Chapter XXIII: Section II: English Diplomacy

[Sidenote: § 1. English proposal to Sweden and Denmark.]

In August 1624 two English ambassadors, Sir Robert Anstruther and Sir James Spens, set out from London; the first to the King of Denmark, the second to the King of Sweden. The object of the embassies was identical, to urge upon the two kings the necessity of stirring themselves up to take part in a war for the recovery of the Palatinate, and for the re-establishment of the old condition of things in Germany.

[Sidenote: § 2. The Danish answer.]

Christian hesitated only so far as to wish to be quite sure that James was too much in earnest to turn back as he had turned back in 1621. Anstruther was to go around the circle of the princes of Lower Saxony, and as soon as a favorable report was received from them, and the impression made by that report was strengthened by the news of Mansfeld's preparations in England, Christian engaged to take part in the war.

[Sidenote: § 3. Foresight of Gustavus.]

Gustavus was far more cautious. Never doubting for a moment that the task before him was one of enormous magnitude, he argued that it would not be too much if all who had reason to complain of the House of Austria, from Bethlen Gabor in the east to Lewis of France in the west, were to join heart and soul in the great enterprise. With this view he was already in close communication with his brother-in-law, George William, the Elector of Brandenburg, who for once in his life was eager for war, perhaps because he had hardly reached to a full conception of all that such a war implied.

[Sidenote: § 4. His answer.]

Gustavus, too, had his own ideas about the way in which the war was to be carried on. In the first place there must be no divided command, and he himself must have the whole military direction of the troops. A certain number of men must be actually levied, and a certain sum of money actually paid into his hands. To the mere promises which satisfied Christian he would not listen. And besides, two ports, one on the Baltic, the other on the North Sea, must be given over to him in order to secure his communications. Perhaps, however, the part of his scheme which gives the greatest evidence of his prescience is that which relates to France. Avoiding the rock upon which the English government was splitting, he made no attempt to force a Catholic sovereign like Lewis into over-close union with the Protestant powers. Help from France he would most willingly have if he could get it; but he argued that it would be better for the French forces to find a sphere of action for themselves in South Germany or Italy, far away from the regions in which Gustavus himself hoped to operate at the head of a purely Protestant army.

[Sidenote: 1625.

§ 5. England adopts the Danish plan.]

In January 1625 the answers of the two kings were known in England. Of the 50,000 men demanded by Gustavus, 17,000 were to be paid out of the English exchequer. Till four months' pay had been provided he would not stir. He, for his part, had no intention of being a second Mansfeld, the leader of an army driven by sheer necessity to exist upon pillage.

[Sidenote: § 6. Thinking it easier to satisfy Christian than Gustavus.]

Christian's ideas were framed on a more moderate scale. He thought that 30,000 men would be sufficient altogether, and that 6,000 would be enough to fall to the share of England. Both James and Charles declared that if they must make a choice they preferred the Danish plan. Even 6,000 men would cost them 30,000_l._ a month, and, though the French marriage was settled, Parliament had not yet been summoned to vote the subsidies on which alone such an expenditure could be based. But they did not yet understand that a choice was necessary. They thought that Gustavus might still come in as an auxiliary to the Danish armament. To this suggestion, however, Gustavus turned a deaf ear. He had no confidence in Christian, or in allies who had taken so scant a measure of the difficulties before them. It was true, he replied to a remonstrance from the English ambassador, that he had asked for hard conditions. 'But,' he added, 'if anyone thinks it easy to make war upon the most powerful potentate in Europe, and upon one, too, who has the support of Spain and of so many of the German princes, besides being supported, in a word, with the whole strength of the Roman Catholic alliance; and if he also thinks it easy to bring into common action so many minds, each having in view their own separate object and to regain for their own masters so many lands out of the power of those who tenaciously hold them, we shall be quite willing to leave to him the glory of his achievement, and all its accompanying advantages.'

[Sidenote: § 7. Gustavus attacks Poland.]

With these words of bitter irony Gustavus turned away for a time from the German war to fight out his own quarrel with the King of Poland, a quarrel which he always held to be subservient to the general interests in so far as it hindered Sigismund from taking part in the larger conflict.

[Sidenote: § 8. Attempt of Charles to fulfil his engagements.]

Christian's more sanguine ideas were soon to be put to the test. In March James of England died, and two months later Charles I. entered into an engagement to supply the king of Denmark with 30,000_l._ a month, and scraped together 46,000_l._ to make a beginning. Mansfeld, it was arranged, should abandon his hopeless attempt to reach the Palatinate along the Rhine, and should convey the remnants of his force by the sea to the assistance of Christian.

[Sidenote: § 9. Commencement of the Danish war.]

After all, however, the main point was the success or failure of the king to gain support in Germany itself. The circle of Lower Saxony, indeed, chose him for its military chief. But even then there was much division of opinion. With the commercial classes in the towns war against the Emperor was as yet decidedly unpopular. They were tolerably well assured that they would reap no benefit from any accession of strength to the princes, whilst the danger from the Emperor was still in the future. But they were not strong enough to carry the circle with them. A centre of resistance was formed, which must be broken down if the Emperor's pretensions were not to be abated. On July 18 Tilly crossed the Weser into Lower Saxony, and the Danish war began.