Chapter XXXII: Section III: Wallenstein deprived of his Command

[Sidenote: § 1. Strong position of Wallenstein.]

The long expected breach between the League and the Emperor's general had come at last. Instead of reducing his forces after the Peace of Lübeck, Wallenstein had increased them. He was now at the head of 100,000 men. From a military point of view no one could say it was too much. He had Mantua to defend, the coasts of the North Sea to watch, perhaps France to guard against, and that too with all the princes and peoples of Germany exasperated against him. Some efforts he made to curb the violence of his soldiers. But to restrain the monster he had created was beyond his power. And if his soldiers bore hard upon burgher and peasant, he himself treated the princes with contemptuous scorn. He asked why the electors and the other princes should not be treated as the Bohemian nobles had been treated. The Estates of the Empire had no more right to independence than the Estates of the kingdom. It was time for the Emperor to make himself master of Germany, as the kings of France and Spain were masters of their own dominions. All this made the electors above measure indignant. "A new domination," they told Ferdinand, "has arisen for the complete overthrow of the old and praiseworthy constitution of the Empire."

[Sidenote: § 2. What could he effect?]

A reconstruction of that old rotten edifice would have done no harm. But its overthrow by military violence was another matter. A new form of government, to be exercised by a soldier with the help of soldiers, could never be found in justice,

For always formidable was the league And partnership of free power and free will. The way of ancient ordinances, though it winds, Is yet no devious path. Straight forward goes The lightning's path, and straight the fearful path Of the cannon-ball. Direct it flies, and rapid, Shattering that it may reach, and shattering what it reaches.

Schiller's _Piccolomini_, act i. scene 4.

[Sidenote: § 3. His partiality.]

Even whilst he was defending the universality of oppression on the principle that it was but fair that all estates should contribute to the common defence, he was exhibiting in his own case an extraordinary instance of partiality. Whilst all Germany was subjected to contributions and exactions, not a soldier was allowed to set foot on Wallenstein's own duchy of Mecklenburg.

[Sidenote: § 4. The Edict of Restitution carried out.]

And if the Catholic electors had good reason to complain of Wallenstein, Wallenstein had also good reason to complain of the electors. The process of carrying out the Edict of Restitution was increasing the number of his enemies. "The Emperor," he said, "needed recruits, not reforms." Ferdinand did not think so. He had persuaded the chapter of Halberstadt to elect a younger son of his own as their bishop. He induced the chapter of Magdeburg to depose their administrator, on the ground that he had taken part in the Danish war. But, in spite of the Edict of Restitution, the chapter of Magdeburg refused to choose a Catholic bishop in his place, and preferred a son of the Elector of Saxony. John George was thereby brought by his family interests into collision with the Edict of Restitution.

[Sidenote: § 5. Magdeburg refuses a garrison.]

The city of Magdeburg had not been on good terms with the chapter. Wallenstein offered to support its resistance with the help of a garrison. But the city refused, and Wallenstein, in the face of the growing opposition, did not venture to force it to accept his offer.

[Sidenote: § 6. Growing opposition to Wallenstein.]

Of the fact of the growing opposition no one could be doubtful. As to its causes there was much difference of opinion. The priests ascribed it to the barbarities of the soldiers. Wallenstein ascribed it to the violence of the priests, and especially to the vigour with which they were attempting to reconvert the inhabitants of the archbishopric of Bremen, which they had recovered in virtue of the Edict of Restitution.

[Sidenote: § 7. He talks of attacking the Pope.]

On every side the priests and their schemes were in the way of Wallenstein's dazzling visions of a grand imperialist restoration. The Pope, as an Italian prince, had sympathized with France. "It is a hundred years," said Wallenstein, "since Rome has been plundered, and it is richer now than ever."

[Sidenote: § 8. Assembly of Ratisbon.]

On July 3, 1630, Ferdinand assembled round him the princes and electors at Ratisbon, in the hope of inducing them to elect his son, the King of Hungary, as King of the Romans, and therefore as his successor in the Empire. But to this project the electors refused even to listen. All who attended the assembly came with their minds full of the excesses of Wallenstein's soldiery. The commissioners of that very Duke of Pomerania who had served the imperial cause so well in the siege of Stralsund, had a tale of distress to pour out before the princes. His master's subjects, he said, had been driven to feed upon grass and the leaves of trees. Cases had occurred in which starving wretches had maintained life by devouring human flesh. A woman had even been known to feed upon her own child.

[Sidenote: § 9. The deprivation of Wallenstein demanded.]

Other tales were told, bad enough, if not quite so bad as this, and the misery of the populations gave support to the political grievances of their rulers. Ferdinand was plainly told that the electors did not mean to be subjected to military despotism. He must choose between them and Wallenstein.

[Sidenote: § 10. Richelieu's intrigues.]

Behind the Catholic Electors was Richelieu himself. Together with the recognized French ambassadors, the Capuchin Father Joseph, Richelieu's trusted confidant, had come to Ratisbon, encouraging the opposition to Wallenstein, and urging the electors to demand the neutrality of the Empire, if a war broke out between France and Spain.

[Sidenote: § 11. Policy of the Electors.]

Unhappily for Germany, the policy of the electors was purely conservative. There was nothing constructive even in Maximilian, the greatest of them all. The old loose relationship between the princes and the Emperor was to be restored whether it was adequate to the emergency or not. At the very moment when he had every need of conciliating opposition, he and his brother electors were refusing the petition of the deputies of the Duke of Pomerania that their masters might be allowed to keep possession of the bishopric of Camin.

[Sidenote: § 12. Landing of Gustavus.]

At the moment when the offence was given, it was known at Ratisbon that Gustavus Adolphus had landed on the coast of Pomerania.

[Sidenote: § 13. Gustavus comes without allies.]

Five years before Gustavus had refused to stir against the Emperor without the aid of a powerful coalition. He now ventured to throw himself alone into the midst of Germany. He had no certainty even of French aid. The French ambassador had offered him money, but had accompanied the offer by conditions. Gustavus thrust aside both the money and the conditions. If he went at all, he would go on his own terms.

[Sidenote: § 14. His hopefulness.]

He knew well enough that the task before him, apparently far harder than in 1625, was in reality far easier. He saw that between the ecclesiastical Electors on the one hand, and Wallenstein on the other, the Protestant princes must cling to him for safety. To one who suggested that even if he were victorious the princes would seek to profit by his victory, he answered, with the assurance of genius, 'If I am victorious, they will be my prey.'

[Sidenote: § 15. Dismissal of Wallenstein.]

Events were working for him at Ratisbon. Before the persistent demand of the electors for Wallenstein's dismissal Ferdinand was powerless. Even Wallenstein would not have been strong enough to contend against the League, backed by France, with a whole Protestant north bursting into insurrection in his rear. But, in truth, neither Ferdinand nor Wallenstein thought of resistance. The general, strong as his position was, at the head of the most numerous and well-appointed army in Europe, retired into private life without a murmur. He may, perhaps, have calculated that it would not be long before he would be again needed.

[Sidenote: § 16. Ferdinand's position.]

That Ferdinand felt the blow keenly it is impossible to doubt. He thought much of the maintenance of the imperial dignity, and the uprising of the electors was in some sort an uprising against himself. But the system which had fallen was the system of Wallenstein rather than his own. He had sanctioned the contributions and exactions, feebly hoping that they were not so bad as they seemed, or that if anything was wrong a little more energy on Wallenstein's part would set things straight. As to Wallenstein's idea of a revolutionary empire founded on the ruins of the princes, Ferdinand would have been the first to regard it with horror. His policy was in the main far more in accordance with that of Maximilian than with that of Wallenstein.

[Sidenote: § 17. Concessions of Ferdinand in Italy.]

Wallenstein's dismissal was not the only sacrifice to which Ferdinand was obliged to consent. He agreed to invest the Duke of Nevers with the Duchy of Mantua, hoping in return to secure the neutrality of France in his conflict with Sweden.

[Sidenote: § 18. Tilly in command.]

The result of that conflict depended mainly on the attitude taken by the Protestants of the north, whom Ferdinand, in combination with the Catholic electors, was doing his best to alienate. Tilly was placed in command of the army which had lately been Wallenstein's, as well as of his own. The variety of habits and of feeling in the two armies did not promise well for the future. But, numerically, Tilly was far superior to Gustavus.