Chapter XX: Chinese Neutrality and Korean Integrity 363 (2)

Politically, also, the interests of the two Powers are found to be directly opposed to one another. It has been rightly said that Manchuria is the keynote of the Eastern policy of Russia. Besides its immense wealth still unexploited, Manchuria possesses the great Port Arthur, which is the only nearly ice-free naval outlet for Russia in her vast dominion in Asia, while the 1500 miles of the Manchurian Railway, together with the Great Siberian Railway, connect this important naval station with the army bases in Siberia and European Russia, so that Manchuria alone would seem to be politically more valuable for Russia than the rest of her Asiatic territories. Without Manchuria, Russia would be left inclosed in the ice-bound Siberia, with no naval or commercial outlet during nearly five months of each year. With Manchuria, Russia’s traditional policy, which has repeatedly failed since Peter the Great on the Baltic Sea and other European waters, as also on the Persian Gulf,—the policy of becoming the dominant naval power of the world,—would at last begin to be realized. The very importance of Manchuria for Russia, however, constitutes a serious menace to Japan and to the general peace of the Far East. In the first place, the Russian control of Port Arthur gives her a large measure of control over the water approaches to Peking, while the Mongolian Railway now reported to be in contemplation would bring Russian land forces directly upon the capital of the Chinese Empire. The very integrity of China is threatened, and a more serious disturbance of the peace of the world could hardly be imagined than the general partition and internal outbreaks in China which would follow the fall of Peking under the pressure of Russia from Manchuria and Mongolia. Not less grave is the fact that Manchuria is geographically and historically connected with the Peninsula of Korea,[92] which makes Russia’s occupation of Korea a necessary adjunct of her possession of Manchuria. Geographically considered, there exists no abrupt change from the eastern part of Manchuria to the northern half of Korea,[93] which fact goes far to explain the Russian solicitude to obtain railway and other concessions between the frontier and Seul. Even more serious conditions exist on the southern coast of Korea, which contains the magnificent harbor of Masampo, which constitutes the Gibraltar between the Russian fleets at the ice-bound and remote Vladivostok and the incommodious and not altogether ice-free Port Arthur, with no effective means of connecting them. By controlling this coast, Russia would not merely possess a truly ice-free, and the best naval port to be found in East Asia,[94] but also at last feel secure in Manchuria and complete her Far Eastern design of absorbing Korea and China and pressing down toward India. If, on the contrary, another Power should control Masampo, it would be able to watch the movement of the Russian fleets in their attempts to unite with one another, and also seriously impede the greatest hopes of Russia’s Eastern expansion. From Japan’s standpoint, the Russian occupation of this section of Korea would not only possibly close Korea against her trade and enterprise, but also threaten her own integrity. Only fifty miles away lie the Japanese islands of Tsushima, which Russia has always coveted, and which would have been hers had it not been for the shrewd diplomacy of the late Count Katsu.[95] From Tsushima the mainland of Japan is visible on the eastern horizon, so that the presence of Russia at Masampo would arouse in the heart of Japan the most profound feeling of unrest. Russia must have Masampo, and Japan must not let her have it.

In concluding our discussion of the vital issues, both economical and political, which are at stake, it would seem that Manchuria is for Japan a great market as well as an increasingly important supply region of raw and food products and a field for emigration, while for Russia it is the keynote of her Eastern policy, and economically the most promising of all her Asiatic possessions. On the other hand, Korea is essential for Russia for the completion of her Manchurian policy,[96] and for strengthening enormously her general position in the East. For Japan, Korea is nothing short of one half of her vitality. By the opening or closing, strength or weakness, independence or fall, of Korea, would Japan’s fate as a nation be decided. On the contrary, Russia, with Manchuria and ultimately Korea in her hands, would be able, on the one hand, to build up under her exclusive policy a naval and commercial influence strong enough to enable her to dominate the East, and, on the other, to cripple forever Japan’s ambition as a nation, slowly drive her to starvation and decay, and even politically annex her. From Japan’s point of view, Korea and China must be left open freely to the economic enterprise of herself and others alike, and, in order to effect that end, they must remain independent and become stronger by their internal development and reform.[97] Russia’s interests are intelligible, as are Japan’s, but unfortunately their desires are antagonistic to each other, so that a conflict between an open and an exclusive policy is rendered inevitable. The series of events during the past decades, particularly since 1895, which we shall narrate in this volume, has only served to bring this conflict into a sharp clash in arms.

* * * * *

In closing, it may not be entirely out of place to attempt a speculation upon the significance of the conflict, not to the belligerents, but to the world at large. From the latter’s point of view, the contest may fairly be regarded as a dramatic struggle between two civilizations, old and new, Russia representing the old civilization and Japan the new. Two dominant features, among others, seem to characterize the opposition of the contending nations: namely, first, that Russia’s economics are essentially agricultural, while those of Japan are largely and increasingly industrial; and, secondly, that Japan’s strength lies more on sea than on land, while Russia represents an enormous contiguous expansion on land. It is evident that the wealth of a nation and its earning capacity cannot grow fast under a trade system under which it imports many and exports few manufactures.[98] The commercial prosperity of Russia depended formerly upon its nearness, first to the trade route with the Levant, and then to the free cities of Germany, but with the fall of Constantinople and the decline of the Hansa towns the business activity of Southern and Baltic Russia has in turn passed away. Then, from the time of Ivan the Terrible, she unified her European territory, and expanded eastward on land, until she had embraced within her dominion much of Central and all of Northern Asia. For such an expansion Russia seems to have been particularly fitted, for her primitive economic organization suffers little from external disturbances, while the autocratic form of her government enables her to maintain and execute her traditional policy of expansion. But the real importance of her expansion appears to be more territorial than commercial, for the days of the land trade with the Orient are numbered. Even the great Siberian Railway would not successfully divert the Eastern trade landward.[99] If Russia would be prosperous she must control the Eastern sea by occupying northeast China and Korea. Here she comes in conflict with Japan, the champion in the East of the rising civilization. The economic centre of the world has been fast passing to America, where cotton, wheat, coal, and iron abound, the people excel in energy and intelligence, and the government is servant to the welfare and progress of the people. Japan has joined the circle of this civilization, ever since the influence of the youthful nation of America was extended to her through Commodore Perry[100] and Townsend Harris, and the spirit of national progress through industry and education was eagerly adopted by her. To-day, Japan stands within the range of the interests of the British and American sea-power over the Pacific, Atlantic, and Indian oceans, while Russia, on the other hand, represents a vast expansion on land.

The historical bearing of the effects of the old civilization to the world may, perhaps, be best characterized by the one word—_unnatural_. Observe, first, the effect of the policy of land aggression on the internal affairs of Russia. The policy is costly. Hence the great incongruity between the economics of the people, which are agricultural, and the finance of her government, which would be too expensive even for the most highly advanced industrial nation. Hence, also, it is, perhaps, that the richer and more powerful her government becomes, the poorer and more discontented her people seem to grow. Her administration must naturally be maintained by the suspicion of her people and the suppression of their freedom,[101] and the suspicion and suppression must become more exhaustive as the disparity widens between rulers and ruled.[102] Under these circumstances, a constitutional régime would not be possible, for a free expression of the popular will would be hardly compatible with a form of government which seeks to strengthen the state at the expense of the nation. Again, consider the unnatural situation of an agricultural nation competing in the world’s market with industrial, trading nations which command a higher and more effective economic organization. If Russia would sell her goods, her markets abroad must be created and maintained by artificial means:[103] protective and exclusive measures must be pushed to such an extent as to distance all foreign competition, the interests of the consumer must be disregarded,[104] and those of the growing industrial nations must be sacrificed,[105] all for the sake of artificially promoting the belated manufactures in Russia.[106] From this unnatural state of things would seem to follow the Russian policy of territorial occupation and commercial exclusion in the East, and also her free use of the old-time intrigue in diplomacy; for it is Russia’s fortune that she would not be able to compete freely with the new, growing civilization, whose open arts she cannot employ to her advantage, but to whose advanced standard of international morals she must appear to conform. Her position forbids her to have recourse to an open policy and fair play, and yet she cannot afford to overtly uphold the opposite principles.[107] On the other hand, the new civilization, represented in the present contest by Japan, relies more largely upon the energy and resources of the individual person, whose rights it respects, and upon an upright treatment by the nations of one another.

What is the goal of the warfare of these two civilizations? It is, it may be said, the immensely rich and yet undeveloped North China, of which Manchuria is a part, and to which Korea is an appendix. Over this territory, the interests of Russia and Japan have come to a clear and sharp clash, those of the former demanding the subjection and closure of this great portion of the earth’s surface, and those of the latter imperatively calling for its independence and progress.

Whoever wins, the issues are momentous. If Russia should win, not only Korea and Manchuria, but also Mongolia would be either annexed by Russia or placed under her protection, and Japan’s progress would be checked and her life would begin to fail. Russia would assume a commanding position over all the Powers in the East, while the trading nations of the world would be either largely or completely excluded from an important economic section of Asia. The Siberian railway system might at last be made to pay, and Russia’s exclusive policy would enable her and her ally France to divide the profit of the Eastern trade with the more active industrial nations. The old civilization would enjoy an artificial revival, under the influence of which China and Korea would be exploited by the victors and, for the most part,[108] closed against reformatory influences from abroad. All these momentous results would be in the interest of an exclusive policy incorporating principles which are generally regarded as inimical to freedom and progress. If, on the contrary, Japan should win, the doubtful importance of the Siberian Railroad as a carrier of the Eastern trade would in the mean time be further overshadowed by the Panama Canal, and it would be compelled to perform its perhaps proper function of developing the vast resources of Siberia and Manchuria. The Oriental commerce would be equally free and open to all; the Empires of China and Korea would not only remain independent, but, under the influence of the new civilization, their enormous resources would be developed and their national institutions reformed, the immense advantages of which would be enjoyed by all the nations which are interested in the East. There would naturally result a lasting peace in the East and the general uplifting of one third of the human race. Japan’s growth and progress after the war would be even more remarkable than in the past. In short, East Asia would be forcibly brought under the influence of the new civilization, the effect of which would not be without a profound reaction upon Russia herself. Humanity at large, including the Russians, would thereby be the gainer. The difference in the effects of the outcome of the war, according to who is the victor, would be tremendous. Which will win, the old civilization or the new? The world at this moment stands at the parting of the ways.

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE
ON THE SIBERIAN RAILWAY[109]

According to an estimate made by a Russian expert of the carrying capacity of the great Siberian railway system,[110] the Siberian section alone will carry at least 190 million poods, and the Manchurian section from 100 to 150 million poods, making a total of 300 to 350 million poods, approximately. It is contended, however, that, while the present conditions of the inhabitants of Siberia and Manchuria make it possible for the railway to carry only raw and crudely manufactured goods, these are the very articles whose cost would easily be raised by the long distance over which they have to be carried by rail. In Europe, it never pays to carry these articles for a longer distance than 2000 miles. Nor would it in Siberia, unless abnormal reductions are made in freight rates, or unless commerce and manufacture are artificially fostered in Siberia and Manchuria. It is supposed, therefore, that it would always be unprofitable to carry bulky, cheap goods between Europe and the East on the Siberian Railway. China’s exports to Russia consist of such costly goods as teas and silks, which may be profitably transported by rail, but thus far even teas have only begun to be so transported under more or less artificial measures in favor of the railway traffic at the expense of the routes through Kiakhta, up the Amur, and by sea to Odessa. As to Russian imports into China, cotton and woolen goods and metals would never be carried by rail under normal circumstances.[111] The benefit of the eight thousand versts of the railway from Moscow to Dalny may be safely said to be as slight to the carrying trade as it is great to the travelers and postal service between Europe and the East.

The statistics for 1899 and 1900 show that the bulk of the Russian trade with China was carried on land, but that the land trade was decreasing and sea trade increasing. See the following table (unit 1000 rubles):[112]—

│ Export Import Total Ratio
1899│Land 7,522 30,007 37,520 74%
│Sea 4 13,508 13,512 26%
────┼────────────────────────────────
1900│Land 6,678 29,779 36,457 69%
│Sea 24 16,166 16,190 31%

It should be noted, however, that the period covered by the table is not only too short, but also precedes the opening of the Manchurian Railroad to trade, which took place only in 1903. Nor should it be overlooked that the figures indicate the China trade of _Russia_ alone.

Regarding the _European_ trade with China in general, M. Sorokin, Assistant Director of Customs at Niu-chwang, is reported to have remarked that the freight per pood from Europe to the East was five rubles on land and 1.50 on sea.[113] Certain articles, such as glassware, tobacco, and the like, seem to be carried from Russia to China at two rubles by rail and one ruble by ships.[114] The sea route consumes nearly two months, but, for bulky merchandise, it would be impossible for the railway to compete with it.

It is interesting, in this connection, to remember that, from _America_, the freight between San Francisco and the Eastern ports has been reduced repeatedly during the last year, owing to the competition among the shipping companies, so that the charge for flour does not seem to be more than one mill per ton-mile, or forty cents a hundred pounds for 8000 miles.

During 1901, according to the latest statistics available, the deficit of the Ussuri branch of the Siberian Railway is said to have amounted to $435,162, and that of the entire railway to $11,330,000.[115]

* * * * *

In this connection, it is interesting to note that this view is further confirmed by no less authority than Count Cassini, the present Russian Minister at Washington, who, in his statement given on April 9, and published in the _North American Review_ for May, 1904, said:

“... Consider Russia’s position commercially toward Manchuria with that of the United States. In this country [the United States] are made not only the very materials that would find a sale among the people of the province, but with American goods shipped by an all-water route, the cost of transportation would be much lower than the cost of carrying on the all-land routes to which Russia would be confined. Should Russia ship by water to Manchuria from Odessa, the distance would still be too great to make competition with the United States successful. From Moscow to Port Arthur the distance by rail is 5000 miles. It is therefore easy to realize the privileged position of the United States in competing over an all-water route from the Pacific coast, with Russia over an all-rail route.”[116]

-----

Footnote 1:

Official figures for December 31, 1903. The _Fourth Financial and
Economical Annual of Japan_, 1904 (hereafter abbreviated as the
_Fourth Annual_), published by the Department of Finance, Imperial
Government of Tokio, p. 5. The actual numbers may be even higher.

Footnote 2:

_The Monthly Return of the Foreign Trade of the Empire of Japan_ for
May, 1904, published by the Department of Finance, pp. 91–95.

Footnote 3:

_Japan in the Beginning of the 20th Century_ (hereafter abbreviated as
the _20th Century_), compiled by the Department of Agriculture and
Commerce, Tokio, 1903, pp. 53–58.

Footnote 4:

Or, 241,891,946 out of 285,971,623 _yen_. As the term manufacture is
expansive, the articles herein included should be enumerated. They
are: clothing, chemicals and drugs, metal wares, oil and wax, paper,
cotton yarn and fabrics, raw and woven silks, tobacco, and sundries.
Teas, grain, marine products and other food-stuffs, and furs, as well
as reëxported articles, are excluded. See the _Kwampō_ (Official
Gazette of Japan), No. 6199 (March 4, 1904), p. 77, table 7.

Footnote 5:

The crop of rice has increased since 1877 from 26.6 million to about
42,000,000 _koku_; that of barley, rye, and wheat from 9.6 million to
19 million _koku_. But the increase has been due more to an improved
cultivation than to an extension of acreage. Although the wheat,
barley, and rye land has grown from 2.35 million in 1877 to 4.43
million acres in 1901, the rice land has increased from 6,517,000 to
only 6,982,000 acres. The crops of hemp and rape are stationary, while
those of sugar, cotton, and indigo have largely fallen off. (These
figures have been converted from those in the _20th Century_, pp. 119
ff. One _koku_ dry is equivalent to 4.9629 bushels.)

Footnote 6:

These figures have been worked out from the _Kokumin Shimbun_
(National News, hereafter abbreviated as the _Kokumin_) of February 5,
10, and 19, 1904. Also see a table and comment in the _Tōyō Keizai
Shimpō_ (“Oriental Economist”), for May 5, 1903, pp. 17–19.

Footnote 7:

If sugar is added to the list, the figures will go up to more than 190
million _yen_, or 60 per cent. of the entire import trade.

Footnote 8:

289.2 million _yen_ in 1902–3. The _Fourth Annual_, pp. 4 and 9, and
plate 3. Also see the _Tōyō Keizai Shimpō_ (“Oriental Economist”) for
December 5, 1902, pp. 19–21 and chart.

Footnote 9:

Or, less than 7,000,000 acres of wet fields and less than 6,000,000 of
upland fields, the latter including mulberry and tea gardens, besides
fields for _mugi_, beans, and vegetables. Based on the _20th Century_,
pp. 95 ff.

Footnote 10:

This figure includes, however, all the land inclined at angles less
than 15°, so that, from the practical point of view, it may be
considered as highly exaggerated. The actual extent of the reclamation
of wild land advances at a slow pace outside of the still largely
undeveloped island of Hokkaidō. See _ibid._, pp. 95–96, 104.

Footnote 11:

Or, about 23,000,000 acres for nearly 47,000,000 people. If we take
only the land under cultivation, on the one hand, and only the farming
population, on the other, the ratio still remains the same, for then
we have 13,000,000 acres for 28,000,000 people. The aggregate of the
capital involved in the agriculture of Japan, including the value of
land, buildings, implements, and live stock, is estimated at
7,400,000,000 _yen_, while the annual crops return about 1,000,000,000
_yen_. See the _20th Century_, pp. 105–106.

Footnote 12:

The annual rainfall of Japan proper averages between 1300 mm. at
Awomori and 2040 mm. at Kagoshima. A fairly rich sedimentary formation
of soil is found everywhere, owing to the hilly nature of the country
and the short and rapid current of the rivers.

Footnote 13:

Wherever possible, the farmer contrives to raise more than one crop on
his land in different seasons during the year. In fact, more than 30
per cent. of rice land yields other crops besides rice, at places
_mugi_, indigo, beans, and rape being cultivated on the same piece of
land.

Footnote 14:

More than half of the wet fields of the country consist of lots
smaller than one-eighth acre, and nearly three fourths are each less
than one-quarter acre. The average size of the lots outside of Formosa
and Hokkaidō is put down as .1 acre for wet fields and .12 acre for
upland fields.

Footnote 15:

Compare the report of the U. S. Consul-General Bellows at Yokohama in
the U. S. _Consular Reports_, advance sheets, No. 1757 (September 24,
1903). In addition to the conditions here enumerated, it must be
remembered that there exists little or no pasture land in Japan, and
that nearly all the labor is done by hand, there being only 1,500,000
horses and 1,300,000 horned animals in the country. See the _20th
Century_, chapters on agriculture; the _Annual_, No. III, tables
x-xiii; J. J. Rein’s _Industries of Japan_, English translation, New
York, 1889, chapters on agriculture; and H. Dumolard’s _Le Japon
politique, économique et social_, Paris, 1903, pp. 109–121.

Footnote 16:

The _20th Century_, p. 117; Dumolard, pp. 112–113.

Footnote 17:

This ratio includes, however, in the tenant class those farmers who
are partly lessees and partly proprietors of small lots. In 1888, the
ratio between (1) independent farmers, (2) partly lessees, and (3)
entirely lessees, was 147:200:95. Since that time the ratio must have
grown in favor of the tenants. See the _20th Century_, p. 90.

Footnote 18:

See the U. S. _Consular Reports_, advance sheets, No. 1529 (December
26, 1902). In 1902 the total debts of the farming classes of Japan
were estimated at 400 million _yen_. Mr. S. Nakayama, in the _Tōyō
Keizai Shimpō_ (“Oriental Economist”) for July 15, 1902, p. 14.

Footnote 19:

In 1903, Japan’s American trade was much below that of 1902. The
latter showed an increase of 362 per cent. over 1890.

Footnote 20:

The actual figures were:—

European American Japanese
1890 57,200,000 _yen_ 36,700,000 _yen_ 45,700,000 _yen_
1903 166,900,000 _yen_ 95,900,000 _yen_ 295,900,000 _yen_

Footnote 21:

In East Asia are included Korea, China, Hong-kong, British India,
French Indo-China, Dutch East Indies, the Straits Settlements, Siam,
the Philippines, and Russian Eastern Asia. If Hong-kong, an
essentially transit-trade port, is excluded, the East Asiatic trade of
Japan amounts to 264,476,239 _yen_, or 43.6 per cent. of the entire
foreign trade of Japan. See the _Kwampō_ (Official Gazette of Japan),
No. 6199 (March 4, 1904), p. 74, table 4.

Of the three great divisions of Japan’s markets, Europe sells her
machineries and articles of general consumption, and buys in return
such peculiar products of her soil as silks and teas. East Asia,
including India and the southern islands, takes coal and manufactured
goods in general and furnishes cotton, food-stuffs, and other articles
of more direct need than the European goods. America occupies a unique
position in regard to Japan, as it combines to a large extent the
peculiarities of both Europe and East Asia: it exports to Japan cotton
and flour, besides machinery and goods of general consumption, and
imports from her, not only raw silk and tea, but also smaller
manufactured articles.

Footnote 22:

Oil-cakes are used as manure. As to rice, wheat, and flour, it is
unnecessary to say that their importation depends largely upon the
conditions of the crop at home.

Footnote 23:

The present author has often met persons who misinterpreted the “open
door” to mean the complete throwing open of a country to the ruthless
exploitation of the foreigner. The “open door,” it is needless to say,
merely negatives a differential treatment in favor of one or more
foreign nations at the expense of all the others. It does not
necessarily imply a wide opening, but an impartial, even if narrow,
opening for all nations.

Footnote 24:

Consult the British _Diplomatic and Consular Reports_, Annual Series,
Nos. 2995 and 2999; the U. S. _Monthly Summary of Commerce and
Finance_, January, 1904, pp. 2410–1; the _Kokumin_, September 19–21,
1901; Minister Kiyoura’s address before the Osaka Chamber of Commerce,
February, 1904.

Footnote 25:

The figures were taken from the _Monthly Summary of Commerce and
Finance of the United States_ for February, 1904, p. 3006.

Footnote 26:

From _ibid._, p. 3006. In 1903, rice imported amounted to 51,960,000
_yen_ in value. The _Fourth Annual_, p. 77.

Footnote 27:

See the U. S. _Monthly Summary_, February, 1904, pp. 3006 and 3013.

Footnote 28:

At present, Chinese merchants in Korea compete with the Japanese only
at the ports on the western coast, principally in the import trade of
silk. The number of the Chinese residents in Korea is one tenth that
of the Japanese, or about 4000.

Footnote 29:

The _Kokumin_, January 30, 1904.

Footnote 30:

Based on the figures in the _British Diplomatic and Consular Report:
Trade of Corea for the Year 1903_, pp. 11–13.

Footnote 31:

Of the 1430 vessels, aggregating 1,104,000 tons, entered at and
cleared from Niu-chwang in 1902, the Japanese had 710 vessels and
491,000 tons, the British, 374 vessels and 350,000 tons, the Germans,
88 vessels and 73,000 tons, and so forth.—The _Kokumin_, April 29,
1904, from the _Tai Shin-Kan Bōyeki Chōsa Hōkoku_ (report on the trade
with China and Korea), compiled by the Department of Agriculture and
Commerce, Tokio, 1904. The Russians could show only 3 vessels and
1,223 tons, which was below their record for 1901 and less than one
half of the average of the five years 1886, 1897, 1898, 1899, and
1901.—The British _Diplomatic and Consular Reports_, Annual Series,
No. 2999 (on Niu-chwang), p. 9.

Footnote 32:

_Ibid._, p. 8.

Footnote 33:

The direct import trade of any trading nation at Niu-chwang does not
represent the actual amount of the articles imported from the country
of that nation, for most of the foreign goods come to Niu-chwang
through some other distributing centres in China, such as Hong-kong or
Shanghai. The Japanese goods, however, are nearly all carried by
Japanese vessels. On the contrary, the American imports, besides
jeans, drills, sheetings, kerosenes, and flour, are not specified in
the customs returns of Niu-chwang, and consequently their nominal
figures are insignificant (7396 _l._ in 1901 and 4089 _l._ in 1902),
while Hong-kong, through which most of the American goods are imported
into Niu-chwang, showed, in 1902, 385,302 _l._, or 55 per cent. of the
entire direct trade. On the other hand, the estimate made by the
Bureau of Statistics, Department of Commerce and Labor, Washington,
showing 18,000,000 haikwan taels for the _real_ import of American
goods into Niu-chwang, seems to be pretty liberal. See British _D. and
C. Reports_, annual series, No. 2999, p. 8, and the U. S. _Monthly
Summary of Commerce and Finance_, January, 1904, p. 2328.

Footnote 34:

See the _Tsūshō Isan_ for January 22, 1903, pp. 10–11.

Footnote 35:

See the _Tōyō Keizai Shimpō_ (“Oriental Economist”), No. 165 (July 15,
1900), and No. 244 (September 25, 1902).

Footnote 36:

The _Kokumin_, November 26, 1903.

Footnote 37:

The _Annai_, pp. 58–61.

Footnote 38:

Mr. Shiga’s letter, in the _Kokumin_, July 5, 1904.

Footnote 39:

In July, 1903, there were, besides soldiers, 26,705 Japanese in the
eight treaty ports and Seul and Ping-yang. To these must be added
about 4000 who lived on some islands and places outside of the treaty
ports. See the _Dōbun-kwai Hōkoku_ (Report of the Dōbun Association),
No. 41, pp. 95–96, and the _Tsūshō Isan_ for October 18, 1903, pp.
29–47; April 8, 1904, pp. 28–52. Mr. Yamamoto places the number of the
Japanese residents in Korea at 40,000. See his _Saishin Chōsen Ijū
Annai_ (latest guide for emigration to Korea; hereafter abbreviated as
the _Annai_), Tokio, 1904, p. 14.

Footnote 40:

The _Annai_, pp. 8–9, 19–20.

Footnote 41:

_Ibid._, p. 81.

Footnote 42:

In July, 1903, of the 26,645 Japanese in Korea, 15,442 were men and
11,263 women. It may be noted, in passing, that, in the case of
Manchuria, a great majority of the Japanese women residing there are
not the wives of the male settlers, and hence the comparative numbers
of men and women there should not lead us to a similar conclusion as
to Korea. This part of the problem of Japanese emigration opens up an
interesting social question, which it is hardly necessary for us to
discuss here.

Footnote 43:

From the legal standpoint, the Japanese had no right, outside of the
treaty settlements, to live or buy land.

Footnote 44:

On March 31, 1904, there were about 1,234,000 _yen_ of these notes in
circulation against a reserve of 944,000 _yen_. From the British _C.
and D. Reports_; _Trade of Korea for the Year 1903_, pp. 7–8.

The Russians and their sympathizers at Seul have more than once tried,
though unsuccessfully, to induce the Korean Government to suppress the
issue of the notes. See pp. 281–284, below.

Footnote 45:

The nickel coins of Korea have been so debased and so much
counterfeited that they are at a discount of much more than 100 per
cent.

Footnote 46:

The right of building this line was originally granted by the Korean
Government to Mr. Morse, an American citizen, in March, 1896, who,
however, sold it to a Japanese syndicate in November, 1898, and handed
the line over to the latter before it was completed. The whole line
was in working order in July, 1899. See p. 286 (Article 3), below.

Footnote 47:

Actual work was begun in August, 1901, but Japan’s want of capital was
such that by the first of December, 1903, only thirty-one miles from
both ends had been built. In view of the immense economic and
strategic importance of the line, the Japanese Government, which had
for a certain period of time guaranteed 6 per cent. annual interest on
25,000,000 _yen_, which was fixed as the minimum capital of the
company, now further promoted its work by liberal measures, so as to
make it possible for the company to complete the line before the end
of the present year. Both the Korean and Japanese Imperial Houses own
shares of the company.

Footnote 48:

The line passes through the richest and most populous four provinces
of Korea, which comprise nearly seven tenths of all the houses in the
Empire, and cover more than five sevenths of the cultivated area of
the country, with considerable capacity for future cultivation and
improvement. The road also connects places to which the Koreans flock
from neighboring regions for the periodical fairs held there. These
fairs occur six times each month, held alternately in different
places, besides great annual fairs in large cities. Among the
thirty-nine stations of this railroad, six will be daily seen holding
fairs, for which the traffic of passengers and merchandise through the
road will be considerable. It is safe to say that five sevenths of the
entire Korean foreign trade belong to the sphere controlled by this
line, and also that nearly all of this trade is in reality the fast
growing Japan-Korea trade. The effect of the completion of the line
upon this trade will be tremendous. See Mr. J. Shinobu’s _Kan Hantō_
(“The Korean Peninsula”), Tokio, 1901.

Footnote 49:

The French have an agreement with the Korean Government regarding a
Seul-Fusan railway. The Seul Government is to build it with its own
money, and the French to furnish engineers and material. Not a mile of
rail has been laid by the impecunious Government, and the present war
is rapidly changing the entire situation. A Japanese railway for
strategic purposes has already been started from Seul northward.
Another line, between Seul and Wonsan (Gensan), will also be built by
the Japanese in the near future.

Footnote 50:

It was one of the first propositions from Japan to Russia during the
long negotiations between them which have ended in the present war,
that Russia should not impede Japan’s possible attempt in the future
to extend the Fusan-Seul Railway in the manner above described. See p.
286 (Article 3), below.

Footnote 51:

A promoter of Russian interests in Korea, and to all intents and
purposes a semi-official diplomat for Russia, living at Seul and
observing the political barometer of the Court at close range. Another
person, perhaps less known to the outside world, but far more
influential at Court, is a woman, Fräulein Sonntag, a relative of the
wife of the ex-Russian Minister Waeber at Seul. See p. 280, below.

Footnote 52:

The _Kokumin_, January 15, 1904.

Footnote 53:

From an address by Mr. Suerō Katō, of the Department of Agriculture
and Commerce, who had studied the agriculture of Korea on the ground
three times in succession.—_Ibid._, May 27, 1904.

Footnote 54:

Calculated from the data given in the _Kokumin_ for January 8, 1904.
The official census of Korea for 1902 gives a population of 5,782,806,
but assuming that there live 145 people per square mile, which is one
half the density of the population in China, the Korean population
cannot be much below 12,000,000. The official record of the land under
cultivation is also untrustworthy for institutional reasons not
necessary to mention here.

Footnote 55:

The question of cultivating the waste land in Korea by Japanese
enterprise, however, has called forth a very delicate situation which
still awaits the most careful solution. The progress of this situation
will be a matter of great interest, but it is still too early to
discuss it. Cf. the _Korea Review_ for July and August, 1904, and
follow its subsequent numbers.

Footnote 56:

See the _Tsūshō Isan_ for August 3, 1903, and the _Kokumin_ for
January 7, 15, and 16, 1904.

Footnote 57:

The rent is of two kinds: either to be decided anew each year after
the harvest, or to deliver to the proprietor 50 per cent. of the crop.
It should always be remembered that a large majority of actual
cultivators are tenants, the proprietors being limited to a small
class of rich men, officers, and nobles. The daily wage of the laborer
on the farm averages 20 _sen_, but it is usually paid in kind, as are
debts and repayments in many cases. The standard of life of the Korean
farmer is perhaps lower than that of the Japanese, but apparently not
less comfortable. The national land tax is said to be mild and largely
discarded, but the house tax, special tax, local tax, and the like,
bring up the dues of the farmer sometimes to an unendurable extent.
The tenant, after paying his rent and other charges, is obliged to
sell what little rice is left to him at the earliest opportunity, so
that he henceforth becomes a buyer of rice, and consequently has
little to buy other articles with, and still less to save, until his
spring harvest of wheat comes in. Woe betide him when both the rice
and the wheat crops fail! See the _Kokumin_, January 13 and 14, 1904,
and the _Tsūshō Isan_ for August 3, 1903, p. 21.

Footnote 58:

An address by Mr. G. Hirose, a competent eye-witness, in the
_Dōbun-kwai Hōkoku_, No. 48, November, 1903, pp. 15 ff. Official
census, however, gives only 2806 Japanese in Manchuria (December 30,
1903). See the _Tsūshō Isan_ for April 13, 1904, pp. 33–38.

Footnote 59:

Mr. Hirose, already mentioned, refers to a Japanese capitalist who
started a lumber business in Kirin Province and another who discovered
coal deposits near Harbin and began to mine them, both of whom, in
spite of the permits they had received from the Chinese authorities by
regular process, were driven away arbitrarily under threats of the
Russian military. The _Dōbun-kwai_, No. 48, pp. 21–22.

Footnote 60:

The so-called Manchus, the original inhabitants of Manchuria, have
migrated to China proper, which they conquered during the seventeenth
century. The present inhabitants of Manchuria are immigrant Chinese,
whose greater economic capacity has been rapidly developing this
immensely rich territory.

Footnote 61:

An official report of the Province of Amur, dated June 22, 1903,
denies that the actual cost of construction per verst was, as had been
alleged, 150,000 rubles, but 113,183 rubles. The _Tsūshō Isan_ for
August 8, 1903, p. 46. A ruble is equivalent to about 51.5 cents.

In this connection, it is interesting to note in M. Witte’s report to
the Czar after the former’s tour in the Far East in 1902, that the
Siberian Railway had cost 758,955,907 rubles, but, with the
Circum-Baikal section, would cost not less than 1,000,000,000 rubles,
excluding the salaries of officers, expenses for soldiers, the Pacific
fleet, harbor work, and the like. The _Dōbun-kwai Hōkoku_, No. 42, p.
30.

Footnote 62:

According to the “Past and Present of the Siberian Railway,” compiled
in 1903 by the government committee in charge of the railway, as
quoted in the _Dōbun-kwai Hōkoku_, No. 51, pp. 58–60.

Footnote 63:

M. Witte’s report of September, 1901, quoted in the _Kokumin_ for
October 1, 1904.

Footnote 64:

Consul Miller at Niu-chwang, in the U. S. daily _Consular Reports_,
February 15, 1904 (No. 1877), p. 8.

Footnote 65:

The _Tsūshō Isan_, November 25, 1903, pp. 16–18.

Footnote 66:

The U. S. daily _Consular Reports_, July 30, 1903.

Footnote 67:

See the _Shiberiya oyobi Manshū_ (“Siberia and Manchuria”) Tokio,
1904, compiled by T. Kawakami, special agent of the Foreign Office of
Japan, who was sent to Siberia and Northern Manchuria to investigate
economic and military conditions there, pp. 94, 119–121, 124, 138.

Footnote 68:

For the relative advantages of the Manchurian Railway and the Amur
River, see the U. S. daily _Consular Reports_, August 5 and October 5,
1903, and January 19, 1904.

Footnote 69:

The Russia-China trade began more than 250 years ago. Before 1860, it
was carried wholly on land, and its balance was nearly even. Since
1860, when sea trade from Odessa was opened, the progress of this
trade has been slower than the general foreign trade of China, and its
balance has been heavily against Russia (6,702,000 against 45,945,000
rubles in 1900). More than half of the Russian imports into China
consists of cotton fabrics, and over 80 per cent. of the exports from
China to Russia are teas. Russia’s share in the entire foreign trade
of China has also fallen from 4.6 per cent. in 1899 to 4.4 per cent.
in 1900, 2.6 per cent. in 1901, and 2.3 per cent. in 1902, as compared
with the growing share of the trade by Japan amounting to 14.2 per
cent., 15.9 per cent., 15.7 per cent., and 18.4 per cent., in those
respective years. Of the Russian share of 2.6 per cent. in 1901,
Russian Manchuria occupied only 0.6 per cent. See the _Tsūshō Isan_,
July 8, 1903, pp. 1–4; T. Yoshida’s _Shina Bōyeki Jijō_ (Trade
Conditions in China), Tokio, 1902, pp. 128–129, etc. For the gold
values of the figures up to 1903, see the British _D. and C. Reports_,
annual series, No. 3280.

Footnote 70:

From Russian official figures quoted in the _Tsūshō Isan_, November
25, 1903.

Footnote 71:

The reader is recommended to the reports of the United States Consul
Miller at Niu-chwang, particularly those which appeared in the daily
_Consular Reports_ for January 21 and 24, and February 5, 1904 (Nos.
1856, 1858, and 1869). Reference should also be made to the ex-British
Consul at Niu-chwang, Alexander Hosie’s _Manchuria_, London, 1901 (new
edition, New York, 1904).

The resources of Eastern Manchuria are well described in the _Tsūshō
Isan_, October 13, 1903, and those of Northern Manchuria in the
_Shiberiya oyobi Manshū_, Tokio, 1904, compiled by the Foreign Office
of Japan, pp. 427–485.

Footnote 72:

The present population of Manchuria is differently estimated between
the limits of 6.5 and 15 millions. Probably there are more than 10
millions. Immigration was said to have been progressing rapidly under
the Chinese rule.

It is noteworthy that Siberia, with a larger area than Manchuria,
contains only about 8,000,000 inhabitants. The productive capacity of
the Manchurian population must be measured, however, not only by their
larger numbers, but also by their far superior economic training.

Footnote 73:

The _Tsūshō Isan_ for June 23, 1903, pp. 34–35. Pood = 36.112 lbs.;
ruble = 51.5 cents.

Footnote 74:

Under this and other differential measures the commercial importance
of Vladivostok is said to be fast passing away. Local merchants made a
strong plea of their case before M. Witte when he traveled in the East
in 1902, but on his return he reported to the Czar that the interests
of the Empire demanded a large sacrifice at Vladivostok for the sake
of Dalny.

Footnote 75:

The effect of the new duties levied on tea at other places than Dalny
is seen in the following comparative table. The figures for 1902 are
taken from the U. S. _Monthly Summary_ for January, 1904, p. 2420, and
those for 1903 have been converted from data given in the British _D.
and C. Reports_, Annual Series No. 3280.

In 1902, the Russian Empire took 882,893 out of the 1,519,211 _piculs_
of tea exported from China, while in 1903 the corresponding amounts
were 1,010,580 out of 1,677,530. The distribution of the imported teas
to the Russian Empire, according to the routes, was as follows:—

1902 1903
_Via_ Odessa and Batum 206,699 _piculs_ 200,391 _piculs_
_Via_ Kiakhta 403,648 244,668
To Russian Manchuria 272,546 191,679
To Port Arthur and Dalny 373,842

We presume that most of the teas exported to Russian Manchuria went
through Niu-chwang. The table plainly shows an increased importation
at Dalny at the expense of all other points. It is not known how much
of the 373,842 _piculs_ imported at Dalny and Port Arthur was
reshipped to other ports not mentioned here. (_Picul_ = 133⅓ lbs. av.)

Footnote 76:

See the _Tsūshō Isan_, April 18 and August 3, 1903, and the U. S.
daily _Consular Reports_, January 21, 1904 (No. 1856). Reduction
apparently had not reached its minimum point. It was unknown whether
Dalny handled much of the Manchurian export trade.

Footnote 77:

The _Kokumin_, March 7, 1903. The ex-Japanese Consul at Niu-chwang,
Mr. K. Tanabe, doubts that Dalny will completely displace Niu-chwang
as an exporting centre. The latter is geographically the nature outlet
for the grain from the Liao Valley, and, in winter, the handling of
this product is apt to be done more at Mukden than at Dalny, the
latter becoming in that case a mere port of transit. Moreover,
mercantile customs differ so much at Niu-chwang and Dalny that it is
not possible that the conservative Chinese merchants should readily
transfer their business from the one place to the other. See Tanabe’s
conversation in the _Tōyō Keizai Zasshi_ (“Oriental Economist”), No.
244 (September 25, 1902), p. 16.

Footnote 78:

The central distributing station at Vladivostok has a capacity of
600,000 poods, and the one to be built at Dalny will hold 1,500,000
poods, to which a special tank steamer will bring oil from Batum.—The
_Tsūshō Isan_, May 3, 1903. Americans tried to build warehouses at
Dalny, but were opposed by Russians. The importation of American
kerosenes at Niu-chwang decreased from 3,172,000 gallons ($410,500) in
1901 to 603,000 gallons ($77,000) in 1902, and the decrease was in no
small measure due to the Russian competition at Dalny.

Footnote 79:

The _Tsūshō Isan_, October 23, 1903, pp. 1–21; the U. S. daily
_Consular Reports_, May 7, July 16, and August 28, 1903, and February
23, 1904.

Footnote 80:

See Mr. Miller’s reports in the U. S. daily _Consular Reports_ for
January 21 and 24, and February 5 and 6, 1904 (Nos. 1856 1858, 1859,
and 1870).

Mr. James J. Hill, in a recent speech at Minneapolis, said that his
great system of transportation, by taking advantage of all conditions,
and by carrying full loads both ways, had been able to make a freight
rate of forty cents a hundred pounds of flour to the Orient, or one
mill per ton-mile. According to him, the effect of the growing
exportation of wheat from the Pacific coast to the East seems to have
caused an advance in its price at Minneapolis of five to seven cents
per bushel. In view of these facts, the possible exclusion of American
flour from Manchuria would not be without serious effects, especially
if we consider Mr. Hill’s opinion that the success of Mr.
Chamberlain’s financial scheme would result in enabling Manitoba to
supply all the wheat needed in Great Britain, thus leaving in the
United States a large surplus of grain, for which other markets would
have to be developed. See the American _Review of Reviews_ for
February, 1904.

Footnote 81:

The U. S. daily _Consular Reports_, February 15, 1904 (No. 877), p.
11.

Footnote 82:

The U. S. daily _Consular Reports_, January 19, 1904 (No. 1854). Also
see _ibid._, April 4, 1903.

Footnote 83:

British Consul Hosie’s report, the _British Parliamentary Papers_
(“Blue Books”), _China, No. 1 (1900)_, p. 154.

Footnote 84:

See U. S. daily _Consular Reports_, February 15, 1904 (No. 1877), and
the _Tsūshō Isan_, October 8, 1903, pp. 42–43.

Footnote 85:

The _North American Review_ for May, 1904, pp. 683–684.

Footnote 86:

For the laborious process of obtaining permits to carry on business
only for short terms in these great sites for future cities, see the
_Tsūshō Isan_, September 18 (pp. 40–41) and November 23 (pp. 39–40),
1903.

At Dalny, however, Russia has welcomed the coöperation of all
nationalities in its development, and has been rather disappointed at
their comparative indifference. See Mr. F. Nakasawa’s conversation in
the _Tōyō Keizai Zasshi_ (“Oriental Economist”), No. 262 (March 15,
1903), p. 13. The reasons for this modification at Dalny of the
customary Russian policy are plain, for the port must be developed as
rapidly as possible before the Russians can absolutely control its
trade. Thus the importance of Dalny as a trading port brings to
conspicuous prominence the universal contradiction of the Russian
commercial policy in East Asia. Russia would exclude other trading
nations from her possessions in order to control the trade, but is at
the same time unable to develop it without either the coöperation of
other people or some unnatural devices.

Footnote 87:

See pp. 313 ff., below.

Footnote 88:

On March 27, 1904, Russia declared that Niu-chwang was under her
martial law. This eventuality had been fully expected by Japan. The
gravity of the situation, however, may be understood, when we remember
that the Russian law of neutrality considers food as among contraband
goods, so that the supply of millet, beans, and bean-cakes from
Manchuria to Japan was henceforth completely closed, until the
Russians evacuated Niu-chwang in July.

Footnote 89:

These concessions were acquired by the Russians in 1896 when the
Korean King was still living in the Russian Legation in Seul. About
May, 1903, after more than seven years’ inactivity, the Russians began
to cut timber on a large scale along the Yalu River, and subsequently
made extensive improvements at Yongampu at the mouth of the river. The
political features of this event do not concern us here. See pp. 263,
289 ff., 318 ff., below.

Footnote 90:

Kaiserling is a successor to the two other Russians who, one after the
other, had been engaged in the whale fishery on the Japan Sea for a
long period of time. It was Kaiserling, however, who extended the
work, made an agreement with the Korean Government, and was turning
the business into an apparently successful enterprise. In 1901, his
two vessels caught about eighty whales, which number was in 1902
increased to 300.—The _Tsūshō Isan_, September 28, 1903, p. 34.

Footnote 91:

Mr. J. Sloat Fassett’s article in the American _Review of Reviews_,
for February, 1904, p. 174.

In the winter of 1902–3, ice at Dalny was six inches thick.—Mr. F.
Nakasawa in the _Tōyō Keizai Zasshi_ (“Oriental Economist”), No. 262
(March 15, 1903), p. 13.

Footnote 92:

It is well known that at several times in history kingdoms have been
built which extended over both sides of the present boundaries between
Korea and Manchuria.

Footnote 93:

It is noticeable that the Russian diplomatic historian already
referred to gives as a reason for the desirability of placing Korea
under Russian protection the need of safe-guarding the frontiers of
Russian territories adjacent to Korea.—The _Dōbun-kwai Hōkoku_, No.
49, p. 8.

Footnote 94:

The Bay of Masampo, generally so-called, which lies between the Island
of Koji and the Korean coast, is said to be deep and broad enough to
hold the largest fleet, sheltered from winds from all directions.
Several islands with sufficiently wide passages between them form a
splendid gate to the bay, while the western extremity of the latter
may be walked across, when the tide is low, from the Koji to the
coast.

As to the Masampo reach or inlet, specifically, which is the head of
the gulf, “its entrance, five cables wide, named the Gate, is
perfectly free from dangers, and is available for all classes of
vessels. On either side are treeless hills, bare in winter, but in
summer covered with grass; these hills, near the entrance, slope
steeply to the water’s edge. The general depth over the reach is seven
fathoms, but it shallows gradually as the town of Masampo is neared,
until at one mile from the town the depth is four fathoms....
Anchorage may be had anywhere in Masampo reach, according to draught;
a depth of three fathoms being found at half a mile from the town, and
six to seven fathoms at two miles below it.”—The _Sailing Directions
for Japan, Korea, and Adjacent Seas_, published by the British
Admiralty, London, 1904, pp. 114–115. Masampo is the best but not the
only good naval harbor on the southern coast of Korea.

Footnote 95:

In 1861, when some Russian marines landed here and took virtual
possession of the islands, Awa Katsu, who was then one of the officers
appointed by the Yedo government to study the possibility of
organizing military forces after the Western model, succeeded in
setting the British Minister against the Russian Minister about the
Tsushima affair. Russia was obliged to abandon the islands. See the
_Katsu Kaishū_ (a life of Katsu), Tokio, 1899, iii. pp. 57–59.

Footnote 96:

It is interesting to hear that Russian school text-books enumerate
Korea and Manchuria among the Russian spheres of influence.—A letter
from Tōsuisei, dated St. Petersburg, February 13, 1900, in the
_Kokumin_, April 1, 1900.

Footnote 97:

It is remarkable how little the spirit of Japan’s policy, which the
writer has attempted to express in this sentence, is understood among
the people here. A vast majority of people, not excluding recognized
writers and speakers on the East, seem to ascribe to Japan certain
territorial designs, particularly in Korea. It is not remembered that
Japan was the first country to recognize the independence of Korea,
the cause of which also cost Japan a war with China. The present war
with Russia is waged largely on the same issue, for it is to Japan’s
vital interest to keep Korea independent. From this it hardly follows
that Japan should occupy Korea in order not to allow her to fall into
the hands of another Power. If Korea is really unable to stand on her
feet, the solution of the difficulty does not, in Japan’s view,
consist in possessing her, but in making her independence real by
developing her resources and reorganizing and strengthening her
national institutions. It is in this work that Japan’s assistance was
offered and accepted. It would be as difficult for any impartial
student not to see the need of such assistance as to confuse it with
annexation. It would, however, be entirely legitimate to regard the
task as extremely difficult and dangerously prone to abuse. Further,
see pp. 366 ff., below.

Footnote 98:

Russian exports for 1900–2 are classified as follows (1000 rubles as
unit):—

Food-stuffs Raw material Animals Manufactures Total
1900 381,174 269,806 17,902 19,553 688,435
1901 430,955 256,697 20,224 21,939 729,815
1902 526,189 258,267 21,558 19,263 825,277