Chapter III: Confession (2)

The question naturally arises what the confessor is to understand by a numeral qualified by “about” or “at least.” As a general rule the greater the number expressed, the greater is the number that may be understood as implied; for instance, “about three times” would mean from two to four times; “about five times,” from four to six times; “about ten times,” from eight to twelve times; “about one hundred times,” at most from ninety to one hundred and ten times. It is clear from this general appreciation of theologians that the numbers implied by the term “about” increase in proportion to the actual number mentioned. If the penitent discovers that he has mentioned a number considerably less than the truth, he must remedy the defect; if he has erred by giving too large a number, he need not correct the mistake, because the larger number includes the less. Moreover, it is advisable, instead of using high numbers, to state how often the sin has been committed in the course of a week or a month, etc., especially with regard to frequent or interior sins. Indeed with habitual sinners it suffices to state how long they have indulged the evil habit, and that they have given willful consent more or less daily whenever occasion offered; this is enough, when the actual number of sins is so doubtful that there would always be a grave risk of a mistake in trying to determine it. “The confessor, when he knows the period over which the accusation extends, may easily and safely form his opinion in the case of a penitent whose will is habitually inclined to sin, that the penitent has sinned as often as there were necessary interruptions to his sin.”[245] This method in determining the number of sins is as well founded as the other, for in this case, too, all is done that is morally possible. Hence the confessor should never force his penitent to give a determinate number, for this is in most cases impossible. On the other hand, the confessor should help the penitent to state the number in the way we have indicated.[246]

Hence a prostitute makes a sufficient statement in confessing how often she has been accustomed to sin each day or week, at the same time telling the species, or at least the more general species, of the sins so far as possible; she would make a perfect confession by an accusation such as follows: “I have spent so many years in this state of sin, and as occasion offered I sinned with all who came, married and unmarried, and also with those who were bound by vow.” Penitents must always give at least the more general specific characters of their sins, and the number of times per day or week they have sinned.[247]

A similar difficulty is presented in the case of those who have a deeply rooted habit of sin—those, for example, who constantly entertain impure desires with regard to women whom they chance to meet; it is very difficult in such a case to give any number. Such people make a perfect confession by stating that they are given to this habit, adding whether they indulge frequently in the day or week; besides this they should mention at least the more general specific characters, whether they indulge these desires with regard to married people or relations or persons consecrated to God.[248]

The same difficulty arises with regard to uneducated and ignorant people who have to accuse themselves of impure conversations carried on at their work during the whole day, on all sorts of subjects and before all kinds of companions. They, too, may confess the number and species of their sins as we have indicated above.[249]

Lugo and Sporer would also admit the confession as valid and give absolution to a thief who accuses himself as follows: “Since I was ten years old I have been so addicted to stealing that whenever a chance was offered—and that happened very frequently—I stole what I could; besides I have stolen sacred objects of considerable value on five occasions or, if I mistake not, six.”[250]

Though the accusation of the species in confession usually offers more difficulty than that of the number, yet Lugo advises the more learned confessors in particular to refrain from being too exacting in demanding the classification from their penitents. As the less-trained confessor may fail in this respect by defect, the more learned confessor is exposed to the danger of excess. The penitent must give the species of the sin, and the confessor is bound to inquire with due regard to the penitent’s ability and the knowledge which he had at the time of sinning; for a man cannot do evil of which he is ignorant; moreover, it is sufficient to have a general consciousness of grave malice.

24. The Confession of the Circumstances of Sins.

The circumstances under which sins are committed (_conditiones quæ actus substantiam circumstant atque in ejus moralitatem influunt_) are of different kinds: 1. Some change the species of the sin (_speciem mutantes_); for example, the circumstance of a vow or of marriage adds to the sin of impurity that of sacrilege or that of adultery. 2. Other circumstances are aggravating (_aggravantes_) in greater or less degree and _gradum moralitatis mutantes_ or _moralitatem augentes_—such, for instance, as increase the malice within the limits of the same species; they are the duration of the act, its intensity, its degree, the manner of carrying it out, the particular occasion, etc. 3. Other circumstances are mitigating (_minuentes_, _moralitatem minuentes_), because they palliate the malice of the act; as, for example, want of advertence, etc.

The circumstances must be confessed:—

I. If they change the species of the sin. This is the express teaching of the Council of Trent. Hence it is not enough to confess to stealing if the property of the Church has been taken; for the stealing of a _res sacra_ is not merely a sin of injustice but a theft from God and so a new sin. If a child curses its parents, it is not enough to mention that it cursed, for, since special reverence is due to parents, the violation of that special reverence is a new sin.

The following circumstances call for particular mention:—

1. The circumstance of the person _who commits the sin_, when with regard to the matter of the sin he is consecrated to God or bound by vow, as in sins against purity, or when he sins against the chastity of the married state, or when he stands in special spiritual relations towards those with whom he sins.

If a man is consecrated to God by Holy Orders or the religious state and has to confess a sin against purity, he must mention the circumstance of his state of life, since he has committed a double sin, one of impurity and another of sacrilege. Now those who are consecrated to God by Holy Orders or the religious state incur the special sin of sacrilege when they fall into impurity; the mere circumstance of the vow being simple or solemn does not constitute a new species, nor the fact of being bound to chastity by vows of religion as well as by Orders; these added details need not be confessed. Many moralists teach also that those incur sacrilege who are bound by a private vow of chastity, and St. Alphonsus admits this opinion as probable. Hence all those who have sinned against purity make a full confession when they confess the circumstance of the vow by which they are bound, without distinguishing whether the vow be private, solemn, simple, or that of Orders (_votum solemne ordinis sacri_).

This is the doctrine of Lugo[251] and Lacroix;[252] Sanchez,[253] too, defends this view on the ground that the solemn vow is in substance or _in se_ not distinct from the simple vow. His authority seems to have won over many theologians to the same opinion. Gury also holds this view; but the Ratisbon[254] and Roman[255] editions of his valuable manual reject it in the notes. Lehmkuhl,[256] moreover, opposes it and teaches that to incur a personal sacrilege (and this is the question under discussion) the person sinning (or with whom the sin has been committed) must be consecrated to God _publica auctoritate_, _i.e._ by Holy Orders or by vows of religion. Hence by the violation of a private vow of chastity a sacrilege in its strict and proper sense is not incurred, though a sin is committed against religion by the breach of fidelity to God. Sacrilege is incurred by the abuse of a sacred object. Now that cannot be called a sacred object which is privately consecrated to God without any recognition on the part of the properly constituted authorities. A private vow cannot produce this effect, for the common teaching of all theologians, a few excepted, maintains that the breach of such a vow is a violation of fidelity, not of the reverence due to God, at least not in such a degree as to constitute a sacrilege strictly so called.[257] Thus the more correct view is that of those who hold that, in confessing sins against purity, the circumstance of Holy Orders and of the religious vow is to be given; for whoever confesses as doubtful a circumstance which certainly changes the species of the sin does not fulfill the precept of confession. Such may be the case, for instance, where a priest conceals the circumstance of Holy Orders and mentions only the violation of the vow of chastity; for the violation of this vow is certainly a sacrilege for those in whom it has been solemnized by the reception of “Holy Orders,” while that of the simple vow is only doubtfully so.[258]

Parish priests by scandalizing their flock, parents their children, teachers the scholars under their instruction, incur a special sin against charity. Such persons have in virtue of their office the strictest obligation to edify those intrusted to them and to keep them away from harm. The case of a confessor who gives scandal to a person who happens to be his penitent is different; but he is obliged to mention the circumstance of this relationship when he has given scandal in connection with the administration of the Sacrament; his office as confessor only imposes on him the strict duty of guiding the penitent safely in the Sacrament of Penance, and is only transitory, ending _per se_ with each confession, while that of the parish priest and of the others mentioned above demands a constant spiritual care of those intrusted to them. Other offices involving authority do not change the species of the scandal given to subjects, though they may increase its malice, if, for example, a master leads his servant into sin. The dignity of a person does not of itself change the species of the sin of scandal given to his subjects, though it increases the gravity of a sin. If, however, a master has taken upon himself the duties of a parent, for instance, towards his servant-girl, he most certainly incurs a new and distinct sin by scandal given to her, and must mention his special relation to the girl.

2. The circumstance of the person _with whom the sin has been committed_, if God’s honor has suffered in any way, or if the rights of a third person or the particular respect or love which is due to the said person have been violated.

If the person with whom sin has been committed or who has been led into sin is consecrated to God or bound by a vow referring to the matter of the sin, a new and special sin is incurred against the virtue of religion (_i.e._ a sin either of sacrilege or at least of a violation of the vow). If any one commit a sin of impurity with a relation, it is no longer merely a sin against purity, it is incest. It is a probable opinion that the penitent is not obliged to mention the exact degree of relationship whether by blood or marriage, since that does not change the species _ratione incestus_, except in the first degree either of blood-relationship or marriage connection; thus sin committed between father and daughter, mother and son, father-in-law and daughter-in-law, mother-in-law and son-in-law, must be mentioned along with the relationship; yet there is no doubt that _ratione superioritatis vel pietatis_ sin incurred by a father with his own daughter or his daughter-in-law, bears a different character from the sin of a son with his mother or mother-in-law.

The sin of hatred acquires a new species of sinfulness when the hatred is directed against those more closely connected, _e.g._ parents, children, grandparents, grandchildren, and against those connected by marriage in the first degree of the direct line, such as wife, godparents, and brothers. Hatred of those most nearly related may much more easily become a grievous sin than hatred of other people.[259]

3. The circumstance of _place_, if a sacrilege is thereby committed; thus (_a_) if a sacred object or something belonging to the property of the Church is stolen and taken out from a sacred building, a double sacrilege, real and local, is committed. The circumstance of the local sacrilege, that is, the fact that sin has been committed in the Church is not of itself gravely sinful; hence when a profane object which is merely accidentally in the Church is stolen, a sacrilege, though not a gravely sinful one, is added to the sin of theft.[260] (_b_) If the immunity of a church is violated; (_c_) if anything is done in a church by which it is polluted in the sense of the canon law; (_d_) if profane occupations gravely at variance with the holiness of the place are carried on in the church, whether those occupations be in themselves sinful or not.

4. The circumstance of _time_; if, for instance, the time at which the sin took place was the reason why the action in question has been forbidden, and if by the action done at some particular time a special offence is given to God. This circumstance might involve grave sin (_a_) if Good Friday were chosen for the performance of an obscene play; (_b_) if during the forbidden time a marriage were celebrated with great pomp; (_c_) if during the celebration of Mass or immediately after holy communion, before the sacred species had time to be altered, the communicant were to commit some outrage greatly dishonoring to the Blessed Sacrament. These are circumstances which moralists generally enumerate as constituting a new species of sinfulness. On the other hand, a sin committed on a Sunday or feast-day or on a communion-day is not _per se_ invested with the particular malice of a sacrilege; nevertheless the fact that a man relapses into his old sins on a confession or communion day gives ground for the suspicion that his last confession was devoid of real contrition and in consequence invalid and sacrilegious.[261]

5. Finally, the circumstance of _the end_ in view is to be confessed if it is _in se_ mortally sinful; for instance, a man who steals with the object of getting drunk is guilty of drunkenness as well as theft, and on that account must confess the purpose for which he stole.[262]

Now there are many penitents who cannot judge of the circumstances which change the nature of the sin; such must be taught to mention in confession whatever increases or diminishes the malice of the sin; the rest will be supplied by the confessor, for he has the duty of asking the penitent not only about the circumstances which affect the species of sin, but everything which he considers necessary to aid him in forming a correct judgment on the spiritual state of the penitent. This right implies a duty on the part of the penitent to answer the questions put to him; these questions turn for the most part on habits of sin, relapses, and proximate occasions of sinning. Hence Innocent XI condemned the proposition[263] which denies the obligation of answering when the confessor makes inquiries about habits of sin. The knowledge of a habit of sin, or of relapses, or of proximate occasions is very important in settling whether absolution should be given or deferred;[264] besides it is of supreme importance to the confessor in his office as physician that he be in a position to suggest the necessary and proper means for amendment. The penitent must, therefore, if asked, mention former sins though already confessed. No one need take offense because he is thus obliged _per accidens_ to repeat sins which have already been duly forgiven; the purpose is not to pronounce a new sentence upon them, but to enable the priest to form a correct judgment with regard to the sins just confessed by noting their relation to former sins, and thus to prescribe suitable means of correction and provide as much as possible against relapses.[265]

II. Those circumstances are also to be mentioned by which sins of their own nature venial become mortal (_C. aggravantes_). Intemperance is not always a mortal sin, but it becomes so when it deprives a man of the use of reason; to steal a cheap tool might of itself be only a venial sin, but if the loss of it deprives a poor artisan of the means of doing a day’s work, it becomes mortal. In the same way one ought to mention the mitigating circumstances which make a mortal sin only venial or even no sin at all.

Moralists give seven cases in which circumstances may change a venial into a mortal sin:—

1. _Ratione conscientiæ erroneæ_, when a man through ignorance thinks a venial sin to be mortal. 2. _Ratione scandali vel gravis damni_, when grave scandal is given to one’s neighbor, doing spiritual or temporal harm; as, for instance, if a priest were to speak lightly of sacred things—thus St. Bernard[266] says: _Nugæ inter sæculares nugæ, in ore sacerdotis blasphemiæ sunt_; or, again, if a priest behaved lightly with a woman or were seen the worse for drink; or if one were to address a person rather insultingly, foreseeing that he would break out into a great rage and blasphemy; or if a woman dress vainly and foresee that some young man at the sight of her will sin mortally by impious desires. 3. _Ratione pravi finis graviter mali_, when, for example, a small lie is told to lead a girl into sin. The evil intention may not only increase the guilt of a sinful action, but it will make an otherwise innocent action sinful. 4. _Ratione formalis contemptus legis vel superioris_, when a venial sin is committed out of formal contempt for the law or lawgiver, or superior, as when a Catholic on an abstinence day, and quite aware of the duty of abstaining, eats ostentatiously a little flesh-meat to show the slight regard in which he holds the law.[267] 5. _Ratione pravi affectus in rem alioqui leviter malam_, when a man is so attached to a venial sin that he would commit it even if it were mortal, or in consequence of this attachment would be ready to commit other mortal sins,[268] as, for instance, if a man chose rather to steal than to overcome his vanity or intemperance. 6. _Ratione periculi seu occasionis proximæ in peccatum mortale labendi_, when the venial sin is known, or can be known, as a proximate occasion of mortal sin; a man, for example, looks at a person of the other sex or entertains rather familiar relations with her though he knows that such conduct in his case is a proximate occasion of gravely sinful desires or actions. Even actions otherwise neutral or indifferent may for this reason become gravely sinful. 7. _Ratione cujuscunque circumstantiæ quæ mortalem in se malitiam contineat_; thus insults, proceeding from envy and desire of revenge, may be mortal sins.[269] Hence these circumstances must be confessed.

The following circumstances may make sins venial which are of their own nature mortal: 1. Smallness of matter; 2. Want of full advertence; 3. Want of consent; 4. A false conscience.[270]

These circumstances must be told in confession not in order to secure its integrity, but that the confessor may be able to form a correct judgment.

III. Circumstances which make but little difference in the gravity of the sin need not be confessed.

IV. Circumstances which aggravate a mortal sin within its own species to a notable degree (_circumstantiæ notabiliter aggravantes intra eamdem speciem_) need not _per se loquendo_ be confessed; this is the common and most approved teaching of theologians; other reasons may exist which make it expedient to mention these circumstances.

At the same time theologians are not unanimous on this subject. Three opinions are current, and each one of them has its own probability and its champions of no mean repute. We may as well observe that the probability of the negative proposition (that there is no obligation) is conceded even by its opponents; hence all grant (_ex omnium sententia_) as probable that no one is bound to confess these circumstances, so that a penitent cannot be forced to disclose them unless some exceptional case should call for their mention.[271]

Those who maintain the affirmative proposition (_i.e._ the duty of confessing the _circumstantiæ notabiliter aggravantes_) fall back on the reasons to which the Council of Trent appeals for the necessity of confessing _circumstantias speciem mutantes_, viz. in order that the confessor may make a correct judgment, impose a suitable penance, and suggest the proper means of help; for, they add, the _circumstantiæ notabiliter aggravantes_ exercise a great influence on the view of the case taken by the confessor, and on that account ought to be confessed. The fact of the Council defining that only the _circumstantiæ speciem mutantes_ need be disclosed might be easily explained by supposing that the Council defined only what was certain, and left theological views where they were, neither approving nor condemning them. The last conclusion, however, is not justified, for the Council prescribes that _circumstantiæ speciem mutantes_ should be confessed without determining any precept for the _aggravantes_, and if equally cogent reason had existed for confessing both classes of circumstances, there could have been no reason for restricting the doctrine to those which change the species; for, says Lugo,[272] it ought to have made the decree to embrace both classes without imposing any limiting clause.

Further demonstration is taken from the Rituale Romanum, which directs: “If a penitent has not confessed the number, species, and circumstances which ought to be given, the confessor must ask him.” By the word species should be understood the _circumstantiæ speciem mutantes_, and by the rest the _circumstantiæ notabiliter aggravantes_. This distinction, however, is unfounded, for by species is meant _species ex parte objecti_, such as stealing, impurity, etc., and under _circumstantiæ necessariæ_ the _circumstantiæ speciem mutantes_ or the _species ex parte circumstantiarum_, as when theft becomes a sacrilege, etc.[273]

Appeal is made also to the Catechismus Romanus, which directs that those circumstances should be confessed “which greatly increase or diminish the malice.”[274] It may be objected to this, however, that the context makes it clear that there is no necessity to interpret the passage as referring to circumstances which merely increase the degree, not the kind, of the guilt; for the Catechism continues thus: Many circumstances are so serious that in them alone lies the whole gravity of the sin, so that they ought to be confessed; but the only circumstances which can make a sin grave are those that change the moral or theological species. This is confirmed by the fact that the Ritual prescribes also that circumstances very notably diminishing the gravity of the sin should be revealed; for even the opponents grant that this has force only when the mitigating circumstances change the species.[275] Moreover, the Catechism illustrates its doctrine by declaring the necessity of mentioning the circumstance of “a person consecrated to God” in a case of murder, and the circumstance of “marriage” in the case of impurity; and these belong to the circumstances which change the moral species. Finally, if the Catechism adduces the example of a theft, it is no proof that the question is not of circumstances which change the species, and when it declares that one who has stolen one gold piece is less guilty than another who has stolen a hundred pieces this may easily be understood of a circumstance which (with regard to the absolute quantity) constitutes a venial guilt and so introduces a distinct theological species.[276]

This view is held, among others, by Suarez, Sanchez, Gonet, Lacroix.

Other theologians teach that there is no necessity of confessing _circumstantias notabiliter aggravantes_, but they make an exception with regard to the circumstance of quantity in cases of theft. St. Alphonsus, along with other theologians, however, is of opinion that this exception ought not to be granted if the quantity is described as being large; for from that the confessor can _per se_ make a sufficiently accurate judgment. Ballerini remarks very justly that the exception should be worded thus: Except when some additional reason exists, _e.g._ a reservation directed against a certain kind of incest or against the theft of some given amount.

The third opinion denies absolutely the necessity of confessing _circumstantias notabiliter aggravantes_, and this is the more common and probable view, for which there are many and weighty reasons.

(_a_) The Council of Trent by positively limiting its decision to those circumstances which change the species seems to exclude positively the obligation of confessing others. It teaches that circumstances must be mentioned because without them the sins would not be properly confessed by the penitents nor properly understood by the judge, so that he would be incapable of estimating correctly the gravity of the sins and of imposing a becoming penance. From these words of the Council it is fair to conclude that the penitent has done all that is necessary when he confesses those circumstances.

(_b_) Moreover, we are bound only to declare mortal sin; now the _circumstantiæ notabiliter aggravantes_ within the same species evidently add no new species of a mortal sin, hence they need not be confessed. To confess them is an act of perfection, good, of course, and wholesome, just as is the practice of confessing venial sins.

(_c_) Moreover, many consequences of no small importance follow from the opposite doctrine. While the present opinion is calculated to set at rest the minds of both penitent and confessor, the other has quite the opposite tendency, for who could even approximately gauge how far circumstances have a notable effect upon the sin? Imagine the difficult and often fruitless inquiries a confessor would have to make with many of his penitents in order to come to a satisfactory decision. It follows, besides, from the opposite view that the _circumstantiæ notabiliter minuentes_ would have to be confessed or else the confessor would consider some sin more serious than it actually was, and even our opponents grant that this is not necessary.

(_d_) Finally, the Church could not in the General Council deduce this obligation from the words of Christ, otherwise she would not have given that definite limit to the obligation; the law of confessing _circumstantiæ notabiliter aggravantes_ is, therefore, at least doubtful, and a doubtful law has no binding force. Hence this opinion may be adopted _in praxi_ with a safe conscience even though its opposite be probable, and whoever follows it does not expose the Sacrament to any danger of nullity, for to secure validity a formally entire confession is sufficient, and of that there is no doubt.

This view is taught by St. Thomas (in 4 Sentent. d. 16, Q. 3, art. 2 et Opusc. 7, Q. 6), St. Antoninus, St. Bonaventura, St. Bernardine, Lugo, Vasquez, Bonacina, Salmanticenses, and the greater number of the older theologians. Among the more recent it is quite the common doctrine; compare Gury and the different editors of his text-book, among whom Ballerini is strongly in favor of this opinion, Müller, Lehmkuhl, Aertnys, Mark, Konings, Simar, Kenrick, Gousset, Pruner, Ninzatti, etc.

It is, however, advisable to mention these circumstances, and it is necessary:—

(_a_) When they affect the jurisdiction of the confessor, as in the case of a censure or reservation. If one has struck a cleric, for instance, it should be mentioned whether the assault was notorious or not; in the former case it would be reserved to the Pope, in the latter to the bishop; also if the person struck were a cardinal, a bishop, apostolic nuncio, or other cleric, since the excommunication is reserved in a special manner to the Pope.

(_b_) When they affect the character, in law or justice, of important acts, as espousals, various contracts, restitution, etc., in order that the penitent may receive proper instruction; this is most important in cases of theft.

(_c_) When, finally, the confessor without a knowledge of these circumstances is unable to direct his penitent as required for his salvation.

Since these circumstances must be confessed, not because they are _circumstantiæ notabiliter aggravantes_, but on the grounds alleged, the confessor has a right to question about them and the penitent is obliged to answer as we have already observed.

Moreover, the faithful usually add these circumstances in confession because it gives greater peace of heart and more abundant fruit; besides, a better and safer guidance is thus secured and an opportunity of practicing humility.

As to the utility and advisability of confessing circumstances all theologians agree in making an exception with regard to sins against the sixth commandment; for beyond what is necessary to determine the species of the sin the confessor ought not to ask the penitent any further question nor allow him to make any further statement. Even with regard to the species theologians all teach with one accord that in so dangerous a matter where scandal may so easily be given one may at times refrain from inquiring into the species.[277]

Cedreno gives useful advice for the confession of the circumstances attending sin: “If the person with whom you have sinned, the place where the sin was committed, or the manner of its accomplishment, or any other detail, gives you special remorse, then mention that point, for it will then be the confessor’s duty to decide from these indications how far they affect the species of the sin or only increase its gravity.”

25. The Confession of Doubtful Sins.

There are three points of view from which a sin may be regarded as doubtful:—

1. With regard to the existence of the sinful action, as when a man doubts whether he really committed the action.

2. With regard to the quality of the sin, as when a man knows he has sinned, but doubts whether it is a mortal or a venial sin.

3. With regard to the confession of a sin, as when a man knows he sinned grievously but doubts whether he ever confessed his sin.

The doubt may be positive or negative. A negative doubt exists when no solid reason can be given either _pro_ or _con_, but only insignificant arguments for both sides, so that no decision can be arrived at. A positive doubt exists where two contradictory propositions have each solid reasons in their support.

Armed with these premises we are now in a position to set forth the doctrine with regard to the confession of doubtful sins.

I. A sin need not be confessed when there is no positive reason to suspect its existence or gravity, or when there is positive ground against believing its existence or gravity, even where there is a solid reason on the other side. In other words, a sin negatively doubtful from both points of view, or positively doubtful from both points of view, or negatively doubtful on the side affirming guilt is not necessary matter of confession; but a sin positively doubtful on the side affirming guilt and only negatively doubtful on the side denying guilt, must be confessed.

With the exception of a few rigorists, theologians are unanimous in teaching that a sin positively doubtful from both sides need not be confessed; for if there is a _dubium facti_ which establishes the obligation of a law, liberty is in possession, _i.e._ there is no obligation. But in our case the fact of the sin is doubtful, thus we are not obliged to confess it. Moreover, when the existence of a law is doubtful we are not bound by it; but the law of confessing doubtful sins is uncertain; hence we are not bound by it.

If, however, a man in danger of death doubted whether he had committed a grievous sin, knowing that he had never been to confession since that doubtful act, he would be obliged, in order to avoid the risk of damnation, not indeed to confess that sin, but either to receive the Sacrament of Penance, in which he confesses other sins, that thus he might receive at least indirect absolution if his doubtful sins were really mortal, or he should at least make an act of perfect contrition. In such a case the act of perfect contrition _sine voto confitendi_ would be sufficient, since no obligation binds him to confess the _peccata dubia_.[278] So much for sins which are positively doubtful on both sides.

If, however, a very strong argument affirms our guilt with only very slight reason to deny it, we are obliged, according to the unanimous teaching of theologians, to confess those doubtful sins, for in such a case the conviction of our innocence does not rest on solid grounds. Of course our guilt is not conclusively proved; but in these things where evidence is often wanting we must be led by principles of sound moral certainty, even when they are unfavorable to us, since confession is not only a burden, but a Sacrament, and as such a means for greater sanctification.[279] In this case one cannot argue that _in dubio facti_ (and this undoubtedly exists) the opposing arguments cancel one another, as might two opposing witnesses; for this only takes place when the two arguments are of the same kind and quite similar, as in the case of two opposing eye-witnesses, when it is certain that one of the two is mistaken and neither can be believed since it is not known where the mistake lies. It is quite different, however, when the opposing reasons are of distinct classes and unlike, as in the case of two witnesses who do not recount what they themselves have seen, but bear witness to various conjectures _pro_ and _con_; then they both deserve reasonable attention, since the conjectures on either side rest on different motives.

If a penitent doubts positively whether he has sinned in some action, and it is probable that advertence or consent, etc., was wanting, or that full deliberation or consent was absent, he is not obliged to accuse himself of this action in confession.

On the other hand, theologians are not so clear as to the obligation of confessing sins which are doubtful _dubio negativo pro utraque parte_. The older theologians, among whom St. Thomas and other eminent doctors are to be found (Sanchez enumerates forty), insist on the duty of confessing this class of doubtful sins. This opinion is founded on the decree of the Council of Trent declaring that all grave sins _quorum conscientiam habent_ (_sc._ _pœnitentes_) must be confessed; thus the penitent must confess the sins as they are in themselves, those which are certain as certain and those which are doubtful as doubtful. This is the general and constant practice of the faithful, and by that fact we may consider it as proceeding from Christ’s institution.[280]

Other theologians, of no small weight both by their number and authority, do not impose the obligation of confessing these doubtful sins. St. Alphonsus also defended this view in a very convincing manner on internal grounds. The Council of Trent binds penitents only to reveal those sins _quorum conscientiam habent_; it says nothing about _uti sunt in conscientia_, or telling undoubted sins as certain and doubtful as doubtful, but only _quorum conscientiam habent_, which means those of which they have certain knowledge; for, according to St. Bernard, _conscientia_ is nothing more than _cordis scientia_ and _judicium practicum_ on the sins incurred. Now doubtful knowledge is neither knowledge (_scientia_) nor a judgment (_judicium_), but a _suspensio judicii_; hence no one can have a _conscientia peccati_ who has no proof that he has incurred sin. This is the answer to the arguments of the first opinion. Weight is added to this answer by the very words of the same Council: “It is well known that in the Church of God nothing more is demanded of the penitents but that each one after diligent examination ... confess those sins by which he is conscious to himself of having grievously offended his Lord and God; the remaining sins, however, which do not occur to him after diligent examination are considered as included generally in the same confession.” Since, therefore, concludes the holy Doctor, the penitent is not bound to confess his venial sins, he is not bound to confess the doubtful ones, for the Council says he is not obliged to confess any but the mortal sins of which he has knowledge; but to doubt is not “to have knowledge,” it is rather “to be wanting in knowledge.” Moreover, an _onus certum_ ought not to be inflicted for a _delictum dubium_, and in the doubt whether the law exists there is no obligation to observe the law. Finally, he who doubts without good foundation should not heed the doubt. The faithful, it is true, do confess these doubtful sins in order to gain peace and ease of conscience, but not because they are bound to do so; it is also customary and general for them to confess those which are positively dubious, and no one holds that this is of obligation, not even our opponents.

The grounds for this opinion, and the objections to the opposite view, are so convincing that it may be regarded as the more probable and be followed _tuta conscientia_.[281] The following objection has no weight. Since confession is a necessary means for salvation, and since in such a case a man must take the safer means rather than trust to a probable opinion, he is thus obliged to confess _peccata dubia_. A distinction must be made. The Sacrament of Penance, and particularly the absolution in which its efficacy for the most part consists, may certainly be called a necessary means for salvation _in re vel in voto_ with regard to those who have committed mortal sin after Baptism; besides, if a man doubt whether he has sinned grievously, either perfect contrition or absolution are necessary, and for that reason confession also in so far as this is required to obtain valid absolution or sanctifying grace through the absolution; but the integrity of confession can be regarded as necessary only in so far as it is proved to be the prescribed means of obtaining absolution _licite et valide_. The proof, however, for the necessity of confessing doubtful sins is so little substantiated that, as we have shown, the very opposite is proved from the words of the Council and the explanation of St. Alphonsus.[282]

When one considers the teaching of those older theologians who maintained the necessity of confessing _mortalia negative dubia_, it is not difficult to see that, while their mode of expression comprises more, yet, they really meant to say that a penitent is not to consider himself free from all obligation of confessing his sin for some paltry reason which is in his favor, though knowing at the same time that there are weighty reasons to be urged against him and his freedom from mortal sin.[283]

From this teaching it follows that he who has a negative doubt as to whether he sinned is not _stricte loquendo_ obliged to confess before communicating; but in order to make sure of the required dispositions he ought either to make an act of perfect contrition or receive sacramental absolution after confessing something which is included under _materia certa_.[284]

For the rest it is in practice generally recommended to the faithful, in order to secure peace of soul, to mention even their doubtful mortal sins, though there is no obligation to do so, and the confession without the accusation of these sins is complete; they must, however, be instructed to confess these sins as doubtful and not as certain. If a penitent have only sins of this sort to accuse himself of, he has a right to conditional absolution on the first accusation of them. It is better, however, to add other certain matter as the sins of one’s past life; this is required if the absolution is to be unconditional.

In practice the following rules might be profitably observed:—

1. If there be a doubt as to whether the matter of a sin be grave, ill-instructed penitents (_pœnitentes rudes_) should confess their doubts because (_a_) they cannot guide their own consciences, or they do so with great difficulty, and because (_b_) for the most part they do not know how to distinguish between mortal and venial sin. Exception, of course, is made for the scrupulous who are not in the habit of frequently committing mortal sin. Well-instructed penitents are certainly not obliged to confess doubtful mortal sins, since they are in a position to guide their own consciences; yet they are advised to do so, for then their confessor is informed of the dangers to which his penitent is exposed and can warn, instruct, and free him from them.

2. If the doubt turns on the free consent of the will or full advertence, (_a_) penitents of timorous consciences, who do not ordinarily sin mortally, are in no way obliged to confess doubtful sins, for the presumption is in their favor: _ex communiter contingentibus fit prudens præsumptio_. Since they are not in the habit of sinning mortally, it is fair to presume that their doubtful sins are not mortal; indeed they ought not infrequently to be deterred from confessing them if they are inclined to scrupulosity. “A man of approved virtue who is worried as to whether he has consented to an impure temptation may be morally certain that he has not consented; for it is morally impossible that a will so constant in good resolutions should change without giving unmistakable signs.”[285] (_b_) Penitents who, though not timorous, are not lax are certainly not obliged to confess a doubtful consent, though they may be advised to do so to secure peace of conscience and the other benefits which follow from the practice. (_c_) If, however, the penitent has a lax conscience, he is obliged to confess his doubtful sins, for the presumption is against him.[286]

If, then, a pious person who often renews his resolution never to sin mortally is not certain that he has ever revoked that resolution; if he is startled when he perceives the evil and promptly repels the temptation, and doubts whether he has given way; if he remembers that he was in an excited state of mind; if he cannot tell whether the thought or action took place in sleep or in waking moments, the presumption is that there was no full consent.

The presumption, however, is against those who are accustomed to fall easily into grave sin; had they withstood the temptation they would remember what effort they made to overcome it. Hence Lacroix[287] very justly concludes that such people never have a real negative doubt, since the presumption determines the probability of consent or resistance to the temptation.

Now comes the question as to what the penitent ought to do who has confessed a mortal sin as doubtful and afterwards discovers that he has certainly committed it; is he obliged to confess the sin anew or may he consider the case closed? The sin has undoubtedly been remitted directly by the power of the keys, since the conditional sentence “if thou hast really sinned” becomes absolute where the condition has been verified. St. Alphonsus[288] teaches that sins confessed as doubtful should be mentioned again as certain if it turns out that they are certain; and this doctrine he affirms to be the common opinion. The defenders of this view maintain as their great argument that the sin was not confessed as it was in the conscience at the moment when it was committed; then it was a _peccatum certum_; moreover, they argue, the sentence passed on a doubtful sin is quite different from that passed on a sin which is certain. Yet in the case of sins which have been confessed in round numbers St. Alphonsus himself teaches that even when the penitent afterwards recalls the exact number, he is not obliged to confess again; why, then, should this obligation be imposed on the penitent who has confessed his sin as doubtful when he discovers later that it was certain? A man who has confessed that he has committed a mortal sin about ten times and later discovers that the number was twelve must either confess as certain the two or more sins which were previously confessed as doubtful, or, if this obligation is denied, he cannot be obliged to confess a sin again which he has discovered to be certain after having already confessed it as doubtful. That in the first instance the penitent is free of all obligation to confess again, is the _sententia communissima_, and it is borne out by the practice of the faithful; hence in the other case the same freedom must be granted, for both decisions rest on the same grounds. Nor can it be objected that the number of the sins is merely a circumstance, while the sin itself is a substantial fact, for the number belongs to the very substance, since it indicates so many substantial acts.[289]

It is true that St. Alphonsus calls the affirmative opinion _communis_; but since Lugo (though even he gave his adhesion practically to the view of St. Alphonsus in consideration of the great number of theologians who favored it) has combated the view with strong arguments, later theologians adopted his side, so that the affirmative proposition maintaining the duty of confessing again can no longer be considered as _communis_. At present, as Ballerini aptly shows, the other view is the _communior sententia_ and is established on good external and internal probability, and may be unhesitatingly considered as _probabilior et communior_.[290]

II. If a man is certain that he has committed a grave sin but doubts upon slight grounds whether he has confessed it, he must accuse himself of it; but if he has a sufficient probability that it has been confessed, he is under no obligation.

In this case some positive reason is required to show that he has complied with the obligation of confessing the sin, for an undoubted command is not satisfied by a doubtful fulfilment; but where there is really good reason to suppose that the sin has been confessed, that is, a reason which, though open to some doubts, offers some probability, the obligation may, in accordance with the principles of probability, be regarded as not binding. “For if we are to avoid making laws and duties odious, we ought to concede something to human probability taken in a broad sense; thus presumption in a case of this kind often presents proof of sufficient probability and security.”[291]

Hence a man who is accustomed to make his confessions with care, and later on is unable to remember whether he has confessed this or that sin, may presume that he has confessed it, and he is not obliged to confess it again. This is the teaching of many eminent theologians.[292] Although St. Alphonsus affirms that a man is obliged to mention again a sin which has probably been already confessed, he does not condemn the contrary opinion. If, again, a man who has been converted from a habit of sin, and for a long period has been leading a good life, begins to doubt whether, in the confessions either general or particular which have been made with suitable care, some sin or circumstance has been withheld, he may be forbidden to mention that sin or circumstance, or even to think of the past at all. Finally, scrupulous people ought only to confess their past sins when they are quite certain that they have never confessed them; this is the _sententia communissima_.[293]

On the whole it is recommended in practice to mention doubtfully confessed sins, because their confession helps much to peace of soul and allays all anxieties.

Quite distinct from the preceding question is the case in which a man fully confesses as certain some sin which he has committed, but which neither he nor the confessor considered at the time as a mortal sin; if afterwards, in consequence of better instruction or advice, he discovers that the sin was mortal _ex genere suo_, he is not obliged to repeat it, for it was already perfectly confessed and it is not necessary for the validity of confession that the penitent or confessor should know that the matter of a sin is grave, and it is the matter only that is involved in this case.[294]

III. The sins which have been incurred after a doubtfully valid Baptism must be confessed when Baptism is given conditionally. Lehmkuhl treats very fully of this question and remarks that on this point there can be no doubt after the late decisions of the Apostolic See. Many theologians were inclined to free converts from the obligation of making a confession of their sins on the ground that, their Baptism by a heretical minister being doubtful, the sins committed after Baptism were doubtful matter for confession; hence they thought that to such converts, if they confessed matter sufficient in any way for receiving validly the Sacrament or the grace of sanctification through the Sacrament, absolution might be given conditionally; this, they maintained, was the practice to be recommended in order that converts might not be obliged in the beginning of their conversion to undergo this often very severe ordeal of a confession of a lifetime.

In answer to repeated questions the Apostolic See (in the years 1715 and 1868) explicitly declared that converts who receive conditional Baptism must after receiving this conditional Baptism confess the sins of their past life and be absolved from them _sub conditione_. This decision was given of course as an answer to a particular case laid before the tribunal; but the intention of the Holy Office, as is quite clear, was to pass a sentence and give a universal decision which might apply to all cases falling under this head and which might be regarded in future as the law on the matter, for this decree can be regarded only as an authentic interpretation of the divine law by the Head of the Church, and not as a local law of the Church or a part of her discipline. Nor need any one be surprised that a decree, though particular in form, has a universal application; for a command of the Church will never prescribe anything as necessary matter of confession which is not in accordance with the divine law.[295] In order, then, to recognize the possibility that such a precept is contained in the decree of 1715 it must be granted that, in accordance with divine right, the sins incurred after doubtfully valid Baptism must be submitted to the keys. Such is what we learn from that positive declaration; moreover, reason confirms it, for, though one who is doubtfully baptized has not a certainty but only a probability of receiving sacramental absolution of his sins, it in no way follows that the obligation to confess them is only probable and practically to be disregarded; for the duty of confessing and performing the assigned penance is for all more certain than that probability of receiving the effects of the Sacrament. This does not go beyond a moral certainty taken in the wider sense, since it rests ultimately on the validity of the Baptism and other conditions, so that doubts can always be entertained about it. But the duty of confessing and performing the assigned penance permits no such doubt, since every obligation though it be based on grounds only morally certain is sufficiently evident; otherwise there would be an end of anything like obligation in human affairs.