Chapter XX: Chinese Neutrality and Korean Integrity 363 (3)

It is seen that the exportation of food-stuffs was the largest in
value and increasing, while that of manufactured articles was the
smallest (2.5 per cent.) and, to say the least, stationary. Imports
were as follows:—

Food-stuffs Raw material Animals Manufactures Total
1900 79,844 307,402 1,136 183,682 572,064
1901 84,349 288,107 1,495 158,993 532,944
1902 81,409 295,483 1,403 148,800 527,095

The importation of manufactures decreased, but also that of raw
material did not increase, while, as shown above, the exportation of
manufactures was slight and stationary. Figures have been taken from
the _Tsūshō Isan_ for November 25, 1903, which drew them from Russian
official sources.

It is interesting to note the unfavorable conditions of the foreign
trade of Russia’s ally, France, in U. S. Consul Atwell’s report in the
daily _Consular Reports_ for February 24, 1904 (No. 1884), who quotes
from Georges Blondel.

Footnote 99:

See the Supplementary Note to this chapter on pages 61–64.

Footnote 100:

Documents of that time clearly indicate that the discovery of gold in
California and the westward expansion of the American nation, as well
as the growing prospects of the China trade and the increasing
application of steam in navigation, were the motives which prompted
the United States Government to open negotiations with Japan in 1853.

Footnote 101:

To-day there seem to be about 84,500 public schools in Russia, of
which 40,000 are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education
[compared with 30,157 public and private schools in Japan in 1902].
Toward the maintenance of the 40,000 schools, the ministry
appropriates only about $2,000,000, or a little over one eighth of the
annual cost. The teachers number 172,000 [in Japan, 126,703, in 1902],
and pupils and students, 4,568,763 [in Japan in 1902, 5,469,419].
7,250,000 children of school age are without any education [while in
Japan, in 1902, the ratio of attendance to the number of children of
school age was 95.80 per cent. for boys and 87.00 per cent. for girls,
or, on the average, 91.57 per cent.]. See the U. S. daily _Consular
Reports_ for February 8 and March 4, 1902 (Nos. 1871 and 1892), [and
the _Kwampō_, April 8, 1904].

Footnote 102:

As an evidence for this striking state of things the reader is
referred to Dr. E. J. Dillon’s article in the American _Review of
Reviews_ for October, 1904, pp. 449–454. The whole subject should be
more carefully studied than it seems to have been thus far.

Footnote 103:

“The whole northern part of _Asia Minor_, according to the treaty
between Russia and Turkey, is now placed under such conditions that
Russian capitalists have the area open to them, to the exclusion of
foreign enterprise. A situation analogous is found in _Persia_, where
the entire northern portion is acknowledged to be under the exclusive
economic influence of Russia.”—Consul Greener at Vladivostok, in the
U. S. daily _Consular Reports_, April 22, 1903 (No. 1627).

Footnote 104:

For example, the normal freight per ton from Russia to Eastern Siberia
would be about twenty-one rubles, while that from Japan or Shanghai is
three or four rubles. If Russian goods were sold to the artificial
exclusion of articles exported from nearer countries, the consumer’s
burden would be greatly increased.

Footnote 105:

Count Cassini, the present Russian Ambassador at Washington, wrote, in
the _North American Review_ for May, 1904: “... But let us suppose for
argument’s sake that Russia, triumphant in this war, finds herself
dominant in Manchuria. Japan, her enemy, could look for no favors; she
could not expect to find encouragement for the importation of her
manufactures” (p. 688).

Footnote 106:

Continuing, the Count stated: “But Manchuria would require many things
that Russia could not supply, or supply at figures reasonable enough
to create a market. In Russia, agriculture is, comparatively speaking,
more important than manufacturing, and those goods which are made in
my country are not such as Manchuria would need. Russia, too, would be
obliged to use the railway with its high freight tariffs....”—_Ibid._

Footnote 107:

One can seldom find a more outspoken confession of a diplomacy
consisting of a series of deliberate falsehoods than the chapters on
the Russian relations with China, Korea, and Japan, in a diplomatic
history by a Russian writer, as translated in the _Dōbun-kwai Hōkoku_,
Nos. 45, 46, 48, 49, and 50 (August, September, November, and
December, 1903, and January, 1904).

Footnote 108:

The Russian diplomatic historian to whom frequent reference has been
made frankly says that the feebleness and internal disorder of China
are welcome conditions for the expansion of Russian influence in the
Far East, and that it would be the height of folly to displace the
weak China with a colonial possession of a European power.—The
_Dōbun-kwai Hōkoku_, No. 48, p. 36.

Footnote 109:

See p. 55, note 1, above.

Footnote 110:

The _Shiberiya oyobi Manshū_, pp. 221–223.

Footnote 111:

The _Shiberiya oyobi Manshū_, pp. 223–225, 490–495.

Footnote 112:

The _Tsūshō Isan_, July 8, 1903, p. 4.

Footnote 113:

The New York _Evening Post_, January 20, 1903.

Footnote 114:

The U. S. daily _Consular Reports_, April 22, 1903 (No. 1627).

Footnote 115:

The U. S. daily _Consular Reports_, February 24, 1904 (No. 1884).

Footnote 116:

The _North American Review_, May, 1904, p. 688.