Chapter VII (2)

"Upon arriving there (McLean's Ford), I found General Jones had
returned to the intrenchments with his brigade, and I was
informed by him that General Beauregard had directed that I
should join him (General Beauregard) with my brigade.... He then
asked me if I had received an order from General Beauregard to
go to him, and, on my replying in the negative, he informed me
that he had such an order for me in a note to him. He sent to
one of his staff-officers for the note, and showed it to me. The
note was one directing him to fall back behind Bull Run, and was
in pencil. At the foot of it were these words: 'Send Early to
me.' This was all the order that I received to move to the left,
and it was shown to me a very little after twelve o'clock....
Chisholm, who carried the note to Jones, in which was contained
the order I received, passed me at McLean's Ford going on to
Jones about, or a little after, eleven o'clock. If I had not
received the order until 2 P. M., it would have been impossible
for me to get on the field at the time I reached it, about 3.30
P. M. Colonel Chisholm informed me that the order was for all
the troops to fall back across Bull Run.... I was met by Colonel
John S. Preston, one of the General's aides, who informed me
that General Beauregard had gone where the fighting was ... but
that General Johnston was just in front, and his directions were
that we should proceed to the left, where there was a heavy fire
of musketry.... When we reached General Johnston, he expressed
great gratification at our arrival, but it was very perceptible
that his anticipations were not sanguine. He gave me special
instructions as to my movements, directing me to clear our lines
completely before going to the front.... In some fields on the
left of our line we found Colonel Stuart with a body of cavalry
and some pieces of artillery, belonging, as I understood, to a
battery commanded by Lieutenant Beckham.... I found Stuart
already in position beyond our extreme left, and, as I
understood it, supporting and controlling Beckham's guns, which
were firing on the enemy's extreme right flank, thus rendering
very efficient service. I feel well assured that Stuart had but
_two_ companies of cavalry with him, as these were all I saw
when he afterward went in pursuit of the enemy. As I approached
the left, a young man named Saunders came galloping to me from
Stuart with the information that the enemy was about retreating,
and a request to hurry on. This was the first word of
encouragement we had received since we reached the vicinity of
the battle. I told the messenger to inform Stuart that I was
then moving as rapidly as my men could move; but he soon
returned with another message informing me that the other was a
mistake, that the enemy had merely retired behind the ridge in
front to form a new flanking column, and cautioning me to be on
my guard. This last information proved to be correct. It was the
last effort of the enemy to extend his right beyond our left,
and was met by the formation of my regiments in his front....
The hill on which the enemy's troops were was Chinn's Hill, so
often referred to in the accounts of this battle, and the one
next year, on the same field.... An officer came to me in a
gallop, and entreated me not to fire on the troops in front, and
I was so much impressed by his earnest manner and confident
tone, that I halted my brigade on the side of the hill, and rode
to the top of it, when I discovered, about a hundred and fifty
yards to my right, a regiment bearing a flag which was drooping
around the staff in such a manner as not to be distinguishable
from the Confederate flag of that day. I thought that, if the
one that had been in front of me was a Virginia regiment, this
must also be a Confederate one; but one or two shots from
Beckham's guns on the left caused the regiment to face about,
when its flag unfurled, and I discovered it to be the United
States flag. I forthwith ordered my brigade forward, but it did
not reach the top of the hill soon enough to do any damage to
the retiring regiment, which retreated precipitately down the
hill and across the Warrenton Pike. At that time there was very
little distinction between the dress of some of the Federal
regiments and some of ours. As soon as the misrepresentation in
regard to the character of the troops was corrected, my brigade
advanced to the top of the hill that had been occupied by the
enemy, and we ascertained that his troops had retired
precipitately, and a large body of them was discovered in the
fields in rear of Dogan's house, and north of the turnpike.
Colonel Cocke, with one of his regiments, now joined us, and our
pieces of artillery were advanced and fired upon the enemy's
columns with considerable effect, causing them to disperse, and
we soon discovered that they were in full retreat.... When my
column was seen by General Beauregard, he at first thought it
was a column of the enemy, having received erroneous information
that such a column was on the Manassas Gap Railroad. The enemy
took my troops, as they approached his right, for a large body
of our troops from the Valley; and as my men, moving by flank,
were stretched out at considerable length, from weariness, they
were greatly over-estimated. We scared the enemy worse than we
hurt him....

"We saw the evidences of the flight all along our march, and
unmistakable indications of the overwhelming character of the
enemy's defeat in abandoned muskets and equipments. It was
impossible for me to pursue the enemy farther, as well because I
was utterly unacquainted with the crossings of the Run and the
woods in front, as because most of the men belonging to my
brigade had been marching the greater part of the day and were
very much exhausted. But pursuit with infantry would have been
unavailing, as the enemy's troops retreated with such rapidity
that they could not have been overtaken by any other than
mounted troops. On the next day we found a great many articles
that the routed troops had abandoned in their flight, showing
that no expense or trouble had been spared by the enemy in
equipping his army.... In my movement after the retreat of the
enemy commenced, I passed the Carter house and beyond our line
of battle. The enemy had by this time entirely disappeared, and,
having no knowledge of the country whatever, being on the ground
for the first time, besides not observing any movement of troops
from our line, I halted, with the expectation of receiving
further orders. Observing some men near the Carter house, I rode
to it, and found some five or six Federal soldiers, who had
collected some wounded there of both sides, and among them
Colonel Gardner, of the Eighth Georgia Regiment, who was
suffering from a very painful wound in the leg, which was
fractured just above the ankle.... Just after my return from the
house where I saw Colonel Gardner, President Davis, in company
with several gentlemen, rode to where my command was, and
addressed a few stirring remarks to my regiments, in succession,
which received him with great enthusiasm.

"I briefly informed Mr. Davis of the orders I had received, and
the movements of my brigade, and asked him what I should do
under the circumstances. He told me that I had better get my men
into line, and wait for further orders. I then requested him to
inform Generals Johnston and Beauregard of my position, and my
desire to receive orders. I also informed him of the condition
in which I had found Colonel Gardner, and also of Colonel Jones
being in the neighborhood badly wounded, requesting him to have
a surgeon sent to their relief, as all of mine were in the rear
attending to the wounded of their regiments. While we were
talking, we saw a body of troops moving on the opposite side of
Bull Run, some distance below us.

"Mr. Davis then left me, going to the house where Colonel
Gardner was, and I moved my brigade some half a mile farther,
and formed it in line across the peninsula formed by a very
considerable bend in Bull Run above the stone bridge. I put out
a line of pickets in front, and my brigade bivouacked in this
position for the night. By the time all these dispositions were
made it was night, and I then rode back with Captain Gardner
over the route I had moved on, as I knew no other, in order to
find General Johnston or General Beauregard, so that I might
receive orders, supposing that there would be a forward movement
early in the morning. I first went to the Lewis house, which I
found to be a hospital filled with wounded men; but was unable
to get any information about either of the generals. I then rode
toward Manassas, and, after going some distance in that
direction, I met an officer who inquired for General Johnston,
stating that he was on his staff. I informed him that I was
looking for General Johnston also, as well as for General
Beauregard, and supposed they were at Manassas; but he said that
he was just from Manassas, and neither of the generals was
there.... At about twelve o'clock at night I lay down in the
field in rear of my command, on a couple of bundles of wheat in
the straw. My men had no rations with them. I had picked up a
haversack on the field, which was filled with hard biscuits, and
had been dropped by some Yankee in his flight, and out of its
contents I made my own supper, distributing the rest among a
number of officers who had nothing.

"Very early next morning, I sent Captain Gardner to look out for
the generals, and get orders for my command. He went to
Manassas, and found General Beauregard, who sent orders to me to
remain where I was until further orders, and to send for the
camp-equipage, rations, etc., of my command. A number of the men
spread over the country in the vicinity of the battlefield, and
picked up a great many knapsacks, India-rubber cloths, blankets,
overcoats, etc., as well as a good deal of sugar, coffee, and
other provisions that had been abandoned by the enemy....

"After I had received orders showing that there was no purpose
to make a forward movement, I rode over a good deal of the
field, north of the Warrenton pike, and to some hospitals in the
vicinity, in order to see what care was being taken of the
wounded. I found a hospital on the Sudley road, back of the
field of battle, at which Colonel Jones, of the Fourth Alabama,
had been, which was in charge of a surgeon of a Rhode Island
regiment, whose name was Harris, I think. I asked him if he had
what he wanted for the men under his care, and he told me he
would like to have some morphine, of which his supply was short.
I directed a young surgeon of our cavalry, who rode up at the
time, to furnish the morphine, which he did, from a pair of
medical saddle-pockets which he had. Dr. Harris told me that he
knew that their troops had had a great deal of coffee and sugar
mixed, ready for boiling, of which a good deal had been left at
different points near the field, and asked if there would be any
objection to his sending out and gathering some of it for the
use of the wounded under his charge, as it would be of much
service to them. I gave him the permission to get not only that,
but anything else that would tend to the comfort of his
patients. There did not come within my observation any instance
of harsh or unkind treatment of the enemy's wounded; nor did I
see any indication of a spirit to extend such treatment to them.
The stories which were afterward told before the Committee on
the Conduct of the War (appointed by the Federal Congress), in
regard to 'rebel atrocities,' were very grossly exaggerated, or
manufactured from the whole cloth....

"On the night following the battle, when I was looking for
Generals Beauregard and Johnston, in riding over and to the rear
of the battle-field, I discovered that the greater part of the
troops that had been engaged in the battle were in a great state
of confusion. I saw companies looking for their regiments, and
squads looking for their companies, and they were scattered as
far as I went toward Manassas. It was very apparent that no
considerable body of those troops that had been engaged on the
left could have been brought into a condition next day for an
advance toward Washington....

"The dispute as to who planned the battle, or commanded on the
field, General Johnston or General Beauregard, is a most
unprofitable one. The battle which General Beauregard planned
was never fought, because the enemy did not move as he expected
him to move. The battle which was fought was planned by
McDowell, at least so far as the ground on which it was fought
was concerned. He made a movement on our left which was wholly
unexpected and unprovided for, and we were compelled to fight a
defensive battle on that flank, by bringing up reënforcements
from other points as rapidly as possible. When Generals Johnston
and Beauregard arrived on the field where the battle was
actually fought, it had been progressing for some time, with the
odds greatly against us. What was required then was to rally the
troops already engaged, which had been considerably shattered,
and hold the position to which they had been compelled to retire
until reënforcements could be brought up. According to the
statements of both generals, the command of the troops then on
the field was given to General Beauregard, and he continued to
exercise it until the close, but in subordination, of course, to
General Johnston, as commander-in-chief, while the movements of
all the reënforcements as they arrived were unquestionably
directed by the latter. According to the statement of both, the
movement of Elzey's brigade to the left averted a great danger,
and both concur in attributing the turning of the tide of battle
to the movement of my brigade against the enemy's extreme right
flank (General Beauregard in a letter on the origin of the
battle-flag, and General Johnston in his 'Narrative' recently
published).

"General Beauregard unquestionably performed the duty assigned
him with great ability, and General Johnston gives him full
credit therefor. Where, then, is there any room for a
controversy in regard to the actual command, and what profit can
there be in it?

"General Johnston assumes the responsibility for the failure to
advance on Washington, and why, then, should an effort be made
to shift it on any one else? He certainly was
commander-in-chief, and had the privilege of advancing if he
thought proper. The attempt to show that the failure to advance
was due to the want of transportation and rations for the army
is idle. If the Bull Run bridge had not been burned on the 18th,
our supplies could have been run to Alexandria, if we could have
advanced, as easily as to Manassas, for the enemy had repaired
the railroad to Fairfax Station as he moved up, and failed to
destroy it when he went back. Moreover, we had abundant
transportation at that time for all the purposes of an advance
as far as Washington. In my brigade, the two Virginia regiments
had about fourteen six-horse wagons each, and that would have
furnished enough for the brigade, if the Seventh Louisiana had
none. In 1862 we carried into Maryland only enough wagons to
convey ammunition, medical supplies, and cooking-utensils, and
we started from the battle-field of second Manassas with no
rations on hand, being, before we crossed the Potomac, entirely
dependent on the country, which, in July, 1861, was teeming with
supplies, but in August and September, 1862, was nearly
depleted. The pretense, therefore, that the advance in July,
1861, was prevented by the want of transportation and of
supplies is wholly untenable."

I will now make the promised extracts from reminiscences of Colonel (then Captain) Lay, which were sent to a friend, and handed to me for my use. The paper bears date February 13, 1878. After some preliminary matter, and stating that his force consisted of three cavalry companies, the narrative proceeds:

"I was under orders to be in the saddle at 6.30 A. M., July 21,
1861, and to report immediately to General Beauregard at his
headquarters. About 7.30 A. M. I accompanied him and General
Johnston to a position near to Mitchell's Ford, where for some
hours we remained under an active fire of the long-range guns of
the enemy upon the opposite hills. When the unexpected flank
movement of the enemy was developed, with the generals named, we
rode at rapid speed to the left, when General Beauregard
immediately rode to the front, General Johnston taking position
near and to the left of the Lewis house.... About 3.15 P. M.,
Captain R. Lindsey Walker, with his battery, took position to
the left and in front of the Lewis house and commenced firing. I
was near him when the shot from his battery was fired, and
watched its effect as it swept through the columns of the enemy,
producing perfect confusion and demoralization.... I rode to
join my brother, Colonel Lay, whom I saw going toward my command
from General Johnston. He reported to me that General Johnston
said: 'Now is your time; push the pursuit.' I started at once on
a trot, was passing General Johnston, who gave some orders, and
I understood him to say, 'Salute the President in passing.' ...
I saluted, and passed on at a gallop.

"I halted at Bull Run to water my horses--then suffering--and to
confer a moment or two with my gallant old commander, General
Philip St. George Cocke.

"I passed on, ... when to my astonishment I saw the President
near me in the orchard. I immediately rode up to him, and said
that he was much farther forward than he should be; that the
forces of the enemy were not entirely broken, and very few of
our troops in front of the Run, and advised him to retire; that
I was then about to charge....

"We made the charge; a small body of the enemy broke before we
reached them, and scattered, and the larger body of troops
beyond proved to be of our own troops rapidly advancing upon our
left.... After parting from the President, I pushed on to Sudley
Church, and far beyond. Sent my surgeon, Dr. Randolph Barksdale,
to Captains Tillinghast, Ricketts, and other badly wounded
United States officers, and was going on until a superior force
should stop me, but was recalled by an order and returned over
the field to my quarters at Manassas a little before daylight--I
and my little gallant squadron--having been actively in the
saddle, I think, more than twenty hours....

(Signed) "John F. Lay,

_"Late Colonel of Cavalry, C. S. A._

"N.B.: It may be well to add that General R. Lindsey Walker
(then Captain Walker, of the battery referred to) is now in my
office, and confirms my recollection.... J. F. L."

The quartermaster-general of General Beauregard's command, W. L. Cabell, states in a letter written at Dallas, Texas, on the 16th of August, 1880, in regard to the field transportation of General Beauregard's forces before the battle of Manassas, that as nearly as he could remember it was as follows, viz.:

One four-horse wagon to each company.
One " " " for field and staff (regimental).
One " " " " ammunition.
One " " " " hospital purposes.
Two " " wagons " each battery of artillery.
Twenty-five wagons in a train for depot purposes.
One ambulance for each regiment.

Transportation belonging to General Johnston's army did not arrive until the day (or probably two days) after the battle.

If General Johnston, as stated, had nine thousand infantry, the field transportation reported above could surely have been distributed so as to supply this additional force, and have rendered, as General Early states, the pretense wholly untenable that the advance in July, 1861, was prevented by want of transportation.

The deep anxiety which had existed, and was justified by the circumstances, had corresponding gratification among all classes and in all sections of our country. On the day after the victory, the Congress, then sitting in Richmond, upon receiving the dispatch of the President from the field of Manassas, adopted resolutions expressive of their thanks to the most high God, and inviting the people of the Confederate States to offer up their united thanksgiving and praise for the mighty deliverance. The resolutions also deplored the necessity which had caused the soil of our country to be stained with the blood of its sons, and to their families and friends offered the most cordial sympathy; assuring them that in the hearts of our people would be enshrined "the names of the gallant dead as the champions of free and constitutional liberty."

If universal gratulation at our success inspired an overweening confidence, it also begat increased desire to enter the military service; and, but for our want of arms and munitions, we could have enrolled an army little short of the number of able-bodied men in the Confederate States.

I have given so much space to the battle of Manassas because it was the first great action of the war, exciting intense feeling, and producing important moral results among the people of the Confederacy; and further, because it was made the basis of misrepresentation, and unjust reflection upon the chief Executive, which certainly had no plausible pretext in the facts, and can not be referred to a reasonable desire to promote the successful defense of our country.

Impressed with the conviction that time would naturally work to our disadvantage, as training was more necessary to make soldiers of the Northern people than of our own; and further, because of their larger population, as well as their greater facility in obtaining recruits from foreign countries, the Administration continued assiduously to exert every faculty to increase the efficiency of the army by addition to its numbers, by improving its organization, and by supplying the needful munitions and equipments. Inactivity is the prolific source of evil to an army, especially if composed of new levies, who, like ours, had hurried from their homes at their country's call. For these, and other reasons more readily appreciated, it was thought desirable that all our available forces should be employed as actively as might be practicable.

On the 1st of August, 1861, I wrote to General J. E. Johnston, at Manassas, as follows:

"We are anxiously looking for the official reports of the battle
of Manassas, and have present need to know what supplies and
wagons were captured. I wish you would have prepared a statement
of your wants in transportation and supplies of all kinds, to
put your army on a proper footing for active operations....

"I am, as ever, your friend,

(Signed) "Jefferson Davis."

[Footnote 179: The foregoing was copied from "The Land we Love," for February, 1867 (vol. ii, No. 4).]

[Footnote 180: General Beauregard's report.]

[Footnote 181: General McDowell's return, July 16, 17, 1861.]