Chapter III: Confession (3)

Now with regard to confession and absolution of sins in the tribunal of penance Christ has handed over all power to the jurisdiction of the Church, and it is by Baptism that men come under this jurisdiction; this is the external rite by which men are admitted as members. But no one doubts that a man remains subject to the jurisdiction of a social body into which he has been admitted by the acknowledged external rites till that reception is proved to be invalid. All, therefore, who have in any way received Baptism (which they were desirous of receiving validly, though its validity admits of doubt) are as a general rule undeniably and certainly subject to the Church’s jurisdiction and laws and are bound to comply with the divine precept which ordains that their sins should be told in confession and sentence passed upon them. In other words, the doubt with regard to Baptism has this effect, that the Baptism can be regarded as invalid in the sense that it can and ought to be repeated conditionally lest the man should risk his eternal salvation, but nowise in the sense that one who is doubtfully baptized may consider himself free from the observance of these precepts and obligations which are binding on the baptized by the ordinance of God or the Church; among these duties the precept of confessing sins holds the principal place.[296]

As to the ceremonies to be observed in receiving a convert into the Church, there is nothing to prevent the confession being made first, followed by the conditional Baptism, then a summary repetition of the accusation along with an act of contrition and the conditional absolution. This order is allowed by the Holy Office in a Rescript of November, 1875. The American Ritual, on the other hand, gives the following order: 1. Renunciation of heresy and profession of faith; 2. Conditional Baptism; 3. Confession with conditional absolution. This order was prescribed by the instruction of the Holy Office for North America.[297]

26. Sins Omitted through Forgetfulness or other Causes not Blameworthy.

In order that the principles to be applied here may be understood, it must first be observed that all grievous sins committed after Baptism must be confessed; hence what has been said of the material and formal integrity of confession as well as upon the distinction between sins directly and indirectly remitted must be carefully borne in mind.

Since the formal or subjective integrity of confession consists in this, that all mortal sins are mentioned which the penitent can recall after a diligent examination of conscience, and of which the enumeration is possible _hic et nunc_, it does not suffer by inculpable forgetfulness on the part of the penitent; and the same holds true of all other legitimate reasons which at any time excuse the penitent from objective integrity.[298]

Sins which are required for objective though not for subjective integrity are considered as included in the confession and are really remitted by the absolution, not directly, however, but only indirectly.

Hence are derived the following principles:—

I. Mortal sins omitted without fault are and remain _materia necessaria_ of confession, or the objective duty of confessing them remains binding as before.

These sins are, of course, really forgiven, but, as we have already observed, only indirectly or _per concomitantiam_ through their connection with the other mortal sins which have been confessed and directly remitted. In the Sacrament of Penance the remission of sins is effected by the absolution; but sins which have not been mentioned do not directly fall under the absolution since, properly speaking, they are unaffected by the sentence pronounced by a judge who knew nothing about them. Nevertheless the absolution pronounced _rite et valide_ over certain sins is effectual because it is sacramental and because in God’s providence no remission of sin takes place without an influx of sanctifying grace into the soul which presents no _obex_. Now sanctifying grace removes the whole _reatus culpæ mortalis_ and restores a man to perfect friendship with God and to his claim in the heavenly kingdom. Thus valid absolution produces sanctifying grace in the soul and consequently the remission of all mortal sins staining the soul, even those inculpably forgotten.

There remains now the precept of Our Lord to submit all mortal sins to the power of the keys in the Sacrament of Penance; these forgotten sins have not been confessed as yet, nor has the priest pronounced any direct sentence upon them. Though these sins have been remitted indirectly, there still remains the obligation _ex jure divino_ of confessing them directly to the judge in the tribunal of penance when they occur to the mind again, not because these sins have been revived, but because the neglect of God’s command in the matter would involve a new sin. This holds of all mortal sins inculpably omitted, of their species, of all circumstances changing the species, as well as of mortal sins, confessed indeed, but to a priest without jurisdiction who either _bona fide_ or for reasonable motives gave direct absolution of the sins for which he had faculties, thereby remitting the others indirectly. Hence Alexander VII condemned the proposition: “Sins which have been omitted in confession either from an imminent danger to life or for any other motive need not be mentioned in the following confession.” (Prop. XI. damn.) It is different, however, in the case of reservation or censure for a sin remitted indirectly if confession be made to a priest equipped with the necessary faculties; for in general absolution is given from reservation and censure, and the penitent is probably freed from the reservation or censure attached to the sin forgotten; so that if the sin occur again to his mind, he may be directly absolved by any confessor, even a _confessarius simplex_.[299]

II. The obligation of confessing these forgotten sins does not urge _ratione sui_ “as soon as possible” (_quam primum_), not even before receiving holy communion.

Of course many distinguished theologians[300] teach that whoever remembers a grave sin, even though not committed since the last confession but forgotten, must confess that sin and receive absolution before going to communion. The only reason urged is that he is conscious of this sin; and, according to the Council of Trent, no one who is conscious of grave sin may receive communion before having confessed where there is an opportunity of making the confession. The defenders of this view maintain that the Tridentine decree[301] is so expounded and understood by the whole Church; they make an exception, however, for the case where confession cannot be made without risk of scandal or infamy, as, for example, when a priest is already celebrating Mass or a layman has approached the communion-rail and cannot retire without exciting remark.

It is permissible, however, with St. Alphonsus and other theologians (in less number) to follow the other “very probable opinion” which denies the obligation of confessing; for in reality confession has preceded communion and the penitent has confessed all the sins of which he was conscious, so that neither the Council of Trent nor the divine law seems to demand more; moreover, the forgotten sin has been remitted indirectly, the penitent is in the state of grace, not merely by an act of contrition but in virtue of the valid confession. The practice of the faithful which is appealed to for the opposite side is not to be regarded as of binding force, but rather a pious and praiseworthy custom.

Though one may follow _tuta conscientia_ the opinion which denies the obligation, it is good to recommend to the faithful to confess before communion the sins which have been forgotten, unless the extremely sensitive conscience of the penitent should require another course to be adopted; the practice should not, however, be imposed as binding.[302]

The view held by some, though a very few, modern theologians, that it is quite sufficient to mention these sins without receiving absolution, is not at all in harmony with the divine institution of the Sacrament, for confession is not made with the view of acquainting the priest with the sins committed, but in order that they may be remitted by his judicial sentence. Hence a serious argument for the necessity of confession can be drawn only from the supposition that absolution is necessary. Accordingly a penitent who confesses a new mortal sin immediately after absolution must be absolved again. Of course this absolution may be put off to the next confession if the penitent comes again to the same confessor to whom he told the sin. Such delay, however, would hardly be recommended, since it would involve the penitent in the following dilemma: Either he is not free to choose his confessor on the next occasion on which he approaches the Sacrament, or if he goes to some other priest he must confess the same sin again.

III. The duty of confessing sins inculpably omitted must be fulfilled either when there is danger of death or at the next confession, whether it be a confession of duty or of choice.

Hence these omitted sins must be confessed, even if no new mortal sin has been incurred, _ratione sui_ when there is grave danger of death and at the time which the Church prescribes for the yearly confession; for the annual confession is prescribed not only in order to obtain sanctifying grace, but also to fulfill the divine law, more clearly defined by the law of the Church. In this case the precept would be binding under grave sin because of the presence of _materia necessaria_, for a mortal sin omitted even without fault is _materia necessaria_.

If, however, a confession be made before that time, either of _materia necessaria_ or _materia libera_, the confession must include the previously omitted sin. This is so evident that no theologian ever dreamt of disputing or doubting it. Every confession must be complete subjectively or formally, and by the declaration of the Council of Trent this confession is not complete unless it includes the sins previously omitted. For this subjective integrity it is required that all mortal sins not yet subjected to the keys which occur to the penitent should be confessed unless some legitimate obstacle stands in the way. If these omitted sins are kept back in the next confession following, that confession is incomplete and sacrilegious. It cannot be argued that these sins had been already indirectly forgiven, for, to speak of no other objection, the same might be urged of sins already condoned by an act of perfect contrition.[303]

27. Reasons Excusing from Complete Accusation.

In the preceding paragraph we said that sins may be omitted by the penitent without the confession becoming sacrilegious. As there are reasons which can justify such silence, and release the penitent from the obligation of confessing the sins of which he is conscious, we devote this paragraph to the consideration of these reasons.

I. No difficulty in the confession itself or internally connected with it ever excuses from making a complete accusation; for when Christ gave the precept that all grievous sins should be confessed to His representatives in the tribunal of penance, He intended that we should submit to the difficulties inherent in such an accusation and bear them as a penance for our sins, and this discipline is very wholesome for the penitent.

A difficulty of this kind would be, for instance, the great shame felt in confessing a sin, even if it came only from the fact of mentioning it to this or that particular priest; the course then to be adopted is to put off the confession, or to go to another confessor, or to be brave and overcome the shame. This difficulty was recognized in the Council of Trent, and hence it was declared that the difficulty of such a (perfect and candid) confession and the shame of declaring one’s sins might well seem great obstacles, but that they were counterbalanced by the consolation and profit accruing to those who received the Sacrament worthily.[304] The same may be said of the other difficulties, such as the fear of losing the esteem of one’s confessor or of receiving a rebuke from him. If such reasons as these could be held to justify a want of integrity in the accusation, the faithful for the most part would consider themselves at liberty to make incomplete confessions, and the great object for which this Sacrament had been instituted would to a great extent be frustrated.[305]

Likewise, a large gathering of penitents (_concursus magnus pœnitentium_) on the occasion of a great feast or indulgence is never a reason for want of integrity in confession, for this is not a case of necessity and it would expose the priest to the risk of giving absolution to ill-disposed subjects. Nor can exception be made to the rule of integrity because people might conjecture from the time taken in the confessional that the penitent had committed very many sins.[306]

II. Besides the case of physical impossibility, however, there are others which justify an incomplete avowal of sin; they are in general such external or accidental difficulties in connection with the confession which render a complete accusation morally impossible, or involve grave harm to the penitent or the confessor. When the impediment no longer exists the law of God comes again into force; the moral impossibility of making a complete confession does not altogether cancel the duty of making it, but only suspends it, since the precept of confession is not one that is confined to any fixed time or state, but extends over one’s lifetime; hence mortal sins which have not been confessed must be mentioned later when opportunity offers.

III. In order that the excuse of moral impossibility may be pleaded it is necessary, 1, that there should be a real or probable risk of great harm; 2, that it is impossible to find another confessor to whom a full disclosure may be made without fear of this particular harm; 3, that only those sins or circumstances be kept back of which the avowal would cause harm; and finally, 4, that the confession cannot be put off.

IV. Physical impossibility might result from, 1, inculpable forgetfulness or inculpable ignorance, or only venially culpable ignorance and forgetfulness. A man who is ignorant _invincibiliter et inculpabiliter_ that the particular act which he calls to mind is sinful, or does not know that his sin must be confessed with its number and species and circumstances changing the species, is not bound to integrity in confession; there is still less obligation on an uneducated and weak-minded penitent.

If, again, a man in examining his conscience cannot recall a past sin, or, having recalled it, forgets about it in the confessional, he is physically incapable of making a complete confession. (On this point see the preceding paragraph.) It is to be noticed, however, that in the case of gravely culpable negligence or carelessness in examining the conscience an imperfect confession is invalid; if, for example, a man through his own fault is ignorant how confession ought to be made, or was unwilling to make a careful examination of his conscience. On the other hand, one is not obliged to go to confession sooner in order not to forget past sins, though frequent confession is much to be recommended; for we are bound only to accuse ourselves of the sins of which we are conscious at the time of confession after making a diligent examination of conscience.

2. There is, moreover, physical inability when there is imminent danger of death (_a_) on account of the penitent’s condition being such that if he should try to make a complete confession he may die before receiving absolution; (_b_) in a common danger, such as shipwreck, before a battle, during a violent epidemic or a swift conflagration. If in such a case there is no time to hear the confession of each individual, it is enough for all to make a general confession of their sins in order to receive absolution, and the priest may give it, using for all the one formula: _Ego vos absolvo_.... Finally, (_c_) when the confessor himself is near death and no other priest is at hand.

The following instructions may be observed by confessors in actual practice:—

(_a_) In case of extreme necessity the accusation of some specific sin must be made so far as it is possible, but in the case of a dying man who is still conscious the confessor should be more solicitous about exciting contrition than about securing a complete confession; in the case, however, of a penitent deprived of consciousness, especially if he gave no previous sign of repentance, the confessor may give absolution conditionally and then devote his care to the administration of Extreme Unction, which in such a case is more certainly valid and efficacious than the absolution itself; meanwhile, however, there would be no reason for not giving the absolution beforehand.

(_b_) If only one confession has to be heard and there is imminent danger, say, from an attack by an enemy, the confessor should get the penitent to mention some one sin, to make an act of contrition, and he should then absolve him, when under the circumstances the absolution is a matter of necessity. If there are several who wish to make their peace with God, as before a battle or in a shipwreck, the following points are to be observed:—

([Greek: a]) If the danger is very pressing, the confessor must exhort all to make acts of contrition and purpose of amendment, or, still better, himself make along with them acts of contrition and amendment, and get them to give some sign of their sorrow and their self-accusation, as by raising their hands or striking their breasts; then he may give them absolution in a body.[307]

([Greek: b]) If there is time enough for each one to approach the confessor, though not for making a complete confession, they should be admitted singly in order the better to secure the salvation of each one, in such numbers as the time will permit; and in order that as many as possible, if not all, may be heard, the accusation may be as short as possible; thus contrition will be more genuine. Of course the penitents will be told that in the event of their lives being spared they must make up what was wanting to the integrity of the confession.[308]

3. Physical inability may also arise from the _defectus loquelæ_ of the dumb who cannot make a complete confession either by writing or by signs. For them it is sufficient if they confess one or other sin by signs. If the defect be only a stutter, the penitent must confess as best he can.[309]

4. The _defectus auditus_ of the deaf who cannot express themselves nor hear the questions which the confessor must put in order that the confession may be complete, can be reckoned as a physical inability. They are obliged to make a perfect confession _ex sua parte_, _i.e._ to mention all that so far as they know is required for a perfect confession, and thus they may not keep back anything. Those who are merely hard of hearing are not on the same footing with the deaf; their confession should be made in a place where the voice may be raised without others overhearing what is said. If, however, the confessor should find out only in the course of the confession that the penitent is hard of hearing, and he cannot take him to a more retired place without fear of causing the bystanders to suspect that some grave sin has been confessed and so violating the seal, he may resign himself to permitting an imperfect confession and may refrain from putting questions. With women the confessor must be particularly on his guard not to give grounds for evil interpretation, since many people are quick to suspect wrong. Thus it would be imprudent for him to admit women penitents to confession at times when the church is less frequented; since absolute security for the seal of confession would even then not be attainable, and suspicion would in all likelihood be easily aroused.

If the confessor is obliged to hear the confessions of deaf people in the church and he has doubts as to the integrity of the accusation, he must be more solicitous for the seal than for the integrity of the confession; hence he must refrain from questions as to the number or circumstances of the sins and must give a very slight and ordinary penance, so that those who overhear his words may not be led to conclude that the penitent has been confessing mortal sins.[310]

5. Finally, ignorance of the language constitutes a physical impossibility for those unable to find a confessor understanding them; for such people it is sufficient if they manifest their contrition and their sins as far as they can by signs. The confessor, in default of any other priest knowing the language, must admit them to confession and _aliquoties_ absolve them even if he can barely make out the most general accusation.

V. A moral impossibility exists, as before remarked, when great harm ensuing to the penitent or to the confessor or to some third person is to be feared from the completeness of the confession; the harm to be feared must preponderate over the material integrity of the confession.

Therefore exception is made to the demand of integrity (completeness) in confession:—

1. When there is risk of infamy (_periculum infamiæ_), if the penitent is exposed to lose the esteem he is held in not only by the confessor but also by others. This may happen in various ways, particularly if the penitent is so placed that a perfect confession would be overheard by others, or if the time required for a complete confession were so long that it would give rise to unfavorable suspicions. Such a case is most likely to happen when others know that the penitent has been in the habit of confessing, and the latter, on account of those confessions being invalid, is obliged to repeat them, while the time for a communion which he cannot postpone without exciting comment, is quite close.

A sick man, for instance, has confessed and is about to receive the viaticum; he reveals to the priest that he has made several sacrilegious confessions. To repeat these in full would excite suspicions on the part of the bystanders who thought that he was prepared to receive holy communion.

Or, to use another illustration, on the occasion of some solemn and public communion in common one of the communicants goes to the priest a short time before communion and reveals that he has made a sacrilegious confession; since there is no time to repeat it, it is enough if he makes an act of sorrow, mentions the sacrilegious confession and perhaps one or two of his other sins; he must then be absolved and later, of course, make a full confession.

Or, a priest is already at the altar, about to offer the holy sacrifice, but remembers that he has mortal sins on his soul not yet confessed; he makes a short act of contrition and confesses his sins to an assisting priest who is standing close by him; the latter will then give absolution secretly. Outside the case of necessity where a priest must celebrate Mass or a person is to receive communion, the penitent is in nowise excused from making a full confession on the ground that others, noticing the length of time spent in the confessional, should suspect him of being guilty of many grave sins.[311]

2. When there is danger of breach of the seal of confession (_periculum læsionis sigilli_), as when, which is a very rare case, it should be foreseen that the confessor would break the seal, or in the case where a confessor could not reveal his own sins without at the same time revealing the sins of his penitent and so breaking the seal.

The first case, _i.e._ where the confessor breaks the seal—without, of course, intending to do so—might happen when the priest speaks so loud that he can be overheard by those in the neighborhood, and in spite of representations still fails to subdue his voice, either because he is deaf, or because his zeal runs away with him, or because he is afflicted with some defect of voice which prevents him talking in a lower tone. This would be only an indirect breach of the seal, certainly not to be sanctioned but rather to be severely blamed as wrong and sinful. If, then, the confessor speaks too loud, and continues to do so even after the penitent has reminded him of the fault, the latter is justified in keeping back part of his confession so that the confessor may not in the course of his questions reveal to the bystanders the sins confessed.

If, however, the penitent has an exaggerated dread that his confessor may break the seal by making revelations outside the confessional, he is not justified in withholding his confession in full, for he imagines a sin so horrible that the suspicion of it could only be entertained in the case of heretics. This holds true at least as far as a direct breach of the seal is concerned. A penitent could hardly ever be dispensed from a full confession on account of such a fear, and if he were to reveal to another confessor that such a motive had prompted him to keep back some of his sins, the confessor could not receive this as an excuse without further inquiry.

On the other hand, the danger of a breach of the seal on the part of a priest who confesses the sins he has incurred in hearing confessions is not beyond the bounds of possibility; in this case he must pass over in silence those sins which would involve such a risk.[312]

3. When danger of scandal (_periculum scandali_) is to be feared either with respect to the priest or the penitent. Such a case might occur where the penitent is afraid of sinning by taking pleasure in thoughts against charity and especially against purity when examining his conscience; his duty then would be to avoid dwelling upon the number and circumstances even at the risk of making an incomplete confession, for the natural law of avoiding the danger of grave sin prevails over the positive law of making a complete confession. The same reason may be a motive to the confessor to be very prudent in questioning such penitents so as not to expose them to commit new offenses against God in the very Sacrament of reconciliation.

If a penitent have well-grounded fears of the confessor’s weakness and that the latter will, if he hear a _peccatum turpe_, give way to bad thoughts or cause him to sin, he is bound to avoid such a confessor; if, however, in a case of necessity, he requires his help and cannot find another confessor _hic et nunc_, he may omit those sins of which the avowal would be dangerous.

A priest who knows that his weakness exposes him to great risks in hearing confessions must withdraw from the confessional if it be at all possible, unless there be good reasons to suppose that the fear arises from some unforeseen and exceptional incident; in such a case the confessor must omit the questions which ordinarily would have to be put to secure the completeness of the accusation.

“Dangers of this kind are not to be lightly and unreasonably supposed, but only on solid grounds; and if it be a question of danger to the confessor, only after very unmistakable indications.”[313]

4. When a scrupulous penitent is always tortured with the thought that his previous confessions have not been valid and believes that his sins have never been properly confessed.[314] Such penitents are to be forbidden to make detailed examination of conscience even though in consequence their confessions should fall short of the necessary completeness.

5. When there is danger of bodily harm (_damnum corporale_ or _periculum vitæ_). If, for instance, a long confession exposed the priest to danger of infection, even though by other precautions he might lessen the danger or perhaps quite reduce it, in order to avoid the risk he may allow the penitent to state quite briefly a few sins, thus contenting himself with an imperfect confession, and may then give absolution; moreover, if the penitent is so weak and exhausted by the illness as to be unable without grave harm, or great increase of suffering and weakening of his condition, to examine his conscience carefully and so make a perfect confession, the priest ought not to annoy him by questions, but rather try to awaken contrition and then give absolution even after an incomplete confession.[315]

It was observed above (n. 4) that moral inability to make a complete confession can only be admitted when the confession cannot be put off and is urgent _hic et nunc_.

The confession may be regarded as urgent, 1, when the penitent is in danger of death; 2, when the precept of annual confession and communion is instant; 3, if the reception of holy communion or the celebration of Mass cannot be put off without confusion or scandal; and, 4, if otherwise the penitent could not again approach confession for a long period. Reuter[316] and Lugo consider a delay of more than three days long enough for a man in mortal sin to regard the case as urgent; indeed one may consider the _impotentia moralis_ as justified if a man were compelled to remain in mortal sin one or two days.

There is a special difficulty in solving the question whether a sin can or ought to be confessed which cannot be disclosed without damaging the reputation of the partner of the sin in the eyes of the confessor. Theologians do not agree in their opinions, but are all unanimous in teaching, 1, that a penitent is obliged to seek, if possible, another confessor to whom he can make a complete confession and to whom the accomplice is unknown, and in this way save his neighbor’s reputation; and, 2, that if the sin which cannot be confessed without injury to the character of the accomplice is not necessary matter of confession, it ought not to be revealed unless the sin of the accomplice be only slight and the confession of that particular sin be of peculiar benefit to the penitent.

If, nevertheless, the accomplice be revealed to the confessor, such revelation, in accordance with a very probable opinion, is not to be regarded as a grave sin; for according to the teaching of a number of theologians, whom St. Alphonsus approves and with whom St. Thomas seems to agree, it is not a gravely sinful defamation to reveal the sins of another to one or other trustworthy and upright man. Though many theologians declare this to be gravely sinful if done without reason, the opposite opinion is so well founded that it may be followed in practice as quite probable.[317] But if it is at all probable, it is much more so when the sin of another is revealed to a priest who is bound to the most inviolable secrecy by the highest and holiest ties. Hence it follows that the revelation of the accomplice is certainly no sin when there is reasonable ground for it; such would be, for instance, if the confession made to a priest who knows the accomplice were useful or necessary to the penitent, supposing that no other confessor, to whom the accomplice is unknown, were available; furthermore, the penitent is not bound to seek another confessor unacquainted with the accomplice if the search involves great trouble or loss.

With these premises we approach the question: May a penitent, or ought he, confess a mortal sin which cannot be revealed without at the same time revealing the accomplice to the confessor, or may he omit the mention of that sin and so detract from the completeness of his confession?

The greater number of theologians and those of most weight teach that the revelation of the _complex_ is not a reason excusing from an entire accusation, since it is no violation of the _jus naturale_ which safeguards the reputation of another to reveal the secret sins of one’s neighbor for good reasons to a prudent and upright man, and the law of charity only forbids defamation of one’s neighbor without reason; in this case, however, there is a _causa justa_, and a very urgent reason, viz., the making of a perfect confession and the guidance of the conscience. The precept of making a sincere accusation is _potioris juris_ than the precept of not defaming the neighbor, so that such defamation in face of the need of making a complete confession is to be regarded as of no account. Lugo rejects, as involving a _petitio principii_, the other argument advanced by the defenders of this view, namely, that the penitent is simply making use of his right to confess his sin, and that the accomplice by participating in the sin has surrendered his claim to his reputation so far as it is affected by the confession of the sins; he adduces another argument: that since the benefits resulting from confession are so immense that Christ has bound the penitent to endure the shame of revealing his own sins, it is a natural consequence that to obtain such benefits one may be allowed to reveal another’s sin.[318] The same is taught by St. Thomas,[319] St. Bonaventure, St. Antoninus, St. Bernard, Gerson, Cajetan, Henriquez, Suarez,[320] Lugo,[321] Laymann, Vasquez,[322] Toletus, Reginald Lessius, Tamburini, Salmanticenses,[323] Reuter.[324] St. Alphonsus[325] also holds this view. At the same time they teach that the penitent is bound, if he can manage it _commode_, to spare the reputation of his accomplice by going to a confessor to whom the accomplice is unknown; and St. Alphonsus expressly condemns the view that this is matter of counsel and not of precept. Thus the penitent is freed from the obligation of seeking out another confessor only (_a_) when there is danger of death or when the annual confession can no longer be put off; (_b_) when the penitent by refraining from communion or from the celebration of Mass would be exposed to misinterpretation and shame; (_c_) when a penitent is in a state of mortal sin, and would be obliged to remain in that condition one or two days (_per biduum imo etiam per diem_) till he could find another confessor; (_d_) when the _complex_ may be presumed to have given up his claim to his good reputation, as in the case of a brother who having sinned with his sister knows that she will not go to another confessor without her mother; (_e_) when a priest being accustomed to celebrate every day, and a lay person being accustomed to communicate daily, would find much difficulty in omitting these pious acts; (_f_) when a person finds great repugnance in revealing his or her state of soul to another confessor; (_g_) when otherwise the penitent would be deprived of a jubilee or other indulgence; (_h_) mothers or husbands may be excused when through a wish to have counsel or sympathy they reveal the sins of their children, etc., to a confessor who knows the latter, especially when they find it hard to approach another confessor; (_i_) when the seeking of another confessor involves a privation of consolation and peace for the penitent accustomed to a wise and helpful spiritual director. Hence it is evident that a penitent is rarely, if ever, obliged to seek another confessor under the given circumstances.[326]

The other opinion, that it is not allowed to reveal the accomplice, and in consequence that one is not bound to mention a mortal sin which cannot be confessed without revealing the accomplice, is taught, among others, by Canus, Petrus Soto, Ledesma, Navarrus, Valentia, Banez, etc. Busenbaum and Mazzotta deemed the opinion probable.[327] These theologians urge that it is a violation of the natural law to injure the good name of another, and hence that the obligation of not inflicting such injury is _potioris juris_ than the duty of making a complete confession, since this is founded on a positive law.

It need not be imagined, however, that this opinion is the _benignior_, because it releases from the duty of making a perfect confession; considered closely the case takes on quite another aspect, for:—

1. It requires the penitent to seek out another confessor to whom the accomplice is unknown even when this involves great trouble to the penitent, for as all will concede, the integrity of the confession must be preserved so far as it is possible, and only the damage and hardship to the penitent which makes the confession morally impossible excuse from making a complete confession. Hence this _incommodum_ must be grave and much greater than that which in the other view allows the defamation of the accomplice.

2. If, however, a man cannot confess to another confessor and is resolved to conceal the sin or its circumstances in order to save his neighbor’s reputation, there arises a greater difficulty, the obligation of confessing the same sin again; for in order to save his neighbor’s good name a man may only conceal that circumstance which affects the reputation of his neighbor, and this is the unanimous teaching of all theologians; for example, if a man has committed incest, and has no other means of confessing it, he must mention in his first confession that he has fallen into a sin of impurity, passing over in silence the circumstances which make it incest. He must, however, when opportunity is presented of going to another confessor, mention the circumstance of the incest, and this cannot be done without repeating his former accusation of having fallen into a sin against purity.

3. It is also to be observed that if defamation of one’s neighbor excuses from a complete confession, and if in consequence a particular sin _may_ not be revealed (for such is the foundation of this opinion), the confessor is not allowed to put questions which may cause an indirect revelation of the accomplice, especially to ill-instructed penitents who would have no idea of how to parry the questions. Now if these questions are to be avoided by the confessor, he may not inquire into the occasions of sin, or he must leave to the judgment and discretion of the penitent how far the latter is bound to answer the questions put to him. The consequences, as any one may see, implicate the direction of penitents in great difficulties, and on that account no one can admit either of these methods of action.

Now the confessor, in order to be faithful to his important duty of withdrawing his penitents from the occasions of sin, and in order not to be deceived by a penitent who, left to his own judgment, will not realize the danger of the occasions, must question his penitent with perfect liberty and undeterred by the fear of obtaining any knowledge of the accomplice in sin, if it is probable though not certain that such defamation of the accomplice is not a reason dispensing from the integrity of the confession. This opinion is certainly probable.

The champions of this view are far from denying that the natural law forbids the injuring of another’s good name, but, they maintain, such injury is forbidden only when there are no reasonable grounds for inflicting it; it must be proved that the precept of making a complete confession is a sufficient reason, since such defamation to a confessor is certainly not objectively grave. That this ground is a reasonable one is evident from many weighty considerations:—

1. Good reasons have been already offered in the difficulties which are presented when perfect liberty is not allowed in confessing or asking the circumstances and occasions of sins.

2. Further examples may be easily imagined in which the defamation of another resulting from the penitent’s confession is not to be considered; for no one would dream, for example, of releasing a son from the obligation of making a perfect confession because it might be concluded from the gravity and nature of his sins that his parents had brought him up very badly; nor would a religious be excused for fear his confessor should entertain the suspicion that his superiors were neglecting their duty towards him. For such defamation may well be considered as of little moment, since the confessor is bound to the most stringent silence and can make absolutely no use of what he hears in confession.

3. Moreover, the precept of making a complete confession is so severe that the penitent may never transgress it in order to safeguard his own good name, and is obliged to overcome the fear of losing it. But, according to the universal teaching, a man is justified in self-defense to do a lawful act even if thereby he injure the character of his neighbor if there is no other way of shielding his own or regaining it when lost; hence it must be allowable to injure the reputation of another if the end in view is to make a perfect confession; or the same cause (the integrity of the confession) which binds me to injure my own good name gives me the right of disregarding any infamy that may accrue to others in discharging this duty.[328]

4. Finally, since it was in early days the practice of confessing to one’s parish priest, and he was generally acquainted with all his subjects, the precept of making a complete confession would have had no meaning if the other opinion were tenable in respect to sins which were difficult to confess. Is it possible that Christ should give a command which in practice turned out so nugatory?[329]

From what has been already said on this subject it follows that the confessor, if he thinks fit, is quite at liberty to put questions on the circumstances or occasions of sin; moreover, that penitents ought not to be instructed to conceal circumstances which may injure the reputation of the accomplice with the confessor; they ought rather to be encouraged to make a complete confession to their regular confessor if they are unable to find another.

If, however, some one acting upon the undoubted authority of theologians who teach the other view wishes to make his confession accordingly, he cannot be blamed if he has formed a _dictamen conscientiæ_, and he cannot be forced to renounce his opinion.

Again, if a confessor remarks that a penitent is familiar with his theology and makes his accusation in accordance with the other opinion, and if he is satisfied that said penitent is capable of forming a judgment about his obligations, he may more easily omit certain questions and leave the penitent free to follow his own opinion.

What has been said with respect to the accomplice’s reputation applies equally to those who have been in any way an occasion of sin to the penitent. There are cases in which the penitent cannot give the specific character of his sin without at the same time disclosing the sin of another which has been the object or occasion of his own sin. A man, for instance, discovers his unmarried sister to be in confinement and maltreats her so that _abortus_ follows; he cannot explain the nature of his crime fully in the confessional without revealing his sister’s sin and so destroying her reputation in the mind of the priest. Although some even of those who teach that the integrity of the confession may take precedence of the accomplice’s character are unwilling to grant it in this particular case, yet there is at least a probability that the obligation of integrity prevails in any case.[330]

ARTICLE III

THE MEANS TO BE EMPLOYED IN ORDER TO MAKE A PERFECT CONFESSION

28. The Examination of Conscience.

Since the penitent is obliged to make a complete confession of his mortal sins, as far as lies in his power, there naturally devolves upon him the duty of examining his conscience. Regarding the examination of conscience the following points are to be noted:—

I. The penitent is bound under pain of mortal sin to prepare for confession by a serious and careful examination of conscience, and he must devote to this examination such diligence as a prudent man would ordinarily devote to any important business; hence in order that the omission of mortal sins in the accusation may not be attributed to sinful neglect, _diligentia mediocris_, as it is called, or _diligentia moralis_ is required, not such as would make the practice of confession hateful or unduly burdensome.

The proof for this is supplied by the Council of Trent,[331] and it is clear that if mortal sins are to be confessed they must be recalled to the mind. Theologians observe, however, that when a man has examined his conscience with moral diligence, but still believes that further examination would reveal more sins, he is not obliged to spend more time in examining his conscience; otherwise a penitent who had neglected confession for many years would have to examine his conscience for days and still fail to do his duty; such a conclusion is obviously wrong.[332]

Sporer[333] even goes so far as to teach that a man who has used moral diligence in examining his conscience and has made his confession, and afterwards cannot recall whether he mentioned or not some particular sin, is not bound to confess it, because the presumption is that he has confessed it along with the other sins. If, however, he have strong misgivings on other grounds and cannot settle his doubt as to whether he has confessed the sin or not, he is always obliged to mention that sin, if there is no doubt of its having been committed, in the next confession.

II. The care which ought to be employed in this examination is not the same for all classes of penitents; it varies according to the circumstances of the penitents: more especially according to—(1) the state of conscience and the habitual purity of life; (2) the time elapsed since the last valid confession; (3) the education, the knowledge (in religious matters especially), the intelligence of the penitent; (4) the state of health.[334]

1. One who seldom falls into mortal sin may satisfy himself with a less strict examination of conscience, especially if he be in the habit of making a daily examination of conscience; for if a penitent of this kind falls into mortal sin, he will immediately recall it; and one who is morally certain that he has not sinned mortally is, strictly speaking, not bound to any examination of conscience, but he must be careful to offer sufficient matter for confession. Though this is quite correct in theory, in practice the penitent is strongly advised to make a careful examination of conscience in order to rid himself of his smaller faults and to reap greater fruit from the Sacrament.

2. The longer the period over which the examination is to extend the more time and care must be expended in this preparation, but it is not to be laid down as a principle that a man who has not confessed for a year is bound to be twelve times as long in his preparation as the man whose last confession was a month before.

3. Less instructed or quite uneducated people are not obliged to so careful and searching an examination as the better instructed; they are quite incapable of examining their conscience, _ad impossibilia nemo tenetur_. If an educated penitent comes to the Sacrament unprepared, the confessor should with all proper consideration send him away again to prepare himself by a careful examination of conscience, unless there should be solid grounds for supposing such a step inopportune; but only grave reasons justify such toleration, for, though the sins committed might be ascertained by questions, there is no moral certainty that such a confession is a perfect one. A penitent who has not been to confession for a long time and is leading a worldly life cannot without preparation answer at once and correctly whether he has committed such or such sins. If the penitent is uneducated, or, although educated, yet ignorant in religion, and has taken absolutely no pains to acquire a knowledge of his sins, he must be treated in the same way; if, however, he has taken some pains in the matter, the confessor may supply the defect by questions; for an uneducated man left to himself will, even after a long examination of conscience, never succeed so well as when guided by the prudent questioning of an experienced and skillful confessor who will do the work in a much shorter time. If, then, the confessor sees that he can procure by questioning a perfect confession such as the penitent left to his own resources could hardly make after long examination, he should help him, all the more if there is reason to fear that the penitent would be frightened by the postponement of his confession, and might be deterred from confession, at least for a time, by the difficulties attending a careful examination of conscience. This method, the result of great experience, is confirmed by the Catechismus Romanus:[335] “If a priest remarks that such penitents are quite unprepared, he should dismiss them with very gentle words and advise them to come again after spending some time in thinking over their sins. If they maintain that they have already exercised all diligence in examining their conscience, he should hear them, since there is reason to fear that if sent away they might not return, and he may with more reason hear their confessions if they show any signs of wishing to reform their life; then they may be urged to accuse themselves of their carelessness and promise for the future to make up for their faults by a careful examination.”

Reuter[336] observes on this subject: “Besides, experience teaches, as is well remarked by Vasquez and Lugo, that a prudent confessor can accomplish more with most penitents and uneducated people by a few questions than they can themselves after a long examination. Hence such penitents when they give any signs of fervor ought not to be easily dismissed, in order to examine themselves again, even when defects are noticed.” Sporer[337] writes: “Uneducated and inexperienced penitents are unable to make such an exact examination as the more educated; hence they should be helped by the confessor.” Segneri,[338] too, warns the priest not to send away ignorant penitents to make a fresh examination of conscience, unless for the most urgent reasons, since, on the one hand, they may be frightened away and never come to confession again, and, on the other hand, the confessor himself can easily supply for their deficiency by his zeal.

Although a penitent knows that he will be questioned by his confessor, he is none the less bound to examine his conscience, since otherwise he would be exposed to the danger of giving wrong and insufficient answers or of omitting a great deal; he may, however, permit himself a little less care, especially with regard to the sins common to people in his state of life.[339]

No one is bound to write his sins even if he should be afraid of forgetting them; nor, if sin has been committed with another, is there any obligation to consult with the accomplice in sin to determine the number of sins; so, too, one who has missed Mass the whole year is not bound to count up the feasts in the calendar, for this would be _diligentia extraordinaria_ such as the Council of Trent does not demand.[340]

4. Those who are prostrated by illness and through weakness or pain cannot review their past life are not obliged to make an exact examination of conscience; indeed the confessor should only put to them a few questions according to their condition. If, however, they regain their health, they must supply what was wanting in their accusation; if, after receiving absolution, other mortal sins occur to their mind, they should confess them and get absolution. In general the sick are not required to make so careful an examination as others; hence the priest should not yield when they wish to put off confession from one day to another on the plea of examining their conscience better; usually this is only a pretext for putting off the confession, and does not arise from anxiety or eagerness to prepare well, but from fear; such persons must be prepared by the priest himself for absolution and the other Sacraments.[341]

III. A penitent who is guilty of gross neglect in the examination of conscience makes _per se_ an invalid and sacrilegious confession; he must, of course, be sufficiently conscious of such neglect in order to incur this sin. The malice of the offense consists in the risk of omitting some mortal sin, and so, though none may have been actually left out, the penitent has sinned gravely by consciously exposing himself to the danger.