsing the enemy at Manassas, let the
troops that marched on Romney return to the Valley and move
rapidly westward to the waters of the Monongahela and Little
Kanawha. Should General Kelley be defeated, and especially
should he be captured, I believe that, by a judicious
disposition of the militia, a few cavalry, and a small number of
field-pieces, no additional forces would be required for some
time in this district. I deem it of very great importance that
northwestern Virginia be occupied by Confederate troops this
winter. At present, it is to be presumed that the enemy are not
expecting an attack there, and the resources of that region
necessary for the subsistence of our troops are in greater
abundance than in almost any other season of the year. Postpone
the occupation of that section until spring, and we may expect
to find the enemy prepared for us, and the resources to which I
have referred greatly exhausted. I know that what I have
proposed will be an arduous undertaking, and can not be
accomplished without the sacrifice of much personal comfort, but
I feel that the troops will be prepared to make this sacrifice
when animated by the prospects of important results to our cause
and distinction to themselves. It may be urged, against this
plan, that the enemy will advance on Staunton or Huntersville. I
am well satisfied that such a step would but make their
destruction more certain. Again, it may be said that General
Floyd will be cut off. To avoid this, if necessary, the General
has only to fall back toward the Virginia and Tennessee
Railroad. When northwestern Virginia is occupied in force, the
Kanawha Valley, unless it be the lower part of it, must be
evacuated by the Federal forces, or otherwise their safety will
be endangered by forcing a column across from the Little Kanawha
between them and the Ohio River. Admitting that the season is
too far advanced, or that from other causes all can not be
accomplished that has been named, yet, through the blessing of
God, who has thus far so wonderfully prospered our cause, much
more may be expected from General Loring's troops, according to
this programme, than can be expected from them where they are.
If you decide to order them here, I trust that, for the purpose
of saving time, all the infantry, cavalry, and artillery will be
directed to move immediately upon the reception of the order.
The enemy, about five thousand strong, have been for some time
slightly fortifying at Romney, and have completed their
telegraph from that place to Green Spring Depot. Their forces at
and near Williamsport are estimated as high as five thousand,
but as yet I have no reliable information of their strength
beyond the Potomac. Your most obedient servant,

"T. J. Jackson, _Major-General, P. A. C. S._"

"Headquarters, Centreville, _November_ 21, 1861.

"Respectfully forwarded. I submit that the troops under General
Loring might render valuable services by taking the field with
General Jackson, instead of going into winter-quarters, as now
proposed.

"J. E. Johnston, _General_."

"Headquarters, Centreville, _November_ 22, 1861.

"General Cooper, _Adjutant and Inspector-General_.

"Sir: I have received Major-General Jackson's plan of operations
in his district, for which he asks for reënforcements. It seems
to me that he proposes more than can well be accomplished in
that high, mountainous country at this season. If the means of
driving the enemy from Romney (preventing the reconstruction of
the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and incursions by marauders
into the counties of Jefferson, Berkeley, and Morgan) can be
supplied to General Jackson, and with them those objects,
accomplished, we shall have reason to be satisfied, so far as
the Valley district is concerned. The wants of other portions of
the frontier--Acquia district, for instance--make it
inexpedient, in my opinion, to transfer to the Valley district
so large a force as that asked for by Major-General Jackson. It
seems to me to be now of especial importance to strengthen
Major-General Holmes, near Acquia Creek. The force there is very
small, compared with the importance of the position. Your
obedient servant,

"J. E. Johnston, _General_.

"[Endorsement.]

"Respectfully submitted to the Secretary of War:

"S. Cooper, _Adjutant and Inspector-General_.

"_November 25, 1861_."

"Richmond, Virginia, _November_ 10, 1861.

"General J. E. Johnston, _Manassas, Virginia_.

"Sir: The Secretary of War has this morning laid before me yours
of the 8th instant. I fully sympathize with your anxiety for the
Army of the Potomac. If indeed mine be less than yours, it can
only be so because the south, the west, and the east, presenting
like cause for solicitude, have in the same manner demanded my
care. Our correspondence must have assured you that I fully
concur in your view of the necessity for unity in command, and I
hope by a statement of the case to convince you that there has
been no purpose to divide your authority by transferring the
troops specified in order No. 206 from the center to the left of
your department. The active campaign in the Greenbrier region
was considered as closed for the season. There is reason to
believe that the enemy is moving a portion of his forces from
that mountain-region toward the Valley of Virginia, and that he
has sent troops and munitions from the east by the way of the
Potomac Canal toward the same point. The failure to destroy his
communications by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and by the
Potomac Canal has left him in possession of great advantages for
that operation. General Jackson, for reasons known to you, was
selected to command the division of the Valley, but we had only
the militia and one mounted regiment within the district
assigned to him. The recent activity of the enemy, the capture
of Romney, etc., required that he should have for prompt service
a body of Confederate troops to coöperate with the militia of
that district. You suggest that such force should be drawn from
the army at the Greenbrier; this was originally considered, and
abandoned, because they could not reach him in time to
anticipate the enemy's concentration, and also because General
Jackson was a stranger to them, and time was wanting for the
growth of that confidence between the commander and his troops,
the value of which need not be urged upon you. We could have
sent to him from this place an equal number of regiments, being
about double the numerical strength of those specified in the
order referred to, but they were parts of a brigade now in the
Army of the Potomac, or were southern troops, and were ignorant
of the country in which they were to serve, and all of them
unknown to General Jackson. The troops sent were his old
brigade, had served in the Valley, and had acquired a reputation
which would give confidence to the people of that region upon
whom the General had to rely for his future success. Though the
troops sent to you are, as you say, 'raw,' they have many able
officers, and will, I doubt not, be found reliable in the hour
of danger. Their greater numbers will to you, I hope, more than
compensate for the experience of those transferred; while, in
the Valley, the latter, by the moral effect their presence will
produce, will more than compensate for the inferiority of their
numbers. I have labored to increase the Army of the Potomac,
and, so far from proposing a reduction of it, did not intend to
rest content with an exchange of equivalents. In addition to the
troops recently sent to you, I expected soon to send further
reënforcements by withdrawing a part of the army from the
Greenbrier Mountains. I have looked hopefully forward to the
time when our army could assume the offensive, and select the
time and place where battles were to be fought, so that ours
should be alternations of activity and repose, theirs the heavy
task of constant watching. When I last visited your
headquarters, my surprise was expressed at the little increase
of your effective force above that of the 21st of July last,
notwithstanding the heavy reënforcements which, in the mean
time, had been sent to you. Since that visit I have frequently
heard of the improved health of the troops, of the return of
many who had been absent sick; and some increase has been made
by reënforcements. You can, then, imagine my disappointment at
the information you give, that, on the day before the date of
your letter, the army at your position was yet no stronger than
on the 21st of July. I can only repeat what has been said to you
in our conference at Fairfax Court-House, that we are restricted
in our capacity to reënforce by the want of arms. Troops to bear
the few arms you have in store have been ordered forward. Your
view of the magnitude of the calamity of defeat of the Army of
the Potomac is entirely concurred in, and every advantage which
is attainable should be seized to increase the power of your
present force. I will do what I can to augment its numbers, but
you must remember that our wants greatly exceed our resources.

"Banks's brigade, we learn, has left the position occupied when
I last saw you. Sickles is said to be yet in the lower Potomac,
and, when your means will enable you to reach him, I still hope
he may be crushed.

"I will show this reply to the Secretary of War, and hope there
will be no misunderstanding between you in future. The success
of the army requires harmonious coöperation.

"Very respectfully, etc.,

"Jefferson Davis."

After General Jackson commenced his march, the cold became unexpectedly severe, and, as he ascended into the mountainous region, the slopes were covered with ice, which impeded his progress, the more because his horses were smooth-shod; but his tenacity of purpose, fidelity, and daring, too well known to need commendation, triumphed over every obstacle, and he attained his object, drove the enemy from Romney and its surroundings, took possession of the place, and prevented the threatened concentration. Having accomplished this purpose, and being assured that the enemy had abandoned that section of country, he returned with his old brigade to the Valley of the Shenandoah, leaving the balance of his command at Romney. General Loring, the senior officer there present, and many others of the command so left, appealed to the War Department to be withdrawn. Their arguments were, as well as I remember, these: that the troops, being from the South, were unaccustomed to, and unprepared for, the rigors of a mountain winter; that they were strangers to the people of that section; that the position had no military strength, and, at the approach of spring, would be accessible to the enemy by roads leading from various quarters.

After some preliminary action, an order was issued from the War Office directing the troops to retire to the Valley. As that order has been the subject of no little complaint, both by civil and military functionaries, my letter to the General commanding the department, in explanation of the act of the Secretary of War, is hereto annexed:

"Richmond, Virginia, _February_ 14, 1862.

"General J. E. Johnston, _commanding Department of Northern
Virginia, Centreville, Virginia_.

"General: I have received your letter of the 5th instant. While
I admit the propriety in all cases of transmitting orders
through you to those under your command, it is not surprising
that the Secretary of War should, in a case requiring prompt
action, have departed from this, the usual method, in view of
the fact that he had failed more than once in having his
instructions carried out when forwarded to you in the proper
manner. You will remember that you were directed, on account of
the painful reports received at the War Department in relation
to the command at Romney, to repair to that place, and, after
the needful examination, to give the orders proper in the case.
You sent your adjutant- (inspector?) general, and I am informed
that he went no farther than Winchester, to which point the
commander of the expedition had withdrawn; leaving the troops,
for whom anxiety had been excited, at Romney. Had you given your
personal attention to the case, you must be assured that the
confidence reposed in you would have prevented the Secretary
from taking any action before your report had been received. In
the absence of such security, he was further moved by what was
deemed reliable information, that a large force of the enemy was
concentrating to capture the troops at Romney, and by official
report that place had no natural strength and little strategic
importance. To insure concert of action in the defense of our
Potomac frontier, it was thought best to place all the forces
for this object under one command. The reasons which originally
induced the adding of the Valley district to your department
exist in full force at present, and I can not, therefore, agree
to its separation from your command.

"I will visit the Army of the Potomac as soon as other
engagements will permit, although I can not realize your
complimentary assurance that great good to the army will result
from it; nor can I anticipate the precise time when it will be
practicable to leave my duties here.

"Very respectfully and truly yours,

"Jefferson Davis."

To complaints by General Johnston that the discipline of his army was interfered with by irregular action of the Secretary of War, and its numerical strength diminished by furloughs granted directly by the War Department, I replied, after making inquiry at the War Office, by a letter, a copy of which is hereto annexed:

"Richmond, Virginia, _March_ 4, 1862.

"General J. E. Johnston, _Centreville, Virginia_.