Chapter II: Preface

This is an attempt to present in a verifiable form some of the issues and the historical causes of the war now waged between Russia and Japan. Powerfully as it appeals to me, I would not have discussed a subject so strange to the proper sphere of my investigation, had it not been for the fact that no one else has, so far as I am aware, undertaken the task in the same spirit in which I have endeavored to write these pages. Although I deeply regret that I do not read the Russian language and cannot do full justice to the Russian side of the question, the impartial reader will observe, I trust, that this work is neither a plea for the one side nor a condemnation of the other, but a mere exposition of the subject-matter as I comprehend it. When the author offers what he considers a natural explanation of a question, the reader should not read into it a moral judgment. Indeed, I earnestly wish that the kind reader would thrash out of these pages every grain of real prejudice. Nor can I welcome a greater favor from any person than a more complete and just statement of Russia’s case than I have been able to make. After having said so much, it is unnecessary to tell the reader how, when the substance of the introductory chapter to this volume was published last May in the _Yale Review_, some of its critics ascribed to the writer motives utterly foreign to himself. One of those alleged motives was that I had sought to prove that the American trading interest in Manchuria and Korea would be better served by a final victory of Japan than by that of Russia. I neither proved nor disproved such a theme, but I did state that Japan’s interest demanded the maintenance in those regions of the principle of the impartial opportunity for all nations. Whether the result of this policy would prove better or worse for the interest of any one nation than the effect of an exclusive policy, did not concern me. It did not and does not belong to me to appeal to the commercial instinct of the reader, or even to his sympathy with, or antipathy to, either of the present belligerents. My only plea is that for truth.

The substance of the introductory chapter, as has been said, and also a brief summary of the body of the volume have been published in the _Yale Review_ for May and August of the present year. I am greatly indebted to the editors of the _Review_ for allowing me to use the material in the preparation of this work. I also wish to express my sincere thanks to my friends who have encouraged me in the publication of this volume.

ASAKAWA.

HANOVER, NEW HAMPSHIRE,
August 30, 1904.

CONTENTS

PAGE

INTRODUCTORY 1

Economic issues: (1) Japan’s side; transition from an
agricultural to an industrial stage, pp. 1–10; community of
interest between Japan and Korea and Manchuria, 10–32. (2)
Russia’s side, 32–47; comparison, 47–48; political issues,
48–51; summary, 51–53; conclusion, 53–61.

Supplementary Note 61

CHAPTER I. Retrocession of the Liao-tung Peninsula 65

Primorsk and Sakhalien, 65–67; intervention of 1895, 68–77;
its historical significance, 77–78; its effects on Japan,
78–82.

CHAPTER II. The “Cassini Convention” and the Railway Agreement 83

The Russo-French loan and the Russo-Chinese Bank, 83–85; the
agreement of alliance, 85–87; the “Cassini Convention,”
87–95; the railway agreement of September 8, and statutes of
December 23, 1896, 95–100.

CHAPTER III. Kiao-chau 101

The seizure of Kiao-chau, and the Agreement of March 6, 1898,
101–105; the conduct of Great Britain, 106–109.

CHAPTER IV. Port Arthur and Talien-wan 110

Russian warships at Port Arthur, 111–112; British demand for
the opening of Talien-wan, 113–118; Port Arthur and
Talien-wan, the British and Russian Governments, 118–125;
Wei-hai-Wei, 125–129; the Agreement of March 27, 1898, and
supplementary agreements, 129–132; the administration of the
leased territory, and Dalny, 132–134.

CHAPTER V. Secretary Hay’s Circular Note 135

The circular of September, 1899, 135; the Powers’ replies,
136–138.

CHAPTER VI. The Occupation of Manchuria 139

Russia’s attitude toward the Boxer trouble in North China,
139–143; the Manchurian campaign, 143–146.

CHAPTER VII. North China and Manchuria 147

Characteristics of Russia’s diplomacy regarding Manchuria,
147–148; the distinction made between North China and
Manchuria; the circular note of August 25, 1900, 148–155.

CHAPTER VIII. The Anglo-German Agreement 156

The Northern Railway affair, 156–157; the Anglo-German
Agreement of October 16, 1900, 157–158; the Powers’ views,
158–160; Germany’s view, 160–161.

CHAPTER IX. A _Modus Vivendi_: the Alexieff-Tsêng Agreement 162

Peace negotiations at Peking, and Russia’s Manchurian policy,
162–165; the Alexieff-Tsêng Agreement of November, 1900,
165–168; the protests of the Powers, 168–169; Count
Lamsdorff’s explanation, 169–172.

CHAPTER X. A “Starting-Point”—the Lamsdorff-Yang-yu Convention 173

The Lamsdorff-Yang-yu Convention, 173–176; China’s appeal,
and the Powers’ protests, 176–178; Russia detached herself
from the allies, 178–181; the amendments of March, 1901,
181–182; the British and Japanese remonstrances, and
withdrawal of Russian demands, 182–188.

CHAPTER XI. Further Demands 189

M. Lessar’s demands in August, 189–190; in October, 190–193;
protests, replies, and delays, 193–196.

CHAPTER XII. The Anglo-Japanese Agreement and the Russo-French
Declaration 197

A growing sympathy between Great Britain and Japan prior to
the conclusion of the agreement, 197, 198; diplomatic steps
toward the conclusion, 199–202; the Agreement of January 30,
1902, 202–209; the Russo-French declaration of March 16,
209–213.

CHAPTER XIII. The Convention of Evacuation 214

The Russo-Chinese convention of April 8, 1902, 214–226; an
analysis of the document, 226–232.

CHAPTER XIV. The Evacuation 233

The first evacuation, October 8, 1902, 233; the nominal
character of the evacuation, 234–237; Niu-chwang, 237–238.

CHAPTER XV. Demands in Seven Articles 239

The second evacuation, 239–241; new Russian demands, April 5,
1903, 241–244; the opposition of three Powers to the demands,
244–246; Count Lamsdorff’s disclaimer, 246–248; Count
Cassini’s statement, 248–251; diplomacy at Peking, 251–256.

CHAPTER XVI. Diplomatic Struggle in Korea, I 257

Japan’s failure and Russia’s success at Seul, the murder of
the Queen, 257–261; the flight of the King, 262–263; the
Yamagata-Lobanoff Protocol, June 6, and the Komura-Waeber
Memorandum, May 14, 1896, 263–268; a decline of Russian
influence, 268–271; the Nishi-Rosen Protocol, April 25, 1898,
271–272.

CHAPTER XVII. Diplomatic Struggle in Korea, II 273

Pavloff and Hayashi, 273; the Masampo affair, 274–278;
abortive loans, 278–280; Russians and pro-Russian Koreans at
Seul, 280; the bank-note trouble, 281–282; the Keyserling
whaling concession, 282–283; the Tumên River telegraph lines,
283–285; the Seul-Wiju Railway, 285–289; the Yong-am-po
affair, 289–295.

CHAPTER XVIII. The Russo-Japanese Negotiations, I 296

Japan’s invitation to negotiate, July 28, 1903, 296–299;
Russia’s assent, 299; political changes in Russia, and the
Viceroy of the Far East, 299–302; Japan’s first proposals,
August 12, 302–307; negotiations transferred to Tokio,
307–308; Russia’s first counter-proposals, October 3,
308–311; Russian diplomacy at Peking, 311–318; the
development of the Yong-am-po affair, 318–323.