Chapter XIX: The Russo-Japanese Negotiations, II

The Russian counter-note having been received on October 3, Baron Komura began to confer with Baron Rosen upon the basis of both the Japanese note and the Russian reply.[629] Meanwhile, the Japanese statesmen again held deliberations on the 10th and 24th of October,[630] and agreed upon the “irreducible minimum,” which was accordingly communicated to the Russian Minister on the 30th in the form of the following note:—

“1. Mutual engagement to respect the independence and territorial
integrity of the Chinese and Korean Empires.

“2. Recognition by Russia of Japan’s preponderating interests in
Korea, and of the right of Japan to give to Korea advice and
assistance, including military assistance, tending to improve the
administration of the Korean Empire.

“3. Engagement on the part of Russia not to impede the development
of the commercial and industrial activities of Japan in Korea, nor
to oppose any measures taken for the purpose of protecting those
interests.

“4. Recognition by Russia of the right of Japan to send troops to
Korea for the purpose mentioned in the preceding Article, or for the
purpose of suppressing insurrection or disorder calculated to create
international complications.

“5. Engagement on the part of Japan not to undertake on the coasts
of Korea any military works capable of menacing the freedom of
navigation in the Korean Straits.

“6. Mutual engagement to establish a neutral zone on the
Korean-Manchurian frontier extending fifty kilometres on each side,
into which zone neither of the contracting parties shall introduce
troops without the consent of the other.

“7. Recognition by Japan that Manchuria is outside her sphere of
special interest, and recognition by Russia that Korea is outside
her sphere of special interest.

“8. Recognition by Japan of Russia’s special interests in Manchuria,
and of the right of Russia to take such measures as may be necessary
for the protection of those interests.

“9. Engagement on the part of Japan not to interfere with the
commercial and residential rights and immunities belonging to Russia
in virtue of her treaty engagements with Korea, and engagement on
the part of Russia not to interfere with the commercial and
residential rights and immunities belonging to Japan in virtue of
her treaty engagements with China.

“10. Mutual engagement not to impede the connection of the Korean
Railway and the Eastern Chinese Railway when those railways shall
have been eventually extended to the Yalu.

“11. This Agreement to supplant all previous Agreements between
Japan and Russia respecting Korea.”[631]

It will be seen from this note that Japan made several important concessions. These naturally fall under three classes: concessions made to an expressed wish of Russia; those in which desires of Russia were changed from a one-sided into a reciprocal form; and those made voluntarily on the part of Japan. To the first class belongs the free passage of the Korean Straits (Article 5), while the neutralization of territory on both sides of the northern frontier (Article 6), and the mutual declaration that Korea was beyond the sphere of the “special” interests of Russia, and Manchuria of Japan (Article 7), may be said to fall under the second class. Purely voluntary concessions may be said to consist of the tenth Article regarding the Eastern Chinese and Korean Railways meeting on the Yalu, and a part of the eighth Article, in which the “special” interests—not necessarily in the railway work alone, as in the first Japanese note—of Russia in Manchuria were unequivocally recognized. Other Articles are largely identical with those of the first note, except the new ninth Article, which embodied the matter-of-fact principle that the treaty rights of Russia in Korea, and of Japan in Manchuria, should be mutually respected. Taken as a whole—with the only exception regarding the preponderating interests of Japan in Korea, and the natural wishes of Japan arising from this peculiar situation, the former of which had been wholly,[632] and the latter partially,[633] recognized by Russia—the prevailing characteristic of the second Japanese note may be said to be its reciprocal nature. The special interests of Russia[634] in Manchuria counterbalanced the preponderant interests of Japan in Korea,[635] and each other’s right to take necessary measures to protect those interests was recognized.[636] At the same time, Manchuria was declared as far beyond the sphere of Japanese special interests as was Korea of the Russian,[637] while, on the other hand, the treaty rights of Russia in Korea, and of Japan in Manchuria, were to be respected as a matter of course.[638] If Russia was requested not to impede the economic activity of the Japanese in Korea,[639] Japan also agreed not to fortify the Korean coast.[640] The case of the neutral zone[641] need not be repeated. In spite, however, of the reciprocal nature of the note, it is unnecessary to say, so long as the control of the Eastern policy of Russia remained in the same hands as before, she could hardly be expected to acquiesce in the Japanese proposals.[642]

As has been said, the second note was handed by Baron Komura to Baron Rosen on October 30. To this note, after a repeated application from Japan for a speedy answer,[643] Russia replied only on December 11, or more than forty days after the receipt of the Japanese note. This second reply of Russia[644] was as much a reduction of her former concessions as was the second note of Japan an increase upon hers; for Russia was now entirely silent on the subject of Manchuria, and, regarding Korea, repeated the restrictions proposed in September, as if the second Japanese note had never reached her, besides refusing to recognize Japan’s right to give Korea anything beyond mere advice for the reform of her civil administration. In short, the second counter-note was equivalent to the first _minus_ the clauses regarding Manchuria and Japan’s right to assist Korea in the latter’s reform. The possibility of a reconciliation of the views of the two Powers now appeared remoter than before. If the exact contents of the reply had been publicly shown to the Japanese people, it would have been extremely difficult for the Katsura Cabinet to control their resentment against what would have been regarded under the circumstances as a deliberate insult to their country.

After another meeting of the Cabinet members and Councilors on the 16th, Baron Komura made one more attempt to appeal to the friendly sentiment of the Russian Government. The nature of the third Japanese overture will be seen from the following dispatch, telegraphed by the Baron to Mr. Kurino on the 21st:—

“In my interview with the Russian Minister on December 21, I pointed
out that, between our original proposals and the new Russian
counter-proposals, there was a fundamental difference concerning the
geographical sphere of the understanding. After fully explaining how
the Imperial Government had come to consider it desirable, in the
general interest, to include in the proposed understanding all the
regions in the Extreme East where the interests of the two Empires
met, I expressed the hope that the Russian Government would
reconsider their position regarding that branch of the question. I
also informed him, in detail, of the amendments which the Imperial
Government considered it necessary to introduce into Russia’s new
counter-proposals. Accordingly, in order to remove every possibility
of misunderstanding on the part of Russia respecting the attitude of
the Imperial Government, you are instructed to deliver to Count
Lamsdorff a _note verbale_ to the following effect:—

“‘The Imperial Government have examined with great care the new
Russian counter-proposals of the 11th instant. They regret that the
Russian Government did not agree to extend the compass of the
suggested understanding over the territory whose inclusion was
deemed essential by Japan.

“‘The Imperial Government, in their original proposition to the
Russian Government in August last, endeavored to make it entirely
clear that they desired, with a view to remove from the
Japanese-Russian relations every cause for future misunderstanding,
to bring within the purview of the proposed arrangement all those
regions in the Extreme East where the interests of the two Empires
met. They cannot believe that a full realization of that desire
could be expected if a large and important section of those regions
was wholly excluded from the understanding. Accordingly, the
Imperial Government feel constrained to ask the Russian Government
to reconsider their position on the subject, and they hope that the
Russian Government will be able to see their way to arrive at a
satisfactory solution of the question.

MR. KURINO

_Late Japanese Minister at St. Petersburg_
]

“‘The Imperial Government also find it necessary to ask for the
following amendments to the new Russian counter-proposals:—

“‘_a._ ARTICLE II. to read: Recognition by Russia of Japan’s
preponderating interests in Korea, and of the right of Japan to give
Korea advice and assistance tending to improve the administration of
the Korean Empire;

“‘_b._ ARTICLE V. to read: Mutual engagement not to undertake on the
Korean coast any military works capable of menacing the freedom of
navigation in the Korean Straits; and

“‘_c._ ARTICLE VI. to be suppressed.

“‘Not only as the main points of these amendments cannot be said to
be in excess of the modifications which were agreed to _ad
referendum_ at Tokio, but also as the Imperial Government considered
those changes indispensable, it is believed that they will receive
the ready agreement of the Russian Government.’

“In presenting the foregoing note to Count Lamsdorff, you will say
that I have spoken to Minister Rosen in a similar sense, and you
will also express the desire for a prompt reply.”[645]

Mr. Kurino carried out his instructions on December 23, and telegraphed on the same day to Baron Komura: “... He [Count Lamsdorff] told me he had received a telegram from Minister Rosen, stating that the latter had had an interview with Baron Komura, and that particulars would follow; but such particulars had not yet been received by him [the Count.][646] When I handed him the _note verbale_, he received it, and said that he would do his best to send the Russian answer at the earliest possible date; but added that he would have to communicate with Viceroy Alexieff. In conclusion I stated to the Count that, under existing circumstances, it might cause serious difficulties, even complications, if we failed to come to an _entente_, and I hoped he would exercise his best influence so as to enable us to reach the desired end.”[647]

When Minister Kurino saw Count Lamsdorff on January 1, 1904, the latter, as he had been persistently doing during the past few days, remarked that he saw no reason why an _entente_ could not be arrived at, for Minister Rosen would soon be instructed to proceed with the negotiations in a friendly and conciliatory spirit.[648] Other statements of the same pacific nature were frequently made, not only by the Count, but also by the Czar, and were circulated through the press and foreign telegraphic service. When, however, the reply of Russia[649] reached Tokio on January 6, it was found that here again, as in the first reply of September last, the recognition by Japan of Manchuria and its coast as beyond her sphere of interest—the word “special” not preceding the last word—was insisted upon, while, as before, no mention was made of the territorial integrity of China in Manchuria. As regards the equal opportunity for the enterprise of other nations, it should be noted that Russia now agreed to insert a clause not to obstruct the enjoyment by Japan and other Powers of the treaty rights which they had acquired from China in regard to Manchuria, but only on the condition of maintaining the clauses on the neutral zone in Korea and the non-employment by Japan of any part of Korea for strategical purposes. Moreover, the treaty rights of other Powers in Manchuria, which Russia would respect, explicitly excluded those concerning the foreign settlements in the open ports,[650] thus again evincing her exclusive policy. Over and above these considerations, it should be remembered that, as has been pointed out by Baron Komura,[651] the treaty rights which China had accorded to other Powers could not be maintained if her sovereignty in Manchuria, the existence of which Russia declined to assure Japan that she would respect, should cease.[652]

In a few days there took place an important event which made the Russian position untenable. The Chinese-American[653] and Chinese-Japanese[654] commercial treaties which had been concluded on October 8, 1903,[655] the date appointed for the final evacuation of Manchuria, were ratified on January 11, 1904, the former opening to the world’s trade Mukden and An-tung, and the latter, Mukden and Tatung-kao, thus not only multiplying the treaty rights, including rights of foreign settlements, of Japan and the United States in Manchuria, but also forcibly reinstating the sovereign rights of the Chinese Empire in the territory, and directly reversing the exclusive claims of Russia therein. It will be recalled that Russia had recently seized Mukden, and had been strengthening her forces upon the Yalu, on which the other two new ports were situated. The United States Government, immediately upon the ratification of the treaty, appointed Consuls for the three new open ports.

To return to the Russo-Japanese negotiations. Thus far notes and replies, exchanged three times within a period of five months, must have made the position of each negotiating Power perfectly clear to the other. No further discussion could possibly bring the two Governments nearer to a reconciliation of wishes so diametrically opposed. In the mean time, the Japanese people were suffering from enormous economic losses. A large part of their raw materials had ceased to come, the shipping and trade with Korea and Northern China had declined, the fishing industry had been paralyzed, and, contrary to the tendency at normal times, the banks had been embarrassed with an over-abundance of funds.[656] On the other hand, Russia, while circulating the optimistic views of her Emperor and Foreign Minister, had continued her sharp diplomacy at Seul and Peking, and pushed on land and sea her vast warlike preparations in the East.[657]

Even then the Japanese Government would not terminate its negotiations with Russia, for it was well aware that upon the conduct of these negotiations the peace of the East depended. If the principles proposed by Japan were not accepted, the integrity of China would be threatened, and the independence of Korea, as well as the vital interest of Japan, would be profoundly endangered; thus the entire future of the Far East would be plunged into unknown perils. Under these circumstances, it seemed that Japan owed to the world as much of patience, as she owed to herself of determination. The situation was gravely discussed by the statesmen on the 11th, and before the Throne again on the 12th.[658] On the next day, January 13, now for the fourth time, and against the wishes of the majority of the people, the Government of Tokio reminded Russia of the serious position in which the two Powers found themselves, and begged her to reconsider the situation. Observe the following telegram of the same date from Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino:—

“You are instructed to deliver to Count Lamsdorff the following
_note verbale_ in order to confirm to him the views I have
communicated to Baron Rosen on the 13th January:—

“‘The Imperial Government, with a view to arriving at a pacific
solution of the pending questions, and to firmly establishing for
all time the basis of good relations between the two Powers, as well
as to protect the rights and interests of Japan, have, from this
point of view, given most careful and serious consideration to the
reply of the Russian Government which was delivered by his
Excellency Baron Rosen on the 26th instant. They have finally come
to the conclusion that the following modifications are necessary, i.
e.:—

“1. ‘Suppression of the first clause of Article 5 of the Russian
counter-proposals (presented to the Japanese Government through
Baron Rosen on December 11), that is to say, not to use any part of
Korean territory for strategical purposes.

“2. ‘Suppression of the whole Article (6) concerning establishment
of a neutral zone.

“3. ‘The Russian proposal concerning Manchuria to be agreed to with
the following modifications:—

“_a._ ‘Recognition by Japan of Manchuria and its littoral as being
outside her sphere of interest, and an engagement on the part of
Russia to respect the territorial integrity of China in Manchuria.

“_b._ ‘Russia, within the limits of Manchuria, will not impede Japan
nor other Powers in the enjoyment of rights and privileges acquired
by them under the existing treaties with China.

“_c._ ‘Recognition by Russia of Korea and its littoral as being
outside her sphere of interest.

“4. ‘Addition of an Article to the following effect: Recognition by
Japan of Russia’s special interests in Manchuria, and of the right
of Russia to take measures necessary for the protection of those
interests.

“‘The grounds for these amendments having been frequently and fully
explained on previous occasions, the Imperial Government do not
think it necessary to repeat the explanations, beyond expressing
their earnest hope for reconsideration by the Russian Government. It
is sufficient to say that the suppression of the clause excluding
the establishment of settlements in Manchuria is desired because it
conflicts with stipulations of the new commercial treaty between
Japan and China. In this respect, however, Japan will be satisfied
if she receives equal treatment with other Powers which have already
acquired similar rights in regard to settlements....

“‘Finally, the above-mentioned amendments being proposed by the
Imperial Government entirely in a spirit of conciliation, it is
expected that they will be received with the same spirit at the
hands of the Russian Government; and the Imperial Government further
hope for an early reply from the Russian Government, since further
delay in the solution of the question will be extremely
disadvantageous to the two countries.’”[659]

An early reply was urged by Mr. Kurino at least four times,[660] but, even so late as February 1, Count Lamsdorff declined even to name the date on which his reply would be given;[661] and, indeed, the reply[662] which was being framed was found later to have contained substantially the same points as the three previous replies—points some of which had been repeatedly and unequivocally demonstrated to be entirely irreconcilable with the vital interests of Japan. Just at this time, the activity of the Russian forces in the East seemed to have been accelerated: on January 21, numbers of infantry and artillery left Port Arthur and Dalny for the Korean frontier, soon to be followed by contingents from Liao-yang; on the 28th, Viceroy Alexieff ordered the troops on the Yalu to be placed upon a war footing; on February 1, the Governor of Vladivostok warned the Japanese Commercial Agent at the port to prepare for withdrawing his compatriots to Habarofsk, as he had received instructions from his Government and was ready to proclaim martial law at any time; and, on the 3d, all the war-vessels located at Port Arthur, excepting one, steamed out of the harbor.[663]

It was now considered by the Japanese Government that the critical point had been reached. The Cabinet members and Privy Councilors held a conference on February 3, and again, on the next day, before the Throne. On February 5, at 2 P. M., two notes were telegraphed to Mr. Kurino, the one communicating Japan’s decision to break off negotiations which had not been met with proper consideration and had become useless, and to reserve to herself the right to pursue an independent course of action, in order to safeguard her interests and rights and to protect her position menaced by Russia; and the other stating that Japan had been obliged to sever her now valueless diplomatic relations with the Russian Government. We subjoin the entire texts of the telegraphic messages from Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino inclosing the above-mentioned notes:—

“Further prolongation of the present situation being intolerable,
the Imperial Government have decided to terminate the pending
negotiations, and to take such independent action as they may deem
necessary to defend our position menaced by Russia, and to protect
our rights and interests. Accordingly you are instructed,
immediately upon receipt of this telegram, to address to Count
Lamsdorff the following signed note:—

“‘The Undersigned, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, has the honor, in pursuance of
instructions from his Government, to address to His Excellency the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of His Majesty the Emperor of all the
Russias the following communications:—

“‘The Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan regard the
independence and territorial integrity of Korea as essential to the
repose and safety of their own country, and they are consequently
unable to view with indifference any action tending to render the
position of Korea insecure.

“‘The obstinate rejections by the Russian Government, by means of
amendments impossible of agreement, of Japan’s proposals respecting
Korea, the adoption of which the Imperial Government regard as
indispensable to assure the existence of the Korean Empire and to
safeguard Japan’s preponderating interests in the peninsula; and the
obstinate refusals of Russia to enter into an engagement to respect
China’s territorial integrity in Manchuria, which is seriously
menaced by the continued occupation of the province, notwithstanding
Russia’s treaty engagements with China and her repeated assurances
to other Powers possessing interests in those regions—have made it
necessary for the Imperial Government seriously to consider what
measures of self-defense they are called upon to take.

“‘In spite of Russia’s repeated delays to reply without intelligible
reasons, and of her naval and military activities, irreconcilable
with pacific aims, the Imperial Government have exercised during the
present negotiations a degree of forbearance which they believe
affords sufficient proof of their loyal desire to remove from their
relations with the Russian Government every cause for future
misunderstanding. But finding in their efforts no prospect of
securing from the Russian Government an adhesion either to Japan’s
moderate and unselfish proposals or to any other proposals likely to
establish a firm and enduring peace in the Far East, the Imperial
Government have no other alternative than to terminate the present
futile negotiations.

“‘In adopting this course, the Imperial Government reserve to
themselves the right to take such independent action as they may
deem best to consolidate and defend their menaced position, as well
as to protect the acquired rights and legitimate interests of the
Empire.

“‘The Undersigned, etc., etc.’”[664]

“You are instructed to address to Count Lamsdorff a signed note to
the following effect, simultaneously with the note mentioned in my
other telegram:—

“‘The Undersigned, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, has the honor, in pursuance of
instructions from his Government, to address to His Excellency the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of his Majesty the Emperor of all the
Russias the following communications:—

“‘Having exhausted without effect every means of conciliation with a
view to remove from their relations with the Imperial Russian
Government every cause for future complications, and finding that
their just representations and moderate and unselfish proposals made
in the interest of a firm and lasting peace in the Far East are not
receiving due consideration, and that their diplomatic relations
with the Russian Government have for these reasons ceased to possess
any value, the Imperial Government of Japan have resolved to sever
those diplomatic relations.

“‘In the further fulfillment of the command of his Government, the
Undersigned has also the honor to announce to his Excellency Count
Lamsdorff that it is his intention to take his departure from St.
Petersburg with the staff of the Imperial Legation on the ... day.

“‘The Undersigned, etc., etc.’”[665]

These notes were transmitted by the Japanese Minister to Count Lamsdorff on February 6, at 4 P. M., Baron Rosen having already been informed by Baron Komura of the severance of the negotiations and general diplomatic relations between the two Powers.[666] The first naval engagement occurred at Chemulpo two days later, followed by the naval battle at Port Arthur on the night of February 8–9, and, on the 10th, war was formally declared by the Emperors of both Powers. The Russian Sovereign’s manifesto, which appeared in the _Official Messenger_, said:—

“We proclaim to all our faithful subjects that, in our solicitude
for the preservation of that peace so dear to our heart, we have put
forth every effort to assure tranquillity in the Far East. To these
pacific ends we declared our assent to the revision, proposed by the
Japanese Government, of the agreements existing between the two
Empires concerning Korean affairs. The negotiations initiated on
this subject were, however, not brought to a conclusion, and Japan,
not even awaiting the arrival of our last reply and the proposals of
our Government, informed us of the rupture of the negotiations and
of diplomatic relations with Russia.

“Without previously notifying us that the rupture of such relations
implied the beginning of warlike action, the Japanese Government
ordered its torpedo-boats to make a sudden attack on our squadron in
the outer roadstead of the fortress of Port Arthur. After receiving
the report of our Viceroy on the subject, we at once commanded
Japan’s challenge to be replied to by arms.

“While proclaiming this our resolve, we, in unshakable confidence in
the help of the Almighty, and firmly trusting in the unanimous
readiness of all our faithful subjects to defend the Fatherland
together with ourselves, invoke God’s blessing on our glorious
forces of the army and navy.”[667]

The Japanese Imperial Rescript, countersigned by all the members of the Cabinet, and declaring war against Russia, read as follows:—

“We, by the Grace of Heaven, the Emperor of Japan, seated on the
Throne occupied by the same dynasty from time immemorial, do hereby
make proclamation to all our loyal and brave subjects:—

“We hereby declare war against Russia. We command our army and navy
to carry on hostilities against her with all their strength, and we
also command all our officials to make effort, in pursuance of their
duties and in accordance with their powers, to attain the national
aim, with all the means within the limits of the law of nations.

“We deem it essential to international relations, and make it our
constant aim, to promote the pacific progress of our Empire in
civilization, to strengthen our friendly ties with other States, and
thereby to establish a state of things which would maintain enduring
peace in the East, and assure the future security of our Empire
without injury to the rights and interests of other Powers. Our
officials also perform their duties in obedience to our will, so
that our relations with all Powers grow steadily in cordiality.

BARON DE ROSEN

_Late Russian Minister at Tokio_
]

“It is thus entirely against our wishes that we have unhappily come
to open hostilities against Russia.

“The integrity of Korea has long been a matter of the gravest
concern to our Empire, not only because of the traditional relations
between the two countries, but because the separate existence of
Korea is essential to the safety of our Empire. Nevertheless,
Russia, despite her explicit treaty pledges to China and her
repeated assurances to other Powers, is still in occupation of
Manchuria, and has consolidated and strengthened her hold upon it,
and is bent upon its final absorption. Since the possession of
Manchuria by Russia would render it impossible to maintain the
integrity of Korea, and would, in addition, compel the abandonment
of all hope for peace in the Far East, we expected, in these
circumstances, to settle the question by negotiations and secure
thereby a permanent peace. With this object in view, our officials
by our order made proposals to Russia, and frequent conferences were
held during the last half year. Russia, however, never met such
proposals in a spirit of conciliation, but by her prolonged delays
put off the settlement of the pending question, and, by ostensibly
advocating peace on the one hand, and on the other secretly
extending her naval and military preparations, sought to bring about
our acquiescence. It is not possible in the least to admit that
Russia had from the first a sincere desire for peace. She has
rejected the proposals of our Empire; the safety of Korea is in
danger; the interests of our Empire are menaced. At this crisis, the
guarantees for the future which the Empire has sought to secure by
peaceful negotiations can now only be sought by an appeal to arms.

“It is our earnest wishes that, by the loyalty and valor of our
faithful subjects, peace may soon be permanently restored and the
glory of our Empire preserved.”[668]

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE TO CHAPTER XIX

In view of the singular circumstances under which the war broke out, it would be a matter of permanent interest to the student of international law to observe the difference of opinion which arose between the contending Powers respecting the legality of opening hostilities before war was formally declared, and also respecting the so-called neutrality of Korea. We reproduce below, without comment, the charges of Russia and replies of Japan regarding these subjects.

On February 18, the Russian Government issued the following official _communiqué_:—

“Eight days have now elapsed since all Russia was shaken with
profound indignation against an enemy who suddenly broke off
negotiations, and, by a treacherous attack, endeavored to obtain an
easy success in a war long desired. The Russian nation, with natural
impatience, desires prompt vengeance, and feverishly awaits news
from the Far East. The unity and strength of the Russian people
leave no room for doubt that Japan will receive the chastisement she
deserves for her treachery and her provocation of war at a time when
our beloved Sovereign desired to maintain peace among all nations.

“The conditions under which hostilities are being carried on compel
us to wait with patience for news of the success of our troops,
which cannot occur before decisive actions have been fought by the
Russian army. The distance of the territory now attacked and the
desire of the Czar to maintain peace were causes of the
impossibility of preparations for war being made a long time in
advance. Much time is now necessary in order to strike at Japan
blows worthy of the dignity and might of Russia, and, while sparing
as much as possible the shedding of blood of her children, to
inflict just chastisement on the nation which has provoked the
struggle.

“Russia must await the event in patience, being sure that our army
will avenge that provocation a hundredfold. Operations on land must
not be expected for some time yet, and we cannot obtain early news
from the theatre of war. The useless shedding of blood is unworthy
of the greatness and power of Russia. Our country displays such
unity and desire for self-sacrifice on behalf of the national cause
that all true news from the scene of hostilities will be immediately
due to the entire nation.”[669]

On February 20, the _Official Messenger_ published the following account of the termination of the diplomatic relations between the two Powers:—

“On January 16, after receipt of the last Japanese proposals, the
Russian Imperial Government at once proceeded to examine them. On
January 25 Mr. Kurino, the Japanese Minister at St. Petersburg, in
reply to his inquiry, was informed that the Czar had intrusted the
consideration of these proposals to a special conference, which was
to meet on January 28, and that his Majesty’s decision would
probably not be given before February 2.[670] On the last-named date
the Czar gave orders to prepare a draft of definite instructions for
the Russian Minister at Tokio on the basis of the deliberations of
the special conference. On the day following, three telegrams were
dispatched to Viceroy Alexieff, containing the full text of a draft
statement, the reasons which prompted the Russian Government in
making some modifications in the Japanese proposals, and the general
instructions for the Russian Minister at Tokio concerning the
presentation of the reply to the Japanese Government. In order to
save time, identical telegrams were sent direct to Baron Rosen.

“On February 4, forty-eight hours before the receipt of the news of
the rupture of diplomatic relations by Japan, Count Lamsdorff
notified the Japanese Minister of the dispatch to Baron Rosen of the
Russian proposals in reply to the Japanese note.[671] On February 5,
a message arrived from the Viceroy stating that he had heard from
the Baron that the latter had received the Russian reply. On the
6th, at four o’clock in the afternoon, the Japanese Minister, quite
unexpectedly, handed to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs two
notes, the first of which notified the rupture of negotiations on
the pretext that Russia was evading a reply[672] to the Japanese
proposals, while the second announced the breaking off of diplomatic
relations, and added that the Japanese Minister, with the staff of
the Legation, would leave St. Petersburg on the 10th. These notes
were accompanied by a private letter from the Japanese Minister to
Count Lamsdorff, in which the hope was expressed that the rupture of
diplomatic relations would be confined to as short a time as
possible.

“On the same day, Admiral Alexieff, Baron Rosen, and all the Russian
Representatives in Peking, Tokio, and the capitals of the great
Powers were informed by urgent telegrams of the rupture of
diplomatic relations with Japan and the issue of our Imperial order
for the withdrawal of the Russian Legation from Tokio. The said
circular dispatch laid the responsibility of all consequences that
might ensue on the Japanese Government.[673]

“Although the breaking off of diplomatic relations by no means
implies the opening of hostilities, the Japanese Government, as
early as the night of the 8th, and in the course of the 9th and
10th, committed a whole series of revolting attacks on Russian
warships and merchantmen, attended by a violation of international
law. The decree of the Emperor of Japan on the subject of the
declaration of war against Russia was not issued until the 11th
instant.”[674]

The substance of the reply of the Japanese Government to these notes, of which the following is a free translation, was made public through the press on March 3:—

“The Russian Government, by their notes published on February 18 and
20, charged Japan with unexpectedly attacking, and gaining a
treacherous victory over, the forces of Russia, a Power anxious to
maintain peace, and stated that the severance of diplomatic
relations by no means implied the opening of hostilities, and that,
although Japan declared war only on February 11, she had since the
8th made revolting attacks upon Russian war-vessels and merchantmen
and conducted herself in violation of principles of international
law.

“That, however, Russia did not sincerely desire peace may be readily
seen from the fact that she never in any manner met the negotiations
of Japan in a conciliatory spirit, but put off the solution of the
pending question by prolonged delays, and, at the same time,
diligently extended her naval and military preparations. Since
Russia failed in April, 1903, to carry out her pledge respecting the
second part of her evacuation of Manchuria, the facts concerning the
increase of Russian forces in the Far East have been as follows:—

“The following war-vessels were added:—

3 battleships 38,488 tons
1 armored cruiser 7,726
5 cruisers 26,417
7 torpedo-destroyers 2,450
1 gunboat 1,334
2 torpedo-tenders 6,000
— ——————
Total, 19 vessels 82,415 tons

“Besides these, Russia sent by rail to Port Arthur material for
framing torpedo-destroyers, of which seven had already been made,
and armed two volunteer fleet steamboats at Vladivostok and hoisted
the naval flag upon them.

“Moreover, Russia dispatched one battleship, three cruisers, seven
torpedo-destroyers, and four torpedo-boats, aggregating about 37,040
tons, which were on their way to the East. The total of all these
vessels would therefore reach the tonnage of about 113,000 tons.

“As regards the increased land forces, Russia, beginning with the
two brigades of infantry, two battalions of artillery, and certain
numbers of cavalry and of the commissariat, which she sent to China
on June 29, 1903, under the pretext of making experiment of the
carrying capacity of the Siberian Railway, continually dispatched
troops to the Far East, until there were already, at the beginning
of February of this year, more than 40,000 soldiers. Russia was
further preparing to send, in case of necessity, over 200,000 more
soldiers.

“Simultaneously, Russia hastened her work through day and night in
building new forts at the naval harbors of Port Arthur and
Vladivostok; repaired fortifications at Kun-chun, Liao-yang, and
other strategic points; sent to the Far East by the volunteer fleet
and the Siberian Railway large quantities of arms and ammunition;
and, so early as the middle of October, 1903, fourteen trains
carrying field-hospital equipment left Russia in great haste. From
these data, one may conclude that Russia had not the least desire
for conciliation, but sought to coerce Japan by force of arms.

“The military activity of Russia was further accelerated from the
end of January. On the 21st of January, about two battalions of the
infantry and some of the artillery were sent from Port Arthur and
Talien to the northern frontier of Korea; on the 28th, Viceroy
Alexieff ordered the Russian troops near the Yalu to be placed on a
war footing; on February 1, the Governor of Vladivostok asked the
Japanese Commercial Agent at the port to prepare to withdraw to
Habarofsk the Japanese subjects residing there, as the Governor was,
under instructions from his Government, ready at any time to
proclaim martial law; all the capable warships at Port Arthur,
except one battleship under repair, steamed out to sea; and army
forces were continually leaving Liao-yang toward the Yalu. Who can
say that Russia had neither desire nor preparation for war? Under
these critical circumstances, rendering another day’s delay
inadmissible, Japan was compelled to break off the useless
negotiations and take necessary measures of self-protection. The
responsibility of provoking war does not rest upon Japan, but, on
the contrary, entirely upon Russia.

“Moreover, Japan notified Russia, on February 6, that she would
terminate her negotiations with Russia, and take such independent
action as she deemed best in order to defend her position menaced by
Russia and protect her interests, as well as that the diplomatic
relations with Russia were severed and the Japanese Legation would
withdraw from St. Petersburg. An independent action implies all,
including, as a matter of course, the opening of hostile acts. Even
if Russia were unable to understand it, Japan had no reason to hold
herself responsible for the misunderstandings of Russia. The
students of the international law all agree that a declaration of
war is not a necessary condition for beginning hostilities, and it
has been customary in modern warfare for the declaration to follow
the opening of the war. The action of Japan had, therefore, no
ground for censure in international law. It is singular that the
censure should come, as it did, from Russia, for historical
instances are not few in which she opened hostile acts without
declaring war. In 1808, she moved troops to Finland even before
diplomatic relations were severed.”[675]

* * * * *

By far the most important document containing Russian charges against Japan was the following circular addressed by Count Lamsdorff, on February 11, to the Russian Representatives abroad:—

“Since the rupture of the negotiations between Russia and Japan, the
attitude of the Tokio Cabinet has constituted an open violation of
all customary laws governing the mutual relations of civilized
nations.

“Without specifying each particular violation of these laws on the
part of Japan, the Imperial Government considers it necessary to
draw the most serious attention of the Powers to the acts of
violence committed by the Japanese Government with respect to Korea.

“The independence and integrity of Korea, as a fully independent
Empire, have been fully recognized by all the Powers, and the
inviolability of this fundamental principle was confirmed by Article
1 of the Shimonoseki treaty, and by the agreement especially
concluded for this purpose between Japan and Great Britain on
January 30, 1902, as well as by the Franco-Russian declaration of
March 16, 1902.

“The Emperor of Korea, foreseeing the danger of a possible conflict
between Russia and Japan, addressed, early in January, 1904, a note
to all the Powers, declaring his determination to preserve the
strictest neutrality. This declaration was received with
satisfaction by the Powers, and it was ratified by Russia. According
to the Russian Minister to Korea, the British Government, which had
signed the above-mentioned treaty with Japan on January 30, 1902,
charged the British diplomatic Representative at Seul to present an
official note to the Emperor of Korea, thanking him for his
declaration of neutrality.[676]

“In disregard of all these facts, in spite of all treaties, in spite
of its obligations, and in violation of the fundamental rules of
international law, it has been proved by exact and fully confirmed
facts that the Japanese Government,

“1. Before the opening of hostilities against Russia, landed its
troops in the independent Empire of Korea, which had declared its
neutrality.

“2. With a division of its fleet made a sudden attack on February
8—that is, three days prior to the declaration of war—on two Russian
warships in the neutral port of Chemulpo. The commanders of these
ships had not been notified of the severance of diplomatic
relations, as the Japanese maliciously stopped the delivery of
Russian telegrams by the Danish cable and destroyed the telegraphic
communication of the Korean Government. The details of this
dastardly attack are contained and published in an official telegram
from the Russian Minister at Seul.

“3. In spite of the international laws above mentioned, and shortly
before the opening of hostilities, the Japanese captured as prizes
of war certain Russian merchant ships in the neutral ports of Korea.

“4. Japan declared to the Emperor of Korea, through the Japanese
Minister at Seul, that Korea would henceforth be under Japanese
administration, and she warned the Emperor that in case of his
non-compliance, Japanese troops would occupy the palace.

“5. Through the French Minister at Seul she summoned the Russian
Representative at the Korean Court to leave the country, with the
staffs of the Russian Legation and Consulate.

“Recognizing that all of the above facts constitute a flagrant
breach of international law, the Imperial Government considers it to
be its duty to lodge a protest with all the Powers against this
procedure of the Japanese Government, and it is firmly convinced
that all the Powers, valuing the principles which guarantee their
relations, will agree with the Russian attitude.

“At the same time, the Imperial Government considers it necessary to
issue a timely warning that, owing to Japan’s illegal assumption of
power in Korea, the Government declares all orders and declarations
which may be issued on the part of the Korean Government to be
invalid.

“I beg you to communicate this document to the Government to which
you are accredited.

“LAMSDORFF.”[677]

In reply to the above, the Japanese Government issued, on March 9, the following statement:—

“The Russian Government are understood to have recently addressed a
note to the Powers, in which the Japanese Government are charged
with having committed certain acts in Korea which are considered by
Russia to be in violation of international law, and in which Russia
further declares all future orders and declarations of the Korean
Government to be invalid.

“The Imperial Government do not find it necessary in the present
instance to concern themselves in any way with views, opinions, or
declarations of the Russian Government, but they believe it to be
their right and duty to correct misstatements of facts which, if
permitted to remain uncontradicted, might give rise in the opinion
of neutral Powers to incorrect inferences and conclusions.

“Accordingly, the Imperial Government desire to make the following
statement respecting the five acts which are declared, in the
Russian note above referred to, to be fully proved and confirmed
facts:—

“1. The Imperial Government admit that a number of Japanese troops
landed in Korea before the formal declaration of war was issued by
Japan, but they must say that such landing did not take place before
a state of war actually existed between Japan and Russia. The
maintenance of the independence and territorial integrity of Korea
is one of the objects of war, and, therefore, the dispatch of troops
to the menaced territory was a matter of right and necessity, which,
moreover, had the distinct consent of the Korean Government. The
Imperial Government, therefore, drew a sharp distinction between the
landing of the Japanese troops in Korea in the actual circumstances
of the case and the sending of large bodies of Russian troops to
Manchuria without the consent of China while peaceful negotiations
were still in progress.

“2. The Imperial Government declare that the Russian allegation that
they stopped the delivery of Russian telegrams by the Danish cable
and destroyed the Korean Government’s telegraphic communication is
wholly untrue. No such acts were done by the Imperial Government.

“Regarding the alleged sudden attack, on February 8 last, upon two
Russian men-of-war in the port of Chemulpo, it is only necessary to
say that a state of war then existed, and that, Korea having
consented to the landing of Japanese troops at Chemulpo, that harbor
had already ceased to be a neutral port, at least as between the
belligerents.

“3. The Imperial Government have established a Prize Court, with
full authority to pronounce finally on the question of the legality
of seizures of merchant vessels. Accordingly, they deem it
manifestly out of place to make any statement on their part
regarding the Russian assertion that they unlawfully captured as
prizes of war the Russian merchantmen which were in the ports of
Korea.

“4. The Russian Government allege that the Japanese Government
declared to the Emperor of Korea through their Minister at Seul that
Korea would henceforth be under Japanese administration, and warned
the Emperor that, in case of non-compliance, Japanese troops would
occupy the palace. The Imperial Government declare this charge to be
absolutely and wholly without foundation.

“5. No demand, either direct or indirect, was addressed by the
Japanese Government to the Russian Minister at Seul to retire from
Korea. The fact is as follows:—

“On February 10 last, the French _Chargé d’Affaires_ at Seul called
on the Japanese Minister there and informed him, as it was confirmed
afterwards in writing, that it was the desire of the Russian
Minister to leave Korea, and asked the opinion of the Japanese
Minister on the subject. The Japanese Minister replied that, if the
Russian Minister would withdraw in a peaceful manner, taking with
him his staff and the Legation guard, he would be fully protected by
Japanese troops. So he withdrew of his own free will on the 12th of
the same month, and an escort of Japanese soldiers was furnished for
him as far as Chemulpo.[678]

“The Russian allegation that the Japanese Government forwarded a
summons through the French Representative in Korea to the Russian
Minister to leave Korea is, therefore, not true. In this connection
it may be remarked that the Russian Consul at Fusan remained at his
post as late as until February 28 last. It is reported that he was
compelled to stay so long owing to the absence of instructions which
the Russian Minister apparently did not think of giving to the
Consul before his own departure from Seul. When it was known that
necessary instructions had at last reached the Russian Consul, and
that he desired to leave Fusan as soon as possible, the Japanese
Consul at the same port offered him every facility for the
departure, and his passage to Shanghai _via_ Japan was arranged by
the Japanese Consul.”[679]

In reply to the above, the Russian Government issued another statement justifying its position, the purport of which may be gathered from the following press dispatch:—

“ST. PETERSBURG, March 12—2:50 P. M. The following reply, inspired
by the Foreign Office, to Japan’s rejoinder to the Russian protest
against the violation of Korean neutrality may be accepted as
official:—

“Japan’s argument that she was justified in landing troops in Korea
before the declaration of war because she had Korea’s permission,
and also that these troops arrived in Korea after ‘the existence of
a state of war,’ is without value, as Korea in January promulgated
her neutrality to the Powers, which received it warmly, Great
Britain even officially conveying expressions of gratitude to the
Korean Government. Therefore, no state of war gave the Japanese the
right to violate her neutrality by landing troops in her territory.
Even the consent of Korea, though extorted by the Japanese, is
without force, from the fact that the dispatch of troops was not
only before the war, but before the breaking off of diplomatic
relations, as clearly established and indeed acknowledged by the
Japanese themselves.

“Japan’s contention in defense of the attack on the Russian ships at
Chemulpo, that the port was not neutral on February 9, is false,
again because Korea had proclaimed her neutrality.

“Japan’s denial of malicious interference with the transmission of
Russian telegrams over the Danish cable cannot be sustained. A
telegram to Baron Rosen (then Russian Minister to Japan), at Tokio,
sent from St. Petersburg February 4, was not delivered till the
morning of February 7. That delay did not occur on the Siberian
line, as was shown by the fact that a reply to a telegram from
Viceroy Alexieff sent at the same time was received the same day.
Therefore, it is conclusive that the Rosen telegram was held by the
Japanese and not delivered for two days.

“Communication with M. Pavloff (then Russian Minister to Korea) by
the Korean telegraph ceased in the middle of January. As the Koreans
were enjoying friendly relations with Russia, there is good ground
for believing that the interruption was due to the Japanese.
Thereafter M. Pavloff used a mail steamer or a special warship to
communicate with Port Arthur. The Minister of Russia at Seul
February 8, therefore, knew nothing of the diplomatic rupture.

“Japan pleads that the charge against her seizure of Russian
merchantmen before the declaration of war cannot lie after the
establishment of prize courts. Their seizure before the declaration
of war being piracy is not defensible by the establishment of prize
courts, which cannot exist before a declaration of war. The steamer
‘Russia’ was seized in the waters of Southern Korea even before M.
Kurino had presented his note here.

“The reply concludes: ‘Our information regarding Japan’s
announcement that in future Korea would be under her administration
came from M. Pavloff and also from the Representative of a friendly
Power at Seul. Japan’s denial, consequently, is fruitless, as also
is the attempt to refute our statement that the Russian Minister and
Consul at Seul were told to leave. We had conclusive proof in St.
Petersburg on February 10 that the French Minister at Seul had
officially notified our Representatives that the Japanese Government
had intimated that they should leave, and that the Japanese had
occupied territory in Korea. M. Pavloff was unable to notify our
Consul at Fusan, his telegram being refused at the telegraph
office.’”

-----

Footnote 629:

_N.-R._, Nos. 18, 19, 20, 21.

Footnote 630:

The Japanese dailies.

Footnote 631:

_N.-R._, No. 22.

Footnote 632:

In Article 3 of the Nishi-Rosen Protocol of 1898, and in Article 2 of
the Russian counter-note of October 3.

Footnote 633:

See the same Article of the counter-note.

Footnote 634:

Article 8.

Footnote 635:

Article 2.

Footnote 636:

Articles 4 and 8.

Footnote 637:

Article 7.

Footnote 638:

Article 9.

Footnote 639:

Article 3, made necessary from the past experience in Korea.

Footnote 640:

Article 5.

Footnote 641:

Article 6.

Footnote 642:

Observe the following passage from the explanatory note issued by the
Foreign Office at St. Petersburg on February 9, 1904:—

“Last year, the Tokio Cabinet, under the pretext of establishing the
balance of power and a more settled order of things on the shores of
the Pacific, submitted to the Imperial Government a proposal for a
revision of the existing treaties _with Korea_. Russia consented, and
Viceroy Alexieff was charged to draw up a project for a new
understanding with Japan in coöperation with the Russian Minister at
Tokio, who was intrusted with the negotiations with the Japanese
Government. Although the exchange of views with the Tokio Cabinet on
this subject was of a friendly character, Japanese social circles and
the local and foreign press attempted in every way to produce a
warlike ferment among the Japanese, and to drive the Government into
an armed conflict with Russia. Under the influence thereof, the _Tokio
Cabinet began to formulate greater and greater demands in the
negotiations_, at the same time taking most extensive measures to make
the country ready for war.” (The italics are the author’s.)

Footnote 643:

_N.-R._, Nos. 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33.

Footnote 644:

The second reply was as follows:—

“1. Mutual engagement to respect the independence and territorial
integrity of the Korean Empire.

“2. Recognition by Russia of Japan’s preponderating interest in Korea,
and of the right of Japan to assist Korea with advice tending to
improve her civil administration.

“3. Engagement on the part of Russia not to oppose the development of
the industrial and commercial activities of Japan in Korea, nor the
adoption of measures for the protection of those interests.

“4. Recognition by Russia of the right of Japan to send troops to
Korea for the purpose mentioned in the preceding Article, or for the
purpose of suppressing insurrections or disorders liable to create
international complications.

“5. Mutual engagement not to make use of any part of the Korean
territory for strategical purposes, and not to undertake on the Korean
coast any military works capable of menacing the freedom of navigation
in the Korean Straits.

“6. Mutual engagement to consider the territory of Korea to the north
of the thirty-ninth parallel as a neutral zone, within the limits of
which neither of the contracting parties shall introduce troops.

“7. Mutual engagement not to impede the connection of the Korean and
Eastern Chinese Railways, when those railways shall have been extended
to the Yalu.

“8. Abrogation of all previous agreements between Russia and Japan
respecting Korea.”—_N.-R._, No. 34.

Footnote 645:

_N.-R._, No. 35.

Footnote 646:

Is it probable that Baron Rosen consulted Viceroy Alexieff by
telegraph before he did Count Lamsdorff?

Footnote 647:

_N.-R._, No. 36.

Footnote 648:

_Ibid._, No. 38.

Footnote 649:

The Russian counter-note was as follows:—

“Having no objection to the amendments to Article 2 of the Russian
counter-proposals as proposed by the Imperial Japanese Government, the
Russian Government considers it necessary:—

“1. To maintain the original wording of Article 5, which had already
been agreed to by the Imperial Japanese Government, that is to say,
‘mutual engagement not to use any part of the territory of Korea for
strategical purposes, not to undertake on the coasts of Korea any
military works capable of menacing the freedom of navigation in the
Korean Straits.’ [The Japanese Government had, as was pointed out by
Baron Komura in the dispatch No. 39, never agreed to the first half of
Article 5.]

“2. To maintain Article 6 concerning a neutral zone (this for the very
purpose which the Imperial Japanese Government has likewise in view,
that is to say, to eliminate everything that might lead to
misunderstanding in the future; a similar zone, for example, exists
between the Russian and British possessions in Central Asia).

“In case the above conditions are agreed to, the Russian Government
would be prepared to include in the projected agreement an article of
the following tenor:—

“‘Recognition by Japan of Manchuria and her littoral as being outside
her sphere of interests, whilst Russia, within the limits of that
province, will not impede Japan nor other Powers in the enjoyment of
the rights and privileges acquired by them under existing treaties
with China, exclusive of the establishment of settlements.’”—_N.-R._,
No. 38.

Footnote 650:

See _British Parliamentary Papers: China, No. 2 (1902)_, Nos. 133,
136, 139, 142.

Footnote 651:

His statements to the journalists on February 10 and at the Lower
House on February 23.

Footnote 652:

It is interesting to note that the Russian Representatives abroad
declared to the Powers about the same time as the third counter-note
was delivered at Tokio, that Russia “had no intention whatever of
placing any obstacle in the way of the continued enjoyment by foreign
Powers of the rights acquired by them [in Manchuria] in virtue of the
treaties now in force.” The exclusion of foreign settlements was not
mentioned, but, judging from the counter-note of January 6, was
implied.

When Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, handed the
memorandum on January 8 to Lord Lansdowne, the latter made
characteristically blunt remarks, as will be seen from the following
dispatch from him to Sir C. Scott: “... I could not help regretting
that Russia should have found it impossible to take even a single step
in pursuance of the policy which she has thus prescribed for herself
[regarding the evacuation of Manchuria]. I trusted that his Excellency
would forgive me for telling him frankly that, in this country, people
were looking for some concrete evidence of Russia’s intention to make
good her promises. An announcement, for example, that Niu-chwang was
to be evacuated at an early date would certainly have a reassuring
effect. So far as I was aware, there was no local difficulty in the
way.”—_China, No. 2 (1904)_, Nos. 162, 163.

Footnote 653:

The text is found in the _Monthly Summary of the Commerce and Finance
of the U. S._ for January, 1904.

Footnote 654:

In the press and the _Kwampō_ of January 20.

Footnote 655:

See pp. 252–254 and 317–318, above.

Footnote 656:

See the _Kwampō_ for February 1 (p. 5), 5 (pp. 110–114), 18 (p. 243),
20 (pp. 280–281); Mr. E. H. Vickers’s letter to the New York _Evening
Post_, March 1; Mr. Soyeda’s address, in the _Kokumin_, February 6;
_ibid._, on the fisheries.

Footnote 657:

According to the estimate of the Japanese Government, Russia increased
her forces in the Far East between April 8, 1903, and the outbreak of
the war, by 19 war-vessels aggregating 82,415 tons, and 40,000
soldiers, besides 200,000 more who were about to be sent. See pp.
352–354, below.

Footnote 658:

The Japanese dailies.

Footnote 659:

_N.-R._, No. 39.

Footnote 660:

_Ibid._, Nos. 40 (January 23), 42 (January 26), 44 (January 28), 46
(January 30). On January 26, Baron Komura again instructed Mr. Kurino
to remind Count Lamsdorff that “in the opinion of the Imperial
Japanese Government, a further prolongation of the present state of
things being calculated to accentuate the gravity of the situation, it
was their earnest hope that they would be honored with an early reply,
and that they wished to know at what time they might expect to receive
the reply.”—No. 42. The probable nature of the forthcoming reply was
also inquired into, without success, even so late as January 30.

Footnote 661:

No. 47. It is unnecessary to point out the various excuses Count
Lamsdorff presented for the delay. One of them was particularly
significant, that is, that the opinions of Viceroy Alexieff and of the
Cabinet Ministers at St. Petersburg had to be harmonized.—_Ibid._

Footnote 662:

Mr. Kurino telegraphed to Baron Komura at 5.05 A. M., February 5:—

“In compliance with the request of Count Lamsdorff, I went to see him
at 8 P. M., February 4. He told me that the substance of the Russian
answer had just been telegraphed to Viceroy Alexieff, to be
transmitted by him to Minister Rosen. The Viceroy might happen to
introduce some changes so as to meet local circumstances; but in all
probability, there would be no such changes. The Count then stated, as
his own opinion, that:—

“‘Russia desired the principle of the independence and integrity of
Korea, and, at the same time, considered the free passage of the
Korean Straits necessary. Though Russia was willing to make every
possible concession, she did not desire to see Korea utilized for
strategic purposes against Russia. He also believed it profitable, for
the consolidation of good relations with Japan, to establish by common
accord a buffer region between confines of direct influence and action
of the two Powers in the Far East.’

“The above was expressed by the Count entirely as his personal
opinion, and, though I cannot be positive, I think that the substance
of the Russian reply must probably be the same.”—_N.-R._, No. 50. Cf.
p. 350, below.

It should be noted that this note from Mr. Kurino reached Tokio at
5.15 P. M., or three hours and a quarter after the Japanese notes
severing relations had been sent.

Count Cassini, in the following striking sentence, includes, among the
contents of the last Russian reply, a point which was not in the least
mentioned in Count Lamsdorff’s personal opinion expressed to Mr.
Kurino. M. Cassini says: “... However, in another effort to bring the
negotiations to a peaceful conclusion, my country did all that dignity
would permit, and _offered to give assurances again that the
sovereignty of the Emperor of China in Manchuria would be
recognized_.”—The _North American Review_ for May, 1904, p. 686.

Footnote 663:

From the reply of the Japanese Government to the Russian charge that
Japan had broken peace and taken Russia by surprise. See pp. 352–353,
below.

It should not be forgotten, at the same time, that Japan had all the
while been taking precautionary measures in the most careful and
exhaustive manner, not only in military and naval affairs, but also in
other matters connected therewith. The difference between the Russian
and Japanese attitude may thus be stated: Russia apparently played the
three-fold game of employing sharp diplomacy at Seul and Peking, of
strengthening her control over Manchuria and the Korean frontier, and
of endeavoring at once to intimidate Japan by vast warlike measures,
and to evade her overtures till she might be compelled to acquiesce in
the situation to be at length perfected by Russia; Japan expressed her
wishes in straightforward language, and relied upon her negotiations
with Russia, which she, in spite of extremely trying circumstances,
conducted with the utmost cordiality and patience, but at the same
time prepared for any emergency in which the unconciliating attitude
of Russia might probably result. It will perhaps be always regretted
by many that the control of Russian diplomacy throughout the
negotiations rested in the hands of those who seemed to fail to grasp
the exact state of Japan’s mind in this greatest crisis of her
national existence.

Footnote 664:

_N.-R._, No. 48.

Footnote 665:

_Ibid._, No. 49.

Footnote 666:

Mr. Kurino left St. Petersburg on the 10th, and the next day saw the
departure of Baron Rosen from Tokio. It was generally believed that
the former had once sincerely desired that a satisfactory agreement
between Russia and Japan should be effected. As for Baron Rosen, every
one surmised that the respected gentleman was little responsible for
the conduct of Russian diplomacy, of which he was regarded as an
unfortunate agent. From a personal point of view, the sudden departure
of both from their posts had something tragic about it, and Baron
Rosen’s situation was deeply sympathized with by the Japanese people.

Footnote 667:

From the English translation in the London _Times_, February 11, 1904,
p. 3.

Footnote 668:

The rescript appeared in the _Kwampō_, February 10, 1904, extra. An
authoritative English translation, which has been slightly altered in
our text in order to bring it nearer to the original language, was
published in the London _Times_, February 12, 1904, p. 3.

Footnote 669:

The London _Times_, February 19, 1904, p. 3.

Footnote 670:

The reports from Mr. Kurino do not agree with this statement of
Russia. According to the former, it was on January 26, not the 25th,
that Count Lamsdorff referred to the conference to be held on the
28th. The date February 2 in this connection does not appear till we
reach Mr. Kurino’s dispatch of January 28. Moreover, on January 30,
the Count told him that he could not tell him the exact date when the
Russian reply would be sent. See _N.-R._, Nos. 43, 45, 47.

Footnote 671:

This is evidently an error. The Count spoke to Mr. Kurino, at 8 p. m.,
February 4, about the probable contents of the reply purely as the
former’s personal opinion. It was not an official statement of the
exact contents of the reply.—_N.-R._, No. 50. See p. 340, above.

Footnote 672:

This statement is incorrect and misleading. Referring to the text of
the Japanese note (pp. 342–344, above), it will be seen that it did
not say that the Japanese Government would break off the negotiations
because Russia had been evading a reply to the Japanese proposals. A
reference was made to the prolonged delays of Russia before giving
replies, but the note did not state that the delays were the only
reason, still less that the delay of “a” reply—i. e., the last
reply—was the ground, for the rupture of negotiations.

Footnote 673:

See a vigorous statement of this charge made by Count Cassini in the
_North American Review_ for May, 1904, pp. 681–682.

Footnote 674:

The London _Times_, February 22, 1904, p. 5.

Footnote 675:

Translated from the statement published in the Japanese press on March
3, 1904.

Professor Sakuye Takahashi enumerated in the _Kokumin_ (February
27–29, 1904) some of the modern European wars in which declarations of
war did not precede the opening of hostilities. He mentioned twelve
such cases between 1715 and 1863, besides ten cases between 1700 and
1853 in which Russia was on the offensive. For these latter instances,
he refers to Colonel J. P. Maurice’s _Hostilities without Declaration
of War_, pp. 12, 16, 22, 34, 38, 49, 50, 55, 64.

Footnote 676:

See p. 322, above.

Footnote 677:

The London _Times_, February 24, 1904, p. 7, and other papers.

Footnote 678:

The diplomatic correspondence in connection with this affair has been
published, in the _Kwampō_, February 15, 1904, pp. 275–276, which
supports the literal truth of the statement contained in this
paragraph.

Footnote 679:

The _Kokumin_ (March 9). The above has been taken from an
authoritative English translation, which was published in the London
_Times_ (March 9), p. 5.